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Christopher Milne Haggett 
An integrated approach to flood warning in England and Wales 
Flood warning systems have been researched and discussed for several decades and there 
is a high degree of consensus in the literature that the most effective structure for a flood 
warning system is that of an integrated system. Experience suggests however, that few, if 
any, operational systems are designed in an integrated way and that few practitioners 
fully appreciate the benefits of integration. Through an analysis of arrangements in the 
Thames Basin, this research addresses this issue by identifying the necessary criteria and 
actions required to introduce an integrated system. 
The limited number of models that attempt to conceptualise flood warning systems in an 
integrated way have been critically examined and have found to focus too narrowly on 
selective integrative criteria. It is concluded that there is a need for a wider and multi- 
dimensional perspective. This study rectifies this deficiency by presenting a conceptual 
model that is derived from a more comprehensive assessment of the most relevant 
integrative factors. A two-staged process is adopted with an initial identification of a 
wide range of issues and variables, leading to a more focused set of factors presented 
under four main headings that are used to structure the substantive chapters of this thesis. 
These integrative factors can be conceptualised as crosscutting strands running through 
and drawing together the main components of a flood warning system (detection, 
forecasting, dissemination and response) that help ensure that these components work 
together collaboratively towards a common aim. 
Few of the integrative factors identified in this research were found in operational flood 
warning practices in England and Wales prior to 1996. A number of improvements were 
made with the establishment of the Environment Agency as the lead authority in both 
flood forecasting and flood warning dissemination, but a number of weakness still 
prevail. Through the use of case studies the plausibility of introducing a fully integrated 
approach to future arrangements has been tested and found to be both practical and 
feasible. 
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
1.1 Warning and hazard mitigation 
Exposure to hazards is an inherent part of everyday life on Earth and the way in which 
human beings respond to the hazards they face can be both complex and unpredictable. 
Hazards take many different forms and can be both natural and man-made. Flooding is one 
natural hazard that modern society has to face, relate to and understand, others include 
earthquakes, volcanic eruptions, tsunamis, hurricanes, snow avalanches, mudflows, 
drought and disease. In addition, there are the man-made or technological hazards that are 
an increasing phenomenon in the early twenty-first century, and these include nuclear 
radiation, pollution, food safety and genetic modification. In fact, new hazards are 
discovered every day, such as the effects of high-voltage transmission lines, the low-level 
radiation emanating from VDUs and mobile telephones, and the exposure to toxic 
substances used in warfare (the Gulf War Syndrome). Whatever the hazard, when human 
beings are faced with a real threat to themselves, to their families, and to their homes and 
possessions, the basic human need for increased safety and security can be a strong driving 
force that can govern our behaviour. This stems from the deep psychological desire to 
reduce fear and anxiety and minimise stress and insecurity that human beings develop from 
an early age. 
The ways in which humans seek to reduce insecurity in the face of a hazardous situation 
can be numerous. These can include permanent relocation or temporary evacuation to 
lower risk locations, the construction of homes and offices that are resistant to natural 
forces (e. g. earthquakes) and the building of defences designed to keep natural forces at 
bay (e. g. coastal flood embankments). But whatever measures are taken the raison d'etre is 
usually the same - to meet the basic behavioural desire for greater safety and security. 
There are of course always exceptions to this rule and there are those who choose to live or 
work in close proximity to hazardous situations despite periodical reminders of the destructive 
power of natural forces. Communities that occupy undefended coastal areas that are prone to 
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hurricanes, the slopes of volcanoes and cities in earthquake zones are examples of where 
people put the desire to live in a given locality before safety and security considerations. 
There are also those who have little or no choice but to occupy hazardous areas due to their 
economic circumstances. Many people in developing countries are drawn to the large urban 
metropolises but often have little option but to live in areas that are subject to landslide or 
flooding for example. 
Irrespective of peoples' reasons for living in hazardous locations, an important way of 
reducing their risk and increasing their safety and security is for them to become informed and 
knowledgeable of the impending danger they face before it strikes. Having the ability to 
predict hazardous events allows people time to think and respond appropriately to danger and 
reduce the potential effects. An early warning of danger gives humans time to consider their 
situation and to modify their behaviour and actions and this in turn increases their safety and 
security. 
It is not surprising that over the last thirty years much scientific attention has been given to 
increasing human ability to detect the onset of natural hazards and predict when these may 
impact adversely upon human communities. In recent times this process has become more 
sophisticated as science and technology has been brought to bear both on the forecasting of 
the severity and timing of the hazard, and to assist with the communication of warning 
messages to communities about to be affected. These activities have been co-ordinated largely 
by government departments and by specialists or "experts" who have developed an in-depth 
knowledge of hazard forecasting and warning techniques. But the "experts" have been guilty 
of frequently working in isolation from the rest of society and in particular the at-risk 
communities that they are employed to serve, and as a consequence the risks and the potential 
impacts have not been fully comprehended. 
In certain sections of western society the public awareness and concern about the 
increasing hazardousness of society has become quite pronounced. Nevertheless, there 
continues to be variations, with some risks feared more than others, with individuals 
perceiving comparable risk differently, and divergent views between the public and the 
"experts". With this growing public perception of hazards there is a growing expectation 
that the experts in the relevant government agencies with the aid of technology are able to 
forecast the onset of a given hazard and warn those at risk before it strikes. The challenge 
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facing modern societies, therefore, is to bring the experts and lay people together in a 
closer working environment so that they can jointly address the risks they face and are 
more aware of the other's ability to understand and respond to those risks. 
Risk communication is an important part of this process involving the delivery of a warning 
message from the expert or agency to the public to enable better understanding and 
preparedness. As Cutter (1993) notes this is complicated by the fact that significant 
differences exist between how the public perceives and responds to risk vis-ä-vis experts. A 
good example of this would be the recent BSE crisis where significant differences in the 
interpretation of the word "safe" arose between the authorities and the public in relation to 
this problem. Cutter believes that the controversy over expert versus public views on risks is a 
product of the social changes that have occurred over the last three decades. She lists 
increased affluence, technology and the public's trust of institutions as being key factors. As 
western society has become more affluent a more comfortable level of economic security has 
been achieved resulting in the public becoming almost cocooned from the reality of hazards 
facing them. In addition, the public has become increasingly distrustful of institutions 
especially those created to protect the environment and public health. There is a growing 
tendency to try and apportion blame for environmental catastrophes that were previously 
accepted as being "acts of God" and to resort to the courts for legal redress. The public 
expectation about being warned of hazards is now widespread and meeting these expectations 
can be extremely problematic. The outbreak of meningitis in South Wales in February 1999 is 
an example (Laurance, 1999). To break out of this climate of mistrust and unrealistic 
expectation it is important that warning systems and flood warning systems are operated in a 
more participative way, with the experts addressing risk communication in partnership with 
those they serve rather than in isolation. 
1.2 Flood warning and the quality paradigm 
Flood warning systems in operation around the world today have a number of functions 
including the saving of life, the prevention of floodwater intrusion, the protection of property, 
and the minimisation of economic disruption. They are often necessary to trigger the 
operation of structural flood control measures, such as barriers and gates, the timely 
monitoring and repair of fixed flood defences, and removal of obstructions to flow in rivers. 
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In some countries, the main objective of flood forecasting is as an aid to navigation, such as 
on the Rhine in Germany (EUROflood, 1994). In the main however, flood warning systems 
work on the principle of reducing flood losses through remedial action by the recipients of 
warning messages prior to a flood. It is important that any system should be viewed as 
comprising of a number of interrelated components or elements, all of which must operate 
smoothly and efficiently as a totality to have any significant effect on flood losses. The 
principal elements of a flood warning system can be defined as: 
1. Detection - this involves the evaluation of hydrological and meteorological processes that 
could generate a flood event in a given river catchment. Information from weather 
forecasts, weather radar and satellite, telemetered rain, river and tide gauges, is used to 
carry out this function with the aid of computer and communication technology. 
2. Forecasting - this involves the prediction of rainfall, river levels, tides and flows, and the 
time of occurrence, severity and duration of a flood. Methods of achieving this can vary in 
technical complexity from rudimentary techniques based on experience, to sophisticated 
modelling capable of predicting rainfall, in-bank flows and flood plain inundation. 
3. Warning and dissemination - this involves the making of decisions concerning the issue 
of flood warnings on the basis of catchment conditions and forecasts, and the passing of 
information to flood-plain inhabitants and response agencies in sufficient time for remedial 
action to be taken to protect life and reduce flood losses. 
4. Response - this stage encompasses the immediate action taken by agencies involved in the 
flood warning process to eliminate the threat to human life, and to minimise flood damage 
to property. It also includes the public response to a flood warning and their reaction to 
flood risk, and the role of public education programmes to improve awareness. 
Mileti (1994) states that warning systems have been researched and discussed for several 
decades and there is a large degree of consensus among researchers that the most effective 
structure for a warning system is that of an integrated system. It is clear that the links 
between the system elements outlined above are substantial and complex, and that any 
deficiency in any one component will affect the performance of the overall system resulting in 
wasted resources and investment. It is vital then, that sound relationships among the 
subsystems be developed and maintained. In addition, because flood warning is a multi- 
dimensional activity, it is likely to require inputs of expertise from a number of different 
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organisational and professional cultures and these inputs must mesh together for the total 
warning system to be effective. This idea of integration and total flood warning system design 
is analogous in many ways to the concept of total quality management discussed by Clarke 
and Clegg (2000). In essence this paradigm advocates a holistic approach to quality 
management, emphasising the need for continuous improvement to achieve greater 
effectiveness, group problem solving, quality assurance, good customer relations, people 
involvement and training, good communication and the building of high-trust relationships. 
All of these aspects are equally important to the development of integrated warning systems. 
In practice however, flood warning systems in most countries are incomplete and 
fragmented and as a consequence tend to function sub-optimally (Keys, 1997). It is 
doubtful whether any warning system justifying the title of "total flood warning system" yet 
exists. Keys (1997) argues that many systems presently in use tend to take a reductionist, even 
minimalist view of the warning process, with often only the more technical facets having 
evolved to an advanced state. Handmer (1997) reinforces this view when he states that until 
comparatively recently the most significant changes in flood warning arrangements in most 
developed countries have been in the areas of flood detection and monitoring. He considers 
that a reasonable generalisation is that the dramatic improvements in information technology 
have yet to play a role in getting messages to the public at risk. Conversely, in developing 
countries it is often the flood detection and forecasting systems that have not been developed 
as quickly as expected. Response measures based on evacuation, relief and rehabilitation have 
been the main strategies employed to reduce flood losses (Chan, 1997). Nevertheless, there is 
evidence that in a few countries in the world the concept of integrated flood warning systems 
is taking root. In Australia, for example, attempts are being made to develop such an approach 
using the basic premise that the scientific, technical and procedural elements of the system 
must focus on its clients, those at risk from flooding (Emergency Management Australia, 
1999). Closer inter-agency liaison, better information, public education programmes and 
closer community involvement are some of the techniques being adopted and this approach 
has strong parallels with the quality paradigm referred to above. 
A key question that needs addressing, therefore, is "what integrates flood warning systems? " 
Handmer (1997) believes that a total (integrated) system is much more than a list of 
components, of greater importance is how they function together to serve the purpose of the 
overall system. There is a need therefore, to identify the factors that can influence the drawing 
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together of the component parts that make up a total flood warning system. These factors can 
be conceptualised as crosscutting strands running through the main elements, and if they can 
be precisely defined and successfully applied to flood warning programmes, it is probable that 
improvements in performance and functionality will result. The identification and analysis of 
these integration factors, therefore, is a key aim and objective of this research project. 
1.3 Aims and objectives of the research 
The aims and objectives of this research project can be summarised as follows: 
9 to determine whether or not a policy of integration would be beneficial to flood 
warning programmes; 
0 to identify relevant integration factors that may be of significance and to present 
these in a conceptual model; 
9 to assess whether these factors are recognised and used in existing operational 
flood warning programmes in England and Wales; 
" and through the use of case studies, determine the plausibility of introducing a 
fully integrated approach to future programmes. 
To achieve this it will be necessary to critically review the literature, not only in the area of 
flood warning and hazard management, but also in a wide range of other fields where a policy 
of integration has been implemented, so as to determine good practice. This will then be 
combined with the experience and operational work undertaken over the last twenty-five 
years by the author and others working in the Environment Agency and its predecessors. 
1.4 Impetus for the study 
This research was motivated by the growing realisation in the mid-1990s that flood warning 
arrangements in England and Wales, and in the Thames Basin in particular, were often not 
functioning optimally. The author brings first hand operational evidence that the multi-agency 
approach to flood warning, that had functioned reasonably well in the past, has been breaking 
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down. This has resulted in the flood warning systems operated by the Environment Agency 
and its predecessors often failing to provide the at-risk public with a credible service. This 
view is supported by research carried out in the 1980's and 1990's in the Severn, Trent and 
Thames catchments, that concluded that flood warnings were often poorly targeted and this 
resulted in a high level of public dissatisfaction with the service (Penning-Rowsell et al 
1986(b); Neal and Parker, 1989; Tunstall et al, 1991; Tunstall, 1992; Hyde, 1992; Parker et al, 
1995). It is also evident that few if any flood warning systems in England and Wales have 
been designed in an integrated way and that the institutional arrangements and statutory 
framework, on which such systems are based, have contributed significantly to their 
increasingly fragmented nature (Parker, 1989; Parker 1993; Haggett 1997). 
One consequence of this problem is that the considerable investment that has been committed 
to detection and forecasting systems in certain areas over the last 25 years has not been 
realised, and that this is due to a large degree to the fragile nature of public warning 
arrangements. It should be noted that the Government's recognition of this issue and the 
resulting reform of arrangements in England and Wales have taken place during the period of 
research. This has enabled an assessment to be made of the adequacy of the old and new 
arrangements in the context of integration. 
The author's role as manager of the fluvial flood forecasting and warning service in the 
Thames Region of the Environment Agency gives him a unique insight into these issues and 
helps focus the analysis on the practicalities of real-world problems. This position was 
reinforced during the period of research as the author was given the role of project managing 
the implementation of the new flood warning dissemination procedures in the Thames 
Region, and became a member of the National Flood Warning Implementation Team within 
the Environment Agency. The research work presented here was conducted during the period 
1994 to 1999 when these new arrangements were first debated, formulated and then 
implemented in September 1996. The procedures were tested during the floods that affected 
the Midlands during Easter 1998 and have been subject of a wide-ranging independent review 
to assess their adequacy. The author became a member of the Agency's Easter Flood Action 
Group in 1998 tasked with implementing the recommendations of the Independent Review. 
Arrangements have continued to evolve since this time and it is likely that the research 
findings presented here will help shape this evolutionary process. 
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1.5 Research focus and boundaries 
The research focuses on flood warning programmes in their widest sense, from detecting and 
forecasting the environmental factors that may give rise to flooding, through to warning those 
of risk of the potential dangers, so as to ensure effective response to save life and minimise 
damage to property. Particular attention is given to flood warning arrangements in the Thames 
Region of the Environment Agency, which covers the natural river catchment area of the 
River Thames and its tributaries (see Figure 1.1). 
This study considers the total warning system that can be defined as that which ".... 
integrates flood prediction, the assessment of likely flood effects, the dissemination of 
warning information, the response of agencies and the public in the threatened community, 
and review and improvement" (Emergency Management Australia, 1999). The study does 
not examine the technical functioning of each element in great detail, but rather 
contemplates how they interact, particularly in the operational environment, to ensure that 
the whole operates optimally. The wider issues surrounding emergency planning and 
management, evacuation, post-event response and recovery etc. are beyond the scope of 
this study. 
1.6 Structure of the thesis 
The thesis is structured into nine chapters, six of which can be termed substantive, one 
presenting case study material, with this introductory chapter and a conclusion forming the 
remaining two. The logical sequencing of the chapters is governed by a conceptual model of 
the integration process that is presented in detail in Chapter 3. The ordering and content of the 
chapters is summarised below: 
" Chapter 2 contains a critical review of the literature that focuses on integration and total 
flood warning systems. Its purpose is to identify what is generally known about 
integration, how integration may be understood and what makes it work or not work as 
the case may be. A number of integration factors are identified which assume importance 
in subsequent chapters. Total flood warning systems are essentially fully integrated ones 
and so are particular pertinent concepts on which to base analysis of flood warning 
systems in England and Wales. 
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" Chapter 3 presents a precise and comprehensive description of the research philosophy, 
design and methods adopted in the thesis. 
" Institutions and laws were found in Chapter 2 to have important implications for 
integration, and therefore Chapter 4 examines the influences that institutions and the law 
have had on integration in England and Wales in general and the Thames Basin in 
particular. 
" Institutions frequently look to technology to provide solutions and Chapter 5 analyses by 
what means, and to what extent, the application of technology has enhanced and can 
further enhance the integration of flood detection, forecasting, warning and response 
systems. 
" Technology can be of benefit to integration but sociological factors can temper its 
influence. Chapter 6 examines the extent to which human interaction can provide barriers 
to integration in some cases, but can provide a positive influence in others. 
" The free flow of information and knowledge around institutions and communities is 
fundamental to successfully integrated flood warning systems, and technology can often 
facilitate this process. Chapter 7 explores how information and knowledge is used and 
interpreted in flood warning systems, and how it influences the consolidation of system 
components to make the whole more effective 
9 The analysis presented in each of the substantive chapters above is tested through the use 
of case studies. Chapter 8 presents the results of the principal case study undertaken in the 
Mimmshall Brook catchment (see section 1.7 below). 
" The principal conclusions of this work are summarised in Chapter 9 as are the 
implications for the institutions charged with delivering effective flood warning systems 
and to flood hazard management in the wider context. 
1.7 The use of case studies 
Throughout the thesis, attempts are made to test and strengthen the main issues and arguments 
raised in each chapter by reference to case study material. Particular attention is given to 
arrangements and experiences of organisations and communities in the Thames Basin (see 
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Figure 1.1), drawing on a raft of material that has been collated into a flood event database as 
part of this project (see Appendix 1). In addition, one area has been selected for greater 
analysis within the Thames catchment. The Mimmshall Brook catchment in Hertfordshire 
(see Figure 1.2) offers a good example of where a community has had to live with a flood 
hazard for many years. The community has to a certain extent organised its own affairs in 
relation to flood warning in the absence of a credible official service, but it is judged that there 
is scope for introducing a more integrated approach to flood warning arrangements in the 
future. The criteria for choosing case studies are explored in more detail in Chapter 3. 
1.8 Summary 
This thesis focuses on the concept of integration and how this can be applied to flood warning 
systems to improve performance. There are many parallels with the quality paradigm that 
stems from a concern for greater effectiveness, quality and performance through an integrated 
or holistic approach to achieve total quality management. 
It is recognised in the literature that the component parts of flood warning systems rarely 
function as a unified whole and are often fragmented. It could be argued therefore, that to 
simply analyse each of these components in turn would perpetuate the problem that this 
research project is seeking to breakdown. Accordingly, an alternative approach has been 
adopted that identifies "strands", "themes" or "factors" that run through each of the system 
elements and can be used to integrate or bind them together and hence improve the 
functionality of the total system. The research sets out to identify the most relevant 
crosscutting integration themes, to present them by means of a conceptual model, and analyse 
them in the principal chapters of the thesis. Through the use of case studies, analysis of 
archival records and documentation, and through direct and participant observation, the 
research sets out to determine the viability or otherwise of introducing a fully integrated 
approach to flood warning programmes. 
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Integration and Total Flood Warning Systems 
2.1 The concept of integration 
Integration is pertinent to most aspects of human endeavour, and is perhaps initially most 
easily conceptualised as individuals, organisations or system components working together 
to a common end which is not easily achievable by separate working or by working in a 
confrontational environment. Integration can be defined as the act of combining or adding 
parts to make a unified whole (Hanks, 1986), and to ensure that all components of the 
whole work together collaboratively towards the same goal. In a number of fields a process 
of integration has been shown to be beneficial and there are many outstanding examples of 
success when individuals, organisations or system components work in concert with one 
another towards a common objective. It could be said that the creation of large spectacular 
structures such as the Thames Barrier or the Channel Tunnel offer examples where 
complex human and organisational systems combine with innovative design and 
technology to accomplish the construction of stunningly ambitious edifices. It is certain 
that many conflicts had to be overcome before these structures were completed, but they 
do offer examples of the benefits of making integration work. 
The aim of this Chapter therefore, is to analyse the concept of integration in order to 
understand what is known about it and its components and how this might be applied to the 
subject of flood warning systems. This will be achieved by looking at what is known about 
integration from a wide range of fields, identifying good practice and determining how 
flood warning systems might be improved by applying what is known about integration to 
them. 
2.2 Integration factors 
When considering the implementation of an integrated approach it is important to identify and 
consider systematically the various factors that are judged to be of significance. Lawrence and 
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Lorsch (1967) refer to these factors as integrative devices. Some of these factors or devices 
will be appropriate only to the function or organisation under consideration, whilst others are 
more universally relevant. Lawrence and Lorsch (1967) observe that such devices are often 
used in different combinations to achieve integration depending on local circumstances. By 
analysing these factors it is possible to determine the degree to which integration is present in 
the area of interest. A number of factors are discussed in the literature and their relevance to 
integration is explored below. 
2.2.1 Institutional arrangements 
One of the key areas of universal significance to successful integration is a consideration of 
institutional arrangements. Mitchell (1990) believes that such arrangements can provide 
stimuli or potential leverage points to foster integration. If however, institutional 
arrangements are poorly configured an extremely fragmented situation can arise that runs 
counter to a policy of integration. The OECD (1989) identifies four key areas of significance 
that will be examined in detail. 
Political credibility and legitimisation 
If integration is to occur it must be given explicit political credibility and legitimisation 
through political commitment. Clear integration objectives must be established and the role 
that each agency has in meeting these objectives should be defined. Mitchell (1990) believes 
that three important elements should be identified; the objectives of pertinent agencies; the 
responsibility, power or authority of these agencies; and the rules for intervention and 
arbitration by higher authorities when conflicts arise that cannot be resolved by the 
participants directly involved. 
Knowing the objectives of each participating agency should help to identify both common 
and divergent interests and Aucott et al (1995) recommend the creation of a written plan that 
can gain general support. Mitchell stresses however, that clarity of objectives by itself will not 
ensure integration, since different agencies almost inevitably will have objectives that 
conflict. Furthermore, while clarity of objectives is desirable, if they are specified in great 
detail it is possible that an organisation will be unreasonably constrained in being able to 
respond to changing conditions and in being able to negotiate with other participants. He 
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argues that some careful generalisation in objectives is desirable so that flexibility can be built 
in. 
It is also important to establish the authority and jurisdiction of each agency and who has the 
responsibility to initiate action and arbitrate in the event of conflict. When the relative power 
of different participants is not specified or made clear, the potential for stalemate is high, as 
various agencies jostle and manoeuvre for a lead position. Even when objectives and powers 
are stated explicitly, there is still a strong probability of conflicts between participating 
agencies as a result of boundary effects. Thus, it is important to identify who has the right and 
duty to intervene to resolve such impasses and it is desirable to incorporate a mechanism into 
the government structure to facilitate resolution of legitimate differences of opinion. 
The OECD believes that the credibility for integration can be provided by several means. 
Political commitment from the Government provides a clear signal to civil servants that 
integration is expected. When this political commitment comes from politicians at several 
levels of government, it is even more powerful and compelling. Legislation is another means 
to provide credibility and the OED believe that this means is normally the most stable and 
compelling (this is explored in more detail in 2.2.2 below). A third means is through 
administrative or bureaucratic policy within agencies. It is normally within the discretionary 
power of senior public servants to direct their departmental activities towards co-ordination 
and integration of activities with other public agencies. Aucott et al (1995) emphasise the 
need for leaders who are committed to the approach and are willing to authorise the resources 
to make it a success. Administrative directives often provide only a veneer of support for 
integration, however, while the "hidden" or "unofficial" agenda supports the furtherance of 
agency interests. 
Mitchell (1990) concludes by stating that the likelihood of effective integration is not great 
unless the concept has been given legitimacy. A statutory basis offers the most enduring 
support for integration, but the probability of real achievement increases substantially when a 
statutory base is combined with strong political commitment. He believes that without 
legitimisation of some form, any initiative to encourage integration and co-ordination faces an 
arduous, uphill struggle. 
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Functions and organisational structures 
Once the objectives, power and rules for conflict resolution have been established, the 
management functions and organisational structures need to be considered. Mitchell (1990) 
believes that the alignment of functions should be examined in a systematic manner, and that 
it should not be assumed that the current way in which functions are organised, that may have 
evolved over time, is necessarily either the most systematic or sensible for current conditions. 
Song and Dyer (1995) looked at the recent trend of cross-functional integration in industry 
and found that such a strategy could be highly effective in some circumstances but 
counterproductive and costly in other situations. They recommend that cross-functional 
integration should not be uniformly applied, but introduced only where the benefits of such a 
strategy can be demonstrated. Venkatachalam et al (1993) see the integration of functions in 
industry as a key strategy for survival and growth. They recognise, however, that 
implementation can be difficult and point to inflexibility of organisational structures as being 
one of the main factors hindering its adoption. 
The OECD (1989) stresses that what is damaging for integration is for functions to be split 
between competing agencies, without any superior national body to co-ordinate planning and 
management across these agencies. To deal with overlapping responsibilities and interests, 
designation of a lead agency can be used to co-ordinate an integrated set of activities. This 
might take the form of a regulatory agency that sets the criteria for other organisations to 
operate within. Flexibility is also important so that agencies have the ability to respond to 
changing conditions, newly emerging issues, ideas and information, and are able to adopt new 
technology and to deal with uncertainty. Another important consideration is accountability, 
ensuring that those who take decisions are accountable to those receiving goods and services. 
This can be enhanced by making relevant data and information routinely available and by 
encouraging public participation in a climate of open decision making. 
Organisational structures should normally flow from the required management functions. In 
selecting an organisational structure, Mitchell (1990) identifies several considerations that 
should be remembered. First, there never will be a perfect match between functions and 
structures. Second, regardless of the structure chosen, boundary problems will emerge. The 
nature of the structure will simply determine whether the boundary problems occur among 
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units within a larger agency or among a number of smaller, more specialised agencies. Third, 
alternative structural forms should be considered, and fourth, it is not necessarily appropriate 
to look for a single structure to handle all aspects of the management problem. 
A number of authors have expressed views on the form organisational structures should take. 
Leonard et al (1994), for instance, believe that organisations need to transform the way in 
which they are structured to increase vitality and efficiency. They recommend that 
responsibility should be shifted out of the boss-subordinate dyad into teams; that diversity and 
interaction across traditional boundaries should be encouraged; and the flow of information 
and exchange of ideas should be stimulated. Hickes and Brydges (1994), stress the 
importance of flexible structures to deal with changing strategies. Considering pollution 
monitoring, they see an increasing trend towards integrated monitoring that brings together a 
number of disciplines to address complex environmental questions. It is important that 
organisations are structured to deal with these changing strategies. Aucott et al (1995) 
describe the changes being adopted in health care, moving away from a departmental 
approach to care that is uncoordinated to an integrated interdisciplinary approach i. e. the 
introduction of lateral teams across vertical lines of functions. This has resulted in a major 
shift in the way organisations are structured and affects planning, documentation and the 
general work environment in these organisations. 
Processes and mechanisms 
No matter how carefully considered and designed, functions and structures are unlikely to fit 
together perfectly. The presence of lose ends because of imperfect fits suggests the need for 
processes and mechanisms to facilitate bargaining, negotiating and mediating at the 
boundaries, thereby encouraging the likelihood of integration and co-operation. Processes and 
mechanisms such as select committees, interdepartmental committees, commissions, task 
forces and review procedures are often used for this purpose. If integration is truly sought, 
then provision should be made to ensure that the views of the general community and of 
individuals are fed into the planning process. Consultative committees, advisory groups, 
public meetings and public surveys are mechanisms that can be used in this context. It is 
important to determine which combination of processes and mechanisms will best meet the 
needs in a given situation. 
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Organisational culture 
Mitchell (1990) believes that there are usually few explicit incentives for integration and co- 
ordination and organisational structures often foster parochialism. Through fuzzy 
legitimisation, unclear functions and cumbersome structures, an organisational culture 
develops that creates real barriers to integrated and co-operative effort. Thus the combination 
of organisational culture, personalities and participants attitudes can pose a major obstacle to 
integration. If a strong declaration about the need for integration is given at the political level 
however, a positive signal will be sent to those responsible for implementing integration. A 
systematic linking of functions to different hierarchies will help to pinpoint areas in which 
integration could be pursued and careful design of organisational structures should ensure that 
diverse viewpoints are bought together. Saleh and Wang (1993) found that organisational 
culture was an important factor in the running of successful businesses. They analysed firms 
in Canada and those that were most innovative showed differences in management strategy, 
organisational structure and organisational climate. These companies took more risk, gave 
more management commitment to entrepreneurial activities and innovation, encouraged the 
integration and intermingling of talents into teams and task forces, and operated a reward 
system that reinforced entrepreneurial behaviour. Mead (1995) believes that by developing a 
management and organisational culture, staff will be encouraged to think more about their 
roles and help an organisation deliver an integrated policy that the staff may be inspired to 
own. 
In conclusion, therefore, when considering organisational arrangements, the following factors 
are of importance to integration. 
I. For a policy of integration to be successful it must be backed by firm political 
commitment. Organisations should be given clear objectives and roles and 
responsibilities within an integrative framework and these should be defined 
preferably in a written plan. There is a need however, for a degree of flexibility to be 
built into these aspects so as not to unreasonably constrain organisations. Rules for 
intervention and arbitration when conflicts arise should also be established. 
2. Consideration should be given to the functions and organisational structures. 
Functions should be assigned to the most relevant organisations in a systematic 
18 
manner and not necessarily following current patterns. From this the structure of 
organisations should flow and these structures should be flexible and accountable. It is 
recommended that a lead agency be designated if possible to co-ordinate activities in 
an integrated way and deal with overlapping responsibilities and interests. 
3. Processes and mechanisms need to be in place to facilitate negotiations between 
organisations to encourage the likelihood of integration and co-operation. These can 
take many forms and the right forum needs to be established to meet the needs of a 
given situation. The need for processes for arbitration when negotiations breakdown 
are essential. 
4. To avoid obstacles to integration, organisations should foster a positive internal 
climate and culture to such a strategy and this can be triggered by a strong declaration 
about the need for integration at a high level. 
2.2.2 Legal arrangements 
Laws can be the source of important constraints on integration. Laws are often specific to 
particular sectors and one resource therefore, can have a number of acts controlling various 
aspects of its use. With respect to water resources for example, the OECD (1989) reports that 
many countries have different acts for water supply, water transport, flood mitigation, energy 
generation and environmental protection and conservation, to name a few. This multiplicity of 
legal enactments can create considerable constraints to integrated management. 
To overcome the constraints to integration that poor legislation can bring, the OECD have put 
forward a set of guidelines that was specifically developed to improve water resource 
management. It is likely that some of these guidelines will have wider application and these 
are summarised below. 
The OECD (1989) stresses that all legislation should be compatible and not contradictory in 
the implementation of management principles. They recommend that present legislation 
should be reviewed, revised and updated as required with this purpose in mind. Secondly, 
legislation should delineate as clearly as practicable respective roles and responsibilities of 
different levels of authority and it should require that agencies seek to resolve specific inter- 
agency conflict. Thirdly, public participation in the process of formulating and considering 
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management options should be promoted as a valuable means of generating more 
comprehensive options and the political support for such options. Legislation should provide 
open and well understood procedures for consultation on objections to and appeals against 
administrative decisions. User rights and responsibilities should be defined. Fourthly, 
whenever appropriate the use of economic principles and instruments should be enforced by 
legislation to allow the more cost-effective attainment of goals. Finally, legislation should be 
subject to review at regular intervals to be able to take into account the evolving nature of 
many disciplines. 
Mitchell (1990) points to the fact that some organisations do have statutory powers to achieve 
a number of aspects of integration. He stresses, however, that even with the most astutely 
crafted legislation integration may not be achieved without political commitment that needs to 
be cultivated and sustained. Without this, moves towards integration may be blocked and 
unsuccessful even when a single powerful statutory base has been put into place. 
In summary, therefore, the following factors are important when considering legal 
arrangements and a policy of integration. 
1. Legislation should be compatible and not contradictory and present laws should be 
reviewed, revised and updated with this purpose in mind. Although this may be a 
laudable aim it is likely to be difficult to achieve especially when the number of 
organisations and pieces of legislation is large. 
2. Legislation should clearly define the respective roles and responsibilities of the 
relevant authorities and mechanisms for resolving inter-agency conflict should be 
delineated. 
3. Legislation should provide clear and open procedures for public consultation as this 
would help generate more comprehensive options for integration and will bolster 
political support. 
4. Sustained political commitment should be sought and cultivated to underpin the 
legislation and the principles of integration. 
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2.2.3 Economic aspects 
It has been suggested (OECD, 1989) that economic mechanisms are crucial in driving 
processes of integration. Penning-Rowsell (1997) identifies a number of economic 
instruments that can influence aspects of policy implementation. These include taxes, 
subsidies, and regulatory price regimes. The adoption and application of appropriate resource 
pricing is considered to be another important element. It is argued that the implementation of 
such a policy will require close co-operation amongst agencies, government departments and 
consumers and will therefore, improve the effectiveness of their integration. 
The OECD (1989) outlines in detail how the principle of resource pricing can influence 
integration in water resource management. The general principle is that the consumer and the 
polluter should be required to pay the full social cost of providing water and related services, 
including treatment and damage costs. It is argued that by adopting this principle, not only 
will there be improved use of water resources and less pollution, but also the creation of more 
efficient administrative arrangements for the integrated management of water and other 
natural resources. The implementation of such a principle however, has been opposed in 
many countries. User groups, such as farmers, have enjoyed substantial government subsidies 
and are reluctant to pay more for water. Natural resource development agencies have also 
been concerned that such an approach would reduce the use of the resource leading to smaller 
budgets and loss of power in the bureaucratic hierarchy, and loss of independence by the 
closer inter-agency co-operation. To overcome these objections the OECD argues that 
government should create the conditions for the application of the resource pricing principle 
and phase out the issuing of grants and loans. 
In manufacturing industry, economic integration is a strategy that has been adopted with 
mixed success. Tannous and Mangiameli (1993) state that the design of a manufacturing 
strategy often incorporates the decision on whether to focus or vertically integrate. Complete 
focus refers to one manufacturing step, and the production of a single component; full 
integration refers to 100 per cent internal manufacturing to produce a finished product. 
Daveni and Ravenscraft (1994) looked in detail at the advantages and disadvantages of 
vertical integration in industry. They found that it resulted in economies particularly in 
administration, sales, advertising and R&D expenditure, however, production costs were 
generally higher. Overall, integrated businesses were found to be only marginally more 
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profitable than non-integrated businesses in the industry in question. Stuckley and White 
(1993) warn that vertical integration is a risky strategy being complex, expensive, and hard to 
reverse. They advise not to integrate unless it is absolutely necessary to create or protect 
value. 
Godard and Beaumais (1994) consider that for industry to be sustainable, a tighter integration 
of environment policies and economic processes is needed. In addition, they believe that a 
greater attention should be given to the cost-effectiveness of policies through the greater use 
of economic strategies. Scientific uncertainties and controversies coming from environmental 
problems should lead to a range of costed options and a search for "minimum regret" 
strategies. As an example they point to fiscal reform incorporating "ecotaxes", such as the 
carbon/energy tax currently under assessment by the European Union. 
At a national and international level, economic integration has been a significant driving force 
for change, however, the merits of this policy are now being questioned. In the European 
Union for instance, the creation of complete economic and monetary union is much talked 
about but has yet to be achieved. As Tsoukalis (1994) observes, there is considerable 
disagreement over the benefits of such a policy and the legitimacy of this new economic order 
is now being challenged. There is concern in some quarters that such a policy could give rise 
to high unemployment and growing economic inequality. Some authors believe that 
economic integration is actually hindering the expansion of the Union. Gibb and Michalak 
(1993) recognise that the Eastern European countries see membership of the European Union 
(EU) as essential not only to the successful transition from Soviet-style economies to a free 
market, but also as a guarantee of long-term political stability. Welfens (1995) however, sees 
the desire of Eastern European states to integrate economically with the EU as having 
dangers. Structural adjustments needed for integration could result in political instability and 
conflict. Gibb and Michalak believe that the EU lacks the political capacity to deepen 
economic integration and incorporate new member states simultaneously. Sinnott (1994) sees 
the obstinacy of the nation-state as one of the main forces against economic integration and 
expansion of the EU. The large European states in particular see such a policy as resulting in a 
decline in their political influence both within the Union and at home. 
From the literature therefore, it is clear that a policy of economic integration will bring 
mixed results. The tendency of organisations such as the OECD to promote the idea that 
22 
economic criteria are the most natural and powerful mechanisms for promoting integration 
is probably misplaced. Accordingly, three main conclusions can be drawn from the review 
of the literature. 
1. It has been argued that by introducing a policy of resource pricing closer co-operation 
will inevitably result amongst agencies and consumers thereby improving the 
effectiveness of their integration. In practice however, it has been shown that such a 
policy may lead to resentment and conflict that can be counter-productive. 
2. To promote a strategy of sustainable development, tighter integration of economic 
processes and environmental policy is needed. Such an approach, however, should be 
subjected to a rigorous cost-benefit analysis and a range of costed options should be 
evaluated before implementation. 
3. The merits of economic integration are being questioned in the literature. Some 
authors feel that such a policy could lead to conflict and instability and recommend 
that implementation should only be considered after careful evaluation. 
2.2.4 Technology 
The influence of technology has increased markedly over the last twenty years in all walks of 
life. It is also apparent that technology can have a significant impact on integration in a range 
of activities, with technological solutions facilitating the bringing together of many functions, 
a practice that would not have been achievable in many instances even in the recent past. It is 
noticeable however, that technology does not feature as a key integrative factor, either in 
terms of reducing or increasing integration, in the guidelines put forward by the OECD (1989) 
and this must be seen therefore as a main weakness of this analysis. 
The driving forces for technological integration can be numerous. Morgan (1992) for 
instance, identifies an increasing trend in industry to integrate telecommunications, computing 
and office systems. He identifies the driving forces for this as; radical advances in technology, 
the quickening pace of deregulation and the growth of global markets. Morgan believes that 
such integration will redefine the parameters for competitive advantage for cities, regions and 
industries. Venkatachalam et al (1993), highlight the fact that due to growing global 
competition, organisations around the world are constantly under pressure to produce high- 
quality products at an economic price. Accordingly, the integration of design and 
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manufacturing effort into one common engineering effort has been recognised as a key 
strategy for survival and growth. Rao and Wang (1993) see that computer integrated 
manufacturing and processing systems as being the development direction of the future. 
Ichimura et al (1994), describe the approach to this strategy in Japan and the introduction of 
CIMS, the computer integrated manufacturing system. This integrated system of hardware 
and software for production management attempts to meet market requirements and 
counteracts fluctuations in users' demand by maintaining effective production planning and 
control. 
In the fields of science and engineering a policy of integration has also been shown to be 
beneficial. Michalak (1993) for example, documents the increasing use of geographical 
information systems (GIS) and shows how such systems facilitate the integration of spatial 
information, including its storage, processing and representation. Although GIS help provide 
a technological solution to complex and difficult issues, they do have limitations. In planning 
for instance, Michalak states that tasks including analysis, projection and evaluation have 
proved difficult to automate and remain outside the scope of GIS. 
Several authors emphasise the impact that technological integration can have on the way 
organisations are structured. Noble (1995) illustrates how the integration of technology linked 
to office systems can develop from a rather narrow conception of "office automation" into 
systems that have strategic significance. He points out that the process of integration in such 
circumstances can necessitate extensive organisational redesign in some cases. McGrath et al 
(1994), looking at advances in telecommunications technologies, note the common desire to 
integrate data and systems in many organisations. On closer examination however, it is 
apparent that in many instances organisations fail to implement planned strategies. This is 
thought to be directly due to such action causing major changes in the balance of power and 
political turbulence in the organisations concerned. 
Rodgers (1995) presents a good example of how technology can be used to promote 
integration and reduce operating costs. He records that London's financial district is one of the 
most densely computerised areas with more than 350 institutions - banks, brokerages and 
fund managers - making millions of deals every working day. Despite a massive investment 
in information technology however, including seven fibre-optic cable networks, the City does 
not have any single, comprehensive system on which it can do business. Instead, it supports 
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dozens of incompatible and often competing, systems. Dealing rooms typically have 
connections to about 15 different networks, each costing about £500,000 a year. By 
integrating them all into one common network savings of up to £25bn a year could be made. 
Rodgers believes that an integrated IT network would help entrench London at the centre of 
world finance and give the City a competitive edge. Integration does have its critics in the 
City of London however, and there are many vested interests wishing to maintain the status 
quo. Institutions for instance, are wary of sharing any technology that gives them an edge and 
are concerned that confidential information could be stolen. 
There is little doubt therefore, that technology can be beneficial to integration, but is this 
universally the case and are there instances when the introduction of new technology can 
reduce integration possibilities? One of the key issues in this respect is social access to new 
technology. Thomas (1995) draws attention to the fact that it is usually the relatively 
privileged and affluent members of society that have access to and benefit from new 
technology. There is often a failure to acknowledge that the disadvantaged and 
underprivileged members of society have a far more limited access to this technology and this 
can lead to fragmentation and inequality. The pace of change in technological developments 
is likely to result in a widening of the gap between those who have access to new technology 
and those who do not. This is compounded by the fact that certain sections of society, such as 
the old, infirm and disabled, have difficulty in mastering technological systems and find them 
confusing and inhibiting. For integration to succeed therefore, there is a need to ensure that 
technology is received and allocated effectively within different social groups and that 
adequate training is provided. 
In conclusion, therefore, technology can facilitate integration but only if it is implemented 
appropriately. Social access to new technology for instance, needs careful consideration to 
avoid the reinforcement of existing social inequalities and the creation of new inequalities. To 
optimise the benefits for integration a number of key factors should be considered. 
1. Organisations, that adopt a policy of technological integration, should be structured 
with sufficient flexibility and robustness to respond successfully to changing 
conditions that such a policy will inevitably bring. Without this, internal power 
struggles and protectionism will conspire to prevent technological integration from 
being implemented. 
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2. Technological advances should be applied to all functions in the area under 
consideration, where this is feasible to do so. Technological solutions should not be 
dedicated to one element in isolation from the rest, as this will militate against the 
process of integration. 
3. The application and integration of technology should not become an end in itself. The 
temptation to "chase" technology and implement technological solutions to their 
fullest extent without considering the end results should be avoided. Well integrated, 
low-technology solutions may be more effective than high-technology approaches 
applied in an unbalanced fashion. 
4. The way technology is introduced into society can be divisive and can lead to 
fragmentation. To avoid variations in social access to new technology care is needed 
in its use and how it is allocated to different social groups. 
2.2.5 Human interaction, expertise and training 
Mitchell (1990) stresses that ultimately integration, co-operation and co-ordination depend to 
a significant extent upon the willingness of individuals to make them happen. As Kellow 
(1985) remarks, "what is unwritten - the degree of co-operation and goodwill ... - 
is more 
important than what is written down". People who are inclined to cooperate and are 
enthusiastic can often make a poor system work well. Conversely, a well-designed system 
may falter if the participants are determined not to work with each other. As O'Riordan (1976) 
observes, decision making for resource management often has little to do with organisation, 
statutory guidelines and co-ordinating arrangements. Rather, it has more to do with the 
outcome of the determination, vision, indifference, antagonisms and bloody-mindedness of 
particular individuals who are in positions of influence. These views appear to be at odds with 
the emphasis placed on legislation and formal organisational issues highlighted in sections 
2.2.1 and 2.2.2. In truth, both viewpoints are valid indicating that there is an underlying need 
for integration between these formal and informal approaches. 
Many companies for instance, are adopting formal policies to better integrate human resource 
management and these strategies are proving to be beneficial. Shadur and Rodwell (1995) for 
example, found that high productivity companies were characterised by particular human- 
resource management practices such as performance-related pay, performance appraisal for 
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all employees and a policy of employment security. Such firms adopted a team working 
approach and linking or integration mechanisms into their working practices. This finding is 
reinforced by Saleh and Wang (1993) who, when looking at factors that differentiate 
innovative and less-innovative companies in Canada, found that the former adopted policies 
of integration and intermingling of talents in teams and task forces. They also found that 
reward systems were widely used and these reinforced entrepreneurial behaviour and created 
incentives. 
In contrast, the OECD (1989) recommends that informal strategies need to be used in 
government organisations to encourage integration. It is valuable in that regard to identify 
social networks that exist and are used, and to encourage the reliance upon informal contact 
between people working in related agencies. Action can be taken to arrange informal 
meetings to discuss matters of mutual interest and concern, to cultivate a network of key 
contacts and sources of information, to place people on key committees and to befriend 
officials at various scales of hierarchy of government. As Mitchell (1990) points out however, 
informal activities can be used to hinder integration. Deliberate delay of responses, 
withholding of information and other similar methods can be used to frustrate efforts of 
realising integration and co-operation. 
Good staff quality is also needed for integration. The OECD found that through their 
education, training and work experience, many staff working in government agencies are 
accustomed to think in terms of narrow objectives and strategies. As a result, most staff have 
poor abilities in the important skills of inter-agency communication, negotiation, and 
bargaining, that are crucial if integration is to occur. The OECD recommends that 
governments and agencies should actively encourage a broadening of education, training and 
work experience of staff. For the longer term, education programmes at universities and 
colleges could be encouraged to incorporate the development of such skills in their 
programmes. Agencies should also recruit staff from a wider range of expertise than is 
conventional, create joint appointments between agencies, and allocate specific budgets to 
staff development. 
One element that is not featured in the OECD work and has important implications for 
integration concerns social structures and social exclusion. It is becoming widely recognised 
(Thomas, 1995; Alcock, 1997; Oliver and Barnes, 1998) that one of the problems of enhanced 
27 
prosperity in society is that of social exclusion. Certain disadvantaged groups, such as ethnic 
minorities, the old and infirm, the disabled and the poor, loose access to information, 
education, employment, etc. and become trapped in a downward spiral that needs intervention 
through policy action. Judd (1999) reports for instance, that 23 per cent of Britons have 
serious problems with literacy and 23 per cent with numeracy, and that the figure for 19 year 
olds is only slightly lower than that for older people. Such problems for individuals "can 
hardly be a surer way to social exclusion" (Judd, 1999). The Government has put in place 
national initiatives to help people with literacy and numeracy problems, but local plans are 
also in place to tackle these issues. In North London for example, an Alliance has been 
formed to identify key communities who are excluded from playing a full part in the local 
economy and society, and put in place strategies for raising basic skills (North London 
Alliance, 1998). For integration to succeed it is vital for disparities between social groups to 
be reduced and for social exclusion to be eradicated by enabling individuals to achieve their 
full potential. 
Mitchell (1990) concludes by saying that a key consideration is the recognition that the 
"human dimension" can be crucial to the success of an integrated approach. 
In conclusion then, it is apparent that the following factors are important in ensuring that a 
policy of integration is successful. 
1. The adoption of formal human-resource management strategies, such as multi- 
disciplinary team working practices, has shown to aid integration and improve 
effectiveness. 
2. The encouragement of informal contacts and use and cultivation of social networks 
can support the process of integration. 
3. A broadening of education, training and work experience through staff development 
programmes is crucial to integration. This coupled with a policy of recruiting staff 
from a wider range of expertise will ensure that the necessary skills to facilitate 
integration are available to an organisation. 
4. A policy of social integration or social equality is needed in society as a whole with 
the aim of reducing the exclusion of disadvantaged groups from gaining access to 
information, education and employment. 
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2.2.6 Information and knowledge 
In many areas the way in which information and knowledge flows, is used and interpreted can 
have an effect on how well components integrate together. Technology can help facilitate this 
process considerably. Seabrook (1993), for instance, describes the pan-European videophone 
trials where recent advances in the integration of digital technology means that high quality, 
full motion, colour images can be transmitted economically across the continent. In industry, 
the integration of information systems has been shown to be beneficial. Greenwell and 
Tannock (1994) state that for effective operation, manufacturing information systems must 
access a number of data sources. Most systems are disjointed or only partially integrated, 
leading to a number of problems with data access, format, translation and transfer. The 
solution to this involves either rebuilding the entire information system from scratch, which is 
costly and disruptive, or the adoption of an integrated strategy to build a more cohesive 
system. They describe an integrated strategy that uses an open systems approach to recover 
data from the existing information system components and transfer the data to a common 
format. The information can be then used by new and existing applications across the 
organisation or transferred to new information systems. Holland et a] (1994) record that some 
companies are implementing inter-organisational information systems (IOS's) with trading 
partners that allow them to share data and information across organisational boundaries. 
Motorola and Citibank, for instance, have effectively meshed parts of their organisations and 
information systems together to provide a mechanism for the seamless collection and 
disbursement of cash payments between the companies and their suppliers. In the public 
sector also, the trend to integrate data systems has been beneficial, improving the level of 
service offered to the public. Lewis (1993) describes how Marconi has developed systems for 
integrating data archived by the police. Integration has posed an interesting task for the 
analyst who has had to identify the "common thread" from the mass of information used by a 
police force and develop a single access system of common information. The resultant system 
allows for highly efficient use of stored data and ultimately an improved public service. 
The integration of knowledge has brought advantages to many fields. Owens and Philippakis 
(1995) describe efforts to integrate knowledge into expert and decision support systems that 
have led to approaches that incorporate techniques to derive rules from data. Batanov and 
Lekova (1993) show how a feature-based approach to the integration of knowledge has been 
applied to manufacturing. Features are "bearers of knowledge" about data and the necessary 
29 
relations among these data relating to a specific product. Intelligent systems for feature-based 
modelling in computer-aided design and computer-aided manufacturing are beginning to be 
introduced into manufacturing industry. Lee and Kim (1995) explore the mechanisms needed 
to integrate human and machine knowledge synergistically to improve performance of expert 
systems. They define machine knowledge as that which is algorithmically derived from past 
instances; whereas human knowledge implies either expert knowledge, judging the trends of 
external factors, or user knowledge, representing users' personal views about information 
given by both expert knowledge and machine knowledge. By integrating such knowledge, 
Lee and Kim show that a significant improvement of performance of an expert system can 
result even in a turbulent decision-making environment such as a stock market. 
Parker and Handmer (1997) stress the importance of the interface between scientific 
knowledge generated by a technocratic body, and "folk" or "traditional" knowledge possessed 
by lay people. The latter is characteristically local as opposed to the former that is inclined to 
concentrate on universal rules. Parker and Handmer recognise the importance of capturing, 
retaining and harnessing all appropriate forms of knowledge in the context of hazard 
management. Williams (1964) and Foster (1980) emphasise the importance of a circular 
rather than a linear flow of information in warning systems through feedback mechanisms. 
This process involves both "official" and "unofficial" knowledge and information and has 
important implications for system integration as it helps bind constituent components of the 
total system together. The recognition that knowledge and information may be held and 
originate from "unofficial" sources however, is often denied. In many instances this may be 
due to the vested interests of major institutions wishing to maintain their power-base. This 
denial can result in closed systems and the integration process becoming blocked. 
The OECD (1989) mentions a crucial and related element, that of pressure from well 
informed and knowledgeable interest groups. Often, such groups can push agencies and 
government for more sensitive policy co-ordination over some particular emerging problem. 
This can act as a trigger for a policy of integration to be followed. The OECD cites the issue 
of bathing water quality in Britain that was highlighted by pressure groups using official data 
to show low standards of pollution treatment. 
As discussed in Section 2.2.5 and in sharp contrast to what has been discussed above, the 
social differentiation that is present in society tends to impact on the ability of certain groups 
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to gain access to information and knowledge from official sources. In general, it is the well 
educated and more prosperous members of society that tend to benefit from the latest 
communications technology and have the ability to interpret and act on the information they 
receive (Thomas, 1995). A sizeable number of disadvantaged and socially excluded groups do 
not have access to such information and knowledge however, and this can be divisive and can 
lead to fragmentation. Many official sources are quick to resort to technology to disseminate 
information and fail to recognise that sections of their target audience may be unable to 
receive and/or interpret this information at all. This obviously has significant implications 
when introducing a policy of integration into society as a whole. 
To summarise, therefore, both information and knowledge are important criteria for 
integration and the following factors are of particular relevance in this context. 
1. The free flow of information within and between organisations and ready access to 
that information in a common format can further a policy of integration. The use of 
technology can facilitate this process. 
2. Expert systems, that attempt to merge machine knowledge with human knowledge, 
have a role in decision making and the furtherance of integration. 
3. The acknowledgement of the fact that information and knowledge may originate from 
"unofficial" sources and that their utilisation, via feed-back mechanisms, can aid 
integration. 
4. Organisations should be aware that certain groups in society might have difficulty 
accessing and interpreting the information and knowledge they disseminate. 
Integrating these groups into the communication process is important. 
Summary 
When contemplating a policy of integration an initial consideration of a wide range of 
possible issues and variables is required and this approach has been successfully adopted in 
this section above. A second stage requires the identification of a more focused set of factors 
that, when met, should lead to overall improved effectiveness in the field in question. This 
strategy has been has followed, resulting in the identification of 24 factors for integration and 
these are presented in Table 2.1 under six broad headings: 
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" institutional arrangements 
" legal arrangements 
" economic aspects 
" technology 
" human interaction 
" information and knowledge 
Although the framework for integration put forward by the OECD (1989) has been used in 
part in this analysis, it has found to have some serious shortcomings. Most notably this 
includes an over emphasis on economic mechanisms as being the driving force for 
integration, a tendency to focus on a limited number of key integrative criteria (institutional 
and legal arrangements, and economic), and a rather undeveloped consideration of social 
issues, especially social differentiation and exclusion. 
After reviewing the literature in this section it is concluded that the merits of economic criteria 
for furthering integration are less than stated by some authors (notably the OECD) and in 
some instances can actually lead to greater conflict and instability. For these reasons such 
factors are not considered further. The remaining 21 factors (identified in bold in Table 2.1) 
are assumed to have universal relevance to integration in a range of fields including flood 
warning. It is recognised however, that adopting these factors will not guarantee the 
successful implementation of a strategy of integration, but it is anticipated that they should 
facilitate this process in the area of interest. This hypothesis will be fully tested in this thesis 
with particular reference to flood warning systems. 
2.3 Examples of integration policy implementation in other fields 
A policy of integration has been followed in a number of different fields with varying degrees 
of success. It will be beneficial to gain insight into the practical problems and difficulties in 
achieving greater integration in some of these areas before considering the implications of 
such an approach in the field of flood warning. The approach to integration in three natural 
resource sectors will be briefly reviewed; water resources, coastal zone resources and soil 
resources and this will be contrasted with the approach taken in the field of marketing. The 
advantages and disadvantages of adopting an integrated approach to environmental protection 
and enhancement within the Environment Agency will also be discussed in this section. 
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Table 2.1: Integrative factors 
Institutional 1. Political commitment should be secured, clear objectives established, and roles and 
Arrangements responsibilities defined within a flexible, integrative framework, preferably In a written 
plan. Rules for conflict resolution should be agreed. 
2. Functions and structures to foster Integration should be established, and consideration 
given to the designation of a lead agency. 
3. Forums for negotiating and llasing between organisations should be established. 
4. A positive organisational climate and culture for integration should be Instilled into 
organisations - triggered by a strong declaration for Integration from top management. 
Legal 5. Legislation should be revisited and updated with a view to making laws compatible and 
Arrangements not contradictory. 
6. Legislation should clearly define roles and responsibilities of relevant authorities and the 
mechanisms for resolving conflict. 
7. Legislation should provide clear and open procedures for public consultation. 
8. Legislation should be periodically reviewed and continued political support should be 
sought to underpin the principles of integration. 
Economic 9. A policy of resource pricing could lead to closer integration between agencies and consumers. 
Aspects But it could also result in resentment and conflict that can be counter-productive. 
10. To promote a strategy of sustainable development tighter integration between economic 
processes and environmental policy is needed. 
ii. The merits of economic integration are being questioned. It could lead to conflict and instability 
and should only be implemented after careful consideration. 
Technology 12. Technological integration could lead to organisational change and structures should be 
flexible enough to cope with this, thus avoiding power struggles and protectionism. 
13. Technological advances should be applied to all functions rather than focusing on one 
function in isolation. 
14. The application of technology should not be an end in Itself. Low-technology solutions 
may be more effective with respect to integration. Application should be balanced. 
15. The social access to technology can be variable and certain social groups can become 
excluded from the benefits It brings, causing fragmentation. Steps should be taken to 
integrate these groups Into communications systems. 
Human interaction, expertise 
and training 
16. Organisations should adopt formal, human resource management strategies, such as 
multi-disciplinary team working practices. 
17. The use and cultivation ofinformal contacts and social networks should be encouraged 
both in organisations and communities. 
18. Broadened staff development programmes and recruitment of staff from a wide base of 
expertise will ensure an organisation has the necessary skills to facilitate integration. 
19. A policy of social integration Is needed in society as a whole with the aim of reducing the 
exclusion of disadvantaged groups from gaining access to information, education and 
employment. 
Information and 20. The free flow of, and ready access to, Information within and between organisations and 
Knowledge communities should be encouraged. 
21. Expert systems that effectively merge machine and human knowledge, have a role in 
decision making and should be explored. 
22. The Incorporation of Information and knowledge from unofficial sources should be 
encouraged and feed-back mechanisms established. 
23. Steps should be taken to ensure that recipients of Information understand it and believe 
it, and are able to confirm Its accuracy. 
24. Organisations should be aware that certain groups in society might have difficulty 
accessing and interpreting the Information and knowledge they disseminate. 
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2.3.1 Water Resources Management 
In 1989 the OECD presented the results of an examination of integrated practices in water 
resources management in member countries. A total of six case studies were targeted for each 
country to represent the range of water resource policy issues active there, resulting in a total 
of 106 case studies being completed. The analysis of the case studies was guided by a focus 
on 13 administrative/institutional characteristics that were judged to be important for the 
successful integration of water resource management policies. For each case study a points 
system was used to score the importance of each characteristic to the process of integration. 
As Penning-Rowsell (1997) concludes, the lessons learnt from this analysis are, first, that 
most countries have got some way to go before their water resources policies are integrated 
with other resource and environment policies. What appears to be the most damaging result of 
this deficiency is the splitting of water functions amongst competing agencies without any 
superior national body to co-ordinate national policies across all agencies. 
Secondly, the analysis showed that there are few incentives for policy integration in the 
countries analysed. In many countries the pattern that is most likely to dominate is a number 
of specialist agencies operating in relative isolation often exhibiting little desire for policy 
change. 
Thirdly, the range of policy tools for promoting integration was shown to be narrow. There 
was a reliance on traditional planning instruments and regulatory instruments, with economic 
instruments only found to be important in a minority of cases. 
Fourthly, it was often the case that water agencies had little inclination to change their 
structures and would only move towards more integrated policies when faced with resources 
crises or pressure from interest groups 
2.3.2 Coastal Zone Management 
Penning-Rowsell (1997) reports the results of 16 detailed case studies undertaken in OECD 
countries that evaluated, amongst other things, the implementation of integrated approaches in 
coastal resource management. 
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The cases studied show that there are considerable problems in this area. The development 
pressure on the coast is increasing; pollution problems are extensive, marine resources are 
over-exploited, and natural hazards continue to pose a threat to selected coastal communities. 
The way these problems have been tackled by individual countries is haphazard with policy 
conflicts between different sectors and levels of government often being the norm. Although 
there are many coastal zone management plans in existence, implementation is often weakly 
pursued. In many case examples this implementation follows a step-by-step pattern, with 
responsible agencies taking one problem at a time, rather than in an integrated and holistic 
fashion. In this respect the inter-dependencies that are particularly inherent in coastal zone 
resources are largely ignored. 
Penning-Rowsell highlights the lack of a coherent body of coast zone legislation and the lack 
of policy co-ordination between agencies as major factors in limiting integration. This also 
has an international dimension with difficulties apparent in policy integration between as well 
as within countries. The Helsinki Convention has led to progress but with an emphasis on 
pollution control rather than other coastal issues. 
2.3.3 Soil Resources Management 
The OECD carried out an analysis of soil resource protection policy in member countries. 
Data from 18 case studies were analysed and the results have been used to gauge the level of 
policy integration in this discipline. 
In a review of the results of this work, Penning-Rowsell (1997) identified four main 
conclusions. First, the length of time that occurred between the implementation of inadequate 
policies or poor soil practices and the soil degradation that follows can be many years or 
decades. This means that many problems currently being tackled by governments are 
inherited or residual problems, rather than resulting from current policies or practices. There 
is often therefore, a remedial task of government before policy integration can take a positive 
effect. The same type of time lag will also effect the implementation of better policies and 
practices. 
Secondly, there are continuing problems with enforcing and implementing policies of 
integration. Despite recent improvements in vertical integration between the different levels 
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of government, there is evidence that horizontal integration across the different resource 
sectors is not well developed i. e. soil and water; soil and recreation. A related problem is that 
in many countries the management of soil conservation and agricultural development policies 
are not integrated, and indeed are in conflict. Another problem is that much soil conservation 
legislation is still framed in isolation from other natural resource sectors, however, the case 
studies indicated that there is less concern about the limitations in the strength of legislation 
and more emphasis on the way it is introduced and implemented. 
Thirdly, while the case studies show that political commitment at the highest level is needed 
for integrated soil conservation legislation and practices with other resource management 
areas, local involvement is also crucial to the successful adoption of better land management 
practices. While a regional perspective is necessary for better policy integration in water 
resource and coastal zone management, it is important in the case of soil resources that 
decision making is devolved to the lowest possible level of government. 
Fourthly, information dissemination and education is important to success in this field more 
than in many others, because there are so many parties involved. 
2.3.4 Marketing 
In the field of marketing, the approach to integration is very different with the emphasis 
placed firmly at the operational level. Linton and Morley (1995) identify a range of benefits 
that a policy of integration brings to marketing, these include; creative integrity, consistency 
of messages, unbiased marketing recommendations, better use of all media, greater marketing 
precision, operational efficiency, cost savings, high calibre consistent service, easier working 
relations and greater agency accountability. They believe that a policy of integration offers 
powerful creative and cost benefits and cite two examples where integration in marketing has 
improved effectiveness. 
Rover Metro's integrated marketing strategy 
The Metro was launched in 1979 and became the highest volume seller in Rover's history. In 
1991, competitive pressure on the Metro increased dramatically with the launch of the 
Renault Clio and Peugeot 106 and sales share began to fall despite pricing activity. In 1992 an 
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integrated marketing strategy was adopted aimed at reversing this decline in share that had 
slipped to below 2%. The objective was to lift share to more than 4% with a settled down rate 
in excess of 3% 
An integrated campaign was developed consisting of 40-second television commercials, 48- 
sheet posters and a national press campaign featuring a direct response mechanism offering 
further information. Those who responded to this received their information pack containing a 
test-drive incentive based on the offer of a range of Harrod's merchandise. This promotional 
offer was also carried through to point-of-sale. The entire campaign was turned around in 
eight weeks from the marketing agency receiving the brief to the first television commercial 
and first press advertisement appearing. 
The result of the campaign has been highly satisfactory. Metro's share of the industry rose 
from 1.9% to 4.3%, subsequently settling down to a share in excess of 3.5%. Previously 
Rover's highest ever response to a test drive incentive programme had been 7,000. The 
integrated campaign generated over 13,500-test drive enquiries. The total cost was under 
£2.5m and Rover estimated that the activity boosted profitability by over £7m. 
Re-positioning ICL customer services. 
When ICL launched a comprehensive range of customer services, they brought together 
hundreds of services provided by different divisions and business units, each communicating 
individually with customers. A complete integrated communications strategy was developed 
to position ICL as a long-term business partner providing professional services that were vital 
to achieving the client's business objectives. The programme lasted over two years and a key 
feature was the inclusion of consistent positioning messages and visual standards in all 
internal and external service communications. All activities were handled by a single agency 
and the result was consistent presentation of a single integrated communications strategy to all 
decision-makers. The customer service division became the largest single contributor to ICL's 
total revenue and profit. 
Linton and Morley (1995) believe that an integrated approach to marketing is one of the most 
exciting developments in this field and provides a powerful range of business benefits. They 
do stress, however, that introducing integrated marketing represents a considerable risk and 
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they recommend that its potential and implications be reviewed before commitment is made 
to a single-source solution. Solving internal political problems, selecting the right agency and 
operating pilot programmes are important stages in a successful transition to integrated 
marketing. 
2.3.5 Environment Agency 
The Environment Agency was formed in April 1996 by the bringing together of a number of 
organisations, including the National Rivers Authority, Her Majesty's Inspectorate of 
Pollution and the waste regulation authorities. One of the key objectives that the Government 
set the Agency was to "adopt an integrated approach to environmental protection and 
enhancement", and accordingly a high level (director level) policy group was established to 
determine and implement a strategy. It was given the following terms of reference: " ensuring 
that a continuum is established between the Agency's overall environmental strategy and the 
policies to implement it, and that those policies are coherent and integrated". It was 
considered that integration had two dimensions. At one level it meant developing a 
management or organisational culture that encourages and enables the staff in the Agency to 
think more widely about their roles and how they help the organisation deliver its "mission". 
At another level integration was designed to make a meaningful connection between a 
number of key issues related to environmental management. It was felt that a policy of 
integration could help deliver the following targets: 
0a greater understanding of the state of the environment 
better information about the nature of environmental impacts and recovery 
0 better assessment of the costs and benefits and risks associated with environmental 
management, and prioritisation and targeting of management strategies 
" the development of effective strategies to influence other bodies and organisations 
" the successful introduction of sustainable development and improvement and the 
ability to measure the success of such a policy (Mead, 1995). 
To implement the integration strategy within the Agency, the Policy Group commissioned a 
number of working groups made up of staff from each of the former organisations. Once fully 
formulated, the strategy was given priority at the highest level and the Chief Executive 
initiated a major organisational change to ensure its implementation during 1997. 
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The strategy was considered to be appropriate and successful for some functions more than 
others within the Agency. In the area of pollution control and environmental protection for 
instance, the policy worked well. Each of the former organisations carried out these functions 
in one form or another and a more integrated approach was considered to be appropriate. In 
other functions, notably flood defence (formerly the responsibility of the NRA and taking half 
the Agency's budget and manpower), the policy was considered by some to be less 
appropriate. Indeed the Independent Review of the Easter 1998 floods states: "the structure 
(of the Agency) may be effective in promoting the integration of skills and resources to bring 
about efficiency and effectiveness in holistic management of the environment. It appears 
feasible for flood defence to operate satisfactorily within this structure but there could be 
disadvantages for an essentially operational public protection service" (Bye and Homer, 
1998). 
Summary 
The studies presented here illustrate the way in which progress is being made in introducing 
an integrated approach to a number of different fields. They also highlight how the concept of 
integration is being contemplated in different ways and at different levels and this has 
important implications for flood warning. The approach to integration in the natural resource 
functions for example, has been to take a broad strategic perspective by examining how each 
discipline interacts with other systems and how high level policy decisions affect the process 
of integration. This contrasts markedly with the approach taken in marketing where a very 
focused policy has been adopted at the operational level, integrating key elements in a 
"building block" approach to improve sales performance. It is clear from the former that 
integration is often difficult to achieve especially when it involves the bringing together of 
policies from a number of agencies often with an inadequate legislative framework to 
facilitate implementation. In such cases the incentives for integration are few, with many 
agencies preferring to preserve their power-base and maintain the status-quo. In the marketing 
examples, integration involves the bringing together of activities carried out by individual 
companies and hence it could be argued that in such circumstances an integrated approach is 
easier to achieve. The main inducement to integration in marketing is economic and by 
demonstrating that such a policy can improve the economic performance of a company can be 
a powerful incentive for its implementation. 
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In the case of the Environment Agency, a policy of integration was introduced with high level 
support within the organisation after receiving political direction and commitment from the 
Government. The necessary functions and structures were established and steps were taken to 
try and inspire a positive organisational climate for the policy. The Agency chose however, to 
implement the policy rapidly and in a rather dogmatic fashion. Without the full grassroots 
support of its employees, the Agency had failed to "inspire" the universal support that it 
originally intended. 
2.4 The relevance of integration to flood warning 
Mileti (1994) states that the most effective structure for a flood warning system is that of an 
integrated system. He defines such a warning system as a means of getting information about 
an impending emergency, communicating that information to those who need it, and 
facilitating correct decisions and timely responses by people in danger. He recognises that 
integrated systems in this field are complex in both organisation and work process. They tie 
together work in a variety of specialities within and across many different organisations. For 
example, they can link science (physical and social), engineering and technology, a number of 
government departments (national and local), and the public. He goes on to state that 
integrated systems in flood warning should be viewed as comprising of a number of 
interrelated components or subsystems that cover the activities of detection, forecasting, 
warning dissemination, and response. Integration requires that sound relationships among 
these subsystems be developed and maintained. Penning-Rowsell (1986) emphasises this 
point and states that it is through the integration of the various constituent parts of a flood 
warning system that the effectiveness and efficiency of that system will be maximised. 
Handmer (1997) believes that a total or integrated flood warning system is more than a list of 
components, of more importance is how the components function together to serve the 
purpose of the whole. 
As Mileti (1994) remarks, the structure of flood warning systems has been researched and 
discussed for several decades and there is a large degree of consensus among researchers 
about how systems should be structured to be effective. Penning-Rowsell (1986) states 
however, that few flood warning systems are designed in the integrated way advocated by 
Foster (1980) and Mileti (1975). He contends that much attention has been given to the 
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detection and forecasting subsystems and that this attention appears to be disproportionate. It 
is irrelevant how accurate a flood forecast could become, using all the latest data-gathering 
and information technology, if the warning is not disseminated efficiently and the public do 
not respond. He believes that more emphasis should be placed on integrating the remainder of 
the warning process with the state-of-the-art forecast production technology, rather than 
taking that technology further in isolation from the use of the forecasts thereby produced. 
Penning-Rowsell (1986) highlights three key factors that influence the performance of 
integrated flood warning systems; institutional arrangements, the technology of forecast 
production and dissemination, and the education of the warning recipients about the warnings 
they are likely to receive and the response expected. 
Under institutional arrangements Penning-Rowsell includes administrative structures, the 
legal position and the resources devoted to the system. He stresses the point that there are 
numerous different ways of organising these arrangements, each of which may be perfectly 
workable and efficient for the particular local circumstance. He also highlights the need to 
review the technology of flood warning systems in light of local experience and to integrate 
the appropriate forecast technology with the character of the dissemination system and the 
likely levels of public response. It may be more appropriate, he suggests, to base forecasts on 
low technology and concentrate resources on efficient dissemination and response, rather than 
producing very accurate forecasts that are either too late or, when they reach those intended to 
respond, are in a form that cannot be understood or used. Penning-Rowsell considers that pre- 
event publicity and awareness programmes are important in raising public response. Such 
programmes are a poor substitute to actual experience of flooding, nevertheless, forms of pre- 
flood publicity should be examined, perhaps using the experience of market research and 
marketing methods. 
Keys (1997) states that because flood warning is a multi-dimensional activity it requires 
inputs from expertise from a number of organisations and professional cultures. Technical 
interests will be involved, as well as those from the social and behavioural sciences. He 
stresses the importance of these inputs meshing effectively together and the need to overcome 
sometimes significant inter-cultural barriers between the different groups involved, to ensure 
that the total system functions well. 
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2.5 Conceptual approaches to flood warning systems. 
When analysing flood warning systems it is important to develop a conceptual framework in 
which to work. This should identify the main components of the total warning system and 
recognise how they relate to one another. It should also offer a means of focusing on areas 
where improvements are necessary to enhance overall system effectiveness. As Penning- 
Rowsell and Handmer (1986b) highlight however, there is little in the field of flood warning 
that can be called "theory" and few overall hypotheses regarding the totality of the warning 
process from which to proceed. They are concerned that this may encourage researchers to 
proceed empirically and through data-orientated case studies rather than by refining the 
concepts to be deployed. They point to the all too frequently expressed view that the 
"answers" relating to optimising flood warning processes are "out there" and all that is needed 
is to devise techniques of measurement and evaluation rather than going through the process 
of creative thought. 
Nevertheless, several models have been developed over the last thirty years that usefully 
attempt to conceptualise the warning process. These are based on the wider hazard perception 
model developed by Kates (1962,1970) which, although being too generalised to be useful in 
the specific flood warning context, helped consolidate and stimulate research in the field. The 
most useful conceptual statements concerning integrated or total warning systems, therefore, 
are those developed by Williams (1964), Foster (1980) and Mileti (1975,1994). The main 
features of these models are presented in Appendix 2 and they are critically examined in the 
next section. 
2.5.1 A critical assessment of the literature 
Penning-Rowsell et al (1982) believe that important observations regarding warnings in 
general can be derived from conceptual models such as those presented by Williams, Foster 
and Mileti. They underline that a warning is a process and not a discrete message or action 
and emphasise the interdependence of the various activities involved. They also point to the 
fact that warnings are best analysed by following a systems approach that identifies 
components of the system, their interaction, and the need for feedback that may create change 
or stability in the system. Williams, Foster and McLuckie (1973) all make the important 
distinction between prediction of danger and behavioural advice. They also differentiate 
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between a forecast, that is a prediction of an event of a specific magnitude occurring at a 
certain time and location, and a warning, that includes the prediction but also a 
recommendation to take precautionary, protective of defensive action. Penning-Rowsell et al 
(1982) also stress the importance of recognising the complex nature of warning response and 
the effect this has on total warning efficiency. McLuckie's (1973) stimulus-actor-response 
model therefore, is considered to mirror reality more appropriately than a simple stimulus- 
response approach as it focuses attention on the perceptions and experiences of the warning 
recipient that can have important ramifications. In general, conceptualising flood warning 
systems in this way draws attention to the fact that such systems are complex processes that 
involve the interaction and integration of physical, technical and social disciplines. The 
effectiveness of any warning system is dependent on how well these three disciplines can be 
satisfactorily coordinated. 
Penning-Rowsell (1986) highlights the dangers of a systems approach to flood warning and 
makes reference to Foster's model in particular. He believes that, although this model 
describes the interactions between parts of the whole, it does nothing to either explain the 
nature of that interaction nor to analyse power within the system, nor necessarily to point 
towards ways of optimising the efficiency of the interaction. He feels the oversimplifying and 
over-rationalising systems framework also tends to emphasise stability and equilibrium rather 
than dynamic change. All parts of the information flow within the warning process are 
dynamically interacting. 
Parker (1991) believes that conceptual models such as Foster's have a number of strengths 
such as looking at the total system and stressing the need to examine feedback between 
constituent parts of the system. They also recognise that changes to one part of the system 
have implications for all other parts and its total performance. A forecaster for example, may 
upgrade flood forecasting technology but may in so doing degrade the warning process, the 
technological change may result in an amended warning message that may differ from what 
the recipient is expecting. Nevertheless, Parker also considers that Foster's approach is flawed 
in a number of respects: 
1. it lacks a recognition of the importance of history, it must take into account the 
successes and failures in the past as these will have an effect on the behaviour of the 
actors involved. 
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2. the model gives no guide as to what is meant to happen in the constituent parts of the 
system. Little consideration of institutional arrangements e. g. the hierarchical layout 
of the agencies involved, the levels at which decisions should be made and reviewed. 
3. no emphasis is given to the environment in which the agency or individual exists - 
decision making is rarely calm or operates in perfect surroundings, for example, data 
deficiencies, political pressures, power of mediating influences, etc. 
To overcome some of these deficiencies, Parker et al (1994) have developed a generic model 
that is derived from existing research from a wide variety of sources with different 
disciplinary bases. 
The main components of the model as illustrated in Figure 2.1, are forecasting (that includes 
detection), warning and response, and information flow, whether intrinsic (i. e. official 
warnings) or extrinsic (unofficial warnings), is seen as an important factor for integrating 
these three components. The model incorporates important feedback loops. The model has 
been expanded to include the principal activities involved in each component of the process, 
the principal agencies and stakeholders, and the factors that are considered important to 
inducing effectiveness. 
Parker et al (1994) make reference to Lazarus's stress model (1966), where stress is a function 
of the challenge or demand of the event and the resources available to meet the challenge. The 
challenge is determined by the flood characteristics (rate of rise, flood depth, velocity of flood 
water, flood duration etc. ) and for every possible challenge there are one or more appropriate 
adaptations (e. g. prevent water entering property, raise property and evacuation). To be 
effective, each adaptation has certain requirements (warning lead-time, prior information 
etc. ). Thus flood-detection-forecasting-warning-response-systems (FDFWRS) need to be 
matched to both flood characteristics and adaptive response requirements. In order for the 
FDFWRS to increase in efficiency there is a need for concerted public information and 
education programmes before flood events. This will enable flood victims to assess more 
adequately environmental cues prior to the receipt of warnings and to respond more 
effectively on receipt of warnings. 
Parker et al (1994) test and expand the initial generic conceptual model. They apply the model 
to climatic change and identify the principal functions of FDFWRS in this context. They 
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develop a single conceptual framework and apply it to a number of countries in the European 
Union. They expand each component of the model and identify each activity associated with 
each component and the main agencies and stakeholders involved at various stages in the 
process. They begin to identify the factors that are important to the effectiveness of FDFWRS. 
Parker et al (1994) also present a staged development model that complements the process 
model. This is used to compare FDFWRS in different countries and is used to identify where 
a FDFWRS is located on the path between rudimentary to advanced. From the model a 
criteria-development matrix (CDM) is developed. 14 criteria were identified by which the 
level of development of FDFWRS may be gauged. A system is categorised in one of five 
categories - or levels of development (from rudimentary to advanced) - according to each 
criterion, generating a profile of the condition of the system under review. Parker and Budgen 
(1998) developed the CDM approach further by increasing the number of criteria from 14 to 
27 and then applied it to the tropical cyclone warning dissemination system in Mauritius. 
The 27 categories adopted by Parker and Budgen (1998) are: 
1. legitimisation and authority accorded to warning dissemination 
2. legislative foundation 
3. flood warning philosophy 
4. forecast and warning parity 
5. application of technology to forecasting 
6. application of technology to warning dissemination 
7. geographical coverage 
8. extent of links with stakeholders 
9. arrangements for night time warnings and response 
10. arrangements for remote areas 
11. arrangements for social groups with limited resources 
12. arrangements for groups with special needs 
13. redundancy in communication networks is developed 
14. multiple reinforcing sources of warnings 
15. content of warning messages to the public 
16. degree of local detail in warnings 
17. extent to which warning system allows for warning confirmation processes 
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18. presentation of warnings by broadcast media 
19. extent of integration of forecast and media agencies 
20. extent of informal communication network activity 
21. availability of hazard information 
22. attitudes towards freedom of hazard information 
23. public awareness raising about warnings 
24. public education about flood warnings 
25. knowledge of FDFWRS effectiveness by agencies 
26. performance targets set and monitored 
27. organisational culture 
In their reassessment and development of the CDM model, Parker and Budgen added 
emphasis in a number of key areas, all of which have relevance for integration: 
" arrangements for public warning - including different social groups with different 
needs and resources, in remote areas and at different times of the day. 
" communication of warnings - including multiple sources and redundancy in 
communication networks. 
" the mass media and media broadcast technology. 
" informal as well as formal communication networks. 
" the provision of locally specific information. 
2.5.2 What integrates flood warning systems? 
From the literature it is clear that the conceptual models presented here are considered to offer 
a useful framework in which to contemplate flood warning systems. But how far do they go in 
giving a full representation of the relevant factors needed for the effective integration of flood 
warning systems? 
The models presented by Williams, Foster and Mileti tend to focus on information, 
knowledge and human expertise as being the main criteria that integrate warning systems. 
Williams for instance, conceptualises a warning as a process involving the flow of 
information that binds all components of the system together. Information may originate from 
a number of sources, both official and unofficial, and this needs to be collated and evaluated 
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before being transmitted by various means to those at risk of flooding. He stresses the need to 
regard a warning system as a circular rather than linear process that involves feedback 
mechanisms from the warned to the warner. Foster also highlights the importance of 
information in his model emphasising the need for it to flow both ways, passing to and from 
those threatened, and for it to disseminated via several channels. The importance of "multiple 
reinforcing sources of warnings" is highlighted by Parker and Budgen (1998) as well as the 
need for warning messages to the public to be "iconically, factually and behaviourally" sound, 
with a high degree of local detail. Williams and Foster tend to assume however, that the 
receiving population of warning information is homogeneous and they fail to take into 
account the important issue of social differentiation. Parker and Budgen (1998) recognise that 
special arrangements need to be made for social groups with limited resources and with 
special needs. But further work is required to identify mechanisms for integrating excluded 
social groups into a conceptual representation of warning arrangements. Greater emphasis 
should also be placed on the role of unofficial or informal flood warning arrangements where 
communities often activate extensive social networks to disseminate flood related 
information. Parker and Handmer (1997) find that such arrangements are often more resilient 
than official systems and that there is much merit in seeking to integrate the two approaches 
and thereby enhancing overall system performance. 
Human expertise and knowledge are seen as variables that can either help facilitate or hinder 
the integration of flood warning systems. Williams sees poor training and education of 
"human operators" as a potential blocking mechanism for warning systems. This can occur at 
any of a number of "sub-points" within the overall warning process and may involve 
individuals that forecast and issue the warnings as well as the warning recipients. Foster 
believes that the effectiveness of warning systems can be enhanced through education, 
without this he sees a greater reliance upon peoples' unconscious and irrational responses that 
may distort the incoming information. Mileti considers the need to reconcile the differences in 
interpretation of flood warnings of those who issue warnings and those who receive them and 
this can be achieved through education and training. Parker and Budgen (1998) refer to public 
awareness and public education in their model and talk about the issue of varying levels of 
education and awareness in different social groups. They pay particular reference to the plight 
of special needs groups and the ethnic minorities, an issue that is not addressed by the other 
conceptual models. In contrast, Parker and Handmer (1997) highlight the fact that local 
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communities can be a "storehouse" of knowledge and wisdom about the flood hazard, a fact 
that is often not appreciated or ignored by managers of official flood warning systems. 
Williams, Foster and Mileti make little reference to other integration criteria in their 
approaches. There is little regard of institutional arrangements for instance, and how agencies 
perceive and carry out their role in flood warning operations and how this is influenced by the 
statutory framework in which they function. Where this framework is weak and ill-defined, 
agencies may not operate in an optimum way and this can impair the warning process. 
Williams and Foster make no reference to institutions in their models and merely lump 
together official organisations as "decision makers". Mileti recognises that different agencies 
have different roles and responsibilities in the process and differentiates between those who 
detect floods (detectors) and those who manage floods (managers). He fails to address 
however, how these agencies should interact or elaborate on the influence institutions have on 
the success or otherwise of flood warning systems. In contrast, Parker and Budgen (1998) 
identify a number of organisational criteria for assessing the level of development of warning 
systems that also have relevance for integration: 
" the need for a well-developed organisational culture for emergency preparedness 
and collaboration. 
" the need for legitimisation and authority to be accorded to warning procedures 
within organisations. 
" for fully developed links to be established with a full range of stakeholders and 
frequent dialogue. 
" for there to be seamless integration between forecasting agencies and media 
organisations. 
The role of technology is another criterion that receives little attention. Technology has 
revolutionised many aspects of flood detection and forecasting in recent years and is being 
used increasingly to improve warning dissemination. Parker and Budgen (1998) identify the 
application of technology as being of fundamental importance to system integration. They 
stress the need for technological application to be advanced and state-of-the-art, and for equal 
attention to be given to forecasting and warning dissemination. What is not accounted for in 
any model however, is the key issue of social access to technology that may be fragmented 
and hence not conducive to integration. The growing problem of social exclusion is an 
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important one within the process of warning especially when many organisations are 
increasingly reliant on technology to disseminate their warning information to the general 
public. 
In general, therefore, although the models presented offer a useful framework, they tend to 
focus on a limited number of factors that have relevance to integration. To be of value as 
representations of integrated flood warning systems a wider perspective is required. As 
Mitchell (1990) states, a wider appreciation of those issues and variables judged to be of most 
significance to system integration should lead to overall improved effectiveness in the field in 
question. This is the central issue to be tackled in this thesis. 
2.6 Conclusions 
In general, integration can be beneficial. Such a policy can lead to enhanced co-operation and 
co-ordination that in turn may lead to overall improved effectiveness. Integration can be 
contemplated in a number of different ways and at a number of levels. Mitchell (1990) 
recommends a two-staged approach to integration - an initial comprehensive viewpoint, 
considering a whole range of issues and variables, followed by a more focused approach that 
concentrates on those issues and variables judged to be the most significant to the area in 
question. When considering the implementation of an integrated approach it is important to 
identify and consider systematically these variables and criteria. A number of these have been 
presented and discussed in the literature that are considered to be of universal relevance to the 
successful implementation of a policy of integration. These have been summarised in this 
chapter under the following headings; 
" institutional arrangements, 
" legal arrangements, 
" economic aspects, 
" technology, 
" human interaction, training and expertise 
" information and knowledge. 
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Figure 2.1: Generic conceptual model of flood detection*, forecasting, warning and 
response system (adapted from Parker et al, 1994). 
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The implementation of an integration policy has been recorded in a number of fields with 
varying degrees of success. The examples presented here illustrate how the concept of 
integration is being contemplated in different ways and at different levels. In some fields a 
broad strategic perspective is being followed, whilst in others a more focused policy is being 
adopted. It is clear, however, that integration is most difficult to achieve when it involves the 
bringing together of policies from a number of agencies often within an inadequate legislative 
framework and where the incentives for integration are few. In contrast, where integration 
involves the bringing together of activities carried out by individual companies and where the 
incentives include improved economic performance, the success rate for implementation can 
be very high. In all cases, it is important to introduce a policy of integration in a balanced 
way, to identify and address all the relevant criteria for the area in question, and not to focus 
on a limited set of attributes whilst ignoring others. 
There is a general consensus in the literature about how flood warning systems should be 
structured. Many researchers believe that the most effective structure is that of an integrated 
system and by integrating the various constituent parts of a flood warning system, the 
effectiveness and efficiency of that system will be maximised. Few flood warning systems are 
designed in an integrated way however, and more fundamentally, there are few overall 
hypotheses that regard the totality of the warning process. The limited number of models that 
attempt to conceptualise flood warning systems in an integrated way have been summarised 
and critically examined in this chapter. 
Although the models presented by Williams, Foster and Mileti offer a useful framework in 
which to contemplate flood warning systems, a number of fundamental flaws in their 
approach have been identified. These include a tendency to oversimplify what is a complex 
process, to be rather too descriptive with little emphasis placed on the less-than-perfect 
situations in which flood warning systems operate, and an inclination to focus on a limited 
number of criteria that have relevance to integration. There is limited reference for instance, to 
the impact of technology, a range of social issues and informal warning arrangements on 
overall system integration. 
It follows therefore, that the implementation of a successful policy of integration requires the 
consideration of a wider range of factors than those identified in the conceptual models 
referenced in this chapter. This will be approached by taking the factors identified from the 
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literature in this chapter as a starting point (see Table 2.1), analysing them in greater detail 
under the relevant substantive heading (using case study material from the Thames basin 
where appropriate), and adding to them if possible. The methodology to be used to achieve 





Research can be viewed as a systematic process to establish facts or principles on a subject 
such as integrated flood warnings, and the way in which this is conducted can 
fundamentally effect the resultant findings. As a consequence, it is particularly important 
to detail and make transparent the research philosophy, design and methods adopted in any 
research work such as this. These aspects are explicitly examined in this chapter so as to 
enable the reader to evaluate the research findings. An analysis of the research design and a 
justification of the validity and reliability of the study follow an examination of the 
philosophy of and approach to this project. The principal sources of information are 
presented and an assessment given of the use of case studies and the selection criteria 
adopted. The research methodology draws on a number of information sources, including 
case study material, unpublished work archived by the Environment Agency, its 
predecessors and other organisations, and extensive participant observation made by the 
researcher through over 25 years of experience in the field of flood warning. 
3.2 Philosophy and approach 
Broadly speaking, research is carried out in order to discover something that is not already 
known about (Hughes and Sharrock, 1997). It can be categorised by two dominant 
philosophies. The first is known variously as "experimental", "hypothetico-deductive" or 
"positivist" (Henwood and Pidgeon, 1993). This paradigm advocates a view that the 
subject of study is external to the research and the researcher, and that reality consists of a 
world of objectively defined facts. It is a system of philosophy based on experience and 
empirical knowledge. Positivist concepts were first proposed by Auguste Comte in the 19`h 
century who believed that the empirical sciences were the only adequate source of 
knowledge and in the importance of scientific verification. This quantitative approach is 
seen as crucial to the natural sciences because it enables the concepts embedded in 
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theoretical schemes or hypotheses to be observed, manipulated and tested. It is 
underpinned by the need for research findings to be capable of replication and 
generalisation, and for predictions to be made upon the basis of observed regularities. 
The alternative epistemological position is expressed in the naturalistic or interpretative 
paradigm. This approach accepts the view that the world is socially constructed and the 
research and indeed the researcher are part of the investigation. The nineteenth century 
German philosopher Wilhelm Dilthey argued that a clear distinction should be drawn 
between the disciplines of natural science and the moral or human sciences. In Dilthey's 
view ([1894] 1997), whilst the former could be supported by external observation and 
explanation of regularities in physical events, the human sciences should be premised upon 
the search for meaning and understanding. Hughes and Sharrock (1997) see the prime task 
of this phenomenological approach as describing the everyday experience of the "life 
world": the world as given in immediate experience and independent of and prior to any 
scientific or other interpretation. It deals with the social reality in which action takes place 
and the outcome of the interpretations made and courses of action undertaken by social 
actors. 
Through the 1930's to the 1960's many workers such as Durkeim (1953) tried to make 
legitimate a conception of social science consistent with the prevailing positivist image of 
natural science. Many had strongly held views that the social sciences should endeavour to 
emulate the most advanced of the natural sciences, namely physics. Some tried to design 
proper empirical experiments for social research. Attempts were made to purge these 
experiments of all emotional, ideological and theoretical preconceptions, in an attempt to 
provide a clear criterion of truth independent of human whim and prejudice in order to 
seek knowledge of the highest order. Carrying these principles into the human sciences 
gave rise to a number of problems. Accordingly, in the latter half of the twentieth century 
there was a reaction against and rejection of positivist doctrines. Winch (1990) sees that 
many of the problems the social scientist faces are indeed philosophical in nature and not 
empirical. He contends, therefore, that it is inappropriate to attempt to solve philosophical 
problems by empirical, especially scientific means. He believes that the world is deprived 
of certainties and that a much more sceptical approach to all questions of knowledge is 
required, emphasising the uncertainty and undecidability of everything that might be taken 
for knowledge. 
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Hughes and Sharrock (1997) stress the importance of recognising that not all problems of 
the social sciences are philosophical rather than empirical or scientific in nature, for there 
clearly are all kinds of empirical investigations that can be and are made. Nevertheless, 
other research methods have come to the fore, associated with the more qualitative 
research advocated by the phenomentogists; these include participant observation, case 
studies, ethnography and discourse analysis. These methods are widely used in the social 
sciences today, but as many authors' stress there is a continuing need to ensure that high 
aspirations to scholarly rigour are maintained in what ever research approach is adopted. 
Bryman (1988) believes that the distinction between qualitative and quantitative research is 
really a technical matter whereby the choice between them is to do with their suitability in 
answering particular research questions. 
This study draws from many aspects of qualitative methodology. These have been usefully 
summarised by Henwood and Pigeon (1993) to include: 
" an emphasis on description rather than explanation 
0 the representation of reality through the eyes of participants 
" the importance of viewing the meaning of experience and behaviour in context 
and in its full complexity 
"a view of the scientific process as generating working hypotheses rather than 
immutable empirical facts 
" an attitude towards theorising which emphasises the emergence of concepts 
from data rather than their imposition in terms of a priori theory. 
Many of the techniques commonly used for such an approach have been adopted in this 
study, including participant observation, interviews, and case studies. These have allowed 
the researcher to examine and analyse flood warning arrangements in England and Wales 
from the perspective of a wide selection of participants with differing levels of knowledge 
and expertise, and with a wide range of interpretations. 
The approach adopted has been heavily influenced by the position of the researcher, 
namely as an employee of the Environment Agency. The research question has been 
addressed by applying the researcher's own knowledge and expertise to the issues in hand, 
with that of colleagues and other staff who operate in the researcher's professional 
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network, both inside and outside the Agency. An attempt has been made to view the issues 
from the perspective of different disciplines, and to incorporate the interpretation of 
common problems by a range of "experts" working in different fields. Although the 
researcher is a physical geographer/hydrologist by training, there is an awareness of 
alternative perspectives articulated by workers in other disciplines, such as social 
scientists, technologists, physical scientists and engineers. The researcher also makes a 
conscious effort to blend the views of practitioners in the operational environment, with 
those of academic workers, and where possible bridge the gap between the two 
communities. 
By undertaking research whilst occupying the role of an "insider", gives the opportunity to 
widen not only one's own perspectives in relation to the subject matter, but to influence the 
thinking of others. This is achieved with colleagues, staff and managers through informal 
discussions, meetings, and via other means of communication such as electronic mail, both 
at a regional and national level within the organisation. 
Another important element of the project is gaining an appreciation of the layman's 
interpretation and assessment of key issues. This is achieved through close reference to 
activities in one study catchment in particular, but opinions of the public in other parts of 
the Thames Region are also analysed in detail. The researcher's position allows direct 
access to these communities and key individuals within them. The emphasis on action- 
research is manifested by the researcher's ability to take certain findings and implement 
them operationally. Much value is placed on being able to observe the impact of the 
resultant operational changes both within organisations and in the communities benefiting 
from the flood warning service. 
3.3 Role of the researcher 
The researcher finds himself in a unique position with respect to analysing flood warning 
systems. He has spent most of his career developing, implementing and operating such 
systems, spanning a period of over 25 years. This started in the London area in 1975 and 
was extended to the whole Thames catchment from 1989 onwards. The researcher's role as 
Regional Flood Warning Manager for the Thames Region of the Environment Agency 
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gives him a particular insight into the practical realities of operating a flood warning 
service in England and Wales. Such a position offers a number of distinct advantages over 
a more conventional PhD student, and these can be summarised below: 
" unlimited access to data, information, unpublished reports operational 
procedures, and other relevant material. 
" unrestricted access to experienced, professional staff in the Thames Region of 
the Environment Agency and other regions. 
" ready access to professional staff in other organisations, such as local 
authorities, emergency services, research institutes, forecasting agencies, both in 
the UK and overseas. 
" having a general familiarity of the workings of organisations, and being aware of 
where to find information and with whom that information resides. 
" the ability to implement operationally many ideas and strategies that may be 
identified in a research project. 
" participating in operational duties and thereby gaining first hand experience in 
the use of implemented procedures. 
" the ability to bridge the gap between the research and operational fields and 
communities. 
" the ability to commission research to enhance operational practices. 
" being a professional in the flood warning field gives a higher level of credibility 
than a conventional student and more influence with staff in the Environment 
Agency, other organisations and the general public. 
The researcher's role as an "insider" therefore, has enabled him to have access to 
information not normally available to research students, to have unique access to key 
institutions and individuals, and to have the ability to participate directly in many of the 
activities central to this project. 
Conversely, being an "insider" does bring a number of disadvantages and potential 
problems when undertaking research of this kind. These can be summarised below: 
" there is a danger that the researcher will have difficulty moving towards the 
position of an impartial and objective scientist. 
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" the ability to be constructively critical may be difficult especially of things that 
the researcher may have developed and in which he/she may have a vested 
interest. 
" the insider may become "blinded" by prejudiced opinions and have developed a 
rigid way of doing things (Chan, 1995). 
" the researcher may be too close to the subject area and his/her views may not be 
as objective as those of an outsider. 
" the insider may have developed over-zealous feelings for the organisation of 
which he/she is part. He/she may not be able or willing to critically evaluate that 
organisation and in extreme cases be in fear of reprisals. An outsider would be 
able to offer a far more open assessment of such an organisation. 
" as a professional, the insider may have become conditioned into a certain way of 
thinking. He/she may also have professional relationships to maintain which 
could cloud his/her assessment of certain issues. 
To cope with these disadvantages the researcher adopted a number of strategies. 
" an open, self-critical approach to the research was adopted. A conscious effort 
was made to try and guide the research more from the viewpoint of the 
recipients of the flood warning service and less from the official perceptions of 
the Environment Agency. 
" the researcher developed his own critical analysis of the way his employer 
approaches issues within the area of flood warning, and attempted to adopt 
alternative values and perceptions where these were felt to be appropriate. 
"a flexible approach was adopted when conducting research to try and avoid the 
imposition of preconceived ideas on interviewees. Allowance was made for 
unexpected developments by modifying the research focus when this became 
necessary. 
" fresh perspectives were sought through the attendance of conferences and 
seminars both in this country and overseas and through discussions with 
colleagues and other workers. 
The researcher undertook a Masters Degree in Earth Science and the Environment at 
Kingston University (Haggett, 1981), whilst working in a full-time capacity for the Greater 
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London Council. The thesis was entitled "The Benefits of an Improved Fluvial Flood 
Warning System in London" and some of the issues being addressed in this research 
project were first examined at that time. The researcher therefore, brought some experience 
of undertaking a project of this kind in such an environment and was aware of the effects 
of some of the issues alluded to above. 
3.4 Research framework 
When analysing flood warning systems it is important to develop a conceptual framework 
in which to work. This should identify the main components of such systems and recognise 
how they inter-relate. As discussed in Chapter 2, there is a general consensus amongst 
researchers that the most effective structure for a flood warning system is that of an 
integrated system. There is also general agreement on the main components, namely: 
detection, forecasting, warning and response, and that sound relationships need to be 
developed and maintained between them. Indeed, a limited number of models have been 
proposed over the last 30 years that usefully attempt to conceptualise the flood warning 
process and identify factors that serve to integrate the constituent parts. It has been 
demonstrated in Chapter 2, however, that many of these models focus too narrowly on a 
limited (but nevertheless important) number of these integrative factors and that there is a 
need for a wider perspective. 
This research project attempts to rectify this deficiency by presenting a conceptual model 
derived from a more comprehensive assessment of "integrative devices" (Lawence and 
Lorsch, 1967) that are considered to be most relevant in the context of flood warning. The 
approach adopted is a two-staged process with an initial identification of a wide range of 
issues and variables, leading to a more focused set of factors presented under four broad 
headings: institutional and legal arrangements, technology, human interaction, training and 
expertise, and information and knowledge. These integrative factors can be conceptualised 
as crosscutting strands running through the main components of a flood warning system 
and are illustrated in Figure 3.1 and described below. 
9 The institutional aspects are dominated by the need to identify a lead organisation that 
is mandated to secure the smooth functioning of the entire system (represented by the 
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solid black line). This lead organisation should interact with other relevant 
organisations that have specific roles in certain aspects of the system (represented by 
the fine lines), and this should be undertaken in a collaborative way (represented by the 
circles). 
" The technological aspects are depicted by the need to expand technology more evenly 
across the four main elements, but recognising that the opportunities for and 
appropriateness of technological development lie more in detection and forecasting 
than in dissemination and response (represented by the wedge shape). 
" The human interaction, expertise and training aspects are represented by the 
recognition that such features need to extend from the few to the many (represented by 
the widening wedge shape) and for learning to be encouraged at each stage 
(represented by the linking lines and arrows). 
" The information and knowledge aspects are represented by the need for a circular 
process to be established (represented by the circle) and the avoidance of one-way 
information and knowledge exchange. 
Each of these aspects is examined in detail in Chapters 4 to 7 using information from the 
Thames Region, including a database of flood events (Appendix 1), and participant and 
direct observations. These are discussed in more detail in the next section. 
3.5 Research design 
Yin (1984), defines research design as the logic that links the data to be collected (and the 
conclusions to be drawn) to the initial questions of the study. It is the action plan for 
getting from here to there, where "here" may be defined as the initial set of questions to be 
answered, and "there" is some set of conclusions (answers) about these questions. Between 
the two, Yin suggests, may be found a number of major steps including the collection and 
analysis of relevant data. 
A number of methods and techniques were adopted in the research design to meet the 
specific needs of this project. It was felt important that the design encompassed a variety of 
methods of investigation and made full use of the extensive data and information available 
to the researcher. A central technique was the use of case studies that seemed to offer 
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Figure 3.1: Conceptual Model of the Flood Detection, Forecasting, Warning and 
Response Process 
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flexibility and the ability to focus on the characteristics of real-life events. The researcher 
chose to focus on the Thames catchment as the main area of case study, supported by a 
more in-depth analysis in one particular sub-catchment. To focus entirely on a single case 
study would hinder the ability to use findings to generalise more widely (Schofield, 1993). 
Another technique that was adopted was that of analysing archival information, to which 
the researcher has unique access. A database of nearly 80 flood events, extending from 
1975 to present day, was collated (Appendix 1). This empirical information resource of 
past events was either used to support the findings from case study analysis or to highlight 
where findings were atypical and could be inappropriately used to generalise more widely. 
The final technique used was that of participant and direct observation. The researcher not 
only participated in the management of many of the flood events referred to above, but also 
had direct access to communities and other organisations in flood risk areas across the 
Thames basin. 
All these techniques are examined in more detail in Section 3.8. 
3.6 Case study selection 
As outlined in Chapter 1, attempts are made throughout the thesis to test and strengthen the 
main issues and arguments in each chapter by reference to case study material. Yin (1984) 
considers that a case study approach is preferred when "how and when" questions are 
being posed, and when the focus is on contemporary phenomenon with some real-life 
content and where behaviours cannot be manipulated. He sees the case study's strength as 
being the ability to uniquely deal with a full variety of evidence, documents, artifacts, 
interviews and observations. It is felt, therefore, that the advantages of a case study 
approach are ideally suited to a research project of this nature. The use of case studies as a 
research method is not without criticism however, and it is important to be aware of the 
limitations of such a strategy. 
A criticism of quantitative research generally and case studies in particular, is the limited 
degree to which findings can be generalised to other or larger populations (Bryman, 1988; 
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Schofield, 1993). Lack of rigour and researcher's bias are other criticisms that have been 
levelled at case study methodology (Yin, 1984). The counter argument is that although the 
generalisation of case study data to larger populations is inconsistent with the requirements 
of statistical sampling procedures, such information can be legitimately used to expand and 
generalise theories (Yin, 1984). Schofield (1993) believes that the goal is not to produce a 
standardised set of results that can be replicated by others with the same set of 
circumstances. Rather it is to produce a coherent description of and perspective on a 
situation that is based on and consistent with detailed study of that situation. It is 
impractical to make precise replication a criterion of generalizability in qualitative work. 
On the issue of generalizability in qualitative research, Schofield (1993) detects that a 
consensus appears to be emerging. She considers that this concept is best thought of as a 
matter of the "fit" between the situation studied and others to which one might be 
interested in applying the concepts and conclusions of that study. She stresses the need for 
"thick descriptions" so that an informed judgement about the issue of fit can be made. 
The importance of rigour in qualitative research is examined in more detail in Section 3.7 
below. 
As outlined in Section 3.5 above, case study material underpinning the project is taken 
from the Thames Region. The Thames basin (see Figure 1.1) has a wide range of river 
catchments and communities at risk of flooding, with a significant flood event occurring 
somewhere in the catchment on average three times per year. Although the Thames basin 
covers an extensive area of southern England it does have some limitations when studying 
flood warning arrangements. For example, with the exception of the Thames Tideway in 
London, all rivers in the catchment are fluvial and there is an absence of steep, upland 
rivers. Nevertheless, the region does have a mixture of urban and rural catchments and 
communities, and fast and slow responding rivers that are subject to flooding from winter 
and summer storms. Another reason for selecting this catchment is because it is the area in 
which the researcher has worked since 1975, he currently manages the flood warning 
service, and has an intimate knowledge of the rivers and areas at risk of flooding. Within 
the Region, the researcher is able to draw on a range of examples of different catchment 
types, organisations and communities to bolster analysis and arguments throughout the 
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project. An example would be the Mimmshall Brook catchment that was selected for an in- 
depth case study. 
The Mimmshall Brook is a tributary of the River Colne in south Hertfordshire and drains a 
catchment area of 53 km2 (see Figure 1.2). The Brook has a history of flooding with 
records stretching back to 1928, and it has been estimated that 55 properties are at risk of 
flooding from a 100-year flood, mainly in the lower reaches. Although flooding has 
occurred relatively frequently (16 recorded flood events in the last 70 years), official flood 
warning arrangements have been rudimentary. This offers a good opportunity to study a 
community that has lived with a flood hazard for many years, has to some extent organised 
its own affairs in relation to flood warning in the absence of a credible official service, and 
where there is scope for introducing improvements to flood warning arrangements in an 
integrated way. 
The community is relatively stable and is made up of professional and skilled homeowners, 
residing in a mixture of bungalows and semi-detached and terraced houses in the 
Warrengate Road and Water End areas of North Mimms. Many of the residents are elderly 
and retired, but the frequency of flooding means that the community is acutely aware of the 
flood risk. They have an active residents association that has been agitating for a structural 
flood alleviation scheme to reduce the risk for many years. This community institution 
formed a useful vehicle with which to establish an enhanced official flood warning service. 
The obvious advantages of studying such a community are balanced by the fact that it is 
unlikely to be typical of the "average" community at risk of flooding in the Thames 
catchment. To address this issue, reference is made throughout the thesis to work carried 
out with other communities to develop improved flood warning arrangements. These 
communities have a range of flooding experiences dictated by differing flood risk, are of 
varying social make-up and are located in rural, urban and suburban environments. By 
such an approach it is intended to give a more balanced picture of the issues arising from 
implementing a more integrated flood warning service in the Thames Region. 
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3.7 Validity and reliability 
One of the criteria for judging the quality of research is an assessment of its reliability and 
validity (Henwood and Pidgeon, 1993). Reliability refers to the degree of consistency 
found in research findings, whereas validity is the extent to which the finding accurately 
represents the situation to which it relates (Hammersley, 1992). 
Baxter and Eyles (1997) stress the importance of rigour in qualitative research and 
consider that this can be achieved through the satisfaction of validity, reliability and 
objectivity. They refer to a set of criteria that may be used to evaluate the rigour of 
research that were first proposed by Lincoln and Guba (1985), and these are summarised in 
Table 3.1. 
Yin (1984) has refined these concepts further with particular reference to case study 
methodology. Yin refers to four tests that should be undertaken to ascertain the quality of 
research, and suggests how these tests can be applied to case study work (see Table 3.2). In 
this project a conscious effort has been made to try and ensure that the research is both 
valid and reliable. Using the criteria set out in Table 3.2 (after Yin (1984)) as a framework, 
a number of strategies have been adopted. 
By using multiple sources of evidence collected using a variety of techniques the validity 
of the research was constructed. This was achieved through techniques such as direct and 
participant observation, interviews, assessment of empirical data, official and unofficial 
reports, and attendance of national and international conferences. A chain of evidence was 
established through the maintenance of a journal or notebook in which research findings 
were detailed, and through the review of draft papers by peers. Internal validity was 
secured through pattern matching between the work of the researcher and that of others 
working in the field. Explanation building has been attempted through the presentation of 
a conceptual model of the flood warning process, outlined in Section 3.4 above. This has 
allowed the causal links between the variables or elements to be explained in some detail. 
A time-series analysis of flood warning data held by the Environment Agency from 1975 
to the present day has been undertaken and this information has been collated into a 
database (Appendix 1). This allows casual relationships between the flood warning system 
elements to be better understood. 
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Table 3.1: Criteria for evaluating qualitative research (after Lincoln and Guba, 1985) 
Criteria Definition Strategy 
Credibility Authentic representations " 
Purposeful sampling 
of experience " Disciplined 
subjectivity 
" Prolonged engagement 
" Persistent observation 
" Triangulation 
" Peer debriefing 
" Referential adequacy 
" Member checking 
Transferability Fit within contexts outside " Purposeful sampling 
the study situation " Detailed 
description 
Dependability Minimisation of " 
Mechanically recorded 
idiosyncrasies in data 
interpretation, variability " Multiple researchers 
tracked to identifiable " Participant researchers 
sources. " Peer examination 
" Triangulation 
Confirmability Extent to which biases, " Audit trail products 
motivations, interests or " Detailed description of 
perspectives of the inquirer the audit process 
influence interpretations. " Autobiography 
" Journal/notebook 
Table 3.2 Validity and reliability (after Yin, 1984) 
Tests Definition Strategy 
Construct validity 
Establishing correct operational " Use multiple sources of 
measures for the concepts being evidence 
studied. " Establish chain of 
evidence 
" Have key informants 
review draft reports 
Internal validity 
Establishing causal " Do pattern matching 
relationships, whereby certain " Do explanation building 
conditions are shown to lead to " Do time-series analysis 
other conditions, as 
distinguished from spurious 
relationships 
External validity 
Establishing the domain to " Use replication logic in 
which a study's findings can be multiple-case studies 
generalised. 
Reliability Demonstrating that the " Use case study protocol 
operations of a study can be " Develop case study 
repeated, with the same results. database 
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External validity and transferability is achieved by recognising that a single case study 
offers a poor basis for generalising. As Yin (1984) stresses, a theory must be tested through 
replications of the findings in a second or even a third area. Once such replication has been 
made, the results can be applied to a much larger area with more confidence. This 
replication logic was followed in this study by reference to a number of different areas in 
the Thames catchment. By necessity however, this study draws on research based on 
different hazards, different time periods, and different institutional and cultural 
backgrounds, and caution is needed when using derived data and conclusions in the UK 
context. This caution must be held in the background throughout this thesis. Reliability 
has been strengthened through the regular comparison of research findings with those 
presented by other workers to determine the degree of consistency. 
3.8 Sources of information/data collection 
A range of data collection techniques was used in this study, including information from 
primary and secondary sources. It was felt important not to rely on single sources of 
information and wherever possible to utilise data from different sources. As Yin (1984) 
describes, such an approach allows for the development of convergent lines of enquiry, a 
process of triangulation. Corroboration of findings is likely to be much more convincing 
and accurate. Accordingly, for the purposes of this study, information was gathered from 
the following sources: 
1. The published scientific and other literature. 
2. The Environment Agency and other relevant organisations, including 
unpublished reports, procedures, environmental and other data, expert opinion, 
operational experience and observation. 
3. Case study material from across the Thames basin, including the Mimmshall 
Brook catchment. 
Interviews 
One of the most important sources of information was the interview. Semi-structured or 
open-ended interviews were most commonly adopted where key respondents were asked 
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for the facts of a matter as well as their opinions about events. A commonly used technique 
was to ask the respondent to propose his or her own insights into certain matters and to use 
such propositions as the basis for further inquiry. As Yin (1984) suggests, the more a 
respondent assists in this manner, the more that the role may be considered one of an 
"informant" rather than a respondent. Key informants are often critical to the success of a 
case study and can often suggest sources of corroboratory evidence. Such informants were 
found not only in local communities but also in the Environment Agency and other 
organisations. It is important, however, not to become overly dependent on such 
informants and to seek out other sources of evidence as far as is possible. 
Interviews were conducted mostly on a face-to-face basis, but occasionally short 
interviews were carried out using the telephone. Detailed notes were taken during each 
interview and written up in full following their completion. 
The professional network was an important source of information and contact with key 
informants within and beyond the Agency took place at varying frequency. A deliberate 
attempt was made to capitalise on the researcher's position as an insider and to utilise the 
professional network available to him. The benefits of this approach were significant in 
that it gave access to views and opinions not normally available to researchers. The 
disadvantage was that formal sampling methods were not used, but in this context they 
may well have been limiting. It was felt that a more action-orientated approach made best 
use of the openings and resources available to the researcher. In practice, interviews were 
conducted as part of the researcher's normal course of duty through group meetings and 
face-to-face discussions. New ideas emanating from this research project were purposely 
injected into the debate and this generated a stream of responses (and hence data) from 
managers, colleagues and peers. 
Questionnaires 
In one instance a questionnaire survey was undertaken among seven flood warning 
practitioners in the Thames Region. This was designed to identify possible differences in 
intuition, perception and interpretation between flood duty officers. The questionnaire that 
was used in the survey is presented in Appendix 4. 
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Archival Records 
Archival information was a vital data source in this study. A previously untapped archive 
of flood event and flood warning data became the object of extensive retrieval and 
analysis. The archive extends back to 1975 and includes information on 80 flood events 
where formal flood warnings were issued in one form or another. The researcher, 
following participation in the management of the events in fact wrote many of the reports 
contained in the archive. The information was collated into a database and it was important 
to retrieve not only data on the magnitude and hydrological significance of flood events, 
but other aspects such as institutional arrangements, behavioural information and 
operational effectiveness. This was gleaned from transcripts of duty officers' logs, 
correspondence, and newspaper cuttings, etc. The retrieval exercise also triggered many 
facts from the researcher's memory that had not been written down at the time. The 
database is presented in Appendix 1 and information from this was used to support the case 
study material and strengthen arguments throughout the thesis. 
The researcher is aware, however, that the accuracy of archival evidence is not always as 
high as it might appear and some caution is needed when interpreting such evidence. 
Documentation 
Documentary information was very relevant to this study. The following types of 
document were referred to at various stages: 
" Letters, memoranda, and other correspondence held by the Environment 
Agency and other bodies. 
" Minutes of meetings, written reports, and newsletters. 
" Formal studies or evaluations of the same sites under study made by the 
Environment Agency and research bodies. 
" Media articles in newspapers. 
Although these documents were extremely useful to the study, it was recognised that they 
should not necessarily be accepted as literal recordings of events or that the information 
contained lacks bias. The documents were used mainly to corroborate and augment 
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evidence from other sources. If the documentary evidence was contradictory, however, it 
did point to the need for further inquiry into the topic concerned. 
Although documents held by the Environment Agency were freely accessible to the 
researcher, documentation from other sources was found to be particularly valuable. The 
researcher did, for instance, ask to be placed on the mailing list for community newsletters 
that provided useful insights into the perspectives of local people on matters such as 
flooding and flood warning in the area concerned. 
Direct Observation 
Observational evidence can be used to provide additional information about the topic being 
studied. As Yin (1984) suggests, if the study involves the use of technology, for instance, 
observations of the technology at work are invaluable aids to the further understanding of 
the limits or the applicability of the technology. Similarly, observations of a community or 
an organisation can add new dimensions for understanding. Baxter and Eyles (1997) stress 
the importance of building rapport and trust with the respondents. They suggest using this 
to develop "information-rich" conversations that can help shape the data gathered and to 
gain an understanding of perceptions. 
The techniques used in this study were both formal and informal, with greater emphasis 
placed on the latter than the former. Within the Environment Agency this included detailed 
observation of operational activities, both before and after changes made as a result of this 
research work. This occurred during actual flood events and during pre-planned exercises, 
at meetings, and through ad-hoc discussions with key informants. Within communities and 
other organisations the techniques included formal meetings, ad-hoc discussions with key 
informants (both during "normal" times and during and after flood events), attendance of 
public meetings, and site visits. Observation was not always through conversation and 
discussion, the ability to stand-back and watch others operate without interference was 
found to be important. Peer debriefing was also found to be useful, whereby data and 
interpretations were exposed to respected colleagues for comment. 
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Participant observation 
Yin (1984) defines participant observation as a special mode of observation in which the 
researcher is not merely a passive observer. Instead, the researcher may take a variety of 
roles within the study and may actually participate in the event being studied. The 
researcher's role as manager of the flood warning function meant that this technique was 
one of the dominant ones used in this project. Yin goes on to say, however, that such 
observation provides certain unusual opportunities for collecting study data, but it also 
involves major problems. The most distinctive opportunities can be defined thus: 
" The ability to gain access to events or groups that are otherwise inaccessible to 
scientific investigation. 
" The ability to perceive reality from the viewpoint of someone "inside" the study 
rather than external to it. 
0 Opportunities arising from the researcher's ability to manipulate events or 
situations. 
The major problems involve the potential biases produced. The researcher has less ability 
to work as an external observer, may become overly supportive of the organisation for 
which he or she works, and may find combining the participant and observing roles too 
demanding. These aspects have been discussed in detail in Section 3.3. 
In this study, the researcher's position gave him the flexibility to legitimately influence 
staff under his direct supervision. He was able to persuade staff to focus, in more depth 
than would normally be required, on the key issues under consideration in this project 
whilst carrying out their normal duties. This helped broaden the information gathering 
process. He is also in frequent contact with flood warning managers in the other seven 
regions of the Agency and at Head Office, giving a good opportunity to canvass opinion 
and influence policy. 
As a Flood Duty Hydrologist, the researcher is responsible for operating the flood warning 
system and was able to pay special attention to the service provided to communities in the 
study areas. He was able to gain first hand knowledge on how arrangements were 
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functioning and, by interacting with the relevant communities and organisations during 
flood events, was able to gain a clear understanding of their perceptions and needs. 
Secondary sources 
The researcher compiled a range of information for the areas under study in the Thames 
catchment. This included hydrological, geological, meteorological, and socio-economic 
details that are summarised in Appendix 1. Data was also collated on flooding histories 
from sources within the Environment Agency, local authorities and local communities. 
Discussions with older residents were particularly useful in supplementing official records. 
The researcher also gained valuable information and fresh perspectives from attending 
national and international conferences and workshops during the period of study. The most 
relevant conferences are listed below: 
1. NATO Advanced Scientific Institute on Flood Defence and Flood Plain 
Management. Budapest, Hungary. May 1994. 
2. International Conference on Hydrological Applications of Weather Radar, Sao 
Paulo, Brazil. August 1995. 
3. International Workshop on Flood Warning: Issues and Practice in Total System 
Design. Middlesex University, September 1995. 
4. Conference on Flood Warning Systems, Technologies, and Preparedness. 
Second national conference of the US National Hydrologic Warning Council. 
St Louis, Missouri, USA. October 1997. Follow-up visit to Urban Drainage 
District, Denver, Colorado - tours of operational and research facilities. 
5. International Conference on Hydrological Applications of Weather Radar, San 
Diego, California, USA. April 1998. 
6. Workshop on Social and Institutional Responses to Climate Change and 
Climatic Hazards, Middlesex University, March 2000. 
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3.9 Limitations of research methods 
The main limitation to the research work carried out in this study was time. Although the 
researcher is working in the flood warning field, undertaking a part-time PhD does result in 
some quite severe time constraints. 
During the period of study, the Environment Agency went through extensive 
organisational change that impacted on the researcher in a number of ways. These can be 
summarised as follows: 
" Time that could have been allocated to research work was invariably taken up 
with organisational issues - both inside and outside office hours. 
" The loss of staff and continuity in the Flood Warning Team resulted in 
disruption to the operational effectiveness of the service. 
" Organisational change had a negative impact on the efficient working of the 
flood warning service. 
Although case study material was taken from across the Thames Region, in-depth analysis 
was limited to the Mimmshall Brook catchment in Hertfordshire. With extra time it would 
have been desirable to carry out more in-depth studies in other river catchments. This 
would have allowed a greater analysis of communities with differing social attributes, and 
river catchments with differing hydrological responses and land-use. 
The advantages and disadvantages of being an "insider" have been discussed at length in 
this chapter. The Environment Agency is essentially a positivistic organisation and adopts 
a quantitative approach to scientific issues. One limiting aspect of this approach is that it is 
easy to become trapped into this positivist mind-set and to step outside this "box" without 
bias can be difficult. Consequently, the researcher encountered a certain amount of 
prejudice from colleagues who questioned the validity of the more qualitative research 
methods adopted in this study which were considered by some to be less relevant and less 
worthy. The very fact that the research approach generated a certain amount of hostility 
was considered to be a positive factor and confirmation that the researcher was developing 
alternative values and challenging the status quo. 
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3.10 Summary 
The research philosophy and approach, framework and design, and methods used in this 
project have been outlined in this chapter. The ongoing epistemological debate within the 
social sciences has been recognised, as has the relative benefits and disadvantages of 
conducting quantitative and qualitative research. The importance of obtaining multiple 
sources of evidence to ensure validity and reliability is also understood. 
It is clear that the approach and methodology adopted in this research project are 
influenced by the unique position in which the researcher finds himself. Occupying the 
post of manager of the flood warning service in the Thames Region of the Environment 
Agency offers particular advantages in terms of access to information, staff expertise and 
operational know-how. This coupled with the length of experience in this field, gives the 
researcher particular insight into the problems associated with the provision of an effective 
flood warning service. There are dangers however, in being too close to the issues resulting 
in a possible lack of impartiality and objectivity, and these problems have been recognised 
and discussed in this chapter. 
The research methods used in the project centre around the use of semi-structured 
interviews, both with staff and experts in the field and the general public in flood risk 
areas. This allowed the researcher to blend his own views with those of others, be they 
46experts" or lay-people living in at-risk communities. A conscious effort was made to view 
the issues from the perspective of different disciplines and to gain insight into how people 
in local communities perceive the issues surrounding flood warning provision. Another key 
element is the interpretation of views and opinions of workers in academia by an 
operational practitioner, and the ability to test certain theoretical ideas in an operational 
envirorunent. Other techniques adopted were the analysis of archival material and other 
documentation, direct observation and participant observation. 
The analytical framework is based on the key concept of integration and an assessment of 
whether an integrated system is more efficient than a more disparate arrangement. The aim 
is to identify a suite of integration factors that can be universally applied to flood warning 
systems. The approach is presented by means of a conceptual model that is described in 
this chapter and forms a framework for the other chapters in the thesis. Case studies offer a 
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useful way to test the model and gain feedback from local communities on the 
effectiveness of the approach. 
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Chapter 4 
Institutional and Legal Arrangements 
4.1 Introduction 
This chapter addresses the first element of the conceptual model presented in Chapter 3 
(shaded area in Figure 4.1 ). It examines the influence that institutions and the law have had on 
the integration of flood warning systems in England and Wales in general and in the Thames 
catchment in particular. The recent evolution of legal and organisational arrangements is 
analysed and an assessment given on how these arrangements help or hinder the integration 
process. Reconu-nendations for change and improvement are presented, based on the factors 
outlined in Chapter 2 of this thesis, and modifications are suggested to further enhance flood 
warning integration. Reference will be made to organisational and legal arrangements before 
and after the I September 1996 when significant changes were introduced in England and 
Wales, and how these arrangements have operated in practice, particularly during the severe 
floods of Easter 1998. Arrangements will be examined at both the national and regional scale, 
using the Thames Region as a case study. 
Figure 4.1: Conceptual model of the FDFWR process 
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(see Chapter 3 for full details) 
4.2 The legal framework covering flood warning 
As detailed in Appendix 3, the Environment Agency (and its predecessors) is the only 
Organisation empowered by legislation to establish and operate flood waming systems. The 
legislation focuses very firmly however, on providing powers to install equipment to detect 
storms and floods. Critically for the development of an integrated approach, the issue of flood 
warning dissemination has not been specifically addressed in the statute and reliance has been 
placed on voluntary agreements between the Environment Agency (and its predecessors), 
local authorities and the emergency services. These agreements were first established across 
England and Wales in 1968 following severe floods in that year, prior to that only ad hoc 
procedures existed for some river catchnients. The informal and co-operative agreements 
remained virtually unchanged for almost 30 years and have worked well in the past, even with 
the evolution of local variations. 
The establishment of the Environment Agency in 1996 gave the Government the opportunity 
to strengthen the legal position, but the enabling Environment Act of 1995 did not address the 
issue and merely consolidated previous legislation. The Government did recognise however, 
that voluntary arrangements between the key players were not functioning as well as they 
should and that there was a need for greater clarity in defining roles and responsibilities. The 
progressive deterioration in arrangements was due in pail to tightening resource constraints, 
growing concerns over legal liability and a failure to formalise procedures between 
organisations. Accordingly, arrangements for flood warning dissemination were modified by 
means of a Ministerial Direction under Section 40 of the Environment Act. This required the 
Environment Agency to take the lead role from I September 1996 and to "take steps as 
appear to it to be reasonable and practicable to provide warning of any danger of flooding". 
The Direction relates to the manner in which the Agency provides a flood warning service 
when it elects to exercise its permissive powers and not to a strengthening of those powers i. e. 
into a statutory duty. The legislation relating to other organisations; involved in flood warning 
and response remained unchanged. 
4.2.1 Critical assessment of the legal framework 
The legal framework covering flood warning and flood response presents a number of severe 
integration problems. This framework seemed adequate in the 1960's when resources in the 
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organisations concerned were sufficient to meet the contingencies of the service. When 
resource constraints were placed on these organisations however, the informal co-operative 
arrangements that had developed between them started to break down. This situation has been 
compounded over the last decade by a growing fear of legal liability both in organisations 
generally and specifically following the "Cardiff Judgement" (see Appendix 3). The reaction 
of many organisations to these issues has been to minimise involvement in activities that are 
not designated as statutory duties and this can include flood warning and flood response. 
There is also the added danger that some authorities may use the excuse of the fear of legal 
liability to withdraw from selected functions. 
The legislation itself focuses on the provision of equipment to detect and forecast flooding. 
The arrangements needed to disseminate warnings and to ensure public awareness are not 
explicitly addressed. Similarly, the Government's grant-aid policy for flood warning supports 
the provision of new capital equipment and gives less attention to the social and 
environmental aspects of flood warning. There is an in-built bias therefore, towards the 
financing of equipment that tends to favour the development of detection and forecasting 
systems often at the expense of the dissemination and response elements. This is a legacy 
from the original legislation that was drafted in the 1970s and highlights the need for review 
at appropriate times such as when new legislation is being drafted. Without modification, the 
Government's grant-aiding procedure will continue to work against the integration of flood 
warning systems and may indeed lead to greater fragmentation. 
The law relating to flood defence responsibilities perpetuates fragmented arrangements that 
impact on flood warning. In particular, there is distinction in law between main and non-main 
river (ordinary watercourses) and a complexity of arrangements regarding coastal matters. So, 
although the general supervisory duty for flood defence falls on one organisation, the 
Environment Agency, the management of flood defence varies depending on the designation 
of the watercourse, resulting in very fragmented arrangements across the country. The 
Agricultural Select Committee (1998) found these arrangements to be confused, outdated and 
incapable of delivering effective policies. It recommends the rationalisation of the legislative 
base of flood and coastal defence policy and sets out the following proposals for change: 
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" the introduction of integrated management of flooding issues for main rivers and 
non-main rivers, with responsibilities transferred from local authorities to 
Regional Flood Defence Committees. 
" the introduction of integrated management of flooding and erosion issues at the 
coast, with all responsibilities transferred from local authorities and Regional 
Flood Defence Committees to coastal groups. 
" strategic direction to be given by the Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food 
(MAFF), with the Environment Agency responsible for all flood and coastal 
defence issues in an advisory and supervisory role, and implementation of policy 
executed at a regional level through Regional Flood Defence Committees and 
coastal groups. 
It remains to be seen if the Government will act on these recommendations. Indeed, the 
Government has had ample opportunity to strengthen the legal framework covering flood 
warning activities but has chosen not to act. The new flood warning dissemination role of the 
Environment Agency for instance, is only formalised by a Ministerial Direction that directs 
the Agency to use its permissive powers and liaise with a limited number of external 
organisations. Several reasons have been suggested for this minimal action on the part of the 
Government, but an overriding factor must be the unwillingness to fund an increased demand 
for resources that will inevitably follow the replacement of the Agency's pen-nissive powers 
with statutory duties. Without this strengthened legal framework however, institutions will 
continue to give priority to other areas and functions where duties are required by statute and 
this can result in severe integration problems. 
The Ministerial Direction has in fact placed the Environment Agency in a difficult situation. 
The Agency has not been given extra (long-term) financial resources to implement the 
Direction and has undertaken this work by rescheduling its existing flood defence 
programme. It can be argued, therefore, that the Agency is not adequately resourced to offer a 
total flood warning service across England and Wales to the estimated 1.6 million households 
at risk. At the same time, the Direction has provided other organisations with an excuse to opt 
out or reduce their involvement in flooding issues and to focus their limited resources on other 
matters. Indeed, the Agency has experienced some difficulty in getting local authorities and 
police forces in particular, to address the issues surrounding flood warning and response with 
any Priority. Many have the mistaken view that these issues are now totally in the domain of 
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the Agency. In London, for example, no organisation is taking the lead in the development of 
a strategic flood plan for the city. The lack of guiding legislation and national standards are 
given as mitigating reasons. Some authorities mistakenly think it is the Agency's role to 
develop major incident response plans for floods. Confusion such as this leads to inaction and 
"buck passing" that can block the implementation of an integrated system. 
The media has an important role to play in flood warning dissemination and the Agency has 
begun to work much more closely with a range of media outlets, especially local radio and 
television stations. Although most stations are keen to broadcast flood warning information, 
there is no guarantee that for a given flood event that this will take place and there is a general 
reluctance on the part of the broadcasters to relinquish editorial control. This can result in the 
Agency becoming less reliant on these outlets and this in turn impacts on the establishment of 
a multi-channelled warning system. There is no statutory duty placed on the media to 
broadcast flood warning notices and this forces the Agency to enter into voluntary agreements 
with large numbers of individual media companies, resulting in fragmented dissemination 
arrangements. This contrasts with arrangements in the United States where media stations 
have an obligation to transmit warning messages written into their operating licences which is 
far more conducive to integration. The Agriculture Select Committee (1998) states "we were 
particularly surprised that it was not already obligatory for all local public and commercial 
radio and television stations to carry flood warnings on air, and would urge MAFF to make 
this a requirement in future". 
For an integrated flood warning system to operate effectively therefore, there is not only a 
need for the legislation to address the total warning process, but to also clearly define the roles 
and responsibilities of relevant authorities and the mechanisms for resolving conflict that may 
arise between them. The authorities that are relevant to this process extend beyond the 
Environment Agency, local authorities and the emergency services (referred to in the 
Ministerial Direction) and should include organisations such as the media, the Met Office, 
utility companies and even the insurance industry. The laws that govern these different 
organisations need to be reviewed to ensure that they are compatible and not contradictory 
and there is a need to ensure continued political support and resources to underpin the 
principles of integration. These aspects will be analysed in more detail later in this chapter. 
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4.3 Assessment of the institutional framework in England and Wales prior to September 
1996 
Parker et al (1995) comment that although flood warning systems in England and Wales 
have reached a relatively mature level of development, legal and organisational 
weaknesses are undermining their effectiveness and integration. As outlined in Appendix 
3, prior to September 1996 national policy towards flood warning dissemination relied on 
voluntary liaison between the then National Rivers Authority, the police, local authorities 
and others (see Figure 4.2). This voluntary arrangement that had been a strength in the past 
however, was proving to be a central weakness. One of the main problems was uncertainty 
over precise roles and responsibilities. Under these arrangements, none of the relevant 
agencies had a clear statutory duty to issue and disseminate flood warnings. This non- 
statutory approach came under severe pressure as local authorities and the police faced 
tighter budgets and an increasing array of statutory duties. In many cases both the police 
and local authorities had retreated from their "responsibilities", encouraged by perceived 
legal liability hazards, and the flood warning dissemination system was in severe danger of 
breaking down altogether. Parker and Penning-Rowsell (1991) believe that non-statutory 
co-operative arrangements are not conducive to integration and tend to degrade over time, 
particularly during periods of financial stringency, making statutory arrangements 
necessary for effective service delivery. 
In 1989 Parker stated that the administrative arrangements that encompass flood warning 
systems needed overhaul and improvement and that additional legislation may be necessary in 
order to secure improvements in the effectiveness of these systems. He put forward a case for 
change and identified that the lack of statutory duties and the relative immaturity and 
embryonic nature of English law as being limiting and counter-productive. The main defence 
of the current legal framework is that it is preferable to avoid tightly defining the roles and 
statutory responsibilities of each agency within the warning dissemination chain. This may 
lead to strict role and responsibility demarcation, thus discouraging discretionary use of 
powers which, it is argued, is essential during periods of uncertainty, such as flood 
emergencies, when the nature of the threat may be difficult to define, or unexpected 
circumstances may arise. Parker (1989) argues that discretionary powers can lead to 
problems, including lack of clarity about liability. Without statutory duties being defined the 
closest attention will always be focused on priorities where there are statutory duties. Parker 
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believes that this is leading to insufficient priority being given to planning for peacetime 
emergencies, such as floods including the dissemination of warnings. If flood warning 
systems are to become more effective and integrated then more defined liability, including the 
clearer statutory definition of roles and responsibilities, is required. 
Another key requirement for integration is periodic review of legislation underpinned by 
sustained political commitment. As discussed in Section 4.2, despite opportunities presented 
by the Water Act 1989, the Water Resources Act 1991 and the Environment Act 1995, 
successive governments have chosen not to modify the legal arrangements relating to flood 
warning. With regard to political commitment, governments continue to send out mixed 
signals. While the Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food places the provision of 
adequate and effective flood warning systems at the top of its priority list, the Home Office, 
which administers civil defence and police policy, has a quite different outlook. Over the last 
three years, the Home Office has reduced civil defence expenditure by a third, and has been 
actively encouraging the police to focus on law and order issues and reduce their involvement 
in "peripheral" activities, such as flood warning dissemination. All these factors have helped 
to constrain the integration of flood warning systems. 
Just prior to 1996, the then National Rivers Authority had attempted to put pressure on local 
authorities and the police to continue to disseminate the flood warning notices they issued by 
articulating what they saw as being current practice in local flood warning procedures. It was 
felt that by setting out the perceived roles and responsibilities of the agencies involved, the 
flood warning dissemination process would be clarified and would, as a consequence, 
function more effectively. The police and local authorities rejected this approach however, 
because they did not accept that at that time the NRA had a co-ordinating role and they feared 
that responsibilities would be placed upon them for which they may become liable. 
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Figure 4.2: Organisational arrangements prior to September 1996 
Met. Office 












Another issue that has had a negative impact on the integration of flood warning arrangements 
over the years is that of organisational boundaries. Although the boundaries of local 
authorities, police and other emergency services generally (but not always) coincide, those of 
the Environment Agency and its predecessors, which are based on river catchments, are 
unique to those organisations. Add to this the differing boundaries of organisations such the 
Met Office, utility companies and the media, then it is easy to see how this issue can make 
integration between organisations difficult to achieve. The establishment of unitary local 
authorities in certain areas and the formation of new utility companies have compounded this 
problem. The number of organisational boundaries in the Thames Region alone has been 
estimated at 157 (see Table 4.1). This is almost certainly an underestimate, as it only includes 
those organisations that are currently in receipt of flood warning notices from the Agency and 
does not include the many internal boundaries that exist within these organisations. 
Parker et al (1989) draw attention to the importance of the organisational culture that 
surrounds flood warning systems. Generally they found organisations to be co-operative and 
interested in developing effective flood warning arrangements. In the years leading up to 1996 
it was noticeable however, that public agencies began to carefully delimit their participation, 
in some cases withdrawing services previously provided. This created gaps or seams in flood 
warning dissemination and response procedures leaving the flood prone with a greater burden 
of poorly appreciated responsibilities for protecting their own property. 
Table 4.1: Number of Organisational Boundaries in the Thames Region 
Organisations in receipt of flood warning notices Number of non- 
coincident boundaries 
County Councils 11 
London Boroughs + City of London 33 
District Councils 54 
Police Forces 7 
Fire and Rescue I 
Ambulance 0 
Utility Companies (water, gas, electricity, telephone, rail) 14 
Navigation Authorities 5 
Weather Centres 7 
Local Radio Stations 14 
Other Media Outlets 7 
Environment Agency 4 
Total 157 
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In general, therefore, the legal and organisational framework that existed prior to 
September 1996 was not particularly conducive to integration. In this section the main 
areas of concern have been identified and a number of recommendations for change and 
improvement can be made: 
The reliance on non-statutory co-operative arrangements between organisations is not 
satisfactory in the long-tenn. As Parker (1992) puts it, the legal "fog" surrounding 
responsibilities for flood warnings requires the attention of legislators. The legislation 
should be clarified and the respective roles and responsibilities of the relevant 
agencies should be clearly delineated. The counter argument that tightly defined roles 
and responsibilities may discourage the discretionary use of powers during flood 
emergencies does not hold up in practice, especially during times of financial 
stringency. Organisations, will always give priority to their statutory duties and this is 
one reason why the voluntary arrangements encompassing flood warning have 
degraded over time. 
" There is a need to review and update legislation at appropriate junctures. The 
legislation covering flood warning systems was originally written in the 1970s and has 
been repeatedly assimilated into successive acts without substantive change. For 
integration to flourish there is a continuing need to revisit and update legislation and 
for laws governing different organisations to be made compatible. 
A key requirement for integration is sustained political commitment to the function in 
question. Flood warning has enjoyed mixed support from Government over recent 
years, with MAFF, for example, placing the function at the top of the priority list in its 
flood defence programme, but at the same time the Home Office has reduced civil 
defence budgets and encouraged police withdrawal from activities other than those 
linked to law and order. This inconsistent approach has placed strains on the service 
and the institutional framework that has hindered the process of integration. There is 
clearly a need to resolve the ambiguous policy stances of different govenunent 
departments to ensure that flood warning systems are cultivated and sustained. 
An area of concern is the lack of effective fora, that allow organisations to formally 
liaise and clarify objectives, roles and responsibilities, and the lack of detailed written 
plans that document these arrangements. Prior to 1996, the NRA attempted to address 
this issue on a number of occasions but with limited success due mainly to the lack of 
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acceptance on the part of the local authorities and the police that the NRA had a co- 
ordinating role. This underlines the need for a designated lead agency that is accepted 
by all parties and capable of co-ordinating and improving the integration of 
organisational activities. 
There is a need for government agencies and local authorities to reach out to the 
media and to cultivate professional and personal relationships over time. By creating 
partnerships with the media the effectiveness of warning dissemination and public 
awareness campaigns can be increased. As Burkart (1991) mentions, the various 
media outlets can integrate different elements to meet the needs of the community in a 
hazard situation. By allowing public sector emergency managers to relay messages to 
mass audiences, the public receives information from the media which carries the 
status of official warnings and of unofficially, independently gathered and filtered 
news. 
The plethora of organisational boundaries is not conducive to integration and a greater 
effort is needed to minimise the impact of this issue by arranging procedures around 
boundaries that have the most commonality. 
Finally, importance should be attached to the development of a positive organisational 
climate and culture in agencies involved in flood warning activities. Just prior to 1996 
a very parochial climate had prevailed with many organisations attempting to distance 
themselves from direct involvement on the pretext of legal liability fears and resource 
constraints. Integration requires a more positive approach but this will not be 
forthcoming until organisations have a clearer view of their roles and responsibilities. 
4.3.1 Critical assessment of the pre-September 1996 arrangements in the Thames 
Region 
From details set out in Appendix 3, it is clear that institutional arrangements in the Thames 
Region prior to 1996 exhibited few signs of being well integrated. To assess the degree to 
which integration is present, it is important to ascertain how many of the factors, identified in 
Chapter 2, were met in practice prior to I September 1996. 
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1. The first factor requires the securement of political commitment, establishment of 
clear objectives, defir-dtion of roles and responsibilities, preferably in a written plan, 
and agreement on rules for conflict resolution. Few if any of these requirements were 
in place in the Thames catchment. Roles and responsibilities were not adequately 
defined and attempts at clarification had largely failed. This left confusion in the 
minds of the organisations themselves and ultimately the general public as to who 
does what. The NRA produced written procedures outlining arrangements as it 
understood them, but failed to secure a consensus on the content. It can be argued that 
one of the main reasons for this failure was the lack of political commitment within 
the agencies involved and the refusal to accept that the NRA had a mandate to 
produce such a document. The NRA found itself in conflict with local authorities and 
the police in certain counties and this escalated as rules for conflict resolution were not 
in place, another prerequisite for integration (see Appendix 3 for details). 
2. The second factor requires the establishment of functions and structures to foster 
integration and consideration of the designation of a lead agency. Institutional 
arrangements concerning flood warning in the Thames catchment were established in 
1968 and had not been revised to any great extent since that time. As has been 
discussed in Section 4.2, no one agency was given a lead role to co-ordinate activities 
across the function. Each of the agencies involved was allocated a general area of 
responsibility and allowed to organise their organisational structures to suit their 
operational circumstances. Cross-functional integration was not given a high priority. 
The NRA recognised the need for a co-ordinating agency however, especially in the 
areas of planning and management, but was unable to gain the acceptance of other 
organisations when it attempted to carry out this role. 
3. The third factor requires the establishment of fora to facilitate liaison, negotiation and 
mediation between agencies. In the Thames Region consultation between 
organisations had been mainly confined to annual Flood Warning Seminars hosted by 
the NRA. The NRA viewed the seminars as a means to remind the local authorities, 
police and other emergency services of the flood warning procedures and to update 
them of progress in flood detection and forecasting capabilities. Although a period of 
open discussion was allowed for, the seminars were not designed for close inter- 
agency liaison on matters of detail. Some local authorities, for example, had explicitly 
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stated that they did not accept that the seminars were the correct forum for 
consultation on matters such as flood warning procedures. 
4. The fourth factor requires the instillation of a positive organisational climate and 
culture for integration. In the years leading to 1996 pressures on resources, confusion 
over roles and responsibilities and concerns about legal liability had conspired to 
develop a parochial attitude within many organisations involved in flood warning. 
This has created real barriers to integrated and co-operative effort. Many authorities 
had become inward looking and much energy was being devoted to minimising 
involvement in an attempt to reduce the risk of litigation and the commitment of 
resources. Some organisations however, continued to adopt an open and co-operative 
policy and this can often be traced to a small number of dedicated individuals who 
have built up a positive culture within their respective organisations. In the Thames 
Region a limited number of local authorities and police forces fall into this category 
and as a consequence have developed good flood warning and response arrangements 
in their area, but prior to 1996 this was increasingly the exception rather than the rule. 
An example would be Hertfordshire Police who were keen to establish effective 
dissemination arrangements in their area and demanded detailed flood plain 
information from the NRA in order to achieve this. This positive approach mainly 
emanated from an individual Inspector who was tasked with making these 
arrangements work effectively. Neighbouring forces felt that Hertfordshire was setting 
a dangerous precedent and tried to dissuade the Force from pursuing such a policy. 
4.4 Critical assessment of the institutional arrangements post September 1996 
In September 1996 a number of significant changes were introduced relating to flood warning 
arrangements in England and Wales (see Figure 4.3). These changes are sunu-narised below 
and analysed in this section and presented in detail in Appendix 3. 
The designation of the Environment Agency as the lead organisation for flood 
warning arrangements. 
Clarification of organisational roles and responsibilities through the production of 
Local Flood Warning Plans and establishment of local multi-agency planning 
groups. 
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* Greater political commitment by the Government through the elevation of flood 
warning to the highest priority in the flood defence function and preferential grant- 
aid funding. 
*A clarification of the legal position in relation to flood warning dissemination 
through the issue of a Ministerial Direction to the NRA/Enviromnent Agency. 
On the face of it, the new arrangements include a number of positive elements that should 
strengthen the process of integration. The way in which these changes are implemented 
however, and the support they attract from the range of organisations involved in flood 
response will influence their impact. 
The designation of a lead agency is positive integrative development and it gives the 
Environment Agency a mandate to co-ordinate planning and management activities across the 
flood warning function and with all involved parties. However, this development came about 
in response to pressure from the police whose main objective was to reduce their involvement 
in flood warning activities rather than through a desire to improve the level of service offered 
to the at-risk public. It is important that other agencies such as the police and local authorities 
support the Envirom-nent Agency in its new role and do not just view these changes as an 
opportunity to minimise their involvement. 
The legal changes have been kept to a minimum and no extra long-term resources have been 
made available to the Agency to fund the new service it is being asked to provide. There are 
two main dangers here; 
1. the Agency may not commit sufficient resources, both in terms of manpower and 
equipment, to be able to offer a robust enough service, risking the possibility of 
failure especially during widespread and protracted flood events. 
statutory duties have not been conferred on any organisation. The Agency can 
only bring about change through negotiation and influence which some local 
authorities and police forces may respond to but others may not. 
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In short, the Direction has been issued to only one organisation with responsibilities in 
flood response and within the context of existing institutional arrangements that, as has 
been discussed in Section 4.3, are seriously fragmented in a number of important areas. 
There has been no attempt by Government to fundamentally change these arrangements to 
minimise this fragmentation and address the need for greater integration. Nevertheless, the 
Direction does try to clarify the role and responsibilities of the Environment Agency and 
by doing so gives the lead organisation a greater degree of legitimisation with the other 
authorities involved in flood response. 
The need for improved inter-organisational liaison is widely recognised as a key 
requirement for integration and the Ministerial Direction requires the Environment Agency 
to consult with some of the authorities involved in flood warning. The Agency is not 
obliged to reach agreement with these organisations however, and plans may be produced 
without going through the full process of consultation. Alternatively, other organisations 
may not consider that flooding is a sufficiently important issue to warrant extensive 
consultation with the Environment Agency. Other organisations such as the Met Office, the 
media and utility companies are not specifically mentioned in the Direction and an 
integrated and seamless partnership is required with all relevant bodies for the policy to be 
fully effective. 
The raising of political commitment to flood warning by MAFF to the top priority in the flood 
defence function is a positive development for integration. Indeed, MAFF has agreed to fund 
work in this area at a special grant-aid rate of 50% and in preference to other flood defence 
projects. The commitment of other key government departments, such as the Home Office 
with their civil emergencies mandate, is paramount as this will influence the commitment of 
organisations such as the police and local authorities. The Home Office has in fact cut back on 
financial support for emergency planning in recent years and MAFF has very little influence 
with local authorities and the police to deliver an integrated flood warning policy in 
conjunction with the Environment Agency. MAFF has also made it clear to the Agency that 
enhanced financial support is a short term expedient and unlikely to extend beyond two years. 
A policy of integration will not succeed unless there is long term political commitment 
supported by the instillation of a positive climate and culture within organisations directly 
involved in its implementation. 
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4.4.1 Critical assessment of the new arrangements in the Thames Region 
The implementation of the new arrangements in the Thames Region is described in Appendix 
3. This section assesses their impact in the Region, and by revisiting the four factors examined 
in Section 4.3.1 it will be possible to judge how significant these changes have been in 
improving organisational integration in the Thames Region and to identify any shortcomings. 
1. The first factor requires the securement of political commitment, establishment of 
clear objectives, definition of roles and responsibilities, preferably in a written plan, 
and agreement on rules for conflict resolution. 
In the Thames Region, as in keeping with national policy, local flood warning plans 
have been produced on a county/metropolitan area basis. To ease the process of 
consultation and to minimise the negative effects of non-coincident organisational 
boundaries, one Environment Agency region has taken the lead in the production of 
the plan for a given county. Accordingly, the Thames Region takes the lead in 
London, Hertfordshire, Buckinghamshire, Oxfordshire, Surrey and Berkshire, the 
Anglian Region leads in Essex, Bedfordshire and Northamptonshire, and so on. The 
plans attempt to set out clearly the objectives of the flood warning service and the 
roles and responsibilities of the various organisations in the process. The Agency 
drafted and circulated each document to all local authorities and emergency 
services by the end of 1996 and attempted to gain agreement on their content 
through consultation at local (county/metropolitan area-based) liaison meetings. 
Consultation meetings to discuss the plans in the Thames Region have generally 
been positive with local authorities and the police assisting the Agency in their 
production. Sections of the plan dealing with roles and responsibilities have had to 
be worded carefully so as not to contravene the policies of individual organisations. 
The danger here is that these sections may become watered-down and ineffective 
and hence perpetuate the lack of clarity that has characterised inter-agency 
arrangements in the past. It is also clear that in some cases authorities are not giving 
the plans sufficient priority, evidenced by a failure to comment on their content and 
to attend liaison meetings. This is particularly noticeable with some of the London 
Borough councils. One failing is that the Agency has not introduced a formal 
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signing off procedure to ensure that outside organisations are formally in agreement 
with the content of the relevant plan and has not been rigorous enough in 
encouraging attendance at its liaison meetings. 
Another area of concern is that of conflict resolution and arbitration, the rules for 
which have yet to be established and tested. MAFF has indicated, through the 
Ministerial Direction, that in the event of conflict over the content of the local flood 
warning plans, the Environment Agency will have the final say. In practice this 
may result in the Agency failing to persevere to resolve matters of conflict with 
other organisations and publishing the plans regardless of any disagreement. 
Table 4.2 illustrates the increase in organisations in receipt of formal warnings from 
the Thames Region under the new arrangements from 13 in 1987 to 163 in 1999. 
Although warnings were cascaded to other organisations in 1987 by the police, the 
Agency's predecessors did not document the process and in many instances 
procedures were ad-hoc with varying degrees of success. The new procedures ensure 
that the process is now fully documented in the local flood warning plans, which is a 
positive integration point. 
2. The second factor requires the establishment of functions and structures to foster 
integration and consideration of the designation of a lead agency. The placing of the 
Environment Agency in the lead role in the flood warning process has been 
universally welcomed by all parties in the Thames Region and is seen as a positive 
move to free-up the process which has been in stalemate over recent years. As lead 
authority therefore, the Agency needs to develop a clear understanding of the roles of 
all other relevant organisations in the flood warning process. The Agency does not 
have the power to instruct these authorities on their function however, or how they 
should be structured, it can only attempt to influence their actions and draw their 
attention to any shortcomings. 
Although the Agency is moving towards consistent structures with regard to flood 
warning and flood defence, the same cannot be said of local authorities, for 
instance. There is significant variation in how the 98 different local authorities in 
the Thames Region are organised. Some authorities co-ordinate their operational 
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response via their drainage departments, others via highways, and others still via 
emergency planning. One manifestation of this fragmented position is the variation 
in policy concerning the provision of sandbags to the public in times of flood. Table 
4.3 shows that although a majority of local authorities hold no or limited stocks of 
sandbags for public use, some authorities have extensive stocks, Buckinghamshire 
County Council for instance, can have 20,000 sandbags available in an emergency. 
This variation results in considerable differences in the level of service provided to 
the public across the Region. 
Table 4.2: Number of organisations in receipt of flood warnings in the Thames Basin. 
Total in In receipt of formal In receipt of formal 
Organisations Thames warnings Warnings 
ReLdon 1987* 1999* 
County Councils I1 0 7 
(3 via police, 2 via 
fire and rescue) 
London Boroughs/ 33 0 27 
City of London 
District Councils 54 0 54 
(10 via police, 14 via 
fire and rescue, 6 via 
county council) 
Police Forces 13 12 13 
Fire and Rescue 13 0 13 
(8 via police) 
Ambulance 12 0 12 
(I I via police) 
Utility Companies 
(water, gas, electricity, 15 1 13 
telephone, rail) 
Navigation Authorities 3 0 3 
Weather Centres 7 0 7 
Local Radio Stations 41 0 14 
Total 202 13 163 
* as identified in Environment Agency or predecessor authority procedures. 
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Table 4.3: Provision of sandbags by local authorities in the Thames Region 
Local Authority Availability/Policy Local Authority Availability/Policy 
Bedford CC No stocks held Surrey CC Limited stock, not for gencLal use 
S. Beds DC No stocks held Epsom and Ewell DC Limited supply - contractors 
RB Windsor/M'head 500 filled, stocks of sand & bags Tandridge DC No stocks - rely on county council 
West Berks DC 300 filled, 3000 unfilled Waverely DC 2000 in stock, contractor can 
supply 1000 more 
Reading BC 200 filled, stocks of sand & bags Reigate &B stead Approx. 98 unfilled 
Bracknell Forest BC Some stocks of unfilled Mole Valley DC No stocks held 
I 
Buckinghamshire CC 2000,3000 unfilled - 20,000 
available in emergencý 
Guildford BC 1000 filled 
Aylesbury Vale DC Very limited stock Rushmoor BC No stocks held 
S. Bucks DC Limited stocks Surrey Heath BC Limited unfilled stock 
Chiltem DC 1000 filled, availability based on 
need 
Woking BC Limited stocks 
Wycombe DC Limited stock Eimbridge BC 10 filled, 500 unfilled for 
emergencies only 
Essex CC No stocks held Runnymede BC A few hundred unfilled 
Epping Forest DC Contracted out to Tan-nac who 
deliver and charge 
Spelthome BC Limited stock of filled, larger stock 
unfilled 
Uttlesford DC Stocks of filled and unfilled - 
will deliver 
City of London No stocks held 
Harlow DC Stocks of filled - will deliver Barking & Dagenham Limited stock 
Brentwood DC Stocks of unfilled/ filled - charge 
made to private households 
Barnet 300/400 unfilled 
Gloucester CC No stocks held Bexley No stocks held 
Cotswold DC 200/250 filled, 500 unfilled Brent 1000 in stock 
Hants CC No stocks held Bromley 2000 unfilled 
E Hants DC Limited stock - collection only 
unless aged or infirm 
Camden No stocks held 
Basingstoke & Dean DC Limited stock filled, large stock 
of sand and bags 
Croydon 50 filled 
Hart DC Limited stocks Ealing No stocks held 
Herts CC No stocks held Enfield No stocks held, can obtain supply 
E. Herts DC 12 unfilled Greenwich Limited stock 
N. Herts DC No stocks held Hackney No stocks held 
Welwyn Hatfield DC 200 unfilled Hammers'th & Fulham No stocks 
held 
St Albans DC No stocks held Haringey 250 empty bags 
Three Rivers DC 200 unfilled Havering 100 filled 
Dacorum BC Limited stocks only Hillingdon No stocks held 
Broxboume DC 50 unfilled Hounslow No stocks held, can obtain supply 
Watford BC 5 00 
- 
1000 bags only Islington No stocks held 
Hertsmere BC Limited stocks Kensington & Chelsea 200 filled 
Northampton CC Very limited stocks Lambeth Limited stock 
S. Northants DC 
cks Merton No stocks held Daventry DC Very limited stocks Newham No stocks, local firm can supply 
Oxfordshire CC Limited stocks Redbridge No stocks held 
S. Oxon DC No stocks held- contracted out Richmond Limited stock 
Oxford City DC 1000 unfilled Southwark Limited stock 
Vales of White Horse Limited stock Sutton No stocks held, can 
ýbtain 
supply 
W. Oxon DC Limited stock funfilled Waltham Forest Limited supply 
LCherwell DC A few hundred only Kingston upon Thames No stocks held 
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3. The third factor requires the establishment of fora to facilitate liaison, negotiation 
and mediation between agencies. In response to the requirements of the Ministerial 
Direction the Environment Agency has established flood warning planning groups 
in each county/metropolitan area in the Thames region. These groups have either 
been newly formed by the Agency (such as in Oxfordshire) or based on existing 
emergency planning groups run by the county councils (such as in Hertfordshire). 
In London however, the absence of a second tier of local government means that 
alternative fora, have had to be sought. The London Emergency Services Liaison 
Panel (LESLP) and the London Emergency Planning Forum were possible options. 
The London Boroughs were not fully represented on these groups however, and 
some felt that they were not being adequately consulted as a consequence. 
Alternative and more locally based emergency planning fora were targeted by the 
Agency therefore, of which there are five in London, but experience shows that 
even these are not well attended by some of the key organisations, notably the 
police. Further work is needed to establish an effective inter-agency liaison forum 
for flood warning in London. 
Outside London, the local authorities and police have co-operated reasonably well 
with the Environment Agency in setting up planning groups and the Agency has been 
actively seeking to obtain agreement with all parties on the content of the local flood 
warning plans. There is a danger however, that some authorities may not agree with 
the contents of a particular plan until reference to roles and responsibilities is made 
sufficiently vague to remove any possibility of litigation. The raison d'etre of the plan 
will thereby be lost. An example of this problem is in Hertfordshire where the police 
had agreed informally to continue to warn the public on receipt of a RED flood 
warning, but failed to confirm these arrangements formally which meant that they 
could not be included in the Hertfordshire Flood Warning Plan. Another issue is that 
most of the planning groups are focused around the Agency, local authorities and the 
emergency services, other organisations such as the media, the Met Office and the 
utilities are often excluded. This can be detrimental to the development of an 
integrated approach across all agencies involved in flood response. 
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4. The fourth factor requires the instillation of a positive organisational climate and 
culture for integration. A very positive climate was initially evident within the 
Environment Agency both at national and regional levels following its designation as 
the lead authority in 1996. The Agency's Board had given the new arrangements a 
high priority and national and regional project groups had been established to oversee 
their implementation over a 5-year period. In the Thames Region, as in other regions, 
there is some evidence that this initial positive approach by senior management had 
begun to wane once procedures had been put in place. The Easter floods exposed 
serious problems with the adequacy of these arrangements in a major flooding 
incident, and there followed renewed vigour at the highest level in the Agency to 
address the shortcomings. 
Although the new arrangements are generally welcomed by police forces, local 
authorities and other organisations in the Thames Region, the political will to 
approach the issue of flooding and flood warning in a positive way is still largely 
lacking in these organisations. Following discussions with a number of authorities 
it is clear that there are four main reasons for this: 
e flooding is not a frequent enough problem in many areas and consequently 
receives a low political profile compared to other emergencies 
* there is continuing concern over litigation and a reluctance to exercise non- 
statutory powers 
there is a general perception that flooding is an issue for the Environment Agency 
there is little support from government departments such as the Home Office, 
which tends to rely on local political will to deal with flooding issues. 
4.4.2 The performance of the new arrangements in the Easter 1998 floods 
The test of any new arrangement or procedure is how it performs in a real event. The first 
comprehensive test of the 1996 procedures was during the Easter weekend in 1998 when 
between 70 and 90 mm of rain fell on saturated river catchments over an area of some 
5,000 square kilometres in the Midlands and East Anglia. Five people died and many 
thousands of people were severely affected by the floodwaters and losses are estimated at 
over E400m. An independent review commissioned by the Environment Agency concluded 
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that "flood warnings were issued in accordance with current policy in most locations but 
lack of public awareness, together with nationally inconsistent and inadequate procedures 
and systems, resulted in poor overall performance" (Bye and Homer, 1998). The Bye 
report calls for a "radically modified strategy for improving flood warning performance". 
A number of recommendations and observations in relation to institutional and legal 
arrangements are made in the report that have particular relevance to integration, and these 
are surnmarised below: 
1. The adequacy of liaison between the organisations involved in flood warning 
and emergency response should be examined and strengthened where 
necessary. The report acknowledges that the Agency had made some good 
progress in improving liaison since 1996, but concluded that more work needed 
to be done. Individual organisations are encouraged to review their flood 
emergency procedures and bring greater clarity to command and control in the 
combined response to floods. The report concludes that most organisations 
were poorly prepared for dealing with the emergency that developed over the 
Easter weekend. 
2. The Easter Floods demonstrated that the lack of an integrated partnership 
between the Environment Agency and the Met Office was a significant 
problem, leading to under-performance of the flood warning system. The report 
recommends that the two organisations should establish a "flood warning 
partnership" that would exploit more fully the resources, skills and public 
communication facilities of the two national organisations concerned with 
severe weather and its flood impacts. The report points to arrangements in 
Australia and the United States where flood forecasting is more integrated with 
the meteorological service and benefits from direct consultations and shared 
data sources. 
I The Agency, local authorities and emergency services should seek national 
consistency in their dealings especially as their boundaries are often 
incongruent. They should place greater emphasis on "testing response activity, 
interfacing and co-operation". 
4. The Agency is encouraged to achieve a higher profile in the national and local 
media, and that better control and co-ordination of press releases between 
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-Agency regions and with other agencies is secured to ensure accurate and 47 
consistent explanations of flood emergencies. 
5. Although warnings through the media - some local radio stations, teletext and 
weather forecasts - appear to be helpful, they did not achieve the degree of 
awareness required to significantly lessen the impending suffering and damage. 
It is recommended to seek the full participation of radio and television with 
programme interruption for more worthwhile benefit. 
6. The Agency should secure closer liaison with navigation authorities and utility 
companies to assess the feasibility of water supply and canal reservoirs being 
operated for the benefit of flood control. 
7. The policy adopted by MAFF and the Welsh Office for approving investment in 
flood warning schemes is felt to be too narrow as it involves a rational and 
economic based justification and "disregards the social, environmental and 
political issues". Such modification would assist in ensuring that the interests 
of the public and other authorities are properly addressed in relation to future 
proposals for new or improved flood warning systems. 
8. Within the Agency itself a number of organisational changes are recommended. 
These include the strengthening of functional management to permit more 
authoritative direction and greater national consistency; the establishment of 
greater local accountability for effective flood warning service provision; 
rationalisation of the Agency's flood defence committee structure; the 
centralisation of flood warning specialist staff resources either regionally or 
nationally to improve efficiency, effectiveness and national consistency. 
4.4.3 The performance of the new arrangements in the Thames Region during the 
Easter 1998 floods 
The flooding in the Thames Region was confined mainly to one river catchment, the River 
Cherwell and its tributaries in Oxfordshire. Nearly 60mm of rain was recorded over a 12-hour 
period on saturated ground that generated a peak flow with a return period in excess of 100 
years (1% annual probability). This resulted in the flooding of over 560 properties in a wide 
area from Banbury to Oxford, Prior to Easter, the Agency's awareness of flood vulnerability 
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was that areas at risk were not extensive and included few properties. Indeed, the flooding 
extended beyond the previously recorded flood "envelope" known to the Agency and was 
greater even than the "Great Flood" of 1947. The Bye Report states that although flood 
warnings were issued in accordance with the procedures in place, "most people affected 
received no alert and were surprised by and unprepared for the flooding. The deficiency in the 
scope of the Agency's warning arrangements is explained by its lack of knowledge about 
previous flooding" (Bye and Homer, 1998). The report also highlights a number of points that 
have a bearing on institutional arrangements in the Thames Region and integration: 
Emergency response and co-operation between all organisations appears to have 
been as effective as could be expected in the difficult circumstances resulting 
from; no prior awareness of extensive flood risk; short notice of flooding; and the 
expectation it would affect few properties. 
The local authority emergency planners, the fire service and the Agency's staff 
were in close contact during the event in Oxfordshire. The Agency's staff assisted 
Cherwell District Council with pumps, sandbags and labour, for example. There 
was no contact on the ground between the Agency and British Waterways Board 
however, and vital floodgates were operated without the knowledge of the 
Agency. In fact the Agency was unaware of the existence of one gate altogether. 
An operating agreement between the Agency and British Waterways is felt to be 
beneficial. 
There is a general need to improve understanding between all agencies involved in 
flood management, including the media, and this is likely to be best achieved 
through the implementation of regular, multi-agency exercises, and improved 
liaison and presence at incident sites and at incident management control centres. 
This approach would engender awareness of roles, responsibilities, tools available 
and limitations. 
The Agency is encouraged to set, publish and monitor Flood Warning and 
Emergency Response standards in consultation with MAFF, the Regional Flood 
Defence Committee, local authorities, emergency services and the public. This 
should lead to a better understanding of roles and responsibilities and on "how the 
boundaries of knowledge and of technology affect the standards attainable". 
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The Agency's Flood Warning Reach System, which had been previously 
circulated to local authorities and emergency services, was not closely referred to 
during the event and it is felt that this could have enabled earlier, and more 
specific warnings to be given to residents in risk areas. 
The Agency is encouraged to investigate how best to institute formal 
arrangements for disseminating public flood warnings to areas at low risk of 
flooding. Although there is no agreed procedure as to achieve this, it is 
recommended that institutions such as Parish Councils are considered as well as 
using loud hailers on Agency and emergency service vehicles. 
A number of recommendations were made on how the Agency can improve its 
own internal management arrangements. These included; better co-ordination of 
incident management (staff were operating from 5 different centres during the 
event); written guidance for staff regarding organisational responsibilities (the 
roles and responsibilities of different internal sections was not fully appreciated by 
some staff); and firmer guidance on individuals' roles within sections (a better 
level of understanding and appreciation of individuals' responsibilities is needed). 
Generally, flood warning notices were effectively disseminated by the Agency to other 
response organisations (including local radio stations) in good time. Table 4.4 gives the 
warning lead times in relation to the times of peak flow at Banbury and Enslow gauging 
stations located upstream of the main centres of population in the Cherwell catchment. What 
was lacking however, was the detailed communication and exchange of information between 
the key players during what was a major flooding incident, in particular between the Agency, 
local authorities, the emergency services and the media. During the early stages of the event 
all these organisations failed to fully appreciate its severity, due to a combination of consistent 
under reporting by the flood detection and forecasting systems and a poor level of flood risk 
information for the Cherwell valley. Experienced staff in the Agency were predicting that the 
flood would dissipate in the wide flood plain as it moved downstream and its effects would be 
minimal in Kidlington. Vital information that was being collected by on-site staff from a 
number of organisations that may have, if collated, produced a different conclusion, was not 
collectively available to decision-makers. The resultant lack of urgency was apparent across 
all response organisations in the early stages, including the media, and this contributed to the 
general lack of preparedness of the public. 
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Table 4.4: Flood warning lead times for River Cherwell - 9-10 April 1998 
Warning Time of Lead time Lead time to 
colour issue/ to Banbury Enslow 
Occurrence 
Reach I Yellow 10.309/4 16.5 hours 
Reach 2 Yellow 10.309/4 34.25 hours 
Reach I Amber 17.009/4 10 hours 
Reach I Red 22.309/4 4.5 hours 
Reach 2 Amber 22.309/4 22.25 hours 
First property 00.3010/4 
flooded at 
Banbury 
Peak at level 03.0010/4 
Banbury 
Reach 2 Red 14.45 10/4 6 hours 
First property 17.0010/4 
flooded at 
Kidlington 




4.5 Summary and conclusions 
The influence that institutions and the law have on the integration of flood warning systems is 
clearly significant. An attempt has been made in this chapter to ascertain the degree to which 
arrangements are either helping or hindering the process of integration at a number of levels; 
national, regional and local. To achieve this goal, reference has been made to the integrative 
factors defined in Chapter 2, to the arrangements in existence both before and after 1996, and 
to the performance of procedures during the Easter 1998 flood event. 
The key findings are surnmarised in relation to the integrative factors referred to above. 
Legal Arrangements 
This chapter has highlighted the fact that in England and Wales no authority has an 
unambiguous statutory duty to prepare for, issue warnings for and respond to peacetime 
emergencies such as floods. The legislative framework covering flood warning and response 
in England and Wales is both weak and unclear and this is a major hindrance to establishing 
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integrated institutional arrangements. 
Prior to 1996, the cornerstone of flood warning arrangements was the voluntary agreement 
between the key organisations that was established in 1968, and this appeared to work well on 
some occasions in the past. Tightening resource constraints and growing fears over legal 
liability however, meant that these procedures began to breakdown and could not be 
sustained. The Ministerial Direction issued to the Environment Agency in 1996 was designed 
to clarify matters and established the Environment Agency as the lead authority. Although the 
Direction requires the Agency to produce written flood warning plans in consultation with the 
relevant local authorities and emergency services which is a positive development for 
integration, it fails to address the specific question of roles and responsibilities. This issue is 
left for the Agency to tackle thorough discussion but without the power of direction over other 
organisations. Other weaknesses include the failure to include other relevant organisations 
such as the media, navigation authorities, utility companies and the Met Office, all of which 
have important roles in forecasting, warning and response, and the lack of procedures and 
mechanisms for dealing with conflict situations between organisations. The Government's 
guidance on the latter point, that in the event of conflict over the content of the local flood 
warning plans, the Agency will have the final say, is unlikely to be effective in practice. 
It is interesting to note that following the publication of the Easter Flood Review the 
Government felt it necessary to write to local authorities and the emergency services "to stress 
the importance of effective liaison with the Environment Agency". If the roles and 
responsibilities of these "key partners" and others had been more clearly defined in the 
legislation, there would be less of a need to send out reminders following flooding incidents. 
The continued vagueness of these arrangements is illustrated in the Government's statement 
to the House of Commons on 21 October 1998: 
"The Agency's responsibility is to issue flood warnings. Having done so, the 
emergency response is the responsibility of others. Local authorities generally 
co-ordinate the local planning process but when those plans are implemented the 
co-ordination role normally falls to the police, though they will clearly need 
strong support from the fire and ambulance services, and emergency planning 
departments in local authorities, social services and other similar agencies". 
Mansard, 1998 - emphasis added) 
Successive governments have had ample opportunity to review, revisit, update and strengthen 
the legal framework but have chosen not to act. The original legislation that specifically refers 
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to flood warning systems was drafted in the 1970s and focuses specifically on the provision of 
equipment for gathering information on rainfall and river flow. These clauses have been 
repeatedly assimilated into successive acts without substantive change. The arrangements 
needed to disseminate warnings and ensure public awareness have never been explicitly 
addressed in the legislation. There is an in-built bias therefore, towards the provision of 
equipment that tends to favour the development of detection and forecasting systems often at 
the expense of the dissemination and response elements. This has been reflected in the 
Government's Grant Aid arrangements for flood warning that were criticised in the Easter 
Flood Review as "taking no account of social, environmental and political considerations', ' 
(Bye and Homer, 1998). It can be argued that the legacy of the apparent narrow 
understanding of the total flood warning process by the legislators in the 1970s has resulted in 
a fragmented approach to flood warning that has not been conducive to integration. 
The Govenunent has shown that it is aware of the need for an integrated approach to flood 
warning. In the parliamentary statement referred to above it was stated: 
that there must be a seamless and integrated service for flood forecasting, 
warning and response. Weather forecast information needs to be integrated with 
reliable information about flood risk in particular areas .... to generate a 
flood 
forecast and, if appropriate, a flood warning. Flood warnings need to get to the 
people in the area at risk of flooding in time for them to respond appropriately". 
The legislation needs to be amended therefore, to reflect this view and there needs to be more 
emphasis placed on reviewing all relevant legislation to ensure that laws that affect one 
organisation are compatible with laws that affect another. This is rarely achieved as the 
sponsoring government departments are often different and the apparent lack of cross- 
departmental liaison can frustrate this process. 
Institutional Arrangements 
This chapter has demonstrated that the institutional arrangements in England and Wales 
prior to 1996 were often fragmented and poorly integrated. Inter-agency procedures were 
frequently informal and undocumented and precise roles and responsibilities were not 
adequately defined and understood. Attempts at formal clarification had largely failed due 
to fears of legal liability and an unwillingness to recognise that the then NRA had a co- 
ordinating mandate. Cross functional integration was not given a high priority at this time 
104 
and each institution assumed a general area of responsibility and arranged its 
organisational structure to suit its operational circumstances. Liaison between 
organisations was conducted in a rather ad-hoc fashion and often involved a limited 
number of agencies. A rather negative climate and culture was becoming common in many 
organisations involved with flood warning as resource pressures, confusion over roles and 
responsibilities, and fears of legal liability created real barriers to integrated and co- 
ordinated effort. Many authorities had become inward looking and much energy was 
devoted to minimising involvement and focusing resources on other statutory duties. 
The introduction of new flood warning dissemination arrangements in 1996 has been a major 
step forward in developing a more integrated approach to flood warning in England and 
Wales. The Environment Agency has been given the lead role in co-ordinating flood warning 
matters and the Ministerial Direction places an onus on the Agency to maintain written local 
flood warning plans and to co-ordinate inter-agency liaison. All of these factors are positive 
integrative advances, but as the Easter 1998 floods exposed, there are a number of significant 
and fundamental weaknesses still to be addressed. 
The Easter floods highlight the importance of inter-agency liaison both in planning for and 
responding to floods and the Bye Report acknowledges that satisfactory arrangements are in 
place between some organisations, but between others liaison is patchy. The Report pays 
particular attention to the need for strengthened links between the Agency and the Met Office, 
the media and navigation authorities such as British Waterways. It encourages all relevant 
organisations to review their emergency planning and preparation and to gain a better 
appreciation of command and control procedures in their partner authorities. Emphasis is also 
placed on the importance of testing and exercising inter-agency plans with extreme event 
scenarios at regular intervals, especially during periods when flooding is infrequent, 
recognising that this practice has not been commonplace in England and Wales and that it 
may require a shift in organisational culture to achieve. 
Although the Agency has taken initiatives since 1996 to raise public awareness, the Bye 
Report states that "people in known and potential at-risk areas do not understand the roles of 
the Agency and the other response organisations". It is also clear that, despite some good 
work since 1996, there is still much confusion within organisations as to the roles and 
responsibilities of others, and in some cases staff are unclear as to the precise role of their own 
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organisation. As Drabek (1986) states, if one organisation is unclear as to the role of the other 
then this can delay response. The problem is compounded by the fact that there is still low 
political commitment to flood warning and flood response in some organisations: "there were 
suggestions that fluvial flooding was not seen as a particular priority alongside other potential 
emergencies" (Bye and Homer, 1998). Even within the Agency, following strong initial 
commitment by senior management to the new flood warning arrangements in 1996, there has 
been a tendency to give higher priority and political focus to other matters, such as integrating 
environmental protection activities. The perception of senior managers was that the flood 
defence and flood warning functions were working relatively well and, as they were not 
subject to major structural change following transfer from the NRA, they required less 
management attention. Senior Management seemed unaware of the Agency's vulnerability in 
a major flooding incident. This is confirmed by Drabek (1986) when he states that hazard 
awareness among executives is often minimal and that this can impact on policy making 
within an organisation. 
In response to the Easter 1998 floods and the Bye Report, the Minister of Agriculture, 
Fisheries and Food issued a statement that has important implications for integration and if 
adhered to should instil a more positive climate and culture for integrated flood warning 
arrangements, 
" "flood warning is the Government's highest priority" (in flood defence) 
" "there must be a seamless and integrated service of flood forecasting, warning 
and response" 
" "all local authorities, police and fire services will be reminded of the importance 
of effective liaison with the Environment Agency, in ensuring that emergency 
plans are kept up-to-date, and for active participation in exercises". 
Since the publication of the Bye Report in September 1998, the Environment Agency has 
taken steps to address each of the Report's recommendations and has published an Action 
Plan. It has established a national project team to oversee this work, the Easter Floods Action 
Group (EFAG), which has been given a very high profile in the organisation. It has also 
established a National Flood Warning Centre that is tasked with forging stronger and more 
nationally consistent links with partner organisations in the operational and research fields. It 
remains to be seen however, if the Agency sustains this level of commitment over a long-term 
period, both internally and within outside organisations, especially if the incidents of and 





This chapter addresses the second element of the conceptual model presented in Chapter 3 
(shaded area in Figure 5.1). Building on what was presented in Chapter 2, its purpose is to 
analyse by what means, and to what extent, the application of technology has enhanced and 
can further enhance the integration of flood detection, forecasting, warning and response 
systems (FDFWRS). Technological applications in such systems address integration problerns 
in a variety of direct and indirect ways, and must be distinguished from those applications of 
technology that are mainly not about enhancing integration and are focused on other aspects. 
Most technological applications are intended to have a favourable impact on either integration ZD 
or non-integration components of FDFWRS, but there are also examples in which it appears 
that technological application has had disintegrative impacts. In some cases a particular 
application may have both favourable and unfavourable effects oil flood warning systems and 
the likely net effect is what must be examined. 
Figure 5.1: Conceptual model of the FDFWR process 
TECI 1I NOL OGY 
(see Chapter 3 for full details) 
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5.2 The nature of technological applications in FFWRS 
Technology has made a significant impact in the development of FDFWRS in the last thirty 
years. It is possible however, to distinguish between those technological applications that 
have specifically enhanced the process of integration and those that have either not addressed 
integration or may have even worked against the development of integrated arrangements. 
5.2.1 Flood detection and forecasting 
The very earliest flood warning arrangements, which were non-technical and largely 
community-based, were in fact very integrated ones. They tended to be locally based, 
dependent on local knowledge, expertise and resourcefulness, reflecting the local need. The 
detection and forecasting was typically undertaken by individuals who lived near a river and 
developed a considerable expertise in the prediction of river levels and response times. Such 
individuals would take it upon themselves to wam their neighbours if they predicted that 
flooding was imminent. 
The initial focus of technological application was in the measurement of hydrological 
parameters such as rainfall, river level and flow. Over the last 30 years a great deal of 
technology has been applied to increase accuracy and precision and this has transformed, for 
example, the simple weight and float gauge into a sophisticated micro-processor based 
measuring device. This thrust of technological activity however, has not been aimed at 
integration. Indeed, the main emphasis has been on improving the accuracy of low flow 
measurement for water resources purposes rather than on high flows for flood defence. The 
effect of this was illustrated in the Easter 1998 floods in the Cherwell catchment in 
Oxfordshire when all 9 river level/flow gauges, designed only to measure aI in 5-year flow 
on average, were overwhelmed by the magnitude of the event, which exceeded I in 100-year 
frequency. This resulted in duty staff underestimating the severity of the event and this 
perception was communicated down the warning dissemination chain resulting in an 
inadequate response (see Table 5.1). 
Another integration issue arising from this lack of functional co-ordination is that many of the 
flow gauging stations are not ideally located for flood warning purposes. For example and as 
Table 5.2 illustrates, out of a network of 34 river gauges in the Lee and Roding catchments in 
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the north-eastern part of the Thames Basin, 28 (82%) were installed primarily for water 
resources purposes. These are often to be found in downstream locations at river confluences, 
rather upstream of flood risk areas where they would be of most value for flood detection and 
forecasting. This was recorded as being a hindrance to operational activities even during flood 
events in the 1990s (see Appendix 1) and can be traced to poor liaison between the Water 
Resources and Flood Defence functions when the gauge networks were planned and installed. 
Better integration between functional departments in river management would help avoid 
such discrepancies in the future 
In 1999 all river gauge stations in the Thames Region were audited to determine their 
measuring range and a programme of work was initiated to make the necessary improvements 
to extend these where practicable. As Table 5.3 illustrates, the number of gauges has 
increased across all river catchments in the 10-year period 1989 to 1999 by 175%, and further 
installations are planned in the next 5 years to give better information in flood risk areas. But 
the problem of accurately measuring extreme flows remains. It is estimated that to construct 
15 gauges to measure in excess of the I in 100 year flow at critical locations in the Region 
could cost in excess of f2orn. 
In the mid-1970s river and rain gauges began to be telemetered, enabling the collection of 
information at a central location, at first by manual interrogation, for use in the preparation of 
flood forecasts. In the last 20 years the level of technology applied to telemetry has increased 
dramatically moving from simple trigger level monitoring devices to on-site micro-computers 
capable of continuous data logging and multiple alarm handling. As Table 5.3 emphasises, the 
development of telemetry networks in tandem with communication systems has been a highly 
integrative process, bringing together data across river basins over both time and space. The 
use of technology therefore, has allowed the integration of data gathering and the generation 
of flood forecasts, resulting in increased flood warning lead times at critical locations. The 
application of this technology has not been compatible in all cases however, and this has 
impacted negatively on integration. In the Thames Region for instance, different telemetry 
systems were installed in different parts of the catchment and as a number of these systems 
were incompatible, regional-wide monitoring and forecasting was not easily undertaken (see 
Table 5.4). Although the integration of telemetry and computer systems was achieved in the 
mid-1990s there were lingering problems of poor coverage and robustness in the network, 
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especially in the west of the Region as detailed in Appendix 1, an issue that is only being fully 
addressed today. 
Table 5.1 Status of river gauges in Cherwell catchment during the Easter 1998 flood. 
River level Status Level (m) and Time of failure Time of first 
station flow (GMT) property 
flooding 
(GMT) 
Cropredy Telemetry 2.296 17.30 9/4/98 
failure 
Banbury Gauge stuck 2.477 01.00 10/4/98 23.30 09/4/98 
(Banbury) 
Bodicote Gauge stuck 1.219 19.15 9/4/98 
Heyford. Telemetry 0.908 00.00 to 07.45 
failure 10/4/98 
Enslow Telemetry 1.583 13.30 10/4/98 16.00 10/4/98 
failure (Kidlington) 
Kings Mill Telemetry 1.898 20.30 10/4/98 
failure 
Oxford Telemetry 74.58 m3/sec 08.45 11/4/98 
failure 
Table 5.2: Location of river flow/level gauges in the Lee and Roding catchments. 
River gauges located for water resources 
purposes 
River gauges located for flood warning 
purposes 
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Looking beyond the Thames Region it is clear that the 8 regions of the Environment Agency 
still operate locally and autonomously developed telemetry systems making the cross regional 
availability of data difficult to achieve. The Agency is generally unable therefore, to share 
data in real-time amongst its operational regions and with other organisations such as the Met. 
Office. This is thought to hamper improvement to forecast accuracy and detection 
capabilities. Even within regions, different functional departments operate different gauge 
networks. These networks may be incompatible with each other and although the number of 
gauges that have been telemetered has increased there is still a substantial number that are not. 
This can result in forecasters not having full access to all relevant data in real-time. These are 
all examples of where, for mainly organisational reasons, technology that has the potential to 
improve integration has not been applied in an integrated way and as a consequence the 
benefits of that technology have not been fully realised. 
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Table 5.3: Outstations available to Flood Warning Staff in the Thames Region - 1989 
and 1999. 




1989 1999 1989 1999 
South London Rivers 11 17 10 23 
North London Rivers 12 9 14 23 
Lee 9 24 14 23 
Roding 4 8 4 4 
Colne 2 8 10 34 
Mole 2 2 7 13 
Wey/Boumes 3 6 10 20 
Loddon 2 2 5 9 
Thame 1 2 1 4 
CherwelURay (Oxon) 2 3 6 10 
Kennet/Ock/Pang 6 9 10 18 
Cotswolds Rivers 5 6 11 17 
Fluvial Thames and 
minor tributaries 
9 9 33 51 
Total 1 68 105 1 135 249 
Table 5.4: Flood warning telemetry systems in operation in the Thames Region prior 
to 1984 
Sub-area Telemetry System 
Thames Valley (upstream of Teddington) Churchill and Delta Technical Systems. 
Lee and Roding Valleys Dynamic Logic Autolog/Radal. 
London tributaries 
I 
Dynamic Logic 32/RGA digital talk-out 
system. I 
The reliance on manual methods to collect and process data from telemetry meant that the 
generation of timely forecasts was only really practicable for rivers with long response times. 
Forecasting for short-response rivers was a far more complicated procedure and generally not 
attempted. In the 1980s computer systems began to be increasingly used in real-time detection 
and forecasting schemes and this had important implications for integration. The processing 
time that the computer offers enables the integration of large volumes of data that can be 
analysed quickly, allowing more sophisticated models to be run operationally. These 
advances gave the hydrologist the tools to develop monitoring and forecasting systems for 
any type of catchment, including those with a short response time, and the ability to issue 
flood warnings in such circumstances is now a feasible proposition. The introduction of 
computer technology therefore, can be a highly integrative process. In the Thames Region for 
instance a regional computer system has brought together a number of key processes, 
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including data capture and processing, the running of forecasting systems and the 
dissemination of flood warning messages via linked facsimile units. But this is only a 
relatively recent development as in the early 1990s there were up to 16 different real-time 
computer systems operating in the region, most of which were stand-alone and incompatible 
with each other (see Table 5.5). This pattern of inconsistency is repeated between regions 
with a wide variation in the computer systems in operation across the Agency that can be 
traced back to procurement decisions by the predecessor Regional Water Authorities prior to 
1989. This has resulted in the evolution of inconsistent and poorly integrated systems across 
the Agency that has hindered the exchange of information and the introduction of nationally 
compatible enhancements. 
Even though the Agency has conducted much research and development into improving 
detection and forecasting techniques over the recent years, it has a poor track record in 
implementing any resultant new products into operational procedures often due to problems 
of system incompatibility. A wide gulf has developed between research and operational 
implementation illustrated by the fact that in the last 15 years the Agency and its predecessors 
have commissioned 16 pieces of research in this area but only 4 of these have resulted in 
enhanced operational systems. This highlights the fact that although computer technology 
offers great potential for integration, unless this technology is applied in a consistent manner 
this potential will not be realised. 
Perhaps one of the most significant technological advances in flood detection and forecasting 
has been the development of weather radar. It was with the advent of the Dee Weather Radar 
Project in North Wales (CWPU, 1977) and the North West Radar Project in north-west 
England (NWRP, 1984) that the importance of radar for hydrological uses, including flood 
forecasting, was fully demonstrated. These projects highlighted that radar has many 
advantages and many of these are highly integrative: 
a) radar data 'could be processed in real-time, transmitted from site and displayed 
remotely with a high level of operational reliability 
b) radar could integrate measurements of areal precipitation over large areas of 
varying terrain and at a far lower cost than a comparable telemetering raingauge 
network 
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Table 5.5: Multi-functional real-time computer systems operating in the Thames 
Region in 1990 (after Kennedy and Donkin, 1990) 
Real-time computer system Function 
I Hyd logical PSTN system (West) Regional Water Resources 
2 Lee Area Telemetry NE Area Flood Defence 
3 Lower Thames Flood Level Telemetry SE Area Flood Defence 
4 Barrier Telemaster System SE Area Flood Defence 
5 Tharnesmead pumping stations SE Area Flood Defence 
6 Thames Tidal Gauges SE Area Flood Defence 
7 Southend Obsermet System SE Area Flood Defence 
8 
_Argus 
Telemetry System Multi functional 
9 CASCADE Flood Warning System Regional Flood Defence 
10 River Level Warning Devices Regional Flood Defence 
II Pinner Alarm system Regional Flood Defence 
12 Flood Warning DTS/WTS System Regional Flood Defence 
13 Trend Monitoring PSTN System Navigation 
Meteorburst Water Quality System Regional Water Quality 
15 Meteorburst Development System Multi functional ul U", 
16 Weir automation Scheme -- 
ýZg-ional 
Flood Defence 
c) on-line hydrological forecasting using radar data was shown to be feasible and 
radar could be used, even in very simple models, to produce forecasts for areas for 
which lead times were previously insufficient 
d) radar data could be used to improve the short period quantitative forecasting of 
precipitation which could be used in turn to improve flood forecasts 
e) radar data could be used in an operational flood wamýing system supplementing 
meteorological and hydrological data from other sources. 
The ability of individual radars to measure rainfall quantitatively up to 76 Ian and 
qualitatively up to 210 km provides the hydrologist with a powerful too] in detecting and 
monitoring flood-producing storms. When radars are then networked together the integrated 
product gives coverage across large river basins and even nations. Extensive radar networks 
are now in operation in the developed world including the NEXRAD system that gives almost 
total areal coverage across the USA with a network of nearly 140 radars. Despite the clear 
advantages that radar offers however, there is a continuing concern in some quarters of the 
accuracy of radar measurements. So although an operational network has been in operation in 
England and Wales since 1984, many hydrologists continue to use radar data only in a 
qualitative way, preferring to rely on raingauge networks for quantitative rainfall 
measurement. These concerns are being actively addressed jointly by the Met Office and the 
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Environment Agency through a 10-year programme of improvements and enhancements to 
the network in England and Wales. From I April 1999, each region of the Agency will 
receive a consistent package of radar products using the best available quality-controlled 
information. As Collier (1996) mentions however, the need to develop robust operational 
radar networks means that consideration must be given not just to the radar itself, but also to 
real-time computing facilities, to telecommunications and to the functions of the software 
producing the data. In other words all these facilities must function in an integrated way to 
obtain the best quality information for flood warning purposes. 
The process of forecasting is potentially a highly integrated one, State-of-the-art forecasting 
arrangements are now operationally available incorporating computer systems that 
communicate via digital telephone circuits, to obtain data from dense networks of intelligent 
telemetry outstations and weather radars which are fed automatically into models, which 
generate forecasts every 15 minutes (see Table 5.6). But are these arrangements in common 
operational use today across England and Wales? The review into the Easter 1998 floods 
reveals that there is a wide variation in the technical approach to flood forecasting in the four 
regions of the Environment Agency that were under investigation. It was found that leading 
edge science is only being used in a few cases, for example the use of radar derived rainfall 
data and forecasts to predict flows. In others, there are "out-of-date techniques" in use that are 
"in need of updating or replacement" (Bye and Homer, 1998). The often held perception that 
sophisticated flood detection and forecasting systems are in operation across the country 
therefore, is not accurate. Indeed, the Agency continues to operate techniques in some regions 
that were first introduced some twenty years ago and described by Smith and Tobin and 
others in the 1970s. The evolution of inconsistent detection and forecasting systems in the 
Agency has been a key integration problem hindering the rolling out of state-of-the-art 
techniques across the country. 
The installation of a fully operational and integrated flow forecasting system across the 
Thames Region has yet to be achieved. Although the Institute of Hydrology's Regional Flow 
Forecasting System was purchased in 1995 insufficient staff resources have been dedicated to 
its implementation. The Easter Flood Review states: "the Thames Region needs forecasting 
and prediction tools that are able to indicate the severity of an event at an early stage. Progress 
on forecasting models had been postponed as the resources were reallocated to work related to 
flood warning dissemination". For an integrated system to evolve it is important that 
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technological advances are applied to all elements of the flood warning process rather than 
focusing on one at the expense of another. 
The Easter Flood Review highlights a number of specific shortcomings with relevance to the 
application of technology and integration: 
telemetry networks have poor coverage in some areas and many river gauges are 
not positioned in the correct places. A high proportion of the gauge network was 
installed for water resources purposes in downstream locations. In addition, a 
significant number of river gauges are unable to measure flows of the magnitude 
that occurred at Easter when many stations were overwhelmed and failed to 
operate. 
technology was either not used or adequately provided to duty officers in a 
consistent way to enable them to detect, monitor and forecast the flood event as it 
developed. This resulted in a general underestimation of the severity of the event. 
flood forecasting models are not widely used operationally by the Agency, and 
where they are the techniques are sometimes outdated. 
Another issue that has hindered the introduction of an integrated approach to flood detection 
and forecasting is that of the reliability and fallibility of technology and the resultant lack of 
confidence in its operational use. As technology was being introduced in the 1970s 
importance was given to continuing to supplement information with manual observations. As 
staff resources reduced in the 1980s and 1990s this became increasingly difficult to support 
and greater reliance was placed on technology. The Easter floods exposed the dangers of this 
reliance with weather radar underestimating the quantity of rainfall, raingauges and river 
gauges failing to measure the magnitude of the event, and some telemetry equipment 
malfunctioning altogether. All these factors conspired to give hydrologists and meteorologists 
a misleading picture of the severity of the event, giving rise to an under-reaction in certain 
areas. It is interesting to note that in the United States where the use of technology in flood 
detection and forecasting is highly advanced, there is still a widespread use of field observers 
in flooding situations (Haggett, 1997). Staff are sent to key locations to give visual 
confirmation of the situation on the ground especially in extreme conditions when gauge 
readings are not always trusted. This is a good example of the continuing need to integrate 
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low and high technological techniques to deliver an effective service 
5.2.2 Flood warning dissemination and response 
Perhaps the most important piece of technology in use today in flood warning systems is the 
telephone (see Table 5.7). The use of the public switched telephone system (PSTN) not only 
offers the ability to target information to those who need to receive it, but has enabled the 
integration of technical aspects of data collection and analysis. As Figure 5.2 illustrates, 
telephone networks effectively link the various components of modem FDFWR systems, 
from the capturing of data from telemetry networks and weather radar to the dissemination of 
warning information to a range of recipients. Whereas in the past, concerns about reliability 
and robustness of telephone networks, especially in flooding situations, limited their utility, 
the advent of digital exchanges, water-resistant cabling and more effective maintenance have 
improved performance dramatically. 
One advantage that the telephone brings to flood warning dissemination is that it offers a 
mechanism for providing a personalised delivery of information from a remote location. 
Next to face-to-face contact, person-to-person dialogue is probably the highest level of 
integration that can be achieved. Another advantage is that most households are equipped 
with a telephone and all sections of society are familiar with and are able to use the 
equipment effectively. The provision of flood warnings manually by telephone does have 
some disadvantages. It can, for instance, take a significant length of time to mobilise 
sufficient staff resources in warning agencies and alert large numbers of people using this 
method. 
Prior to 1996, the use of technology to improve public warning had been limited, although 
some techniques have been tested, such as alerting of flood wardens by telemetry devices. 
This "Watchdog" system was introduced in London in the 1980s and involved the automatic 
triggering of alarm calls when critical river levels were reached. The system was eventually 
replaced by a more robust, manual person-to-person approach due to problems of reliability 
with the technology. This proved to be popular with the warning recipients and allowed duty 
staff to receive feedback from wardens that was not possible with the automated system. 
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Figure 5.2: Thames Region's CASCADE flood warning system. 
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In 1996, the Agency introduced more technological methods to alert and inform the public. 
The automatic voice messaging (AVM) and FLOODCALL voice-bank systems are now in 
routine operational use across England and Wales from the Agency's 21 flood warning 
centres. Both systems have the potential of passing information rapidly to large numbers of 
people, but as reliance on these systems increases, it is important that they are operationally 
robust. Although technological failures have occurred at critical times resulting in some loss 
of confidence by recipients and operators, the use of this technology has been a positive 
development. Nevertheless, a number of disadvantages can be identified with specific 
relevance to integration: 
the AVM system needs individual contact details of each recipient. As these 
numbers increase the maintenance of databases becomes increasingly difficult, 
especially in urban areas where public mobility is greatest. If AVM warnings were 
offered to all residents in the 100-year flood risk area in England and Wales, over 
a million telephone numbers would have to be kept current 
errors in the data stored in the AVM databases and other technical problems can 
result in warning messages failing to be disseminated effectively (see below). 
Quality checks and back-up arrangements are essential to minimise the effects of 
such matters. 
there is some evidence to show that individuals can become over reliant on AVM 
warnings and stop acting on their own initiative in response to their own 
observations. There have been instances where farmers, who normally keep a 
close eye on the weather and river levels and move livestock when flooding is 
considered likely, have tended to rely less on their own observations once placed 
on the AVM system. 
41 the AVM, and particularly the FLOODCALL system, work most effectively if the 
recipient has a touch-tone telephone. There in an assumption that most recipients 
in flood risk areas have access to this technology, but a survey of 220 flood 
warning recipients in the Thames Region indicates that 22% still have dial 
telephones installed in their homes (see Table 5.8). This implies therefore, that 
nearly a quarter of the at-risk public in the Thames Region could have difficulty 
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accessing flood warning information disseminated by the Agency using this 
technology, giving rise to severe integration problems if this was left unchecked. 
o although the AVM and FLOODCALL systems were introduced consistently 
across all Agency regions in 1996, they are standalone systems and the technology 
has not been easily integrated with systems that are in operation in each region. In 
the Thames Region, for instance, the CASCADE system is used to disseminate 
warnings to outside authorities and the media which is also used to detect and 
forecast floods. 
* the AVM allows the dissemination of a 60-second voice message (the need to 
repeat the message gives only 30 to 40 seconds of effective recording time) and 
FLOODCALL has just 20 "information boxes" for all rivers in the Tbarnes 
Region. Both systems therefore, constrain the amount of information that can be 
communicated to warning recipients and as a consequence duty staff in the 
Agency are only able to provide general details of flooding in a given locality. 
The technology does not allow duty staff to communicate specific and locally 
relevant information demanded by the at-risk public (BMRB, 1999). 
Table 5.6: Data types available as input to flow forecasting models in the Thames Region 
Data type Data origin 
Rainfall accumulations Telemetered raingauge network 
River flows Telemetered river flow gauges 
River levels Telemetered river level gauges 
Radar-rainfall accumulations Chenies radar - single site 
Raingauge adjusted radar-rainfall accumulations Chenies radar and raingauge network 
Rainfall forecast accumulations 
(6 hours ahead) 
Nimrod quantitative precipitation forecasts 
Rainfall forecast accumulations 
_(2 
hours ahead) 
Hyrad quantitative precipitation forecasts 
Rainfall forecast accumulations 
(3 hours ahead) 
GANDOLF thunderstorm warning system 
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Table 5.7: Use of telephone circuits in the Flood Warning Centre, Reading. 
Function Number of circuits 
-- 
Type of circuit 
Telemetry polling 25 Exchange line 
Alarm handling 2 Exchange line 
Weather radar data 3 Private wire 
Rainfall forecast data 2 Private wire 
Remote computer access 8 Exchange line 
Automatic Voice Messaging 






Exchange line (fax) 
Exchange line 
Warning dissemination to external 
authorities/media 
12 Exchange line (fax) 
Floodcall 2 Exchange line 
Flood warden helpline I Exchange line 
General public helpline I Exchange line 
Information exchange 3 Exchange line (fax) 
General FW Centre lines 8 Exchange line 
Written message dissemination 2 Telex line 
Table 5.8: Type of Telephone in use by Flood Warning Recipients in the Thames Region 
Operating 
Area 
Pulse % ofthose 
responding 
Tone % ofthose 
responding 
No response 
West 3 23% 10 77% 7 
North East 14 19% 59 81% 47 
South East 14 25% 42 75% 24 
Total 31 -- t22% 111 78% 78 
The Easter 1998 Flood Review assesses the use of these systems in flood warning 
dissemination and makes the following comments which have relevance to integration (Bye 
and Homer, 1998): 
44an error in the pre-programming of the AVM system resulted in amber and red alerts 
failing to be communicated". 
64 although expressing preference for person to person telephone contact, the AVM and 
FLOODCALL services are generally accepted by members of the public as 
appropriate existing or potential dissemination methods". 
"for people who are unfamiliar with modem telephone based information systems, 
FLOODCALL is confusing and this inhibits its effectiveness as a warning 
mechanism. In one region, under 50% of calls made by the public connected to the 
message box and the majority of callers did not, therefore, obtain any information". 
64 consideration should be given to augmenting, or in due course replacing, the AVM 
system with one which offers the flexibility to issue warnings to any area identified as 
at risk during the forecasting phase". 
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"Thames Region do not use the AVM system for dissemination of warnings to 
people at risk. Methods achieving direct personal contact are preferred and 
independent surveys commissioned by the Agency have revealed that a personal 
form of service is favoured by most recipients" 
These comments highlight problems associated with reliability, accessibility, familiarity and 
flexibility. For technology to enhance the development of an integrated FDFWR system it 
needs to be robust, user fiiendly, accessible and non-confining. The most successful solutions 
may be those that bring together high-tech systems with more low-tech, personalised 
approaches. 
Because organisations in receipt of flood warning messages, such as the local authorities, 
emergency services and utility companies, require written confirmation for reasons of security 
and ease of onward transmission, the telex and facsimile have been utilised for this purpose. 
The technology that supports facsimile and telex systems advanced significantly in the late 
1980s/early 1990s as terminal equipment became more compact and cheaper to procure, 
multi-polling became possible and the integration of hardware into computer controlled 
systems became operationally feasible. 
A number of Flood Warning Centres introduced these more sophisticated faxing and telexing 
systems into operational procedures, often borrowing and adapting the technology that had 
been developed for other purposes. In the Thames Region, for example, the TEXTEL system, 
that was developed and marketed by a firm of travel agents, was adapted to issue telex and 
facsimile messages via a host computer. This allowed dissemination systems to be integrated 
with those dealing with detection and forecasting. For the first time warning messages could 
be issued from the same computer ten-ninal that was used to monitor telemetry gauges and 
weather radar, whether in the Flood Warning Centre or at duty officers' homes. This speeded- 
up and simplified warning procedures considerably, allowing up to 180 organisations to 
receive direct flood warning notices within a 15 minute period via 12 linked facsimile units. 
Although the introduction of these and other techniques represent a positive development for 
integration on the one hand, they can create integration problems on the other. By their very 
nature, technological solutions mean that messages are sent impersonally and there is often no 
guarantee that they are received and acted upon by the appropriate individuals. This contrasts 
with a person-to-person communication interface where message transmission is more 
personal and direct. There have been instances, for example, when warning messages have 
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been sent by facsimile to local authority offices but have not been discovered for several 
hours because the offices were not staffed at the time of receipt. In this context technology 
can give rise to a discontinuity in communication and have a negative impact on integration. 
Since the 1970s the police have used their own information transmission media to disseminate 
warnings from their central headquarters to local police stations and thence to local police 
officers on the beat. Initially, the main medium was the police's own radio networks 
supported by telex messages. The police have constantly updated their internal 
communications systems to meet the needs of their core functions and most forces have 
progressively introduced state-of-the-art systems that have resulted in the efficient and 
reliable routing of flood warning messages both internally and to other emergency services. 
The Metropolitan Police at New Scotland Yard, for instance, are able to re-transmit warning 
notices received from the Environment Agency to the appropriate local police station, which 
are staffed on a 24 hour basis, within seconds of receipt. The police's internal 
communications system is therefore, both highly sophisticated and very well integrated. 
In marked contrast to the procedures outlined above, less sophisticated techniques are 
generally used by the police at a local level to disseminate warnings to others. Local authority 
staff, for instance, normally operate a duty officer standby arrangement whereby the local 
police station makes contact by telephone using a duty roster provided. These arrangements 
have not changed to any great degree over the last thirty years, although some of the local 
authorities now offer a 24-hour contact point, some equipped with facsimile machines. Public 
warning arrangements had also evolved little between the 1960s and 1996, with local police 
touring risk areas and alerting residents using a range of techniques including, vehicle-based 
loudhailer, sirens, door-to-door knocking and direct telephone call, each of which has 
advantages and disadvantages. Although these approaches, involving warning dissemination 
by word of mouth and on a face-to-face basis, are often portrayed as being antiquated and 
"low-tech", they are often highly integrated and personalised when targeted correctly, and can 
contrast sharply with the more impersonal AVM technology referred to above. 
In practice, warning mechanisms such as loudhailers and sirens can be unduly indiscriminate 
with whole streets or communities being alerted when in reality the risk may be relevant to 
only a few properties. There is a danger that loudhailers can be over-used to the extent that 
they cause unnecessary alarm. The Environment Agency now offers such a service in some 
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areas, but greater care is needed to target the delivery of warnings more effectively. Research 
carried out in London (GLC, 1979) shows that the audibility of sirens is not great under 
certain conditions and that they are also misunderstood. In Operation Floodcall undertaken in 
London in 1978,77% of those targeted by a siren warning Wed to hear the alert, and 12 of 
the 82 sirens sounded failed to operate at all. Both warning mechanisms, therefore, although 
reaching a wide audience, run a high-risk of misinterpretation. The exception is in coastal 
areas where flooding is likely to be widespread affecting whole communities who often 
clearly understand the risk they face. Some of these schemes are in decline however, due to 
problems of responsibility for upkeep and repair of the hardware. It is interesting to note 
however, that in response to flooding in Northampton during Easter 1998 and after public 
consultation, a siren system was installed in the city. Nevertheless, the first test of this system 
resulted in a high proportion of people failing to hear the sirens even though they were given 
advanced notice of the test. 
The use of the media to disseminate public flood warning information has featured to a 
greater extent since 1996. The Agency has secured agreements for the transmission of 
warning messages with a number of media outlets, including local radio stations, television 
text services, travel bureaux and the Met Office for inclusion in weather forecasts. Messages 
are forwarded to all these outlets by facsimile in an agreed, nationally consistent format. A 
number of shortcomings can be identified with these arrangements that have relevance to 
integration: 
* many local radio stations have a limited budget and usually operate with a single 
facsimile machine for incoming information. There is a high probability therefore, 
that either the line will be busy or in the sheer volume of traffic a flood warning 
message may be overlooked and not acted upon. 
national media outlets, such as Teletext, employ a news agency to receive and 
collate information before disseminating summaries for public consumption. In 
situations of widespread flooding across several regions, many of the Agency's 21 
Flood Warning Centres may be sending information simultaneously. The volume of 
information is likely to be large and this needs to be rapidly assimilated and 
prioritised. For example, in the Thames Region alone a catchment-wide flood could 
generate up to 400 individual warning messages (127 reaches and 3 warning stages). 
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There are dangers therefore, that a single news agency will get easily overwhelmed 
and block or distort the dissemination process. 
@ the amount of information that can be communicated via individual media outlets is 
usually small. On Teletext for instance, each warning message is restricted to a few 
words only. In addition, the agreements that the Agency has secured with the media 
do not give any guarantee that a warning message will get broadcast at all. 
4P to be effective, the public needs to have access to the technology that provides the 
media information and a clear understanding of the public's listening and viewing 
habits is required. A smaller survey of 21 flood wardens in the Thames Region 
provides some useful insights in this context. Unsurprisingly, all wardens owned a 
television, but 67% had access to the text services (so that 23% of wardens did not 
have access to one of the Agency's warning outlets) and only I% had invested in 
cable television. Nearly all respondents (95%) listened to the radio at sometime 
during the day, however 67% indicated that they regularly listened to just I radio 
station, whereas 14% listened to 2 stations and a further 14% to 3 stations. By 
conducting surveys such as this the Agency will be able to better assess the needs 
of the public and their ability to access flood warning information. 
Table 5.9: Media access amongst Flood Wardens in Thames Region 
Media outlet Yes % No % 
Television 21 100 0 0 
Television Text 14 67 7 33 
Cable 1 5 20 95 
Radio 20 95 1 5 
1 station only 14 67 
2 stations 3 14 
3 stations 3 14 
4 stations 0 0 
5.3 Analysis of the impact on integration of current technologies. 
To be able to assess the impact on integration of current technologies in common use in 
FDFWR systems it is necessary to develop an appropriate analytical framework. To meet 
this need a simple methodology is proposed in which each technology is assessed in turn 
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and categorised into low, medium and high impact. As discussed in Section 5.2, some 
technologies can have a positive impact on integration, whilst others can impact 
negatively, this makes it necessary therefore, to analyse the full spectrum of impacts from 
highly negative to highly positive. It is recognised that this process can be very judgmental 
and that different practitioners would make different assessments, but it is nevertheless 
considered to be of value. 
Table 5.10 sets out the results of this analysis in which 13 technologies currently in 
operational use in FDFWR systems are assessed it turn with reference to 4 integration 
impact areas per technology. It is clear that there is not only variation between each 
technology in terms of their impact, but that each individual technology can have different 
impacts depending on the integration impact area under consideration. For example, the 
introduction of telemetry systems is judged to have had a medium-positive impact on 
integration in terms of data collation and reliability, but a low-negative impact due to 
inconsistent application and poor spatial coverage, making its overall impact positive. If a 
crude scoring regime is applied to all technologies and all impact areas, then it can be seen 
that on balance the introduction of technological solutions has had a positive impact on the 
integration of FDF WR systems (see Table 5.10). 
5.4 Technological applications to enhance integrated FFWRS 
Technology is continually changing and the rate of change is accelerating drarnatically. This 
section will examine how technology is likely to impact on integrated flood warning systems 
in England and Wales in the future, including those technologies that have been developed 
but not widely implemented and those that are still in the research phase. 
Over the last 30 years there has been a tendency to use technology to meet a specific need or 
provide a solution to a particular problem, such as a river level gauge to measure and assess 
the rate of rise in a watercourse. There are signs that this detached approach, which can lead 
to fragmentation, is changing and that technology is starting to be used more to consolidate. 
This is most apparent in flood detection and forecasting systems where increasingly powerful 
computer systems, communications and data base technology are allowing advances of this 
kind to be implemented operationally. 
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The detection and forecasting system in operation in the Thames Region for example, is 
becoming increasingly sophisticated. Moore (1993) states that the CASCADE flood 
forecasting system is arguably the most advanced in the Agency in its deployment of weather 
radar for instance. Much work has been undertaken in recent years to link together the 
formerly disparate telemetry systems and integrate them with weather radar and satellite data 
to form a regional flood detection scheme allowing operational access to any individual 
outstation via one computer system. The incorporation of local radar calibration (which 
operationally adjusts the radar data with data from 105 raingauges) and forecasting systems, 
including rainfall forecasts from the Nimrod, Hyrad and, GANDOLF systems, and a range of 
processing and display tools, makes it very versatile. More work is needed however, to 
develop an automated flood forecasting capability and improve the interfacing of the 
detection and forecasting subsystems. The real-time measurement of rainfall and river flow 
could be used to improve the quality of flow predictions further through state-updating or 
error prediction. Plans are in place to improve these aspects, but as Moore (1993) comments, 
"whilst CASCADE can make model predictions for specific catchments, developments have 
not yet been made to co-ordinate the construction of forecasts down the river network". 
This step has been taken with the Regional Flow Forecasting System (RFFS) developed by 
the Institute of Hydrology (Moore, 1993). The system is an example of a generic flow 
forecasting system capable of integrating the task of flood forecast construction for both 
simple and complex river networks and is likely to be the forerunner of a new approach in 
operational forecasting in England and Wales. The system has been developed to invoke and 
manage the co-ordination of data acquisition needed for forecast construction and the ordered 
execution of models working from the headwaters of a catchment to the sea. It tackles a 
possibly complex overall forecasting problem through division into a number of simpler sub- 
problems or "model components". A model component is typically made up of a number of 
model algorithms, for example for snowmelt modelling, rainfall-runoff modelling or real-time 
updating. Such an integrated flow prediction system is capable of forecasting at hundreds of 
locations over a region and incorporating flexible decision-support tools for flood warning 
and river control. The first implementation of RFFS was to provide forecasts at some 150 
locations within the 13,500 k: rn2 region of Yorkshire and operated on a trial basis in 1992/3. 
The system is also to be installed in the Thames Region in the near future but such systems 
have yet to be implemented widely across the Agency. This integrated approach is supported 
by the Easter 1998 Flood Review that recommends that modelling should be rationalised and 
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Table 5.10: Impact assessment of technology in current use in FDFWR systems. 
Technology Integration Impact area Negative Impact Neutral Positive Impact 
Im act p High Medium Low Low Medium High 
River 1. Collation of data X 
levellflow 2. Consistently applied X 
measurement 3. Accuracy in floods X 
4. Spatial coverage X 
Telemetry 1. Collation of data X 
2. Consistently applied X 
3. Reliability X 
4. Spatial coverage X 
Computer 1. Collation of data X 
systems 2. Collation of systems X 
3. Consistently applied X 
4. Reliability 
Weather 1. Collation of data X 
radar 2. Spatial coverage X 
3. Accuracy in floods X 
4. Consistently applied X 
Modelling 1. Collation of data X 
systems 2. Consistently applied X 
3. Accuracy in floods X 
4. Spatial coverage X i 
Telephone 1. User-friendliness X 
networks 2. Reliability X 
3. Personalised delivery X 
4. Multiple recipients X 
AVMJ 1. User-friendliness X 
Floodcall 2. Reliability X 
3. Personalised delivery X 
4. Multiple recipients X 
Facsimile 1. User-friendliness X 
2. Reliability X 
3. Personalised delivery X 
4. Multiple recipients X 
Teletext 1. User-friendliness X 
2. Accessibility X 
3. Locally specific X 
4. Multiple recipients I X 
Local Radio 1. User-friendliness X 
2. Accessibility X 
3. Locally specific X 
4. Multiple recipients X 
Loudhailer 1. User-friendliness X 
2. Accessibility X 
3. Locally specific X 
4. Multiple recipients X 
Sirens 1. User-friendliness X 
2. Accessibility X 
3. Locally specific X 
4. Multiple recipients X 
Face-to-face 1. User-friendliness X 
2. Accessibility X 
3. Locally specific X 
1 4. Multiple recipients 
TOTAL 11 1 
[S 
High=3, medium=2, low= it o 14 A 13 0 10 26 
CORE neutral --0 
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founded on a small number of state-of-the-art techniques relevant to the range of basic 
catchment characteristics found across the country (Bye and Homer, 1998). 
Forecasting in the Thames Region has tended to concentrate on rainfall prediction and 
rainfall/runoff modelling. Improvements in the forecasting subsystem to enable predictions to 
be made of the precise areas and properties liable to flood for an event of a given magnitude, 
would be an important step forward. To achieve this however, links would need to be 
established between model predictions and a database of property information maintained on 
a river reach basis. This in turn would require the development and deployment of real-time 
hydraulic models that could predict out-of-bank flows and flood extents for individual flood 
events. This would allow targeted flood warnings to be issued to those properties identified by 
the forecasting system. Realistically, models of this type are unlikely to be introduced 
operationally in the short term, but this approach does offer the possibility of greater 
integration between the forecasting and dissemination elements of a FDFWR system. 
A further step in this process would include the use of Digital Terrain Models (DTM) and 
Geographical Information Systems (GIS) facilitating the simulation of the extent of a flood 
event ahead of its actual rise. Software could be developed to construct computer generated 
maps to indicate the locations of rivers, streets, utilities, property boundaries, and contours 
and flood routes. Once survey data of significant features are obtained, such as low points on 
roads or the threshold levels of buildings, it would be possible to use such systems to obtain 
an impression of the likely extent and consequences of an impending flood when the forecast 
level is reached. It is important to ensure however, that duty staff are not presented with more 
information that they can assimilate and act upon at peak times. To minimise these effects, 
technology should be used to streamline presentation and aid in assimilation 
Message dissemination systems are increasingly becoming computer-based and in some 
instances, as with the CASCADE system, are being operated on the same computers that 
operate the detection and forecasting systems. This integration process gives the ability of 
accessing all components via one computer terminal that may be situated at the flood warning 
centre or at a remote location. Flood warning messages can be distributed rapidly between 
organisations via banks of computer controlled facsimile machines. In the future, the use of 
electronic mail through local and wide area communication networks and the internet offer 
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alternative means of disseminating information and examples of how greater integration can 
be achieved with emerging communications technology. 
Public warning has traditionally relied on methods such as sirens and door-to-door knocking, 
but here too technology offers scope for improvement. Advanced automatic voice messaging 
systems are being developed to alert large numbers of people in short time periods of 
impending danger. British Telecom for example, is developing the Tallis system that 
telephones those living in an affected area and delivers an alert message (British Telecom, 
1997). A digitised map of the British Isles linked to a database of every telephone number in 
the country is central to the warning system. Operators can highlight the area likely to be 
affected on a computer screen and the system will then begin telephoning all the numbers 
within the delineated boundary and deliver the warning message. The message is fed into the 
system as text and the computer converts it to speech. It is capable of telephoning 10,000 
numbers in an hour, logging responses and listing those it could not reach. At present, 93 per 
cent of homes have a telephone, but the system takes account of those without. The database 
includes information about homes without a telephone and their neighbour's warning 
message can be tailored to include instructions on when to warn them about the danger. The 
hard of hearing can have vibrating/flashing systems to alert them to a telephone call and 
receive warning messages via text-phone units. The system can also be configured to ensure 
that those who are likely to be flooded first are called first, working outward to those at least 
risk. To be fully integrated however, there is a need for such systems to be both user-friendly 
and user-accessible as the more impersonal the warning message the less the recipient is 
likely to believe it and take effective action. 
The full potential of the internet and email have yet to be fully exploited for flood warning 
purposes in the UK. The internet is extensively used in the United States and is not only seen 
as a important mechanism for the rapid acquisition and dissemination of hydrological data, 
but also for disseminating warning information (Haggett, 1997). The intemet and email have 
the potential to facilitate interaction between organisations, allowing the pooling of 
appropriate data in both the planning phase and during actual floods. The fact that such 
information can also be accessed by the public is an important consideration for integration 
and as the number of people linked to the internet increases in the UK (estimated to be nine 
million), this will be an increasingly significant mechanism for disseminating information in 
future years. It should be recognised however, that sections of the population will always be 
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excluded from this technology for reasons of income, infirmity or other special needs. Recent 
public surveys for example, have indicated that the elderly tend to occupy flood plains more 
than other areas (BMRB, 1998,1999), a section of the community that may have difficulty 
relating to technology such as the internet and email. 
Much of the technology being used to improve flood warning dissemination in the United 
States centres on the use of the media. For instance, emergency mangers have the ability to 
override cable television on all channels to turn screens blank and give 30-second audio 
messages or scrolled text messages. This is seen as a very powerful tool in emergency 
situations and managers have full editorial control, an arrangement that is written into the 
licenses of the cable operators. Digital technology is being adopted to broadcast warning 
messages over the radio networks in the United States. The NOAA Weather Radio has more 
than 425 stations in 50 states and the goal of the National Weather Service is to expand the 
reach of weather radio broadcasts to 95% of the U. S. population (U. S. Department of 
Commerce, 1997). Radio sets turn on automatically and/or sound a tone alarm when severe 
weather announcements or emergency information are broadcast. The hearing and visually 
impaired can also receive these warnings by connecting weather radios to other attention- 
getting devices, such as strobe lights, pagers, bed-shakers, personal computers and text 
printers. There have been investigations made on the viability of using technology to activate 
television sets remotely and relay warning messages, however there have been civil rights 
concerns regarding the implementation of such a facility. 
As computer systems increase in power and decrease in price the prospect of integrating 
systems further becomes possible. Expert and decision support systems offer a mechanism for 
achieving this. Such systems are often complex and require significant computer resources to 
operate in real-time, a facility that has not been available until relatively recently. The 
GANDOLF thunderstorm forecasting system, developed jointly by the Met. Office and the 
Environment Agency, illustrates how such a decision support procedure can start to evolve. It 
utilises meteorological data fi-orn various sources and produces new forecasts every ten 
minutes. Such extensive data processing could not be achieved even a few years ago due to 
the large amount of computing resources that are required to operate the system. GANDOLF 
attempts to tackle the problem facing the hydrologist of determining which rainfall 
forecasting technique to use quantitatively to predict river flow. GANDOLF establishes a 
procedure that will automatically select the most appropriate forecast scheme through the 
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identification of the weather type together with a measure of the degree to which convective 
development is occurring (Pierce et al, in press). The GANDOLF system is designed to be 
integrated into the Environment Agency's flow forecasting systems but the main problem to 
date has been one of operational implementation across the Agency's regions. Although the 
system has been successfully introduced in the Thames Region, due to incompatible systems 
this has not been achieved across all regions. There is much scope for furthering the use of 
expert and decision support systems in operational flood warning and this has the potential for 
being very integrative. As computer technology advances the complexity of these systems 
will increase to encompass not only detection and forecasting but the dissemination and 
response elements as well. This potential will not be realised however, until the 
incompatibility issue is addressed. 
In the home, technology may be used in the future to integrate various functions including 
communication with the outside world. Berg (1995) talks about the "Smart House" which 
denotes the extensive application of information technology to the dwelling of the future. 
Such a dwelling could receive information from a range of sources via telephone, cable, and 
even satellite into an integrated central control unit. This would facilitate the receipt of flood 
warning infon-nation and possibly data direct from detection and forecasting systems. As 
discussed in Section 5.2, although this development would obviously be advantageous for 
certain sections of society, it would not be accessible to all. Berg (1995) also raises the 
implications of such arrangements on gender. Technology is traditionally a masculine domain 
whereas the home is traditionally a female domain. Berg puts forward evidence that men have 
dominated the design, installation and use of technology and consequently this might result in 
women becoming excluded from its utility in the home. 
Technological development is a highly dynamic process and it is difficult to know precisely 
how it will impact on flood warning systems over the next ten years. It is possible to identify a 
number of specific enhancements however, that could be developed and introduced during 
this period that will go some way to further improve the integration process. These 
enhancements are set out in Table 5.11. It is of course highly feasible that many of these 
technological developments will be introduced into operational flood warning procedures 
over the next two decades. It must be acknowledged however, that access to new 
technological developments will continue to be distributed unevenly, and in the case of the 
underprivileged members of society this will be limited. This is an important integration issue. 
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Thomas (1995) makes the point that technological developments, far from creating a more 
egalitarian world, will bring about a society that is more unequal as well as socially 
fragmented. He believes that technological developments tend to confirm or reinforce existing 
inequalities, and to create new inequalities. As the pace of change accelerates, the gap 
between those who have access to the new technology and those who do not will widen and 
this will have implications for the future development of integrated flood warning systems if 
reliance on technological solutions becomes too great. In short, sections of society will 
progressively become excluded from the benefits of a technology-driven flood warning 
service. 
5.5 Assessment of the impact on integration of future technologies 
In this section the analysis undertaken in Section 5.3 is repeated for future technologies likely 
to impact on FDFV*rR systems. Eight technologies are considered with four integration impact 
areas per technology. Table 5.12 illustrates that although it is still judged that variation will 
still exist between and amongst technologies, the overall assessment is that the potential 
impact is very positive for integration. It is vital however, that these technologies are 
implemented in an integrated way and that current practices are not perpetuated. As discussed 
in Section 5.2, many technologies in operational use today have a high potential impact for 
integration but in practice this is not realised due to poor implementation policies. 
5.6 Issues arising from the assessment of technology usage in flood warning systems 
Tbrough the analysis presented in this chapter, of the current and potential use of technologies 
in FDFWR systems, it is possible to identify a number of key issues that have particular 
relevance to integration and these will be summarised here. It is useful to draw on the 
integrative factors identified in Chapter 2 and added to in this chapter, to assess ftu-ther the 
degree to which technology has influenced integration. 
Technology has resulted in the decline of informal, community-based arrangements. 
Prior to the first introduction of official flood warning procedures in England and Wales 
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in the 1960s any warning arrangements that were in place were largely local in scale, non- 
technical and community-based, with a high degree of local community ownership. These 
arrangements were highly integrated. The evolution of technology in detection and 
forecasting and the establishment of formal co-operative arrangements between agencies 
to facilitate the exchange of information, resulted in the decline of the old community- 
based self-help systems. The recent application of technology to flood warning 
dissemination has tended to fuel the culture of reliance that has gradually developed over 
the last 30 years. Many recipients of flood warnings seem content to sit back and wait for 
the Environment Agency to issue alerts, but are also quick to apportion blame when 
things go wrong. As Rowe and Thompson (1996) state, 
"there is a danger that technology becomes one's controller rather than 
one's servant. Just as working skills are transferred to machines, so the 
human activities of waking up, ascertaining the weather, remembering 
commitments, making decisions, etc. are taken from us and we cease to 
think for ourselves". 
Technology should be applied evenly within and across the elements of flood warning 
systems. 
Evidence has been presented in this chapter to indicate that technology has not been 
applied evenly across the four elements of flood warning systems and indeed there 
are inconsistencies in its application within the same element. In areas where 
flooding is relatively frequent, for example, there has been an early and persistent 
preoccupation with developing techniques to first detect and then forecast floods, 
and these have become more and more sophisticated over the years. In areas where 
flood risk is low however, investment in state-of-the-art technology has not been 
forthcoming and either more rudimentary arrangements are more typical or no 
systems have been put in place at all. The Agency has commissioned extensive 
research and development into flood forecasting and warning over a number of 
years. The results of such research however, often involving technological 
solutions, have not been routinely introduced into the development of operational 
practices. This has meant that leading-edge systems are not universally in place 
across the Agency's eight regions and this has lead to the evolution of inconsistent 
and poorly integrated practices across England and Wales. These fragmented 
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arrangements are brought sharply into focus when widespread and extreme floods 
occur such as during Easter 1998. Another complication is that the Agency's 
Table 5.11: Technological developments likely to improve the integration of flood warning 
systems 
Detection Systems Once all required detection systems are accessible on a common computer system, one system could 
automatically initiate the operation of another when certain criteria are met, e. g. heavy rainfall 
measured by weather radar could trigger telemetry polling. 
Operationally linked detection systems can be used to improve data accuracy, e. g. weather radar data 
adjusted with telemetry inforniation. 
An alarm or exception condition from a detection system could act as a trigger to the activation of flow 
forecastinR systems. 
Exception conditions generated from a detection system or an activated forecasting procedure could in 
turn activate instructions for duty officers with respect to warning dissemination. 
Computer system belonging to different agencies could be linked so that a flood forecasting agency's 
telemetry data could be made available to the met. service to improve the rainfall forecasts provided to 
the flood forecaster. 
Detection and forecasting computers could be accessible by the public either directly or via the 
intemet. The public would be able to obtain real-time data covering their local river that could link into 
informal warning or self-help procedures. Such access would need to be supported by a public 
education programme. 
Closed-circuit television cameras located at key flood warning gauges could =smit information over 
the internet. Filming of actual floods and of gauges to check their operation would aid detection and 
allow staff in control centres to determine whether the gauge has been vandalised or may be blocked 
with debris. 
Forecasting Systems Forecast models could be operationally linked to the data output from a number of detection systems 
allowing the generation of alternative forecasts, e. g. using raingauges or radar data or a combination of 
the two. 
Measured river flow data could be used to automatically correct flow forecasts in real-time thereby 
improving the forecast for the next tirne step. 
Different forecasting models could be linked operationally e. g. meteorological forecasting to 
hydrological forecasting models, rainfall forecasts to rainfiall/runoff forecasts to flood level forecasts. 
Linked forecasting systerns could in turn be coupled to flood risk maps and property level databases 
held on a geographical information system (GIS) and to Digital Terrain Models (DTM). 
Flood forecasts could be made available to the public via the media. The use of experts to 
communicate this information on radio and television broadcasts using graphics. 
Dissemination Systems Flood warning message dissemination systems could be operationally linked to detection and 
forecasting systems, running on a common computer facility. 
Public warning mechanisms could be triggered by detection systems, e. g. sirens or pagers could be 
automatically activated by a telenictered river level gauge. 
Forecasting systems, linked to property databases, could feed into automatic voice messaging systems 
resulting in targeted warnings to at-risk householders. 
Linked computer systems between the forecasting agency and media outlets, such as local radio, 
television text and travel services, could facilitate the rapid dissemination of broadcast warning 
messages. 
Computer links into flood wardens' homes could present a means of disseminating warning messages 
(possibly automatically triggered by a detection/forecasting system), but could also facilitate the two- 
way exchange of information allowing the warden to notify the forecaster of local flooding incidents or 
river blockages. 
Response Systems Flood warning infonnation systems could be used to advise the public of the status of flood warnings 
and how best to respond. Auto-routing facilities, based on the telephone exchange the caller is dialling 
from, can select the appropriate information for the local area. 
Automatic voice messaging systems can detect whether flood warning messages have been received 
and acknowledged, if not alternative arrangements can be made to improve the response to the 
warning. 
Warning messages could be formatted flexibly to allow the automatic inclusion of advice about the 
most appropriate behaviourall response for the impending situation, as defined by the 
detection/forecasting system, e. g. a flash flood would require a different response to a slow winter 
flood. 
"Fax-back" systems could give the at-risk public a facility to obtain up-to-date advice on what action to 
take in a flood situation. The current status of flood warnings and even river level information could be 
acqui d by this method. 
The intemet and cable technology could be harnessed to issue "live" infori-nation and advice to flood 
plain inhabitants. Warnings could be disseminated by these routes. 
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Table 5.12: Potential impact assessment of future technology. 
Technology Integration Impact area Negative Impact Neutral Positive Impact 
Im act High Medium Low p Low Medium High 
CCTVat 1. Collation of data X 
gauged 2. Confirmation X 
points 3. Accessibility of data X 
4. Spatial coverage XI 
Linked 1. Collation of data X 
computer 2. Data accessibility X 
systems 3. Organisational 
interaction X 
4. Spatial coverage XI 
Linked 1. Accuracyin floods X 
forecast 2. Spatial coverage X 
modelling 3. Universal forecasting X 
systems 4. Targeted forecasts X 
Expert 1. Consistency of service X 
systems 2. Confirmation X 
3. Informed decision 
making X 
4. Locally specific service X -A Internet 1. Universally accessible X 
2. Locally specific X 
3. Rapid dissemination of 
information X 
4. Multiple users X 
Auto- 1. Universally accessible X 
activated 2. Multiple recipients X 
warning 3. User friendliness X 
broadcasts 4. Locally specific X 
Advanced 1. Universally accessible X 
messaging 2. Multiple recipients X 
systems 3. User friendliness X 
4. Personalised delivery X 
Interactive 1. Universally accessible X 
information 2. Locally specific X 
systems 3. User friendliness X 
4. Multiple users X 
TOTAL High=3, medium=2, low--1, -2 0 9 28 18 
I 
SCORE I neutral =0 I I I 
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predecessors tended to introduce independent technological systems that have been 
updated and enhanced separately from each other in the Agency's regions. This 
inconsistent approach becomes self-perpetuating as manufacturers deliberately adopt 
incompatible protocols to fie users into their systems. The transfer of data and techniques 
between regions is made difficult which further inhibits the introduction of new products 
on a consistent basis thereby hindering integration. 
Concerns over the reliability and fallibility of technology can result in loss of confidence 
and integration problems 
Ever since technology was first adopted in flood warning systems there has been concern 
about its reliability and fallibility especially in times of storm and flood- This can be 
traced from the use of the earliest river gauges, through to the use of telephone 
communications, computer systems, weather radar, forecasting models and AVM 
systems. In the 1970s there was greater emphasis placed on using technology in parallel 
with manual techniques to record river levels for instance. As staff resources were cut 
back in the 1980s and 1990s this dual approach became less feasible and reliance on 
technological approaches increased. It is interesting to note however, that in the United 
States where the use of technology is highly advanced, there is still a perceived need to 
provide visual confirmation of measurements especially in extreme conditions when 
gauge readings tend not to be trusted. Indeed, the Easter Floods Review recommends 
flood forecasting operating procedures should ensure that, "in addition to using model 
predictions, close attention is paid to monitored flood levels" (Bye and Homer, 1998). 
In flood events in England and Wales the performance of technology has been variable. 
Following the failure of the warning system in London in 1977 for example, although 
some technological malfunctions occurred, this did not contribute significantly to the 
failure of the total warning system. Poor integration between organisations was found to 
be a more important issue. Confidence in technology emerged as a major problem 
however, and unless systems had a proven operational track record there was a reluctance 
to trust and rely upon them - an issue that is still relevant today, re-emerging with the 
introduction of the AVM system in 1996. During the Easter Floods in 1998 problems with 
weather radar under-recording, poor measurement of river levels and rainfall, and failures 
of telemetry units all conspired to give duty staff an imprecise appreciation of the scale of 
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the event that adversely affected response and the level of warnings issued. Conversely, 
there have been instances when the technology has been correctly measuring an extreme 
condition, but the duty officer has failed to believe in its accuracy. A lack of confidence 
therefore, can act as a blocking mechanism for action resulting in a delayed response and, 
in the extreme case, in no action at all. To overcome tl-ýs problem, it is important to build 
into any integated operational system the means to obtain confirmation from alternative 
sources, especially in severe events, to minimise periods of uncertainty. 
Public access to technology can be variable and can lead to problems of integration. 
Access to technology is not universal and there is evidence to show that a sizeable section 
of society is being or will be excluded from using technology-based systems. In many 
areas at risk of flooding members of the public do not have access to or may be unfamiliar 
with the technology needed to receive flood warning information. As Huby (1998) 
comments, the effects of flooding fall most heavily on the more vulnerable groups in 
society who often have limited access to or experience of technology. Communities in 
rural areas, in the ethnic minorities, and in inner-cities have been specifically cited in the 
literature as falling into this category, and there is also some evidence to indicate that 
women can be disadvantaged in this respect. As discussed in Chapter 2, for integrated 
systems to work there must be a free flow of and ready access to information, If 
information is provided solely by technological means on the assumption that it is 
accessible to all, then this criterion will not be met for certain sections of society. In the 
Easter 1998 Floods, for instance, the majority of callers to the FLOODCALL service in 
one region failed to obtain any information from the system. For technology to deliver an 
integrated service it must be user-friendly and user-accessible, be capable of delivering 
locally specific information and be supplemented by more traditional and personalised 
approaches to meet the needs of the diverse public. As pressure increases on organisations 
such as the Environment Agency to deliver warning information to an increasing number 
of people, the temptation to use technological solutions is likely to increase as staff 
resources decrease. This could well lead to a fragmented flood warning service with the 
prospect of societal inequalities widening further as the pace of technological change 
accelerates. The importance of engaging local communities to ascertain their needs and 
ability to receive information is paramount in ensuring an integrated system. 
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Differing attitudes to technology can block its utility especially when it is perceived not 
to be user-friendly. 
Just as some sections of society become excluded from technology for financial reasons, 
there are others that exclude themselves due to fear, suspicion or even "hostility towards 
the tyranny of technocratic power" (Lyon, 1988). The elderly for example, can often feel 
uncomfortable with technology and view it in a negative way, whereas others may refuse 
to use technology on a point of principle. Within organisations, certain staff can find 
computer systems difficult to deal with and will tend to rely on older arrangements that 
are tried and tested. In extreme cases they may have enough influence to be able to block 
the introduction of new technology and force the continued reliance on out-dated 
techniques. This again can lead to fragmentation and inconsistencies in the delivery of the 
service. The fear and suspicion of technology both in organisations and in communities 
may be overcome through better training and awareness. 
There is anecdotal evidence that when the public is alerted by an AVM call they seek to 
confirm the message before acting. The assumption by some that the recipients of such 
alerts would respond without question is not bome out in practice. The FLOODCALL 
service, that was introduced to provide warning confirmation, does not appear to be 
satisfying that need in some instances. There appears to be a continuing desire for person- 
to-person telephone contact i. e. people want to speak to someone to confirm the warning 
message and obtain locally specific information before responding. Greater attention is 
needed therefore, to the development of more user-fiiendly information systems and if 
this still does not satisfy the public's needs it should be supplemented by person-to-person 
contact. 
The application of technology can result in organisational change giving rise to tensions 
that are not conducive to integration. 
With the introduction of new technology tensions can arise between departments witl-ýn 
an organisation that may work against integration. This is most common between the 
operating department, provider of the service to the customer, and the Information 
Technology Department, provider of the necessary technology to the operating 
department. Conflicts can arise over the control of systems, the level and priority of 
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maintenance, and the development of strategies. One common complaint of operating 
departments is that the IT department does not have the responsibility of service delivery 
and hence puts less emphasis on ensuring reliability and robustness. Conflicts such as this 
can result in mistrust and inefficiency that are not conducive to integration. It is common 
for IT staff to develop a view that "users" lack competence, are unable to articulate their 
requirements and that only IT people "know best". Operational staff, on the other hand, 
are often suspicious of their IT colleagues and feel that they work to their own agenda and 
are generally not supportive (Rowe and Thompson, 1996). This lack of trust results in 
barriers being raised between departments, which works against a policy of integration 
within an organisation. Although it would be an exaggeration to suggest that such inter- 
departmental conflict was widespread, it is certainly common within organisations such as 
the Environment Agency and the Met Office where operating departments have staff with 
a high technical capability. 
The issue of "hi-tech" solutions versus "low-tech" solutions. 
There is a growing concern amongst some practitioners that there is too much reliance on 
technological solutions in flood warning systems today. As Penning Rowsell (1986) 
stresses, there is a need to review the technology of flood warning systems in light of local 
experience and to integrate the appropriate forecast technology with the character of the 
dissemination system and the likely levels of public response. 
"It may be more appropriate to base forecasts on low technology and 
concentrate resources on efficient dissemination and response, rather than 
producing super-accurate forecasts which are either too late or which, 
when they reach those intended to respond, are in a form which cannot be 
understood or used" (Penning-Rowsell, 1986). 
The driving force has often been the desire to introduce the best technology available 
rather than considering what is adequate to meet the target level of service for the public 
at risk in a given locality. It is important therefore, to tailor the methods used to the needs 
of the local community. An example from Appendix 1 is when letters were distributed to 
residents at Maidenhead by the NRA, wanting them of flooding from the Thames in 
January 1994 and again in 1995. This "low-tech" approach was effective, personalised 
and well targeted, and possible because of the long warning lead times and a detailed 
knowledge of properties at risk in the town. 
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On a recent visit to the United States by the author a number of relevant comments were 
made in relation to this issue by workers in both the operational and acaden-ýc areas: 
* "there is no correlation between the fanciest systems and efficiency" 
* "more complicated does not always mean better" 
* .... high tech" should be balanced with "high touch", often local knowledge is the 
key" 
* "the guys that sit on the bench and watch the river all day long have a better idea of 
how the river responds than forecasters in an office 50 miles away, this knowledge 
should be tapped" 
* "we are becoming over reliant on technology - what if it fails? " 
4P "technology must reach down to the end-user (the public at risk) for lives to be 
saved". 
In the past engineers and hydrologists have seen flood warning as simply a technological 
or mechanical process. There is now a growing recognition that the key to a successful 
waming system may not always lie in "high-tech" approaches to the exchange of 
infort-nation between senders and recipients. This will be explored in more detail in 
Chapters 6 and 7 of this thesis. 
"Quick-fix" technological solutions can be politically expedient but can hinder 
integration. 
There is a temptation to use technology as a "quick fix" to meet public demand following 
failures of flood warning arrangements. Such an approach can raise public expectations 
but may not be sustainable in the long-term. A good example of this is at Leamington, 
Warwickshire where the public warning system failed during the Easter floods in 1998. 
The Environment Agency responded to considerable public and political pressure by 
placing all those affected on the AVM system, over 400 properties in the 150 year flood 
risk area. This decision places a considerable workload on the Agency in the upkeep of 
contact databases for a city that floods infrequently. But more importantly for integration, 
it also points to the need for a similar level of service to be provided in other towns and 
cities that face the same level of risk but may not have flooded recently. 
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Senior management in the Agency regards the AVM system as the primary method for 
disseminating flood warning messages to the public. They place considerable pressure on 
staff to increase the numbers of recipients on these systems so as to demonstrate that the 
Agency is extending the warning service. Little regard is given however, to the quality of 
that service and as to whether it meets the varying needs of the public. 
The need for redundancy in technologies 
In an integrated flood warning system there is a need for redundancy in technological 
systems. This not only provides a means of backup in the case of failure, but it also acts to 
reinforce and support. In detection systems for instance, the measurement of rainfall using 
both radar and raingauges enables mutual backup and support. It also gives the 
opportunity for both data streams to be combined to increase accuracy through the use of 
raingauge adjusted radar images. Warning systems are most effective when information is 
disseminated from a single source using multiple channels. By operating several 
technologies side-by-side the warning message is reinforced, the need for confirmation is 
met, and alternative channels are available in the event of one failing. 
Balancing the favourable and unfavourable impacts of technology 
Technology can be divided into three broad categories, basic, intermediate and state-of- 
the-art. It is common in operational flood warning systems for different levels of 
technology to sit side-by-side and in some cases the resultant arrangement can work well, 
but in others not. In some circumstances the most basic technology can give the most 
favourable impact, such as an official manually checking a gauge board and directly 
warning the local public. In others, state-of-the-art technology can give unfavourable 
results because of teething problems, being operationally untested in certain circumstances 
and because of user unfamiliarity. An example would be the use of email to disseminate 
information. Email offers rapid communication, the ability to transfer large amounts of 
information and the ability to contact large numbers of recipients simultaneously. Unlike 
the telephone however, it is not personalised, it is not universafly understood, and it does 
not facilitate easy confirmation and interpretation of the warning message. 
Often it is conventional, intermediate technology that is not state-of-the-art that is the most 
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reliable because it is tried and tested. In certain circumstances it is the combination of 
intermediate and low technologies that gives the best results. An example would be the use 
of well understood and simple river flow forecasting models combined with observations 
of experienced field staff. 
5.7 Summary and conclusions 
It is clear from this analysis that technology has brought mixed benefits to flood warning 
integration. However, it is not only the technology itself that can influence this process, but 
also the way in which it is applied. In other words, technology and the application of 
technology can improve some integration problems whilst at the same time worsen others. 
Table 5.13 surnmarises some of the positive and negative impacts that technology can have on 
the integration of FDFWR systems. The key words for integration in this context are: rapid 
gathering, capturing, storing, consolidating, simultaneous operation, exchange, interaction, 
tried and tested and accessible. In contrast, the key words for the more unfavourable impacts 
are: uneven application, inconsistency, incompatibility, unreliability, fallibility, over-reliance, 
dependency, suspicion, exclusion and tension. An impact analysis, as presented in Section 
5.2, offers a simple mechanism for measuring the impact that each technology may have on 
integration, be it positive or negative. This approach can be used when introducing a new 
technology to FDFWR systems to identify the more negative impacts, allowing steps to be 
taken to minimise their effects. 
The desire to introduce the best technology available has often taken preference over the 
need to adopt the most appropriate level of technology to ensure the total warning system 
meets the needs of the target audience at a reasonable cost. Technological alternatives 
should be assessed as a balance between the potential reduction in flood damage from an 
improved quality of prediction or a more rapid dissemination system, the cost of 
technology needed to gain improvement, and the needs of the community at risk of 
flooding. 
In the future, ever more advanced forms of technology will impact on FDFWR systems 
and if implemented correctly could influence integration in a very positive way. Computer- 
controlled communication systems, GIS, remote sensing, electronic decision support 
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systems, and risk-analysis techniques are certain to advance substantially over the next two 
decades and show great promise for supporting the development of integrated flood 
warning arrangements. For example, the "joined up" use of remote sensing, instant 
communications, GIS-based models and information systems, combined with the increased 
availability and use of technology in the home and in mobile form offers some exciting 
prospects, It may soon be possible for people in flood risk areas, for instance, to monitor 
the evolution of a flood on their television screens. This could be in the form of 
continuously updated "live" and forecast flood extent maps, supplemented by locally 
specific on-line advice on the appropriate action to take in the prevailing circumstances. 
Table 5.13: Summary of the impacts of technology on the integration of FDFWR 
systems 
Favourable impacts Unfavourable impacts 
Gathering data rapidly from spatially diverse Uneven application to solve single issues 
points 
Capturing and storing inforination over time Inconsistently applied between functions and 
within the same function 
Ability to consolidate information from a incompatible technology hampers the 
range of disciplines, enabling the formulation interchange of information and systems 
of multi-functional plans. within and between organisations. 
Simultaneous operation of multiple key Low user confidence due to unreliability, 
processes fallibility and inaccuracy 
Several technologies working side-by-side Can discourage self-help and encourage over- 
can reinforce and support reliance and dependency 
Can facilitate the rapid exchange of Can engender fear and suspicion if level of 
information between large numbers of user-friendliness is low and technology is not 
individuals and organisations tried and tested 
Can stimulate organisational interaction Public access may be variable leading to 
exclusion 
On-line data processing and analysis can Can result in organisation change and inter- 
facilitate forecasting for all catchment types departmental tension 
Tried and tested technology can have a high Temptation to use technology as a "quick- 
level of reliability and high user confidence fix" irrespective of the quality of service it 
offers 
Some technologies are universally accessible Public perception that technology can be used 
e. g. telephone, television and radio to control nature and make people safe 
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Chapter 6 
Human Interaction, Expertise and Training 
6.1 Introduction 
Whereas Chapter 5 dealt with the technical mechanisms for receiving, analysing and 
delivering information, this chapter focuses on the human aspects of interpreting and 
acting on that information; the third element of the conceptual model presented in Chapter 
3 (shaded area in Figure 6.1). The impact of differing approaches amongst the 
professionals or "experts" involved in flood warning is analysed as is the importance of 
multidisciplinary working to integration. Perception differences between the senders of 
information and the receivers of that infori-nation are discussed in some depth and the need 
for consistency and understanding is explored. The relevance of social networks to 
integration is then assessed, both in local communities and in organisations, as is the 
importance of the role of the individual. The chapter concludes with an analysis of leaming 
and training strategies both for individuals in communities and organisations, and for the 
organisations themselves and how this can benefit integration. 
Figure 6.1: Conceptual model of the FDFWR process 
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(see Chapter 3 for full details) 
6.2 Integration of multidisciplinary professions 
Foster (1980) highlights the fact that warning is a complex process involving the 
interaction of physical, technological, and social systems, the operation of which must be 
carefully co-ordinated if the desired result (an effective integrated system) is to be 
achieved. Penning Rowsell et al (1982), see difficulties in the provision of an effective 
warning system because of differences in the beliefs, attitudes and language of the 
"experts" in each of the physical, technological and social sciences. They point to possible 
problems faced by the recipients of warnings in grasping the nature and meaning of the 
advice provided by each, They cite the training of hydrologists and meteorologists that can 
encourage an often uncritical concern for data for its own sake. They see that this, and the 
emphasis on the products of technology to "solve" problems, may give rise to tensions 
with other professionals, such as social scientists, leading to communication difficulties. 
For an integrated system to evolve therefore, it is important that experts across these 
disciplines interact effectively. 
In the forecasting and warning agencies in England and Wales flood warning has been 
dominated, until relatively recently, by a small number of professions. As the range of 
professional involvement has gradually increased over the years, instances of conflict have 
arisen and this can be shown to have a negative impact on total system integration. Even 
within the area of physical science for instance, tensions developed between civil engineers 
and environmental scientists/physical geographers in the late 1970s/early 1980s. The 
engineers, who occupied senior management positions in the forecasting agencies, often 
imposed bars to promotional progress unless retraining programmes in engineering were 
followed. It took almost ten years for the latter to be "accepted" by the former. As 
computer technology developed in the 1980s strains developed between the physical 
scientists and information technologists. It is not uncommon for technological strategies to 
be driven by the technologists as opposed to the "users" and this can result in the 
implementation of systems that do not adequately meet the business needs. More recently 
still, the new warning dissemination duties acquired by the Environment Agency have 
resulted in staff with a social science and public and media relations background becoming 
actively and legitimately involved in the process. Early on in the project however, some 
fundamental differences of emphasis developed between the social and physical scientists 
145 
in the area of Public awareness and community involvement in flood warning 
arrangements. 
A way of addressing the issue within organisations is to introduce multidisciplinary team 
working practices. This approach has been followed in the Thames Region and Table 6.1 
illustrates how the distribution of staff resources in the Regional Flood Warning Group has 
varied since 1985. The team's size has trebled during the past 15 years from being one 
focused on hydrological matters to being far more multidisciplinary. Despite this and as 
Table 6.2 indicates, the senior management within Thames Region (Flood Defence 
function and above) is still dominated by civil engineers and scientists. 
The relationships between professionals involved in flood warning and flood response in 
different organisations is variable. For example, hydrologists and engineers in the Agency 
and staff in the emergency services and local authorities generally enjoy good working 
relationships, although some difficulties can arise due to differences in training and 
perception. The police and emergency planners in local authorities operate under a 
command and control and mechanistic regime and tend to place less emphasis on local 
interpretation and judgement than the hydrologist. They also have difficulty relating to the 
approaches recommended by the social scientists for similar reasons as the physical 
scientist. A similar mistrust is reflected in MAFF's grant-aid policy in support of the 
Environment Agency. The engineers at MAFF are comfortable with providing financial 
support for the installation of telemetry systems to enhance the flood detection capabilities, 
but are suspicious of the value of funding a national public awareness campaign. 
Perhaps the most sharply contrasting professional communities that are often required to 
interact in emergencies are those in the media and emergency management. As Drabek 
(1986) states, many media reporters have no scientific background and they are generally 
unfamiliar with technical subjects and have limited scientific knowledge. They have 
difficulty understanding the information that is presented to them by "experts" who need to 
recognise this and translate their concepts into terms that can be easily used within a news 
format. To avoid conflict Burkhart (1991) suggests that close social contacts need to be 
established between the two communities and that the media are involved in the planning 
stage so that they understand the issues. In fact both communities need to gain knowledge 
of their respective procedures, behaviour patterns and individual personnel. As Burkhart 
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stresses, "there is a need to reach across boundary lines of professional and organisational 
groups" in order to accomplish better working relationships. This is an important 
integration point. 
There are examples however, where inter-professional relationships have grown in an 
increasingly positive way giving rise to a more integrated approach to system development 
and operation. The relationship between hydrologists and meteorologists in the UK falls 
into this category, and good working partnerships have resulted in the successful 
development of the weather radar network and short period rainfall forecasting systems 
which underpin many flood waming systems. This situation is not typical however, and in 
many other countries tensions exist between the two professions. Another example would 
be the relationships between physical scientists and engineers in the operational and 
research arenas that have notably improved in recent years and this can be partly attributed 
to government policy and economics. The fact that universities and research bodies are 
now obliged to seek funding through. outside contracts has forced a more focused research 
programme to meet the specific needs of the operational scientist in areas such as flood 
forecasting. 
Table 6.1: Distribution of staff resources in the Thames Region's Regional Flood 
Warning Group - 1985 to 1999. 
Staff posts 1985 1990 1995 1999 
Flood Warning Manager Nil I I I 
Flood Warning/River Control 4 5 5 4 
Hydrologis 
Flood Warning Technologist Nil 1 1 3 
Flood Warning Inforination Nil Nil I I 
Officer 
Flood Warning Liaison Nil Nil 1 5 
Officer 
Public Relations Officer 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.75 
Out of hours duty officers: 
Hydrologist 3 4 4 3 
Technical support 1 1 1.5 3 
Information officer nil nil 2 1 
Dissemination officer nil nil 0.5 1 
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Table 6.2: Disciplinary background of senior management in the Thames Region 
1985-1999 
Senior management posts Engineer Scientist Accountant Social 
Scientist 
Regional General 1 1 
Manager 
Regional Water Manager I I 
Regional Engineering 1 
Manager 
Regional Flood Defence 2 
Manager 
To summarise therefore, the following approaches to multidisciplinary working can offer 
improvements to ways in which the different professions inter-act which can impact 
positively on the degree of integration in flood warning systems. 
9 Inter-professional rivalry is both normal and natural and attempts should be 
made to minimise possible conflict through regular contact thereby developing 
a common awareness of respective positions. The cultivation of good social 
networks can help in this process. These can be established formally, by 
forming committees and working groups, or more infon-nally, through ad-hoc 
meetings to discuss matters of mutual interest and concern. The importance of 
social networks within organisations is discussed further in Section 6.4. 
Within organisations, multidisciplinary teams offer a useful mechanism for 
integrating staff from different professions to focus on a common issue such as 
flood warning. This approach has been adopted in the Thames Region with 
technologists, hydrologists, a planner, an engineer, and a public 
awareness/information scientist making up the regional flood warning team. 
This could be enhanced further with the recruitment of a professional social 
scientist into the team. The opportunity for multi-tasking across professions 
within teams then becomes possible, facilitating integration to an even greater 
degree. 
Drabek (1986) sees co-ordination between professions in different organisations 
as being important. One way of achieving this during flood emergencies is 
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through the establishment of multi-agency emergency management centres. 
This can reduce potential conflict and suspicion between professional 
communities that are likely to arise if different groups work in isolation from 
each other. 
6.3 Perception and cognition 
For an integrated system to develop successfully there must not only be effective 
interaction between the "experts", but also greater mutual understanding between the 
experts or senders of warning information and the recipients of that information, the at-risk 
public. Ways of achieving this will be explored in detail in this section. 
The warning message is an important element of an integrated system and forms a bridge 
between the appraisal of flood characteristics and the making of decisions about protective 
behaviour (Keys, 1997) (see Section 7.3). The literature indicates that warning messages 
emanating from warning agencies are rarely acted upon immediately by the recipient and 
that peoples' reaction is dependent to a large degree on their perception of the risk they 
face (Quarantelli, 1983; Burkart 1991; Mileti and Sorensen 1988). This perception is often 
formed after reference to other warning information received, to past experiences and is 
dependent on whether the warning is considered to be real and related to the environment 
in which the recipient lives (Janis and Mann, 1977; Drabek, 1986; Parker and Handmer, 
1997). The challenge to designers of integrated warning systems is to ensure that the 
information that is disseminated leads a diverse at-risk public to "correct cognitions and 
perceptions" (as defined by Mileti and Sorensen, 1988: 322). Parker and Handmer (1997) 
state that forecasting agencies in the UK often simply assume that their forecasts are 
conveyed to those at risk, that local needs are met and that appropriate adaptive behaviour 
ensues. They contend that it is common for these organisations to have little idea about the 
social and individual processes at work amongst recipients. Clearly, this position is not 
conducive to the development of a seamless and integrated relationship between these two 
communities. 
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6.3.1 Perceptions of the sender 
The role of the sender of a warning message is to influence the behaviour of the recipient 
and to enhance the actions that would take place naturally without a warning being present 
(Edworthy and Adams, 1996). The message content may depend on the sender's local 
circumstances and frame of reference however, and may be influenced by a number of 
factors. These include the confidence a warning official has in the scientific information 
that is presented, on the ability to interpret that information, and to take the appropriate 
action, which includes the use of the appropriate technology (Williams, 1964). It should 
not be assumed that every duty officer in a warning agency reacts in the same way to the 
environmental and other information that is presented to him or her. In other words there is 
much scope for inconsistency and confusion and this has implications for integration. 
These and other factors have been analysed and their influence on the perception of the 
sender and hence performance of the warning system has been tested in a survey of seven 
Flood Duty Officers who are responsible for delivering the flood warning service in the 
Thames Region: 
* Imprecise or "uncertain" environmental information may be presented in which the 
sender may have low confidence. If extreme conditions are indicated but the 
information is not believed, the sender may hesitate and seek confirmation before 
acting. The sender may experience denial and convince him/herself that such 
conditions are unlikely to develop. Bennett (1997) terms this phenomenon as a 
"perceptual defence mechanism" that causes an individual to dismiss unpleasant 
information and focus towards other (more agreeable) conditions. As illustrated in 
Table 6.3, most duty officers questioned in the Thames Region indicated that in this 
circumstance their initial reaction would be to seek confirmation, two said that they 
would delay action until the situation become clearer. 
The sender's "situational perception" may be influenced by the lack of confirmation 
that a certain condition is taking place. In such circumstances, warning dissemination 
may be delayed or blocked until the situation becomes clearer. An example is provided 
by duty officers during the Easter 1998 floods in the Cherwell catchment who 
interpreted information as indicating that the flood was less significant than it actually 
was. This perception was communicated down the dissemination chain resulting in a 
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less than adequate response. In the Thames Region survey only two of the seven duty 
officers said they would act immediately on the receipt of uncertain information, but in 
one case it was his second preference (see Table 6.3). One duty officer indicated he 
would act immediately in some instances, but seek confirmation in others. 
Table 6.3: Actions by Thames Region duty officers on receipt of "uncertain" 
information. 
Flood Duty Officers 
A B C D E F 
Dismiss the information and take no further action 
Act immediately on the information presented 2 1 
Delay actio until the situation becomes clearer I I 
Proactively seek confirmation from another source 
and only act when certain 
2 1 1 1 1 1 
I= first preference, 2= second preference 
Drabek (1986) states that public officials responsible for issuing warnings are likely to 
delay until they are reasonably satisfied that the danger will actually develop. He 
suggests that officials will be concerned about what false alanns will do to their 
credibility and future effectiveness; they may be concerned with the legal problems 
associated with erroneous predictions. Table 6.3 shows that only one duty officer 
questioned would act immediately on receipt of uncertain information (but not in all 
cases), most duty officers would not act unless they were certain of the accuracy of the 
information presented to them. One commented, "I would need to be convinced of the 
absolute accuracy of the information". 
On the basis of past experience flooding might not be expected to occur at a given 
locality. This is often the case when flood defences have been constructed and a flood 
exceeds the design capacity. The sender's perception is that flooding is unlikely to 
occur at such localities and will tend to focus on areas where the perceived risk of 
flooding is higher. An example is afforded by the response to the flooding that 
occurred in Northampton at Easter 1998. Arrangements for warning the public were 
not in place because the risk was perceived to be low due to the presence of 100-year 
defences and the Environment Agency's policy to use its limited resources to warn 
areas at greater risk (Bye and Homer, 1998). 
151 
9 The intuition of the duty officer may be at odds with the environmental information 
that is being presented via the detection system and he/she may "sense" that flooding 
will not take place on a given occasion. An example would be if rainfall measurements 
indicated that certain flood producing intensities were occurring, but the duty officer's 
own perceptions, based on experience and general observations, may indicate that the 
situation is less severe. All duty officers interviewed in the Thames Region however, 
indicated that in such circumstances they would seek confirmation from another source 
and would only take action when they were more certain. No duty officer said that he 
would act on his own intuition if it was at odds with the information presented to him 
(see Table 6.4). 
Table 6.4: An assessment of the intuition of duty officers in the Thames Region. 
Flood Duty Officers 
A- TB C D E F G 
Dismiss your feelings and only act on factual 
information 
2 1 2 
Go with your intuition if its at odds with the 
information presented to you 
Delay action until the situation becomes clearer 
Proactively seek confirmation from another source 
and only act when certain 
I 
I= first preference, 2= second preference 
* Communication breakdowns may occur between colleagues due to the fact that they 
perceive the same information in entirely different ways. As Bennett (1997) suggests, 
there is a possibility that in such circumstances one duty officer may attempt to 
66 project" his or her own feelings to others. The danger here is that incorrect 
perceptions may prevail. The consensus amongst duty officers in the Thames Region is 
that it would depend upon how the other person's judgement was rated and as to 
whether that person was perceived as having greater experience. If there was 
disagreement most would seek the advice of a third party if time was available. 
In an integrated system a sender should ensure that the content of his/her warning 
message will be received, understood and believed by those at risk, and that 
appropriate action to reduce loss will ensue. Table 6.5 indicates that these concerns are 
not uppermost in the minds of flood duty officers when they are issuing flood 
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warnings. Six of the seven duty officers indicated that their main concern would be to 
get warnings out on time, two officers indicated that they would also be concerned 
about procedural activities being adequately covered, but only one officer indicated 
that he would be concerned about the recipient receiving the warning. Another officer 
mentioned however, that a change in emphasis was required moving towards a greater 
appreciation of the needs of the recipient. 
Table 6.5: Issues that concern duty officers in the Thames Region when issuing flood 
warnings. 
Flood Duty Officers 
A B C ID E IF G 
Getting the warningout on time 
Remembering to cover all activities set out in the 
procedures 
Getting the location of the warning correct 
Concern about issuing a false warning/ future 
credibility 
Ensuring that the warning gets to the recipient 
Ensuring that recipients understand the message 
and act appropriately 
I= first preference 
It is possible therefore, for individual senders of flood warning messages to have varying 
perceptions of the flood hazard and of the action that they and receivers of their warnings 
should take to respond to that hazard. Such differences can be attributed to a number of 
different factors including the individuals' personality, level of confidence, age, sex, level 
of experience, and status in the organisation in which he or she works. Duty officers who 
are young and with a limited amount of experience will have quite different perceptions to 
their older, more experienced counterparts. There will also be marked differences in how 
such individuals are perceived by others, both inside and outside their organisation. This 
will include perceptions of their credibility and their legitimacy. The young, female duty 
officer for instance, sometimes has difficulty in being taken seriously by more experienced 
male colleagues and some members of the public. 
Variations in perception by and of senders of warning messages pose a problem for the 
forecasting and warning agencies as they can lead to an inconsistent level of service to 
their customers. Such variations can also have a detrimental effect on total warning system 
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integration in that in certain circumstances the warning process can become distorted, 
confused or even blocked at this vital interface. The decision to issue a warning may not be 
made at the critical time for a range of perceptual reasons. Williams (1964) mentions the 
phenomenon of the psychological inability to accept the possibility of a completely 
devastating disaster. He also raises the issue of blame. If the warner does not warn and 
death and destruction occur, will he or she be blamed? Conversely, if he or she does warn 
and nothing materialises will there be criticism for upsetting people unnecessarily? This 
dilemma may influence a duty officer's decision to warn. One duty officer in the Thames 
Region commented that if he were criticised for unnecessarily issuing a flood warning, he 
would delay issuing a warning the next time until he was more certain. This highlights the 
need for clear decision rules and other measures that will facilitate decision making and 
integration at this important stage in the warning process. 
A number of measures can be suggested to minimise the possible inconsistencies brought 
about by differences in sender perception, to improve the function of the warning, and 
hence the integration of the total warning process. These include: 
Regular staff meetings, training sessions, and multi-agency exercises that will give 
opportunities to discuss issues, obtain feedback, and receive consistent instruction and 
advise on what action to take in given circumstances. This will be explored in more 
detail in Section 6.6. 
The use of expert systems can help encapsulate the knowledge and expertise of the 
most experienced staff to support the decision making of less skilled staff. Work 
shadowing will also help in this regard. 
Consistency of the warning messages from different sources has been found to be an 
important factor in increasing public belief in the veracity of the warning (Burkart, 
1991). Convincing the public that they are in danger however, is a serious challenge 
and involves the careful communication of risk. This will be addressed more 
comprehensively in Chapter 7 of this thesis. 
A better understanding of the social and individual processes at work among warning 
recipients will help ensure that the sender meets their needs more fully. This will be 
explored more fully in the next section of this Chapter. 
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Duty officers in the Tharnes Region were asked to rank the measures likely to reduce 
inconsistencies between them and the information they perceived that the recipients of 
their warnings would most require. Table 6.6 shows that the introduction of standardised 
procedures, formal training sessions and regular informal meetings were thought to be the 
most effective measures to reduce inconsistencies. The more integrative measures such as 
multi-agency exercises and better understanding of the needs of the recipient were not 
rated highly. The results presented in Table 6.7 are more encouraging however, as factors 
such as the timing and severity of flooding, and provision of behavioural information in 
public warning messages, match public requirements as determined through public 
perception surveys (see Table 6.10). 
Table 6.6: Measures to reduce inconsistency between flood duty officers. 
Flood Duty Officers Aver 
A B c D E F G -age 
Regular informal meetings 4 3 6 1 2 5 3 .3 Informal training sessions 3 4 4 4 1 3 4 2 
Multi-agency exercises 6 6 7 8 3 7 8 7 
Use of eMert systems 7 5 13 31 7 2 6 5 
Better understanding of recipients needs 8 2 5- 7 6 6 5 6 
Standardised actions , 1 1 1 2 8 1 1 1 
Consistent instruction 1 2 
: 8: 2 5 4 4 
_ 
2 4 
Work shadowing 5 Lj 8 6 5 . 
T 7 8 
I=best 8=1east 
Table 6.7: Duty officers' perceptions of the information required by warning 
recipients. 
Flood Duty Officers Aver- 
A B_ C D E F G age 
Time of onset of flooding 1 2 1 1 2 2 3 1 
How long flooding will last 7 3 6 7 7 5 8 7 
Information on what to do 4 6 3 3 4 6 5 3 
How severe will flooding be 2 5 12 6 1 3 1 2 Depth of flooding 2 4 8 8 3 3 7 4 
Where to get sandbags 6 1 4 5 5 8 9 5 
Is the warning real 9 9 9 9 9 1 2 9 
Is evacuation necess _LS, r-yacuation necessary 8 8 5 
2 6 9 4 6 
Where to go for help 5 7 7 3 8 7 6 8 
I=best 8=1east 
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6.3.2 Perceptions of the recipient 
Mileti (1994) poses two fundamental questions in relation to this issue that have 
implications for integration: 
1. Why can different perceptions of risk arise among the members of a public who 
all receive the same flood waming message? 
2. Why can public response to a flood warning differ between individuals who 
receive the same information about how to respond? 
Mileti and Sorensen (1988) contend that people go through a sequential process when they 
receive a warning where various aspects of the decision confronting them are considered 
before acting. They have attempted to encapsulate these actions in a model that is 
presented in Table 6.8. It is through greater understanding of these processes that the 
designers of integrated flood warning systems can achieve greater effectiveness. 
Table 6.8: The general warning-response sequential process model (Mileti and 
Sorensen, 1988). 








Information Seeking and Confirmation 
Mileti and Sorensen see the process as being initiated by notification, or hearing an initial 
warning. This leads to various psychological and behavioural outcomes. The process is 
shaped by sender (those issuing the warning) and receiver (those hearing the warning) 
factors. Mediating the process are information-seeking and confirmation activities. As 
people go through this sequential process their decisions at each stage are based largely on 
their perceptions of the risk of flooding and the options they have to respond to that risk. 
Why these perceptions vary becomes apparent when each of the stages in the process is 
examined in turn. But it is important to recognise that in an integrated system not only 
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should information flow freely between those who issue a warning and those who receive 
it, but that it is understood and acted upon in a consistent way. 
The first stage of public warning response is hearing the warning message. Mileti and 
Sorensen (1988) stress that it cannot be assumed that just because a warning is broadcast 
people will hear it. People may fail to hear a warning for a number of reasons, including 
selective listening or a physical constraint to hearing. The failure to hear a warning can 
preclude or delay response so it is important to disseminate warnings using multiple 
warning channels to ensure the greatest number of people hear and remember that they 
have heard a warning message (Quarantelli, 1983, Drabek, 1986, Mileti, 1994). This is an 
important integration point. During Easter 1998 for instance, flood warnings for the 
Cherwell catchnient in Oxfordshire were only issued via local radio, and although people 
in risk areas heard the warnings they did not think they applied to them. It can be argued 
that if warnings were disseminated via a number of channels they may have been taken 
more seriously, resulting in more appropriate action to minimise losses. There is still a 
tendency by some in the Environment Agency however, to focus on a small number of 
warning methods over which they have complete control such as the AVM and 
FLOODCALL systems. To achieve the desired level of service in an integrated system, it 
is important that these methods are used within a multi-channel strategy. The source of the 
warning has also been shown to have an impact on public response. As Burkart (1991) 
suggests, peoples' confidence in the source of the warning varies and this affects the level 
of seriousness given to particular warning messages. This is particularly relevant in 
England and Wales because, as Table 6.9 indicates, the public awareness of the flood 
warning responsibility of the Environment Agency, although increasing, is still low. It is 
also clear that people are more likely to hear a warning if they are part of a social network 
(Mileti and Sorensen, 1988, Parker and Handmer, 1997), if they are in tune with their 
environmental surroundings, and have experienced a flood in the past (Mileti 1994, 
Quarantelli, 1983, Drabek, 1986). The relevance of social networks will be explored in 
more detail in Section 6.4. 
Once heard, the warning must be understood and given meaning (Mileti and Sorensen, 
1988). It is common however, for the initial reaction to a warning to be one of disbelief 
and a failure to take action, especially when it is unexpected and the level of awareness is 
low (Burkart 1991, Drabek, 1986). Few recipients of warnings develop an immediate sense 
of severe personal risk, and a common reaction is "it can't happen to me". Quarantelli 
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(1980) comments that people in low-risk areas in particular simply do not believe they are 
at risk and they often deny this even in the face of warnings to the contrary. This 
phenomenon was noted in Kidlington, Oxfordshire during the Easter 1998 floods when 
people ignored warnings and told the emergency services just before they flooded that " it 
never floods here". The meaning attached to a particular flood warning can vary among 
people therefore, and this may or may not conform to what was intended by the sender of 
the information. In an integrated system it is important that the recipients of a warning 
respond effectively and they are more likely to respond if they believe that the warning is 
real, that the contents of the message are accurate, and that it applies to them. Mileti (1994) 
argues that believability is influenced by many factors associated with the method and 
contents of the warning message. People are also more likely to respond to a warning if it 
is personalised in some way, if they do not feel that they are the targets of the warning 
they may well ignore it. 
Table 6.9: Spontaneous awareness of responsibility for issuing flood warnings by the 
at-risk population (after BMRB, 1999). 
1999 1998 1997 
Unweighted. base: 1106 1138 855 
Weighted base: 1106 1138 855 
Environment Agency 24 15 8 
Local authority 21 25 29 
National Rivers Authority 12 10 17 
Local water company 10 14 16 
Police 4 7 9 
DoE/DETR 2 1 - 
Fire Brigade 1 2 2 
Don't know 33 33 33 
A number of factors are identified in the literature that are likely to maximise the 
probability that warnings will be understood, believed and personalised. Several 
researchers for instance, consider that the more effective warnings are those that are 
specific about the area to be affected, the time of maximum risk, the characteristics of the 
hazard, and on the action that should be taken (Quarantelli 1980, Mileti 1994, Mileti and 
Sorensen 1988). This is confirmed by the results of recent nation-wide surveys 
commissioned by the Environment Agency and presented in Table 6.10. They indicate that 
the time of flooding, instructions on what to do and the severity of flooding are the most 
commonly mentioned pieces of information required (BMRB, 1998,1999). Despite these 
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findings, information of this type is not routinely disseminated to the public in the 
Agency's flood warning messages. Warning messages put out on the AVM and 
FLOODCALL systems for instance, do not provide behavioural advice nor specific 
information on timing and depth of flooding (see Table 6.12). Although the Environment 
Agency has taken great strides since 1996 to improve the information it supplies, the 
format of the basic flood warning message it issues to the public is still largely factual and 
uniform. Keys (1997) stresses the need to recognise that the community is not a single 
mass of people and that different groups will need different information and different 
presentations of it. The Agency has yet to come to terms with the fact that these differences 
exist and then how to meet the different needs. 
Table 6.10: Information required by the public in flood warning messages (BMRB, 
1998/1999) 
1999 1998 
Unweighted base: 1106 855 
Weighted base: 1106 855 
Time of flooding/when to expect it 23 26 
Instructions on what to do 19 18 
How severe flooding will be 13 16 
Which areas are likely to be flooded 10 14 
Height of the flood 10 11 
Where to evacuate to/which roads to use 8 10 
Whether should evacuate 5 7 
Whether sandbags are their way/where to get them from 8 7 
Where to go for help/what help is available 9 6 
How long flooding will last 7 6 
Preliminary warning/24 hours notice 11 5 
Whether serious risk or just an alert - 2 Other 1 6 
know 11 9 
Edworthy and Adams (1996) emphasise the need to consider the alerting function of a 
warning and the fact that different signals or "icons" produce different levels of arousal. 
Certain key words or symbols can be used to trigger certain reactions and speed-up public 
response. Colours such as "red" and words such as "deadly" or "lethal" for example, can 
be used to signify the highest level of danger. The Agency and its predecessors have used a 
colour-coded system (YELLOW, AMBER, and RED) to communicate increasing flood 
5-emnity for many years. Surveys have shown however, a strong perception among the 
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public that the colours relate to increasing levels of certaint that a flood will hit a certain 
area i. e. a traffic light system. This is a classic example of the recipients of flood warnings 
attaching a different meaning to the warning message to that intended by the sender (see 
Tables 6.13 and 6.14). 
Many researchers point to the importance of confirmation in establishing warning belief 
Most people will engage in some form of confirmation after receiving a warning and 
before taking any protective action, and this is often with relatives and friends rather than 
via official sources (Burkart, 1991; Drabek, 1986). This involves gathering further 
information so that the level of personal risk can be assessed. Drabek (1986) estimates that 
as many as 80% of warning recipients will engage in this type of behaviour and that when 
confirmation is received, perception of risk is likely to be higher. This activity is 
commonly observed in the Thames Region, and a recent example would be when flood 
warnings were issued for the Pinn catchment in north-west London on 2 June 1999. Flood 
wardens were alerted in the early hours and their first response was to observe local river 
levels and liaise amongst themselves before taking any protective action. Drabek states that 
people are more likely to believe a warning if the environment supports the threat message. 
If others around them seem to be behaving as if they believe the warning, then they are 
more likely to do so as well. There is evidence to show however, that the more warning 
messages that are received by an individual, the fewer the attempts at warning 
confirmation (Drabek, 1986). This reinforces the need for a multi-sourced warning strategy 
that will cut the need for confirmatory behaviour and speed up response. Burkart (1991) 
points to the importance of the media as an independent source of surveillance information, 
which may be used to confirm a warning. In summary he states "an environment in which 
the citizen can easily confirm an initial warning through alternative sources is one that 
fosters the development of a warning belief'. 
Even when warnings meet all these standards, response by the public is still dependent 
upon the different perceptions that each individual brings to an emergency situation, and 
which almost predispose them to different actions. Factors that can influence the way 
people react include age, sex, level of education, pre-knowledge about a particular hazard, 
experience of a particular hazard, proximity to risk area, length of residence, and stress. 
Drabek (1986) notes for example, that people of low socio-economic status tend to 
disregard official warnings more than the middle classes, that women are more likely to 
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interpret warnings positively than men, that old people are less likely to respond effectively 
as younger people, and that ethnic groups assign little credit to official warning sources. He 
also notes that families tend to respond more effectively if they are together and that 
emergency planners should work to unite families to avoid delay. Other people are 
constrained from responding to a warning message for a number of reasons. They may lack 
the resources to act, or be particularly stressed, or be elderly, handicapped and infirm, or 
belong to an ethnic group and not understand the meaning of the message. Table 6.11 
indicates that on average one-fifth of households in flood risk areas in England and Wales 
may have an occupant with a long-standing illness/disability/infirmity. As Quarentelli 
(1983) notes, some people may refuse to respond because they fear looting of their 
property, which is often unfounded, or for undue concern over the safety of a loved one or 
a pet. Such behaviour may appear irrational to those issuing flood warning messages. 
Table 6.11: Long-standing disability/illness and non-English speakers across the eight 
regions of the Environment Agency in England and Wales (BMRB, 1998). 
T A M NE NW S W Sw Sw 
Unweighted. base: 139 142 62 117 99 268 94 55 
Weighted base: 57 194 11 22 24 675 24 5 
% % % % % % 0 /0 
Presence of h/hold member 13 17 11 19 20 19 19 22 
with long-standing 
illness/disability/infirmity I 
EnElish not first lanEuaEe 1 11 21 -I -1 21 - 
Past experience of flood events greatly enhances the probability of people taking effective 
action when they are warned. Those who have been flooded before generally react quicker 
than those who have not, once they have accepted the likelihood of danger (Drabek, 1986, 
Perry and Green, 1982, Quarantelli, 1983). People have a tendency however, to believe 
that history will repeat itself and it is often difficult to persuade people that a new disaster 
will be different from the earlier one. Drabek (1986) comments that judgements on 
probable impact of a flood are often made on the basis of the last one that affected the area. 
An example of this would be where individuals go to the expense of raising electricity 
sockets or the floors of their premises above the level of the last flood only to find that the 
next flood is deeper. Past effectiveness of warning systems is also important for timely 
response. If warnings are issued but flooding does not materialise however, then this might 
neutralise future warnings and dampen subsequent vigilant tendencies. There is a desire 
not to react in a way that looks foolish and to be seen to be overreacting and typically 
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people adopt a "wait and see" approach following receipt of a warning. There is evidence 
to show however, that if people have developed a personal or family emergency plan they 
are more likely to heed warnings and respond more effectively (Drabek, 1986). This is 
something that is actively promoted in the United States for example, to try and persuade 
people to be prepared for hazards that may affect their area (NOAA, 1997). 
It is clear therefore, that "receiver characteristics" can vary widely among members of the 
public in any one warning circumstance, as well as between different events. The goal for 
designers of integrated warning systems is to maximise the sender characteristics and 
provide convincing and reasonable warning infon-nation to the public, whilst at the same 
time minimising the negative impacts of receiver characteristics. The interface between the 
sender and receiver of warning information is an important one in an integrated system and 
to make this interface work effectively, greater understanding of the perceptions and likely 
response of the warning recipient is essential. Warning recipients will respond more 
effectively if the sender's messages are believable and understandable and their content 
can be confirmed via alternative sources. To date, this area has received little attention in 
the establishment of flood warning arrangements in England and Wales. Small regard has 
been given to the content and format of public warning information and the varying needs 
and responses of recipients have not been comprehended nor adequately cater for. 
6.4 The relevance of social networks to system integration 
These will be examined under two main headings; within communities and within 
organisations. 
6.4.1 Community networks 
As has been shown in Section 6.3, the interpretation of and reaction to a warning is not a 
simple or automatic process; it is a complex and usually highly social process. The 
literature records that recipients of warnings do not normally respond and interpret 
messages individually, they react instead with other people who may or may not be 
physically present or directly involved (Quarentelli, 1983; Williams, 1964). It is clear that 
people who are part of large and well-established social networks are more likely to 
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receive warnings, to confirm warnings, as well as understand, believe, and personalise 
them, and engage in response (Mileti, 1994; Burkart, 1991). Networks are relevant to 
integration as they can facilitate the same or a similar message being disseminated to most 
of the community. Networks allow people to turn to others to interpret information and to 
increase the options for response, and studies have shown that when people get separated 
from their network they have a lower probability of responding appropriately (Burkart, 
1991). They have the characteristic of binding the community together and providing 
mutually supportive assistance. For fast responding situations local community networks 
are the most effective in rapidly passing messages and giving immediate assistance, but all 
networks take time to start functioning. When lead times are very short people tend to rely 
more heavily on official warning sources (Burkart, 1991). 
Table 6.12 Example of a FLOODCALL message 
THIS STATEMENT WAS PREPARED ON Monday 17 March AT 1200 HOURS 
THERE ARE CURRENTLY THE FOLLOWING FLOOD WARNINGS IN FORCE: 
AN AMBER WARNING FOR THE RIVER Pang and Sulharn Brook 
BETWEEN Hampstead Norreys AND Pangbourne 
INCLUDING Stanford Dingley 
THIS MEANS: 
AMBER - FLOODING TO ISOLATED PROPERTIES, ROADS AND LARGE 
AREAS OF FARMLAND, PARKS AND GARDENS 
WEATHER PROSPECTS 
There is a band of heavy rain steadily moving across the region from the west. This rain 
will persist throughout the afternoon, total rainfall could exceed 40-50mm with as much as 
I Omm in an hour in places. 
RIVER AND FLOODING FORECAST 
The prolonged wet period has resulted in river levels rising. The forecast rainfall is likely 
to result in many watercourses overtoppng their banks and flooding large areas of 
floodplain. 
THIS FORECAST WAS ISSUED AT 1200 HOURS ON MONDAY 17 MARCH AND 
WILL BE UPDATED AS THE SITUATION CHANGES. 
Table 6.13 Awareness of colour-coded warning system across the Environment 
Agency's regions (BMRB, 199811999). 
sw m w NW NE s A T Total 
1999 83% 82% - - - 50% 71% 50% D/ 55;, o 1998 84% 77% 61% 48% 48% 40% 33% 33% 40% 
1997 63% 59% 80% 36% 28% 37% 43% 39% 42% 
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Table 6.14: The interpretation of colour-coded warnings across all Environment 
Agency regions (BMRB, 1998/1999) 
1999 1998 
Unweighted base: 652 542 
Weighted base: 606 453 
YELLOW 
Low risk/only slight risk 32 27 
Possibility/chance of flooding 23 19 
Be prepared/stand by 7 11 
Be alert/be aware 8 10 
Medium to high risk 5 5 
Flooding is imminent 4 5 
Risk of high tides 2 5 
Other 2 1 
Don't know 22 24 
RED 
Flooding is imminent/about to happen 22 27 
High risk/flooding is certain/100% sure 16 26 
Serious/severe/ma or flooding 16 18 
Danger 8 11 
Flood is happening now/has started 12 9 
Need to prepare/move valuables 6 9 
Evacuate now 6 7 
Possible evacuation 6 2 
Listen for further information - 2 
Getsandbags I 
O er th L 
Don't know 
There is evidence presented in the literature that indicates that social networks are an 
important mechanism for disseminating unofficial warnings during times of flood (Parker 
and Handmer, 1997). Drabek (1986) emphasises the importance of informal systems and 
notes that they often keep functioning when official systems fail, a fact that is often not 
appreciated by the operators of official schemes. In the 1990 Thames river floods at 
Maidenhead for example, Tunstall (1992) reports that over 40 per cent of flood plain 
occupants who were eventually flooded sought to warn others in their community once 
they had informally detected the flood risk. Such networks have also been found to be 
important in raising public awareness of the flood risk. Turistall (1992) found that over 30 
per cent of householders in Maidenhead first found out about their flood risk after moving 
into the area through conversation with neighbours. The issue facing the operators of 
official warning systems is how to ensure that a competitive environment does not develop 
between the two systems. Australian research suggests that official and unofficial systems 
164 
can coexist peacefully, and can often function to reinforce each other (Handmer, 1991). 
Research in the Thames catchment (Tunstall, 1992; Hyde, 1992) supports this finding as 
recipients of unofficial flood warning messages were found to display a high degree of 
willingness to participate in an official scheme. People indicated that they were prepared to 
pass on flood warnings by telephone to neighbours and friends, and significant numbers 
were willing to work as voluntary flood wardens. Parker and Handmer (1997) state that 
where they exist, flood wardens can help integrate official and unofficial flood warning 
schemes and appear to be associated with high levels of warning system satisfaction. 
So how can social networks within recipient communities be best used to improve the 
dissemination, interpretation and response to warnings, and ultimately the integration of 
warning systems? Mileti and Sorensen (1988) believe that because different people belong 
to different social networks, warning messages should be disseminated over the full range 
of communication channels to maximise the number who hear a warning. Parker and 
Handmer (1997) suggest that a more targeted approach is needed, to attempt to meet the 
needs of a community through dialogue and the provision of personalised information. 
They state that where the flood warning agency has sought the views and assistance of 
local communities, and subsequently constructed partnership arrangements, the flood 
warning systems appear to be more robust and effective. In the Thames Region an example 
of where this approach has been successfully introduced is in the Pinn catchment in north- 
west London. A residents association, The Pinner Association, has established a 
comprehensive warning network involving over 250 residents as detailed in Figure 6.3. 
"After the Great Flood in 1977, the Pinner Association decided immediate 
action was needed but, as the authorities with any responsibility were unwilling 
or unable to act, the Association agreed to co-ordinate local efforts. These took 
two main courses. The first was to reduce the risk of flooding by applying 
pressures at all levels, from local authority and responsible government 
agencies up to Parliament via our local MPs. The second was to set up a Flood 
Warning Scheme so that those likely to be affected would have notice of 
imminent flooding" (Wise, 1999). 
The Agency is able to activate this community-establi shed network by a single telephone 
call to the co-ordinator and receives feedback from warden observations on the ground. 
The network has been successfully activated on many occasions, the last being on 2 June 
1999 when procedures worked particularly well. This is a good example of how an official 
warning system can successfully integrate with a community-led scheme to provide an 
165 
effective local dissemination network. In fact the Pinner Association wrote to the Agency 
stating that they felt that the arrangement was "an example of how a Government agency 
can work closely with a local association to the benefit of all parties" (see Appendix 5). 
6.4.2 Social networks within organisations 
Parker and Handmer (1997) state that social networks are central to the functioning of 
warning systems within organisations. There is little in the research literature however, that 
examines in any detail the impact of such networks on the functioning of flood warning 
systems. The author's experience within the Environment Agency would suggest that 
social networks of relevance operate at two levels; within the operational framework, and 
in the area of system planning and development. 
The staff engaged in full-time flood forecasting and warning activities in the Agency is 
small, around 60 across all eight regions in England and Wales (although numbers have 
recently increased in response to the Easter 1998 Flood Review). Because of the specialist 
nature of the work, staff have tended to remain in post for long periods (until very recently 
- see Figure 6.2) and close working relationships have been established across regional 
boundaries. Close relationships also develop with staff in other organisations, such as the 
emergency services and local authorities, with which the flood warning staff come into 
regular contact. This can often lead to more efficient working during flood emergencies, 
cementing integration within and between organisations. This is not always the case 
however, and in some instances team working can engender "tribalistic" attitudes between 
groups. In the Environment Agency for example, tensions have been known to develop 
between staff operating in Area and Regional teams. In an integrated system it is important 
that staff work together with a common focus, that there is free flow of information, and 
that roles and responsibilities are clearly defined to avoid conflict. In the Thames Region a 
formal operating agreement has been introduced in 1999 between the Regional Flood 
Warning Centre and the three operating Areas that clearly sets out roles and 
responsibilities of each group. 
Prior to 1989, systems for detecting and forecasting floods and disseminating warnings 
were largely developed separately by 10 autonomous regional water authorities in England 
and Wales. There was typically little contact between the staff managing these functions in 
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these independent organisations, The formation of a national organisation resulted in more 
contact between staff in the newly formed regions and the interchange of ideas. The Flood 
Warning Dissemination Project in 1996 for instance, became a catalyst for greater liaison 
between practitioners in the Agency' regions, strengthened by the organisation's desire for 
greater national consistency. Formal project groups have now been established to oversee 
the development of a whole range of activities in the flood warning field. Underpinning 
these groups is a strong informal network fori-ned by practitioners in what is still a small 
national community. This network has facilitated the exchange of ideas and the 
identification and adoption of best practice, and extends outside the Agency and includes 
workers in other organisations such as the Met Office, research bodies and universities. 
The number of individuals is still relatively small and close relationships develop that help 
with the identification of system development needs and possible solutions. As way of 
illustration, Table 6.15 sets out the personal networks in which the Thames Region's Flood 
Warning Manager participates and the frequency of communication. 
For social networks to develop and to be maintained however, a degree of organisational 
stability is required. Re-structuring and organisational change has been particularly 
prevalent in the Agency and in other organisations in recent years and this has had an 
impact on the functioning of social networks. Figure 6.2 illustrates the staff movements in 
the Flood Warning Group in the Thames Region alone between 1984 and 1999. A marked 
change can be seen in 1996 when previously infrequent staff movement is replaced by a 
rapid turnover that coincides with significant organisational change. Loss of knowledge 
and expertise due to early retirement, redeployment and departure of staff often accompany 
such reorganisations, and the Thames Region was no exception. In addition, the morale of 
the staff remaining has inevitably declined in a climate of uncertainty and change. Social 
networks that have been established with the Agency and with staff in other agencies have 
shown signs of breaking down and this has a potentially negative impact on integration. 
Indeed in the Easter Floods in 1998 there was evidence that the loss in continuity of 
staffing and expertise, and poor liaison between organisations weakened the effective 
response to the incident (Bye and Homer, 1998). 
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Figure 6.2 Staff movements in Flood Warning Group, Thames Region 1984-1999 




6.5 The power of the individual 
Mitchell (1990) states that integration, co-operation, and co-ordination depend to a 
significant extent upon the willingness of individuals to make them happen. People who 
are inclined to co-operate and are enthusiastic can often make a poor system work well. 
Conversely, a well-designed system may falter if individuals are determined not to make it 
work. As O'Riordan (1976) observes, decision-making often has little to do with 
organisation, statutory guidelines and co-ordinating arrangements. Rather, it has much 
more to do with "the outcome of the determination, vision, indifference, antagonisms and 
bloody-mindedness of particular individuals who are in positions of influence". Thus, the 
combination of organisational culture, personalities, and individuals' attitudes can pose a 
major obstacle to integration, or conversely can facilitate its introduction. 
Looking specifically at flood warning systems, who are the key individuals who can make 
or break a policy of integration? It is possible to identify two main types; those in 
organisations who design systems and deliver the operational service; and those in 
communities who receive and act on warning messages. In the fori-ner, the individuals who 
manage and design flood warning systems are highly influential, as it is they who interpret 
and implement the policy of the organisation (see Table 6.16). Their enthusiasm towards a 
policy, such as integration, will determine how effectively it is implemented operationally. 
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Table 6.15: Social Networks in Organisations. Flood Warning Manager, Environment 
Agency, Thames Region. 
INTERNAL TO THE ENVIRONMENT AGENCY Frequency of 
Regional/Area Communication 
Regional Water Department Daily 
Regional Water Department Management Team. Ad-hoc 
Flood Warning Team. Daily 
Regional Flood Defence Teams. Weekly 
Regional Water Resources Teams. Monthly 
Area Flood Defence and Water Resources Teams. Daily 
Flood Duty Officers Team. Daily 
Regional Flood Action Group. Quarterly 
Regional Flood Defence Committee Ad-hoc 
Central Information Services. Weekly 
Regional Telemetry. Monthly 
Public Relations Group. Monthly 
Research and Development. Quarterly 
NATIONAL 
National Flood Warning Implementation Team. Quarterly 
National Weather Radar Team. Quarterly 
Weather Services Team. 6-monthly 
National Flood Defence Team. Ad-hoc 
Flood Defence Managers Group. Ad-hoc 
Easter Floods Action Group. Monthly 
Sub-groups spawned by any of the above Ad-hoc 
EXTERNAL TO THE ENVIRONMENT AGENCY 
Met Office: 
London Weather Centre. 6-monthly 
National Weather Radar Committee. 6-monthly 
National Weather Radar Operational Working Group. 6-monthly 
Commercial Services. Ad-hoc 
Institute of Hydrology: 
Flood Forecasting Group. Ad-hoc 
Local Authorities, Emergency Services, Utilities: 
County FW Planning Groups (12). Annually 
London FW Planning Groups (5). Annually 
Flood Warning Seminars (3). Annually 
Middlesex University: 
Flood Hazard Research Centre. Ad-hoc 
Other: 
Inter-Agency Committee on the Hydrological Applications of 
Weather Radar. 6-monthly 
Chartered Institution of Water and Environmental Management. 6-monthly 
British Hydrological Society. , 6-monthly 
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implementation are low unless organisational pressure is placed on that individual to 
comply. This is unlikely to occur unless the policy has a very high priority within the 
organisation and a strong political message in support of the policy is communicated from 
the top management. It is common for some individuals to react negatively especially if 
they perceive themselves as becoming losers through loss of authority, shrunken empires 
and reduced leverage or influence. In such situations, lip service may be given in support 
of integration, but in practice low-risk strategies such as delay, systematic misinformation 
and minor sabotage will be used to hinder its implementation (Mitchell, 1990). The 
Environment Agency for example, has experienced difficulty in implementing a policy of 
consistency and integration throughout each of its eight regions and twenty-six areas. 
There are still many individual members of staff still wishing to work in ways that have 
been locally formulated to meet, in their eyes, the local needs of their customers. 
In emergency situations, decision making in organisations increases, especially in the 
lower ranks, and individual autonomy increases (Drabek, 1986). Key individuals can often 
trigger the response of organisations and it is important that these individuals are properly 
empowered to take appropriate action. Within the Environment Agency decision making 
on the issue of flood warnings rests with professional flood duty officers who have an 
intimate knowledge of the flood-producing characteristics of the river catchments 
concerned. There is no doubt that these individuals have great influence over system 
integration as they operate at the interface of the detection, forecasting and dissemination 
phases of the warning process. Many integrative processes take place in their heads as they 
assimilate, evaluate and process information and generate other information in the form of 
warning messages. Although the Agency tries to even out the level of service offered by 
such staff through training and the issue of standard procedures, differences in the 
intuition, experience, value judgements and response of individuals are inevitable (see 
Tables 6.4 and 6.6). The process of integration will be assisted by the creation of the right 
environment for officers to operate in, free from the fear of criticism or blame if things go 
wrong. 
Prior to the Easter Floods in 1998 there were signs within the Agency that flood duty staff 
were not being fully valued. There was an increasing trend to reduce staff numbers on 
standby rosters and reduce payments and other terms and conditions. A continuation of this 
Policy would have resulted in loss of motivation and a reduction in the level of service 
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offered to the public. An example is provided in the Thames Region during the 
establishment of a Regional Flood Warning Centre at Reading in the Thames Region in 
1998 involving the closure of the centre in Hertfordshire. The decision was taken despite 
an awareness of the high business risk and potential loss of a large number of experienced 
individuals. As Table 6.17 illustrates, 9 experienced duty officers were lost to the flood 
warning service out of an original team of 11 representing 83 person-years of experience. 
In many response agencies in England and Wales the enthusiasm of key individuals, such as 
emergency planning officers or local commanders, can determine how effectively a given 
organisation responds to flooding incidents and flood warnings. In the Thames Region, for 
instance, the policy of some district councils to operate flood warden schemes and provide 
and deliver sandbags to the public at risk, can be traced to the dedication and interest of one or 
two individuals. The same can be said of the Metropolitan Police in London where differing 
levels of commitment between local commanders' results in different levels of response 
across the capital. The response of the organisation at a local level seems to hinge on whether 
such individuals have an interest in flood response or not. 
Within communities there are usually individuals who are especially sensitive to certain 
kinds of environmental changes, who are more capable than the population in general in 
detecting and interpreting signs of danger from a certain source such as a river (Williams, 
1964). These more sensitive or capable people often take it upon themselves to warn 
others, and as a consequence informal communication processes and networks emerge for 
interpreting and disseminating information about changes in the environment. Parker and 
Handmer (1997) refer to such individuals as "local gurus" who are prepared to serve or 
lead the community, which might include organising networks, stimulating contact 
between people, facilitating the flow of information and providing reassurance. Research 
in the Thames catchment has shown that there is a untapped resource of individuals willing 
to participate in disseminating flood warnings and act as voluntary flood wardens 
(Tunstall, 1992; Hyde, 1992). In many instances flood warden networks have been 
established by local communities acting on their own initiative where there is no (or an 
inadequate) official flood warning system. Parker and Handmer (1997) state that where 
they exist, flood wardens are a potentially important integrating link between official and 
unofficial systems. Flood warning systems that are designed to incorporate the expertise of 
these individuals are likely to be highly effective (see Figure 6.3). 
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Table 6.16: Individual staff posts with influence over flood warning systems in the 
Environment Agency 
Agency Structure Staff position 
Head Office Director of Operations 
Director of Water Management 
Head of Flood Defence 
Flood Defence Officer 
National Flood Warning Campaign 
Manager 
Head of Media 
Regional Office Regional General Manager 
Regional Water Manager 
Flood Defence Manager 
Flood Warning Manager 
Regional Flood Warning Team members 
Flood Duty Officers 
Area Office Area Manager 
Flood Defence and Water Resources 
Manager 
Flood Warning/Operations Team Leader 
Area Flood Warning Team members 
Flood Duty Officers 
- National Groups Flood Defence Managers Group 
Flood Warning Implementation Team 
(Flood Warning Managers) 
Public Awareness Group (Public Relations 
staff) 
Easter Floods Action Group (Expert group) 
Table 6.17: Staff movements following the closure of the Waltham Cross Flood Warning 
Centre in 1998 
Position prior to 1998 Position after 1998 Years working in 
flood warnina 
Continuing role 
in flood warning 
Flood Warning Manager Flood Warning Manager 23 Yes 
Senior Flood Warning 
Technologist 
Software Company II No 
Flood Warning Planning Officer Flood Warnin& Technologist 2 Yes 
Flood Warning Liaison Officer Environment Protection 
Officer 
2 No 
Flood Warning Hydrologist Water Resources Hydrologist 2 No 
Flood Warning Information 
Otticer 
Millennium Project Officer 2 No 
Administration Officer Retired 5 No 
Flood Duty Officers (X5) Removed from the FW roster 60 (combined) No 
173 
Within forecasting and response agencies individuals, such as those referred to above, are 
not always fully appreciated and valued. There has been, for instance, a general reluctance 
to acknowledge the expertise and potential role of "local gurus" in at-risk communities. A 
rather arrogant "we know best" attitude has tended to prevail in these organisations and 
this continues to be the case today. There is a perception in some quarters that members of 
the public cannot be trusted to deliver warning messages to their friends and neighbours. 
The new flood warning dissemination arrangements introduced by the Environment 
Agency for example, were not designed to make provision for such individuals. The AVM 
and FLOODCALL services are mechanisms for passing information in one direction only, 
from the Agency to the at-risk public, they do not cater for the inter-change of information 
with key individuals in the community. In the Midlands and Welsh regions of the Agency 
for instance, a policy decision has been taken to abandon flood warden schemes and focus 
warning dissemination solely on the use of the AVM system. In the Thames Region 
however, a different policy has been adopted. Not only are "local gurus" being actively 
sought out to participate in official warning arrangements often acting as flood wardens, 
but links are being established between them and staff in the flood warning centres to 
encourage the interchange of information during flood events. This is seen to be an 
effective way of disseminating flood warning information to the at-risk public whilst at the 
same time benefiting from feedback from the "local experts". 
6.6 Learning and training 
Bennett (1997) defines leaming as the absorption of knowledge and the acquisition of 
skills and/or fresh attitudes. He sees training as being utilitarian and intended to improve 
the skills that individuals use in their daily lives, Both are important for integration. Foster 
(1980) for example, sees all decision-making processes such as flood warning as leaming 
cycles that can be continually modified with reference to recent experience to improve 
their adequacy and efficiency. Williams (1964), identifies prior training and practice and 
the presence of trained, organised leadership as adding to the effectiveness of the total 
warning process. 
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The importance of learning and training to system integration can be analysed under the 
headings of the individual, both inside organisations and in communities, and organisations 
themselves. 
6.6.1 Individuals within organisations 
Foster (1980) recognises that the operation of the warning system itself should be carefully 
recorded if the total system is to be improved. This can be achieved through debriefing 
sessions after events. Discussions should be held between the key individuals involved, to 
record in detail any problems experienced and the reasons for them, such material is very 
useful in the training of personnel. He goes on to state that regular testing and exercising of 
systems is important to determine how effective they are, and this is especially valuable 
where staff lack direct experience or where the frequency of events is low. As disaster- 
warning networks are essentially learning systems, they generally improve with use. 
Exercises should not be confined to the testing of the technology on which the system is 
based, important though this is. The performance of the personnel should also be 
monitored with a view to improving efficiency; this may identify points of weakness in the 
warning system that can be modified as a result. 
Detection and forecasting systems are increasingly complex and technology-based. 
Personnel within forecasting agencies need regular training on the operation of such 
systems and on the interpretation of the information presented for the total system to 
function effectively. This is particularly relevant where flooding events are infrequent and 
duty rosters are large. In such cases an individual duty officer may only have to manage a 
flood event once every few years, but will be expected to operate systems effectively at 
very short notice. The importance of a continual programme of training coupled with 
regular exercises cannot be over-emphasised in these circumstances. Table 6.18 gives 
details of the Agency's training programme for flood duty staff and it is clear there is 
variation from region to region that could result in differing levels of service across 
England and Wales. 
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Table 6.18: Training programme for flood warning staff in each of the Agency's 
regions (after Bailey, 1999). 
Region Training programme 
Anglian Formalised - training on new developments as weekly duty rosters 
change. Special training day held annually. 
Midlands Not formalised - training confined to new technical systems. 
North East Formalised - half day training as weekly duty rosters change. 
North West Formalised - meetings of duty officers every three months, briefing 
on new developments as weekly duty rosters change. 
Southern Not formalised - duty officers trained on new developments. 
South West Formalised - half day training for duty staff every six weeks. 
Thames Formalised - monthly meetings of duty staff including a formal 
training session. 
Formalised - training sessions every three months. 
The evaluation of incoming environmental information is not a simple process, as it 
requires value judgements based on experience. There are various techniques available for 
passing on this experience and knowledge to others including the use of expert systems, 
forecasting models, comprehensive written procedures, job shadowing etc. Problems arise 
however, when unforeseen circumstances occur and the experienced officer has to use his 
or her initiative to make the right decisions. Such expertise is acquired over a long period 
of time and cannot be passed on easily. 
Bye and Homer (1998) noted that during the Easter 1998 Floods the number of staff within 
the Environment Agency with the necessary expertise was limited. They cite examples of 
the use of computer packages where data had been wrongly analysed for instance. They 
expressed concerns about the scarcity of senior staff with advanced academic training 
within the Agency and the often-poor supervision of less experienced staff They made the 
following recommendations for improvement: 
9 Centralising flood warning and flood defence technical specialisms regionally or 
nationally in order to improve efficiency, effectiveness and national consistency by 
developing excellence through the concentration of specialist resources. 
* Ensuring that flood warning and emergency response activities are led at all times 
and at all stages during the period of flood emergency by senior staff experienced in 
the function and trained in crisis management. 
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9 More effective training of duty officers including the interpretation of 
meteorological information and radar data and the use of forecasting models. 
Greater attention should be given to the human and social aspects of warning 
message construction, dissemination and the encouragement of greater response. 
More emphasis should be placed on evaluating the experiences of flooding victims. 
6.6.2 Individuals within communities 
Williams (1964) recognises the value of instructing or training people in risk areas in 
hazard recognition and emergency procedures. He sees that experience is the great teacher 
but where this is absent he suggests a network of trained leaders or wardens as being an 
effective way of improving awareness. The implementation of such an approach will 
strengthen integration and encourage individuals to become part of the total warning 
process. 
Although pre-disaster education is seen as an effective way of raising awareness and 
instructing individuals on how to recognise and respond to danger situations, there is need 
for public awareness campaigns to be targeted. Those campaigns that are broadly based 
and non-focused have been shown to be ineffective (Drabek, 1986). People are often 
confused about the risks to which they are exposed (they tend to underestimate the events 
that will affect them), what warning messages mean and the roles and responsibilities of 
organisations. Drabek (1986) indicates that hazard awareness is significantly increased for 
individuals who receive information leaflets. In a study in Denver Colorado, he shows that 
a higher proportion of leaflet recipients took mitigating action than those who did not 
receive a leaflet. The effects of this tails off however, as after one year only 37% of those 
supplied with a leaflet remembered receiving one. This compares with public surveys in 
England and Wales where average recognition was only 26% in 1999, in Thames Region 
however, a much higher figure of 51 % was recorded (BMRB, 1999) (see Table 6.19). 
Table 6.19: Prompted awareness of local leaflets (BMRB, 1999) 
Thames Regi n National Ave age 
1997 11998 =1 999 1997 11998 1999 
34% 143%_ 151% 33% 133% 126% 
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Attention is drawn in the literature to the problem caused by events of severe magnitude 
which are well outside the range of historical experience of communities at risk and 
agencies involved in flood response (Emergency Management Australia, 1999). It is 
important to ensure that communities recognise the potential for flooding which is worse 
than they have experienced in the past. There is a tendency for people to believe that flood 
defences constructed to keep out, say, a 1% flood will protect them from all flooding. This 
was clearly illustrated during the Easter 1998 Floods in Northampton where 100-year flood 
defences were overtopped, and at Kidlington where the pre-event perception of the public 
and Agency staff was that the risk areas were not extensive and included only a few 
properties. 
The introduction of public awareness and information campaigns by the Environment 
Agency in England and Wales is discussed in some detail in Chapter 7. The question of 
training individual members of at-risk communities, such as flood wardens, to raise their 
level of understanding of the risk and ultimately their ability to respond, has been debated 
at some length within the Agency. It has been concluded that to offer such training will 
place the Agency (and the wardens) at greater risk of litigation as the wardens could be 
viewed as acting as agents of the organisation. Accordingly, instructions have been issued 
to all Agency regions not to offer any training to individuals such as wardens, not to 
provide them with equipment or any recompense for they work they carry out. Such a 
policy could limit the effectiveness of such schemes and hence reinforce already held 
prejudices against community-based arrangements within organisations such as the 
Environment Agency. 
6.6.3 Organisations 
Bennett (1997) states that the term "leaming organisation" is sometimes applied to 
companies that attempt to facilitate the introduction of new systems through the continuous 
training and development of their employees, This can result in the very essence of the 
organisation totally altering from time to time to avoid the development of rigid and out- 
of-date plans and procedures. Organisational learning involves the collation of all freshly 
discovered solutions to problems that are then passed into the organisation's "managerial 
memory" allowing it to react more effectively to future events. A consequence of this is 
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that decision-making procedures are continually modified and adapted in the light of 
experience, which is a positive process for integration. 
The Agency has recently adopted a "learning" policy that it termed the "next steps 
process". This was introduced during its first year of its operation in an attempt to integrate 
the former predecessor authorities, to drive cultural change through the organisation and to 
establish a unique identity for the new authority. The policy was framed around five main 
themes: envirom-nental awareness, organisational commitment, customer focus, team 
working and staff development. This was applied to all aspects of the Agency's work 
including flood warning, and an intensive staff training programme was established. The 
effects of the establishment of this integrated management structure were not wholly 
positive, and it can be argued that the policy was damaging to the performance of certain 
functions such as Flood Defence. There is evidence that staff morale was adversely 
affected in the process resulting in loss of knowledge and expertise in many key areas 
including flood forecasting and warning. 
There are more positive examples of organisational learning in relation to the Environment 
Agency however, with particular relevance to flood warning. These include the 
commissioning of outside bodies such as Middlesex University to assess the performance 
of flood warning systems, the holding of annual seminars and liaison meetings with local 
authorities and emergency services, to receive feedback on the operation of the service, 
and the conducting of annual awareness surveys to gauge the public's view of the flood 
warning service. All these mechanisms have been used to identify shortcomings that have 
been used to adapt policies and strategies in the flood warning. But probably the best 
example of organisational learning in recent years is the commissioning by the Agency of 
an independent assessment of its performance during the Easter Floods of 1998. This 
review made 55 recommendations for change and resulted in a major shift in how the 
Agency manages flood events and organises the Flood Defence function within England 
and Wales (Bye and Homer, 1998). An organisation that is willing to learn from its 
mistakes, improve its performance and acquire new skills is likely to be highly integrative. 
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6.7 Summary and conclusions 
Flood warning is essentially a social process involving a wide range of players with 
varying levels of knowledge and expertise, all with different perceptions and modes of 
interaction. For an integrated process to evolve the key players (including the at-risk 
public) need to communicate effectively, to minimise their differences in beliefs, attitudes 
and language, and be open to the acquisition of new skills. This chapter highlights a 
number of key issues that can facilitate the development of an integrated approach in the 
area of human interaction, expertise and training. 
1. The development of multidisciplinary working practices. 
For many years flood warning has been dominated by a small number of professions 
and as a result there has been a preoccupation with a narrow range of issues. Tensions 
have arisen when other professionals have become actively and legitimately involved 
in the process. This has tended to have a negative impact on integration. To overcome 
inter-professional rivalry there is need to develop a common awareness of respective 
positions and to cultivate good social networks, both formal and informal. Within 
organisations multidisciplinary team working offers a useful mechanism for integrating 
professionals to focus on a common issue such as flood warning. During flood 
emergencies the establishment of multi-agency emergency centres where all relevant 
professional communities are present can reduce potential conflict and suspicion 
between them. 
2. Variations in the perception of the senders of flood warning information need to 
be minimised. 
The role of the sender of warning information is to try and influence the behaviour of 
the recipient of that information, adding value to what would normally take place 
without the warning. It has been shown here that senders have varying perceptions of 
the flood hazard and of the action that they and receivers of their warnings should take 
to respond to that hazard. This can lead to inconsistencies in the level of service and 
ultimately will have a detrimental effect on total warning system integration. A number 
of measures have been suggested to minimise these inconsistencies and hence facilitate 
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integration including regular staff meetings, training sessions, multi-agency exercises, 
the use of expert systems and work shadowing of more experienced staff But 
importantly there is a need for a comprehensive and common understanding of the 
social and individual processes at work among warning recipients to ensure that their 
needs are more fully met and appropriate response to a warning ensues. 
The varying needs, perceptions and decision-making processes of the receivers of 
flood warning information should be understood and if necessary modified. 
The success of a warning depends on getting an appropriate message to the right people 
and for that warning message to result in an appropriate reaction. This chapter shows 
that the way in which people respond depends to a large degree on their background 
experiences and situation. In an integrated system information should flow freely 
between those who issue warnings and those who receive them, and for that 
information to be understood and believed and acted upon in a consistent way. It 
should not be assumed that recipients react directly they receive a warning message, 
but rather go through a sequential process to consider the relevance and applicability of 
that message to their particular circumstances. Designers of integrated warning systems 
need to pay more attention to the social and behavioural aspects of risk communication. 
There is a need to move away from simple procedures that attempt to deliver a standard 
warning message to a (perceived) uniform community assuming it will reach its 
intended target and result in effective response. 
4. The need for confirmation should be recognised and designed into all stages of the 
flood warning process. 
At every stage of the warning process most people will engage in some form of 
confirmatory behaviour after receiving information and before taking appropriate 
action. The seeking of confirmation. can delay action and if not obtained can result in 
the entire process becoming blocked, thereby having a negative impact on integration. 
The greater the number of information sources the fewer the attempts at warning 
confirmation, the greater the belief in that information and the greater the likelihood of 
appropriate action. In an integrated system confirmatory mechanisms should be built in 
to each stage of the process to avoid delay and improve efficiency. 
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5. The use and cultivation of informal contacts and social networks should be 
encouraged both in communities and organisations. 
Flood warning is a highly social process both in communities and in and between 
organisations. It is clear that social networks are central to the functioning of warning 
systems and that people from whatever background rarely function individually. Such 
networks have a significant role in the interpretation and confirmation of information 
for instance, and where they are in operation effective response is more likely. When 
people get separated from their social network there is evidence that they have a lower 
probability of responding appropriately and this can introduce delay and inaction. 
These findings appear to have equal weight both in communities and in organisations. 
As evidenced in the Mimmshall Brook catchment (Chapter 8), social networks are an 
important community mechanism for disseminating unofficial warnings in times of 
flood. There is evidence to show that they help raise public awareness of flood risk and 
are often more robust that official schemes. In an integrated system it is desirable that 
official and unofficial schemes coexist and reinforce each other. Flood warden schemes 
can help in the integration process and where warning agencies have sought the views 
and assistance of local communities the flood warning systems appear to be more 
robust and effective. 
6. The role of the Individual at all stages in the flood warning process should be 
recognised and encouraged. 
Individuals can have a significant impact on whether a policy of integration is 
successfully implemented. It is important that individuals are empowered and develop 
an affinity with relevant strategies such as one of integration. In many authorities for 
instance, the enthusiasm of key individuals can determine how effectively a given 
organisation responds to a given event. If these staff become disenfranchised for any 
reason they can, through various means, hinder the operation of an integrated approach 
to flood warning. 
Within communities there are individuals who are more capable of detecting and 
interpreting signs of danger. These "local gurus" are often prepared to serve or lead the 
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community in the interpretation and dissemination of information about changes in the 
environment and can perform an integrating role between agencies and the 
communities in which they live. These individuals are not always fully appreciated and 
trusted by forecasting and response agencies and there can be a general reluctance to 
acknowledge their expertise and potential role. In an integrated system these "local 
experts" would be brought into the warning process and supported to ensure their long- 
term involvement. 
7. Individual education and organisational learning strategies should be adopted. 
The importance of learning and training strategies for individuals in both organisations 
and communities, and for organisations themselves cannot be overestimated if a policy 
of integration is to succeed. Within organisations, individuals should receive regular 
training in all elements of the flood warning service, including the operation of the 
detection and forecasting systems, but also covering the social and human aspects of 
warning dissemination and response. The operation of the flood warning service should 
be carefully recorded, detailed debriefing sessions are recommended after events, and 
arrangements and procedures should be regularly exercised. 
In communities, especially where experience of flooding is low, pre-disaster education 
is seen as a mechanism to raise public awareness and instruct individuals on how to 
recognise and respond to danger situations. These campaigns need to be well targeted 
and focused on local issues to be effective. Even communities that have experienced 
flooding need to be regularly reminded of the risk and the potential for floods to be 
worse than they have experienced in the past. 
Organisations need to adopt learning strategies to ensure the continuous training and 
development of their employees. Organisations need to be flexible enough to be able to 
modify their structures and decision-making procedures in the light of experience and 
freshly discovered solutions to particular problems and issues. In an integrated system 
a participating organisation should be able to adjust itself to avoid being encumbered 
with rigid and out-dated plans, procedures and policies. 
183 
Chapter 7 
Information and Knowledge 
7.1 Introduction 
This chapter examines the importance of the fourth component Of the Conceptual model 
(presented in Chapter 3) to flood warning integration, namely information and knowledge 
(shaded area in Figure 7.1). Particular attention is given to how information and knowledge 
flow through flood warning systems, how they are used and interpreted, and how they 
influence the consolidation of system components to make the whole more effective. A series 
of key issues are identified as having particular relevance to integration and these are critically 
assessed. This all takes place under the back-drop of the "inforrilation society" where the 
amount of inforination available to the public is growing exponentially, where the demand for 
information is increasing, as is the requirement for openness especially from public bodies 
such as the Environment Agency. 
Figure 7.1: Conceptual model of the FDFWR process 
TECIH NO LIOGY 
(see Chapter 3 for full details) 
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7.2 The importance of information and knowledge to integration 
The significance of information and knowledge in warning systems is well recorded in the 
literature and there is a general consensus amongst authors (Williams 1964, Foster, 1980, 
Mileti, 1994). In essence, and as diagrammatically represented in the model figure above, 
integrated warning systems should be viewed as a circular communication process, around 
which information and knowledge should flow, rather than a simple linear communication 
chain. This can be conceptualised as a means of getting information about an impending 
emergency, communicating that information to those who need it, and facilitating correct 
decisions and timely responses by people in danger (Mileti, 1994). It is vital however, that 
within such systems information is continually re-evaluated and modified in light of 
experience 
A number of key issues can be identified that affect how information and knowledge flow 
from one system component to another around this idealised. path, and as a consequence 
influence the degree of integration that is achievable. 
7.3 The key issues affecting integration 
7.3.1 Characteristics of the initial environmental information 
The environment produces the initial information that must be collated, assessed and analysed 
to determine whether danger is present and in an integrated system the "environment- 
detectioW' linkage is an important structural characteristic (Mileti, 1994). However, the type 
of incident affects the opportunity to collect environmental information. Gradually rising river 
floods for instance, differ from flash floods in the length of time available to collect and 
process data and predict the occurrence of impact (see Table 7.1). Thus the environment, at 
the outset, affects the functioning of the warning system by influencing the characteristics of 
the initial information, and this has implications for system integration. 
The type of incident will influence not only the type of information the hydrologist needs 
for detection and forecasting, but also that required by the at-risk public to ensure effective 
response. In the case of a fast responding flood, the hydrologist will rely heavily on 
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information provided by the meteorologist such as short-period rainfall forecasts and 
frequently updated predictions of storm development (see Table 7.2). The accuracy of the 
information on which predictions are made is likely to be low and uncertainty will be high. 
Despite this, the public requires targeted information that is sufficiently accurate, timely 
and reliable to stimulate appropriate response. Because in many instances the detection and 
forecasting systems are unable to offer this kind of information, many areas that suffer 
from rapidly responding river flooding are not provided with an official flood warning 
service. It may be that the only system that is functioning effectively in these 
circumstances is an unofficial warning arrangement within the at-risk community itself and 
this system may indeed alert the forecasting agency rather than the other way around. 
Integration of official and unofficial arrangements would be beneficial in such 
circumstances. 
Table 7.1 Lag-times for selected rivers in the Thames Region 
River/location Basin Area (kml)_ AveraRe lag-time (hrs) 
Kyd Brook at d Brook Close 1.8 0.75-1.00 
Mimmshall Brook at Warrengate Road 53 5 
Wandle at Connolly's Mill 176 8-9 
1 Mole at Royal Mills 485 
- 
30-36 
-- FT-hames at Kingston 10,000 
t 
100-900 
For floods that develop more gradually, hydrologists become more self-sufficient, relying 
more on information from local detection networks and flow prediction models under their 
direct control (see Table 7.2). The promptness of the information and frequency of updates is 
less critical and it is likely to be of a higher accuracy and more certain. Warning information 
for the public in these circumstances can be more comprehensive and detailed and can be 
repeated and updated at regular intervals. A slow speed of onset does not necessarily lead to 
more effective warnings however, as too long a period of forewarning, unaccompanied by any 
obvious signs of mounting danger, may result in an apathetic public reaction. A person is 
more likely to believe a warning if his or her physical environment supports the waming 
messages (Drabek, 1986). 
The collection of environmental information is dependent on the size and integrity of the 
detection system. In an integrated system this should be designed to allow the adequate 
monitoring and recognition of an impending threat and where response to that threat must be 
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rapid, information should be relayed automatically to a central processing centre. Sufficient 
coverage often does not exist resulting in incomplete information and inadequate warnings. 
Another issue is the functionality of detection equipment that may be affected by the impact 
of the hazard itself, unrelated technical problems or sabotage. In the Easter 1998 floods in the 
Cherwell catchment for instance, none of the nine river gauges "was without problems" and 
some failed altogether (Bye and Homer, 1998). Within an integrated system every detection 
network should be supported by an independent back-up system or at the very least sufficient 
redundancy should be built-in to a system to make it operationally robust. This back-up 
system should also include the relay of information from those on the ground whether they be 
officials or knowledgeable members of the public (see Table 7.3). 
Table 7.2: Environmental information requirements for fast and slow developing flood 
events 
Fast Responding Slow Responding 
Detection Trigger point exceedance Upstream river levels 
Significant rainfall accumulations Catchment wetness 
Rapidly rising river levels Rainfall accumulations 
Storm development 
Forecasting Frequently updated rainfall Flow forecasts 
forecasts (15 minutes) Daily rainfall predictions 
Dissemination Targeted information on areas at Detailed and locally specific 
most risk - rapidly delivered information, repeated and updated 
Response Signs of immediate danger Signs of mounting danger 
In an integrated system, forecasting systems should also be tailored to the type of event. 
Complex flow forecasting models that require much data and time to produce a prediction are 
clearly not appropriate in flash flooding situations. In such circumstances there is much 
reliance on quantitative rainfall forecasting and the rapid interpretation of information by an 
experienced flood forecaster. Similarly, dissemination systems must be tuned to the type of 
risk; long dissemination chains are inappropriate for fast responding catchments, where 
technological solutions may be the only way of alerting large numbers of people in a short 
period of time. The need for robustness and redundancy are equally important here as well. 
The length of warning about the onset of a hazard is a fanction of knowledge (Foster, 1980). 
As knowledge of environmental processes increases, the ability to predict and warn of their 
effects increases. The individual's knowledge of environmental processes is an important 
factor in an integrated system, be it that of the forecaster, local emergency manager or 
187 
member of the public. An experienced flood forecaster will be in tune with local conditions, 
will be able to assimilate large amounts of environmental information and, based on 
knowledge that has built up often over many years, will be able to make predictions and issue 
warnings with some precision. Experienced local emergency managers may well be 
influenced by environmental conditions, prompting them to bypass the official detection 
system and warning those at risk directly. Similarly, local people living in flood risk areas can 
be very sensitive to envirom-nental conditions, especially if they have experienced flooding 
before, and may act to alert their fiiends, neighbours and even the authorities based on their 
intuition and knowledge. 
Table 7.3: Sources of environmental information in the Thames Region 
Environmental information Sources of information 
Rainfall measurements Telemetered raingauge network (105 gauges) - built in 
redundancy. 
London Weather Radar - high resolution 
National Radar Network 
London Weather Centre 
Staff observations (on-site) 
River level information Telemetered river gauges (250 gauges) - built in redundancy 
Flow forecasting models 
Staff observations (on-site) 
Flood wardens observations (via dedicated telephone line) 
Observations of the general public, media, etc 
Catchment wetness Met Offices MORECS system 
Environment Agency's Water Resources model 
Observations of catchment response to rainfall 
I Staff Observations (on-site) 
The media may act as an independent source of surveillance information of the environment 
(Burkart, 1991). Information presented by the media may play the same role as the direct 
observation of a natural condition during an emergency. The media ofien do not totally rely 
on information provided from official sources, and can add to this information by tracking 
and monitoring the situation themselves. In certain circumstances they will use their own 
judgement more and go and look for themselves, using environmental cues to evaluate the 
severity of the hazard. 
The characteristics of the initial environmental information, therefore, can heavily influence 
the way in which information and knowledge flow through a warning system, and can impact 
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on the degree of integration achieved. The following points should be taken into account 
when developing an integrated approach to flood warning: 
Time is a critical factor and the speed of storm development and catchment 
response affects the time available to prepare a forecast and the medium chosen 
for disseminating a warning. 
Not only does the detection and forecasting system need to be tailored to the type 
of environmental condition that gives rise to flooding, but the dissemination of 
messages and response to warnings must be geared to stimulating an effective 
response. If not, warnings will be issued too late and remedial action will not be 
taken. 
There is a general reluctance to base flood warnings on uncertain information and 
for this reason many small river catchments in urban areas across England and 
Wales are not provided with an official warning service. In an integrated system 
uncertain information should be communicated to those at risk but in a way that is 
easily assimilated and understood. Uncertainty is explored more fully in Section 
7.3.7. 
As discussed in Chapter 6, the knowledge of environmental processes held by key 
individuals is an important resource and should be recognised and managed. The 
assimilation, interpretation and decision-making processes that take place inside 
an experienced flood forecaster's head, for example, have important implications 
for integration. This will be analysed further in Section 7.3-2. 
The media oflen play a role in monitoring and reporting on environmental 
processes, but if they fail to get adequate advice they often attempt to evaluate 
environmental information using their own judgement. This can result in ill- 
informed assessments being made and communicated to the wider public. In an 
integrated system the forecasting agency should engage the media and give access 
to regularly updated information throughout a flooding incident. 
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7.3.2 Interpretation of environmental information 
When the organisation responsible for issuing warnings receives environmental information 
from whatever source, these data have to be collated and evaluated. Decisions have to be 
made on the reliability of the information and what danger, if any, it implies to certain places 
at specific times. This evaluation is not a simple process, it requires value judgements based 
on experience and knowledge (Foster, 1980). In some cases the evaluation can be aided by the 
use of models that allow simulations by using incoming information, such as rainfall or river 
flow. As stated previously, early in a flood event predictions are often based on uncertain 
information. In an integrated system, it is important that there is close liaison between 
64expert" groups to ensure that such infonnation is interpreted and acted upon consistently. In 
the Thames Region for example, a close working relationship between the Agency's 
forecasters and those at the London Weather Centre is paramount, along with the free 
interchange of information. The Agency for instance, provides free access to its raingauge 
information and this has been demonstrated to result in the production of more accurate 
rainfall forecasts and warnings from the London Weather Centre in return. When the Agency 
went one step further however, and offered access to its high-resolution weather radar 
displays and local rainfall forecasting system to provide added value, this was turned down. 
The Met. Office did not want to be seen to be reliant upon rainfall forecasting products 
supplied by a hydrological agency even though individual meteorologists were keen to have 
access to the information. This is a good example of professional demarcation obstructing the 
free flow of inforination between organisations and hence inhibiting integration. 
Another common problem is that of inconsistency of incoming information. When faced with 
conflicting information the individual is likely to accept as more valid that which is least 
threatening. For this reason, evaluating groups faced with data inconsistencies tend to 
underestimate threats and in some cases contradictory data can delay the issue of warnings 
and this has implications for integration (Drabek, 1986). It is common for the receiver of 
infon-nation to seek confirmation from other data sources before acting, especially if an 
extreme condition is detected. There are circumstances however, where only one source of 
data is available and when extreme conditions are being accurately measured there is a danger 
that the information is not believed nor acted upon, especially when that data source has been 
known to be incorrect in the past. An example would be the "Folkestone Storm" in 1995 when 
rainfall totals in excess of I 00mm/hr were accurately recorded by radar but were not believed 
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by operational staff who felt the radar was overestimating. Interestingly, the automatic rainfall 
forecasting system Nimrod, also assumed the radar was overestimating the true rainfall and 
incorrectly reduced the rainfall intensity, which had the effect of confirming the false 
perception gained by the operational staff. 
A further integration point, is the need for organisations responsible for interpreting 
environmental information to clearly understand the aim and objective of the service they are 
providing. It is necessary to determine the precise locations that will benefit from their 
predictions, the criteria on which local warnings should be based, and the time and 
information needed for those being warned to take the necessary protective action. In short, it 
is important for integration that predictions should be made with the end user, the public at 
risk, in mind. Until recently this approach has not always been taken and in some instances 
the production of a flood forecast was seen as an end in itself, with little or no consideration 
given to the requirements of the end user. 
In some European countries, notably Germany and Holland, a policy of open public access to 
environmental information is practised. This is achieved by giving either direct access to data 
from measuring stations via multiple access telephone lines, or by broadcasting hydrological 
information via various media outlets, including dedicated environmental television channels. 
In England and Wales, this level of public participation is not encouraged and this policy 
potentially obstructs the free flow of information, working against integration. The only direct 
exposure to environmental data is via the television weather forecasts where weather radar, 
for example, has been given public exposure in recent years. Unlike in other European 
countries, it is assumed that the public will either not understand hydrological information or 
will be uninterested due to the relative infrequency of flooding. 
In summary, a number of issues can be identified with specific relevance to integration: 
e The evaluation of environmental data is not an easy process and on occasions 
incoming information may be inconsistent, conflicting, highly uncertain or 
incomplete. During flood emergencies it is possible for an "information fog" to form 
making it difficult to determine how the event is developing. In such circumstances, 
the experience and knowledge of the forecaster is paramount in helping to form a 
view of the level of risk and the type of warning needed. This situation can be eased 
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by the interchange of information between forecasting groups (such as hydrologists 
and meteorologists), through close team working where issues such as conflicting 
information can be discussed, and the ability to confirm the accuracy of incoming 
information by some means. This might include receiving feedback from people on 
the ground including knowledgeable members of the public. These are all-important 
points for integration and the need for confirmation will be addressed further in 
Section 7.3.7. 
It is vital for the forecasting agency to take into account the needs of the end-user, the 
public at risk, when interpreting environmental information and not produce forecasts 
just for their own sake, In an integrated system the public need will influence the type 
of information collected, how it is interpreted, and the emphasis placed upon it. 
Giving greater public access to hydrological information will help with interpretation 
and understanding. 
The involvement of the public in the interpretation of environmental information 
should be explored further and where informal systems exist, steps should be taken to 
integrate them into official warning arrangements rather than trying to compete with 
them. Informal warning systems are examined in more detail in Section 7.3.6. 
7.3.3 Interpretation of forecast and warning information by the response agencies 
Once the prediction agency interprets the environmental information and produces a forecast 
it will communicate that risk information with other agencies responsible for local emergency 
management. These agencies will want to interpret this information themselves in terms of 
potential losses (i. e. loss to life and property) and scale their response to the risk accordingly 
(Mileti, 1994). There is a need for clear linkage between agencies in an integrated system and 
because the local emergency management agencies may need assistance with interpreting 
warning messages, communication between personnel during emergencies is vital. It is 
possible however, for the environment to in effect bypass the detection system and to directly 
influence managers in local agencies, and this eventuality should be recognised and planned 
for. This often happens in urban areas such as London, where heavy rainfall may alert local 
managers before formal flood warnings are received. 
192 
Keys (1997) raises the issue of adding value or giving meaning to flood predictions. To do 
this effectively, he argues, local knowledge must be added to the prediction. In Australia this 
has been tackled by the state emergency services through "flood intelligence systems" which 
are records of flood information for the area for which predictions are made. This would 
include gauge heights at which flood waters are likely to begin to encroach upon farmland, 
low points on roads, houses, industrial and commercial premises, community institutions and 
utilities. It is useful to have indications of the heights at which flood defences could be 
overtopped or when communities become isolated, as well as the heights at which significant 
decisions must be made, such as evacuation. In an integrated system, local agencies should 
develop an understanding of the characteristics of flooding in their own areas and have the 
ability to record information to extend that knowledge. In many instances the formal 
development of flood information is absent or rudimentary, and a vital ingredient for high- 
quality communication is often lacking. Gathering flood information not only helps build 
expertise about the characteristics of floods in local areas, but also assists in the development 
of the appropriate flood warning messages for the public, an important integration point. 
In England and Wales, the Environment Agency and its predecessors have taken the lead role 
in the collation of flood information. In some areas, teams of trained staff visit flooded areas 
both during and after flood events and gather detailed information on flood depths and 
extents, and the numbers of properties affected. This information is often collated into flood 
repor-ts and maps and in some cases the data are stored on geographical information systems. 
In the Thames Region, data are used to set trigger levels at river gauging stations, to improve 
flood detection, and to generate reach-based flood information that is supplied to local 
authorities and police forces as an aid to flood warning dissemination. This is good integrative 
practice. Unlike in Australia however, local authorities are not generally active in this area 
and are unable or unwilling to collect detailed flood information. Without good quality 
information and knowledge of the nature and effects of floods in their area however, local 
emergency managers may be hampered in their ability to respond effectively when floods 
strike. 
The Environment Agency's lead role in flood warning matters puts an onus on the 
Organisation to ensure that other agencies involved in the process have access to the correct 
information and know how to interpret it effectively in the event of a flood emergency. In the 
Thames Region, this has been addressed over many years through the hosting of annual 
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seminars with representatives from local authorities and the emergency services (see Chapter 
4 for details). This gives the Agency a forum to liaise with and educate other organisations on 
the relevance of flood warning information and how it can be used in flood events to improve 
response. In addition, county/metropolitan area-based flood warning planning groups, that 
were established in 1996, allow local issues surrounding all elements of the flood warning 
service to be discussed in more detail, the establishment of closer working relationships, and 
for improvements to be made in the flow of information between agencies. 
The main issues of relevance to integration can be summarised as follows: 
e The response agencies will want to interpret, confinn and even by-pass the official 
flood warning infonnation that is sent to them by the forecasting agency. In an 
integrated system these requirements should be planned for and managed. 
It is relevant to attempt to add value to flood predictions by incorporating local 
information. This has the effect of not only building local expertise and knowledge, 
but also improving the quality and meaning of warning messages to the public. 
* Systems should be put in place to collate and archive local flood information by all 
relevant organisations and to introduce feedback loops to improve detection, such as 
modifying trigger levels at river measuring points. 
A role of the forecasting agency is to facilitate the provision and interpretation of 
flood forecasting information to and by the response agencies to improve overall 
response. 
Improved liaison between agencies ensures an improved flow of information during 
flood emergencies and at other times, and shared access to local knowledge. The 
removal of barriers to this free flow of information and knowledge is a positive 
integration action. 
7.3.4 The design of public warning messages 
One of the most important factors in determining the effectiveness of a warning system is the 
warning message itself, and it is the content and style of the warning message that shapes the 
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extent to which an endangered public engages in protective actions (Mileti, 1994). A warning 
message converts technical information on a flood prediction and interpretative material on 
the meaning of that prediction into a message for those at risk (Emergency Management 
Australia, 1999). The message is an important element in an integrated system as it represents 
the critical link between flood prediction and interpretation on the one hand, and effective 
response on the other. 
There is general agreement in the literature concerning how a flood warning message should 
be constructed and the information it should contain (Keys, 1997, Burkart, 1991, Mileti, 1994, 
Emergency Management Australia, 1999, Edworthy and Adams, 1996, Drabek, 1986). Table 
7.4 summarises the main findings and these can be viewed collectively as the principal 
attributes required of an "integrated warning message". It will be of interest to ascertain how 
closely the warning messages issued by the Environment Agency comply with this ideal. 
As discussed in Chapter 6, flood warning messages issued by the Environment Agency and 
its predecessors have been based around a three phase colour coded system, YELLOW, 
AMBER and RED, which is designed to indicate the likely severity of the flood in a simple 
form. Post event surveys indicate however, that there is much confusion amongst recipients of 
colour-coded warnings and they are often misinterpreted (BMRB, 1998,1999) (see Tables 
6.13 and 6.14). During the Easter 1998 floods a number of interpretations were recorded: 
"Red for danger. High priority" 
"Amber: possible risk of flooding" 
"Amber is flooding the road and red is flooding of the property" 
"Amber did not seem that bad" (After, BMRB, 1998) 
The Bye Report concluded that the public was not well served by the system and that an 
altemative, more customer focused approach was required 
"Colour coded warnings appear to be misunderstood by nearly all who receive 
them. This is because the colours are spontaneously linked with the escalating 
probability of flooding actually occurring and not with the extent definitions to 
which the colours relate. The interests of the public are not well served by 
warnings given on a colour-coded basis" (Bye and Homer, 1998). 
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Table 7.4: The attributes of an "integrated" flood warning message 
Attribute Details 
Factual 0 The hazard should be described and how it poses danger to people 
information 0 The message should say what is happening, what is expected to happen and when 
it will occur - the effects of a flood should be predicted if possible 
0 The location of the risk should be described in a way that is readily understood by 
the public 
0 Information should be given about the time available for recipients to act 
0 Messages should contain estimates of probable damage 
0 Information should be specific, accurate and relevant to the individual 
0 Messages should relate to and be reinforced by local conditions 
0 Reference to benchmark floods can enhance comprehension 
0 Messages will not be believed if recipients think they are not receiving the whole 
truth 
Action 0 Information on what people should do to preserve their safety 
advice 0 Information on what people should do to protect their property 
0 Messages should be persuasive to convince people to take action 
0 The warning must convey what is appropriate response 
Source of 0 The source of a message should be identified 
message 0 Messages that come from credible sources are more likely to be believed 
0 Those issuing a warning message should convey authority 
Consistency 0A message should be consistent within itself and across different messages 
0 Messages are more likely to be believed if they are consistent 
Clarity 0 The warning must be clear, concise and "user friendly" 
0 The warning must be easily understood by the target audience 
0 Warnings should be worded in simple, non-technical and jargon-free language 
0 Message content should be attention-grabbing and ordered with the most 
important information first 
Tone 0 Messages should be positive rather than negative 
0 Messages should suggest action rather than inaction 
0 Messages should encourage social interaction ruther than isolation 
0 Messages should be vivid, arouse emotional interest and relate to local situations 
Alerting 0 Warning messages should convey a sense of urgency and arouse some emotion 
function and feeling 
0 Signal words and colours can be used to emphasise the level of risk 
0 The use of appropriate icons can enhance the alerting function 
Messages should contain wording which is designed to motivate and arouse 
Target Different recipient groups will need different information and for it to be 
audience presented in different ways. 
Acquisition of knowledge on the make-up of at-risk communities is important 
Message Media messages should be brief and to the point 
construction 0 Templates should be produced prior to flooding to save time 
0 By adopting appropriate language, messages should be used to convey uncertain 
information 
Professional 0 Construction of messages requires specialist communication skills 
skills 0 Media/public relations specialists should be involved in improving message 
quality 
(After: Keys, 1997, Burkart, 1991, Mileti, 1994, Emergency Management Australia, 1999, Edworthy and Adams, 
1996, Drabek, 1986) 
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In response to these criticisms, the Environment Agency embarked on an extensive 
consultation programme with customer groups and partners during the 12-month period 
commencing September 1998. A national group within the Agency was tasked with collating 
the findings of this consultation programme and formulating and defining an alternative 
system. 
It was concluded that a three-staged warning system was the most appropriate and this is 
supported by "best practice" overseas. This progressively alerts people who may be at risk of 
flooding of the degree of danger to life and property so that they may progress through a 
series of actions that will lead to effective response. These is a need however, for a fourth 
stage which can be described as the "all clear" when all flood watches and warnings have 
been cancelled. It was also recognised, that at each stage it is necessary for certain actions to 
be taken and these need to be specified (Parker, 1999; Haggett, 2000). 
The terms and definitions of the existing colour-coded system and the proposed staged 
system are set out in Table 7.5. It is clear that the new definitions use more vivid language, 
are more action orientated and convey more of a sense of urgency than the old rather staid 
definitions, and this is a positive development. 
Table 7.6 presents an assessment of how each of the integration attributes identified in Table 
7.4 are met by the existing colour-coded system and the proposed staged approach. Although 
the analysis is based on a subjective assessment by the author, it is clear that the new system 
is scoring far higher against the integration attributes when compared to the existing colour- 
coded system. This is a clear indication that the Environment Agency is moving in a positive 
direction in this area with respect to integration. 
In summary, a number of key issues can be identified relating to the design of flood warning 
messages and integration: 
* It should be recognised that the warning message in itself is an important element of an 
integrated system as it links flood prediction and interpretation with effective response. 
* There is a high degree of consensus amongst researchers on the type of information that 
the ideal warning message should contain to engender recipient response. Using findings 
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from the literature it has been possible to summarise the key attributes of an "integrated 
flood warning message" and these have been used to assess how closely current and 
proposed arrangements meet the ideal. 
Table 7.5: Definitions of warning codes and stages used and proposed by the 
Environment Agency (after Haggett, 2000) 
Warning Definition 
code/stage 
Existing YELLOW A warning of flooding of some low-lying farmland and roads 
system near rivers and the sea. 
AMBER A warning of flooding to isolated properties, roads and large 
areas of farmland near rivers and the sea. 
RED A wanting of serious flooding affecting many properties, roads 
and large areas of farmland. 
Proposed FLOOD Flooding is possible in the designated area. Be aware. Be 
system WATCH prepared. Watch out! 
FLOOD Flooding of homes, businesses and main roads is expected in 
WARNING the designated area. Act now! 
SEVERE Severe flooding is expected in the designated area. There is 
FLOOD imminent danger to life and property. Act now! 
WARNING 
ALL CLEAR There are no flood watches or warnings in force in the 
I designated area. 
* In an integrated system, steps should be taken to ascertain whether the public understand 
the content of warning messages and act on them effectively. The need for feedback and 
modification is underlined. For example, there is some indication that although the public 
in risk areas think they understand the meaning of the colour coded system, they are 
misinterpreting the intended meaning. In recent surveys (BMRB, 1997,1998,1999), RED 
is commonly thought to signify that flooding was happening now, ANBER that flooding 
is imminent, and YELLOW that flooding may occur in the future, but is less likely. 
To be effective, flood warning messages need to contain factual information about the 
flood hazard but also advice on what to do. Information needs to be locally specific, 
appropriate to the recipient group and updated regularly. 
Further work is needed to address the requirements of special needs groups within at-risk 
communities, including ethnic groups, the disabled, and the old and infirm. Reliance on 
one warning message fonnat delivered via one mechanism is certain to be inadequate. 
There is a need therefore, to proactively identify key facilities (such as hospitals and 
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retirement homes) and special needs groups that are located in flood risk areas and 
provide appropriate and targeted warning messages. It is recognised however, that the 
dissemination of a range of warning messages can be onerous where lead times are short. 
Table 7.6: Analysis of the colour-coded and staged warning systems with reference to 
integration 
Aftribute Colour-coded system Score Proposed staged system Score 
Factual Storm and flood 2 Greater emphasis planned for 3 
information information made available, the provision of locally 
but not always specific and relevant information. 
relevant to the individual 
and local conditions 
Acton Little behavioural I Action guidelines planned 3 
advice information given for each warning stage and 
each recipient group 
Source of Source of message not I Improvements planned, but 2 
message always clear, messages not more work required 
given authority especially with the full range 
of media outlets 
Consistency Messages not consistent I Messages to be consistent 3 
between regions within and across regions 
Clarity Colour-codes not fully I Messages to be in plain 3 
understood, messages not English and more action 
attention grabbing orientated 
Tone Messages largely factual I Messages to encourage 2 
but neutral in terms of social interaction, specific 
arousing emotional interest individual action, but vivid 
language needed in severe 
events. 
Alerting Colours used to emphasise I Signal words and icons used 2 
function risk, but wording does not to emphasise risk and action, 
motivate or arouse more work needed on 
conveying sense of urgency 
Target Homogenous messages I Messages to be targeted for 3 
audience generally used for all different recipient groups 
_recipient groups Message Message templates not I Range of consistent message 3 
construction consistently produced for templates to be produced, 
different recipients, no "Flood Watch" will allow 
mechanism for conveying - uncertain infon-nation to be 
uncertain information communicated. 
Professional No specialist guidance I Guidance sought from 3 
skills sought communication specialists 
L Scorinji: 1-=Iow, 2=medium, 3=high 
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e Consideration should be given to the provision of a mechanism for communicating 
uncertain information to flood warning recipients. Care is needed however, to ensure that 
the recipient understands the level of uncertainty and what action is appropriate when 
such information is disseminated. The FLOOD WATCH stage proposed by the 
Environment Agency is a positive development in this regard (Haggett, 2000). 
7.3.5 Communication of warning information 
For a warning message to be effective it must be communicated appropriately to those who 
need to take action. Mileti (1994) sees the instigation of comprehensive and multiple channels 
of communication to the public as a key element of an integrated warning system. Foster 
(1980) believes that no warning system will function effectively if its messages are ignored, 
disbelieved, or lead to inappropriate action. To avoid such pitfalls he stresses, warning 
messages must be designed and transmitted with the greatest of care. Drabek (1986) states 
"the more often people obtain information the more they trust the warning and the more they 
prepare". 
A number of authors have documented how warning information should be conveyed 
effectively to those expected to respond. There is agreement that mere dissemination is not 
enough: it must be done in a manner which is both timely and designed to obtain the 
appropriate response (Emergency Management Australia, 1999). An integrated system 
requires warning information to be disseminated at different stages, for different target 
audiences, using different dissemination methods. 
Table 7.7 surnmarises the advantages and disadvantages of different warning dissemination 
strategies that can be utilised in an integrated system. This emphasises the fact that no single 
method is perfect and that a range of dissemination methods is required that compliment and 
reinforce each other. Surveys carried out in flood risk areas across England and Wales 
indicate that the warning methods residents find most helpful are media related, in particular 
local television (78%) and local radio (72%) (see Figure 7.2). A 24-hour information line and 
sirens were each thought to be helpful by at least seven in ten respondents. Most other 
warning methods were seen as helpful by at least half the sample, with the exception of 
Teletext and warning by fax machine (although 58% of businesses thought faxed warnings 
are helpful) (BMRB, 1999). 
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Table 7.7: The advantages and disadvantages of different warning dissemination strategies 
Stmtegy Advantages Disadvantages 
Use of 0 Use of a range of dissemination channels helps 0 Use of multiple channels increases the chances 
multiple communicate complex and widespread impacts of error and the possibility of information being 
warning especially in severe events added to or subtracted from the message and 
channels 0 Different channels can be used in different changing its meaning 
circumstances, dictated by onset time, likely 0 Each dissemination channel must convey the 
severity, nature of community, etc. same information and must be updated 
0 ne more that different channels arc used, the simultaneously to avoid confusion and loss of 
more people who hear and remember they have credibility. 
heard a warning 
0 Allows messages to be repeated - recipients 
more likely to believe 
0 General and specific channels should be used 
together and be seen as complementary 
Use of the 0 The media offer an essentially free channel for 0 In urban areas many broadcast channels exist 
media public infort-nation and individuals have different listening habits 
* In many cases the media offers the only rapid 0 Individuals change their listening/viewing 
way of disseminating information to large and habits during the day. Few people are tuned-in 
diverse audiences through the night 
0 Both the broadcast and print media offer an 0 There may be a delay in getting information 
avenue for raising public awareness of the broadcast on radio and television. Local radio 
flood hazard both during incidents and at other is not able to respond quickly enough to 
times. broadcast flood warnings for fast responding 
0 People find television a personalised way of rivers 
receiving information 0 There is no way of knowing if the message has 
0 People tend to believe warning messages if been heard, understood and believed by the 
they are delivered by "experts" such as recipient 
weather forecasters 0 The media may be ineffective in engendering a 
0 Media and official warnings act as an impetus sense of risk and have only mixed credibility 
for social networks to function and relay with the public 
information to others. 0 To be effective the media must be sent concise 
and specific messages that arc updated 
frequently 
0 ne media may not always pay attention to the 
warning message and act upon it. 
Use of 9 They are likely to be more persuasive than 0 Direct warnings can require a significant 
specific or media warnings resource to deliver direct warning 0 People are more likely to hear, understand and 0 The use of technology can depersonalise 
methods believe a message that is delivered to them warning arrangements 
personally 
0 Personalised delivery allows the provision of 
additional, confirmatory information 
0 Enable targeted warnings to be provided to 
householders, businesses or other clearly 
identifiable individuals, groups or 
organisations. 
0 There is evidence to show that warnings are 
most effective if they come from a credible and 
authoritative source 
Use of non- a Sirens and alarms are simple to operate where 0 Such methods are ineffective by themselves 
specific warning times are short 0 Unless the public is educated about their 
warning 0 Different auditory warning sounds can be used significance they may be ignored 
methods to convey different levels of urgency 0 Many people fail to hear warnings 
0 Auditory warnings can alert the visually 
impaired 
0 The public's' ears are always open to auditory 
stimulus regardless of what they are doing 
(After: Mileti, 1994, Foster, 1980, Williams, 1964, Drabek, 1986, Keys, 1977, Burkart, 1991, Emergency 
Management Australia, 1999, Edworthy and Adams, 1996). 
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Table 7.8 presents an assessment of how closely the warning dissemination strategies 
adopted and proposed by the Environment Agency comply with the ideal arrangements. It 
is clear that although a number of advances were made in 1996 which were all positive 
integrative steps, more work is needed to fully implement a multi-channelled dissemination 
strategy across England and Wales. The Environment Agency plans to address many of the 
identified shortcomings through the introduction of a new warning system in September 
2000. This should result in the use of a wider range of warning methods, better relations 
with various media outlets, the use of warning icons and consistent warning message 
templates, the provision of regular information updates, and more targeted and 
personalised warning messages. At the time of writing however, the system is in the 
planning stage and it remains to be seen if the laudable proposals find their way into 
operational practice from September 2000. 
In sununary, a nuinber of key issues can be identified relating to the conununication of flood 
warning information and integration: 
9 In an integrated system the targeting of warnings for different audiences in the flood plain 
is essential, but this issue has not been fully addressed in England and Wales. There is still 
a tendency to view the at-risk public as a single mass of people and that their needs can be 
adequately met by a standardised message forniat (delivered in English and Welsh), 
disseminated via a limited number of channels. For example, in urban areas, such as 
London, ethnic groups do not necessarily seek information from the traditional media 
outlets, nor speak English and alternative arrangements should be sought to reach them. 
With the assistance of the local authorities, the range of communities and ways in which 
information could be disseminated to them, such as ethnic radio stations, should be 
identified. Specific arrangements should also be made for the elderly, the infirm, and 
other special needs groups where these can be identified. It should also be recognised that 
there is a sizeable section of the community that for one reason or another do not have 
access to technology and may become excluded from warning information that is 
disseminated by technological means. As discussed in Chapter 5, this is a key issue for 
integration. Post-event surveys are required to ascertain if the chosen dissemination 
channels are effective in getting information across to the public: to determine whether the 
target audience is hearing, understanding and acting on the information provided. This 
will influence the number and type of channels used in the future, how frequently 
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information is transmitted and repeated, and the way in which messages are formatted 
and delivered (see Figure 7.2). 
Table 7.8: Effectiveness of existing and proposed warning dissemination strategies in 
England and Wales. 
Strategy Existing system Score Proposed system Score 
Use of A number of warning 2 * Plans to extend the number of 3 
multiple channels established since warning channels 
warning 1996 - Agency regions 0 Mix of methods to be used that 
channels given a choice of 4 broadcast will vary from location to 
methods and 4 direct location 
methods e Facility to be introduced for 
Tendency in some regions to issuing information updates at 
focus on a limited number of each warning stage 
methods for reasons of 
control and convenience 
Use of the A number of local radio 2 0 Intention to engage the media 3 
media stations used to disseminate more to ensure that warning 
warnings but not the ffill messages are acted upon with 
range, other media outlets greater urgency 
not fully exploited e. g. 0 Plans to secure national 
internet, local television, broadcasting agreements with 
weather forecasts, text BBC and Independent 
services companies 
Media not ftdly engaged in 0 Plans to extend the range of 
the dissemination process - media outlets that disseminate 
sense of urgency not always warning messages, including 
given to the broadcasting of the internet 
warning messages 0 plan to use warning icons to 
strengthen warning messages 
on the visual media. 
0 Consistent warning messages 
I templates to be introduced 
Use of specific About 5% of at-risk public 2 0 Intention to place greater 3 
or direct provided with direct warning emphasis on the delivery of 
warning service, but tendency to personalised warning methods 
methods over-rely on a single 0 Improved flood risk 
technological warning information will allow greater 
method i. e. the Automatic targeting of high risk/high 
Voice Messaging system impact areas for direct 
Rejection in some regions of warnings 
more community-based 'Me use of the sub-brand and 
methods such as flood information service 
wardens "Floodline" is likely to make 
the source of warning 
messages clearer and more 
authoritative 
Consistent warning messages 
templates to be introduced 
Use of non- Use limited to small number 1 0 Consistent warning messages 2 
specific of coastal and urban areas templates to be introduced 
warning Inconsistent procedures 0 No immediate plans to make 
methods across England and Wales the use of these methods more 
consistent and widespread I 
Scoring: I =low, 2=medium, 3=high 
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It is also important to determine whether the public believes the warning messages when 
they are transmitted. In the past, the authority of the police ensured that the public took the 
information provided seriously. As Burkart (199 1) notes, when the police are the warning 
source, most people are convinced that the flood threat is real. Today, the Environment 
Agency has more of a problem because awareness of the Agency is relatively low; in a 
recent survey (BNM, 1997) only 8% of respondents were aware that the organisation 
was connected with responsibility for issuing flood warning. This has since increased to 
24% (BMRB, 1999). Most people associate flood warning responsibility with either the 
local authority (210/o), the local water company (10%) and even the National Rivers 
Authority (12%) (the Agency's predecessor authority). When flood warnings are 
transmitted under the name of the Agency therefore, there is a danger that they may have 
limited impact. The situation may be improved if well-respected and authoritative 
individuals, such as established weather forecasters, were employed to deliver warning 
messages. The Agency is attempting to adopt this approach by passing warning 
information to Met. Office forecasters for transmission on local and national radio and 
television weather forecast bulletins. It is clear however, that finther work is need to fully 
integrate the presentation of warning information (meteorological and hydrological) to the 
public via this route. 
In an integrated flood warning scheme warning messages should be disseminated via 
multiple channels as this has been shown to increase warning effectiveness. In practice 
this means that warning agencies need to become reliant on dissemination channels that 
are outside their direct control, such as the media, flood wardens and other community 
channels. If trust is not placed in these warning methods they will fall in to disuse and 
warning agencies will become over-reliant on a small number of warning mechanisms 
that they can control directly, such as the AVM and FLOODCALL services operated by 
the Environment Agency. There are worrying signs that the latter approach is gaining 
favour in some quarters in the Agency with the added danger that technological solutions 
may be given too high a profile. This would have a negative impact on integration. 
7.3.6 Official and informal warning information 
It is important to recognise that in many areas especially where flooding is ftequent, an 
"informal" prediction and warning system may exist in addition to "official" warning 
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arrangements. Such systems are usually made up of local residents who are part of well- 
established social networks and friendship and neighbour groups. These people have leamt to 
live with floods and as a consequence may have developed their own flood warning 
arrangements based on their observations and understanding of hydrological processes. There 
is also evidence to show that informal arrangements exist in flood response organisations such 
as local authorities, emergency services, the media and even within the forecasting agencies 
themselves. Parker and Handmer (1997) consider that the designers of official systems often 
neglect the presence and potential of unofficial systems for enhancing warning effectiveness. 
In the research literature it is recognised that informal warning systems form an important part 
of an integrated warning system. Regardless of the wishes of officials, they will play a role in 
the dissemination, interpretation and response to warnings, drawing on local knowledge and 
personal networks (Mileti, 1994; Parker and Handmer, 1997). In some countries, notably 
Australia, practitioners are actively encouraged to seek advice from local residents who 
operate unofficial systems, share information and incorporate these data into the prediction 
process. It is argued that such a strategy helps integrate the informal system into the formal 
one and minimises the undesirable effects of competing predictions during flood events 
(Emergency Management Australia, 1999). By integrating local arrangements with the formal 
prediction system it helps give the local people some sense of ownership of the overall 
process. The media can also be providers of unofficial information especially if that from 
formal channels is insufficient or absent. This underlines the need for forecasting agencies to 
work closely with the media during flood events and at other times to ensure the effective 
interchange of information and knowledge (Burkart, 1991; Drabek, 1986). It should be 
recognised however, that informal warning systems can be a source of misinformation, and 
this can be damaging as well as constructive. For example, information may be received and 
acted upon by people for whom it is not intended (Williams, 1964). This emphasises again the 
need to integrate informal with formal warning systems, at the planning and operational 
stages, to help ensure the two systems re-enforce rather than compete with each other. 
A useful way of integrating official and unofficial flood warning systems is through the use of 
local flood wardens. Flood wardens are unpaid community volunteers who agree to cascade 
flood warning messages to neighbourhood members. Where they exist, they have been shown 
to improve flood warning performance by linking official systems, with their technological 
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strengths in flood detection, to personal and community networks with their strengths in local 
knowledge and information dissemination (Tunstall et al, 1991; Parker and Handmer, 1997). 
Flood warden systems have been in operation for many years in the Severn and Trent 
catchments, particularly in rural communities that experience frequent flooding. In some areas 
it has been recorded that people are so used to the "annual" floods that they see no beneflt in 
receiving an official warning as they feel they can cope better by acting on their own 
observations, but this is not typical however (Brown, 1995). In areas where wardens have 
been in operation for some time there is an increased level of community involvement in 
disseminating warnings. In some instances people have taken it upon themselves to wam and 
assist others in times of need even if their neighbours had formally declined to participate in 
the official warning scheme. In other areas the official and unofficial systems re-enforce each 
other through the exchange of river level information via a "River Watch System" established 
between the flood wardens and the Environment Agency. This enables the flood forecasters to 
receive valuable data from areas not covered by the Agency's river flow and level monitoring 
stations, thereby enhancing the quality of the official warning system. 
Despite these positive integrative attributes, the Midland Region of the Environment Agency 
has recently decided not only to stop recruiting flood wardens but also to stop supporting 
existing warden schemes. Flood Defence managers have concluded that the AVM system is a 
more reliable mechanism for delivering flood warning messages to the public and that it is 
easier to control than the more "esoteric" community-based methods. This philosophy is also 
being followed in the Environment Agency Wales. In the Thames Region however, the 
opposite is true with greater emphasis being placed on community involvement in warning 
dissemination and integration with informal systems where they exist. 
Table 7.9 shows the steady increase in warden recruitment across the Thames Region in the 
last 10 years, with some of these schemes having their origins in informal schemes that have 
been in operation for some time previously. In the Loddon catchment in Wargrave, Berkshire, 
for example, the chairman of the local residents association maintains a keen interest in the 
river and has kept records of gauge board readings for many years. He alerts local residents of 
high levels and flooding and with his agreement the Agency was able to add value to this 
local initiative by integrating the informal and official warning systems together in 1998. 
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Table 7.9: Number of flood wardens in the Thames Region in 1989 and 2000 
River Catchment Flood wardens 
1989 2000 
South London Rivers 14 14 
North London Rivers 6 7 
Lee 1 7 
Roding - 7 
Colne 45 58 
Mole - I 
Wey/Boumes - 4 
Loddon - I 
Thame/Wye - 2 
Cherwell/Ray (Oxon) - 33 
Kennet/Ock/Pang 12 14 
Cotswolds Rivers - - 
Fluvial Thames and 
minor tributaries 
29 30 
Total 107 178 
Within organisations informal arrangements exist along side the official warning systems. In 
the Environment Agency for instance, although the main data gathering systems involve the 
use of telemetry gauges and computers, it is quite common for manual gauge reading or 
"flood runs" to continue in parallel. This involves river gangs routinely visiting sites upstream 
of flood risk areas to "check levels for themselves". Through discussions with certain local 
authorities, police forces and the British Waterways Board it is understood that this practice is 
duplicated in certain areas by their staff. The Royal Borough of Windsor and Maidenhead 
routinely patrol the River Thames in times of high flow for instance gathering river level data. 
It is also common for news crews from radio and television stations to drive around areas 
subject to flooding gathering information from residents at risk and from their own 
observations that can sometimes lead to exaggerated reporting. As with flood wardens it is 
important that information for whatever source is freely exchanged and for unnecessary 
duplication to be avoided although having back-up arrangements can be valuable. 
The reaction to and management of informal systems by warning agencies therefore, can have 
an impact on integration. It is clear from the analysis presented above that particular attention 
should be paid to the following factors: 
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It is important that the official agencies recognise the existence of informal arrangements 
and develop a positive attitude towards them. Some officials still view such schemes 
sceptically, preferring to replace them with their own arrangements. There is often a lack 
of trust in local people being able to manage their own affairs and this lack of confidence 
can often be then reciprocated. Agencies appear to have little confidence in "non- 
technical" solutions and prefer to rely on techniques over which they have complete 
control. Examples are documented of where agencies have become involved in 
community-based schemes only to withdraw when procedures have not functioned as 
they would like. 
There is some evidence emerging that where official systems are established unilaterally 
this can lead to the demise of informal arrangements, resulting on the public becoming 
over-dependent on the former system. The danger here is that if the official system fails 
for any reason there will no longer be any redundancy in local warning arrangements that 
the informal system could provide. To avoid this, warning agencies should actively seek 
out informal systems before introducing official warning arrangements. Where they exist 
it is important to share information, obtain advice and local knowledge from the people 
who operate them. 
Official schemes should not compete with informal warning systems, and effort should be 
directed towards integrating the two with the aim of enhancing overall warning system 
performance from the perspective of those at risk. Such a policy will help establish a 
sense of ownership amongst the local populace and improve the credibility of the official 
warning system. Informal arrangements operating within organisations should also be 
integrated to avoid fragmentation of response. These arrangements can often support the 
official system and provide on-the-ground confirmation. 
Flood warden schemes are seen as a good vehicle for integrating informal and official 
warning mechanisms. It is vital for such schemes to be well maintained and supported by 
official sources to minimise the possibility of failure. In the Thames Region four full-time 
flood warning dissemination officers have been recruited to improve the functioning of 
existing warden schemes and establish new ones in high-risk areas. One of their key 
objectives is to seek out informal warning systems and use them as the foundation of any 
official arrangements that may be introduced (see Chapter 8). 
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7.3.7 Feedback and confirmation 
Most research on the effectiveness of flood warning systems stresses the importance of 
feedback within the system and the need for confirmation by those delivering the warnings 
and those receiving them (Foster, 1980; Williams 1964). In an integrated system feedback is 
desirable at each stage of the warning process and it is important that information should flow 
in both directions between the wamer and the warned. Seeking confin-nation is another 
important and integrative process; whether it is the forecaster being presented with 
information of an impending severe storm, or the recipient of a warning living in a risk area. 
Appropriate response may be delayed until confirmation is received that the information 
supplied is perceived as valid. It is clear that when people get confirmation the perception of 
the threat is higher than with those who do not (Drabek, 1986). People usually obtain 
information in two ways; it is sent to them or they seek it out (Burkart, 1991). An 
environment in which people can easily confirm an initial warning through alternative sources 
is one that fosters the development of warning belief and is well integrated. 
In the detection and forecasting phases of the warning process, flood forecasters often seek 
feedback and confirmation especially when they are presented with infon-nation indicating 
extreme rainfall or river flows. In such cases, alternative data sources can be used to check the 
validity of information or advice can be sought from another party to confirm that a 
measurement is probable. A gauge indicating a rapidly rising river level, for example, might 
signify a malfunctioning instrument or a very localised flash flood, the forecaster would seek 
confirmation before accepting the validity of the information presented and responding. 
Knowledge of the prevailing weather conditions would help formulate a response: if 
forecasters know that high pressure is dominating weather patterns, for instance, they are 
more likely to conclude that the river gauge in question is malfunctioning in some way. On- 
site reports can also provide valuable feedback to the forecaster, both on the impact of 
flooding and on the accuracy of predictions. Such reports may come from a member of the 
emergency work force, local authority or emergency services staff, flood wardens or the 
general public. There is a danger here however, that reports of flooding received from the 
public may be exaggerated; people have been known to pressure a response agency into 
offering them assistance by indicating that flooding is worse than it actually is. But in general 
to develop an integrated system communication channels should be kept open to give and 
receive feedback from all parties involved in the flood warning process. 
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Feedback is increasingly being used in automated flood forecasting systems to improve the 
accuracy of predictions. Observed river flow information gathered via telemetry can be used 
to adjust the modelled flows so that the accuracy of future forecasts can be improved, this can 
be achieved in two ways; through correction of model states or prediction of model errors 
(Moore, 1993). In the former, techniques are used to correct the states or variables of the 
model in real-time to achieve concordance between observed and model predicted flow. 
Moore sees state correction as essentially a form of negative feedback and shows that it can 
be a very effective procedure. In the latter, rather than adopting empirical adjustment 
procedures to correct modelled flows, the structure of the errors is analysed, and based on this 
analysis, future errors are predicted which can be used to obtain improved flow forecasts. 
Care should be taken when adopting either technique however, as in some circumstances 
erroneous adjustments may be made especially where there are timing errors in the model 
forecast. It should be also noted that in instances where the forecaster has low confidence in 
modelled flows and is unable to confirm the prediction because the river may not yet have 
risen, it is likely that a warning will be delayed until confirmation is forthcoming, say from 
rising upstream levels. Bye and Homer (1998) make the specific point that flood forecasting 
procedures should ensure that, in addition to using model predictions, close attention is paid 
to monitoring flood levels. The recommendation that forecasters should not rely solely on 
model output but should also consider flood level information both measured and from on-site 
observations is an important integration point. 
Confirmation and feedback are equally important in the dissemination and response phases of 
the warning process, acting as integrating mechanisms. Those initiating and delivering a 
warning need to confirm that the message has been disseminated to the target audiences by 
the appropriate means and that effective response ensues. This can be achieved after a flood 
event through liaison with the media and by carrying out post-event public surveys, or during 
the event to give those issuing warnings an immediate indication of whether there has been an 
appropriate level of recipient response. The use of feedback information to modify warning 
messages is particularly valuable, with the potential of integrating the dissemination and 
response phases of a warning system more effectively. To facilitate this, special 
communication channels should be established to ensure that user response to warnings can 
be closely and rapidly monitored. It is recognised however, that in practice little or no attempt 
is made by the warning officials to seek feedback and issue new information. In many 
instances the need for feedback is not even considered and where it does occur it is largely 
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unplanned. It should also be acknowledged that in certain circumstances the nature of the 
hazard prevents feedback; very rapid flash flooding would be such an example. 
Another group of people for which confirmation and feedback is important is the recipients of 
warning messages. It is recognised in the literature that warning messages will be accepted at 
face value only by a minority of the recipients and that most people will attempt to engage in 
some form of confirmation before taking any protective action (Mileti, 1975; Burkart, 1991). 
It is also recognised that the more warning messages that are received by an individual from 
different sources, the fewer the attempts at waming confirmation and that there are strong 
links between the seeking of confirmation, the belief in the warning message and the content 
of the warning message. In practice however, these processes operate sub-optimally and most 
people seek out additional information by calling fhends and relatives to get their 
interpretations of the event and to determine what action they are taking (Drabek 1986). Most 
people contact their personal networks of friends, neighbours and family to confirm warnings 
or do so by direct observation, such as going to the river. The media is a popular confirmation 
source and can play an important role in getting basic information into social networks. This 
can become a valuable tool for emergency managers in the response phase of an incident and 
a useful integration mechanism. Burkart (1991) notes that in general people switch channels 
to confirm warnings and that this switching is done in regular patterns - from official to 
social, from media to social, from social to official, etc. This has implications for integration 
because without an integrated approach to warning message dissemination these different 
sources may well give the recipient a contradictory picture causing confusion and delayed 
response. 
Confirmation behaviour is dependent on warning lead-time. When a warning is urgent and 
lead time short there is often less effort to confirm and more of a tendency to accept the 
warning at face value. In slow onset floods however, people are more likely to engage in 
confirmation behaviour, using their social network and the media as pnmary sources of 
information, but it can take time for these sources to start to function effectively. Burkart 
(1991) suggests that such behaviour can slow down eventual response to a warning and 
recommends that emergency managers should try to cut confirmation behaviour time to a 
minimum. It is important therefore, that confirmation should be facilitated, as people often 
delay appropriate response until they have satisfied themselves that the message is real and 
applies to them, and delay can be a precursor to failure. In Australia this has been addressed 
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by establishing flood information centres during flood events for those seeking warning 
confirmation and other flood-related information (Emergency Management Australia, 1999). 
By providing a confirmation service, the chance of rumours is reduced, a greater credibility is 
conveyed because the source of further information can be specified in the broadcast warning 
message, and integration is facilitated. 
With the transfer of flood warning dissemination responsibilities in England and Wales in 
1996, the Environment Agency recognised. the need for feedback and confirmation, facilities 
for which had previously been rarely provided. It addressed the issue on two main fronts: 
* By providing a dial and listen telephone service, FLOODCALL, that is designed 
to offer infonnation and advice to people living in flood prone areas during flood 
events, and through the dissemination of flood warning messages via various 
media outlets (in addition to direct warning methods). 
By commissioning surveys in at-risk areas to determine the level of awareness of 
the Agency and its functions, awareness and understanding of flood warning 
methods, and the extent to which recipients of warnings are aware of the actions 
they should take in a flood event. 
The Agency introduced FLOODCALL to allow the public to confirm flood warning 
messages, obtain up-to-date information for their local area, and to reduce the number of 
telephone calls made to Agency offices. The system has been well publicised both during 
flood events, where it is referenced on media broadcasts and warnings issued directly (such as 
via the AVM system), and at other times in newspaper adverts and public awareness material 
(including leaflets and merchandise such as fhdge magnets, pencils, key-rings, etc). Quickdial 
codes allow the public to rapidly locate local information on the national system. 
Public surveys conducted annually since 1997 indicate that the proportion of those 
interviewed who have found FLOODCALL to be either quite helpful or very helpful has 
steadily increased from 66% in 1997 to 78% in 1999, marginally higher than local radio (80% 
to 72%) (see Figure 7.2). Figure 7.3 indicates however, that the spontaneous awareness of the 
FLOODCALL system is very low, between 2 and 4% of those interviewed, compared to 
around 20% for local radio. This percentage rose to between 17 and 25% when interviewees 
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Figure 7.3: Spontaneous awareness of flood information methods: 1997,1998 and 1999 
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Figure 7A Prompted awareness of flood information methods: 1997,1998 and 1999 
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were prompted with a list of warning methods that might be available in their area, this 
compares to an average of 55% for local radio (see Figure 7.4). 
Although the FLOODCALL service is a useful initiative it does have a number of drawbacks 
in relation to providing feedback and confirmation and these need to be addressed: 
Whilst such recorded information services are regarded as a vital checking facility 
for the public, they are inherently weak in providing specific feedback information 
to those at risk and equally to those issuing forecasts and warnings. The Agency's 
objective has been to reduce the amount of direct contact with the public for very 
valid reasons such as the fear of overloading switchboards and the limited number 
of duty staff who need to focus on forecasting and dissemination activities. But by 
seeking to curtail the amount direct public contact the scope for feedback is 
reduced. 
As discussed in Chapter 5 some members of society have difficulty relating to 
new technology, including automated information systems. The FLOODCALL 
system was fully tested during the Easter Floods in 1998 with mixed success 
and Bye and Homer (1998) made the following comment in relation to the 
service: 
"For people who are unfamiliar with modem telephone based 
infort'nation systems, FLOODCALL is confusing and this inhibits its 
effectiveness as a warning mechanism. In one region, under 50% of calls 
made by the public connected to the message box and the majority of 
callers did not, therefore, obtain any information. " 
To meet integration criteria therefore, the Agency needs to focus on providing locally specific 
information, to update that information regularly during times of flood, to be aware that 
sections of the community have difficulty using technology-based systems, and introduce 
feed-back mechanisms during flood events. 
To meet some of these requirements, the Agency is trialing a new service from October 
1999 for a 12-month period called FLOODLINE. This service subsumes the 
FLOODCALL system but also gives the caller the option of speaking to a trained operator 
in an external call-centre to obtain basic advice. The caller can request to be transferred to 
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an Agency Area office to either report a flooding incident or obtain more expert advice. 
The success of this service will be assessed during the trial period before longer-term 
commitments are made. 
The need for slow feedback mechanisms or hindsight reviews is also being addressed by the 
Environment Agency on a national scale across England and Wales. In order to evaluate the 
effectiveness of the flood warning service over a period of years, a market research firrn was 
commissioned in 1996 to conduct public surveys to establish baseline information on the 
current performance of the service. The intention is to compare future surveys against these 
benchmarks in order to assess whether the service is improving and that the needs of the 
customer are being met. Three benchmark surveys of public opinion were commissioned in 
1997: 
9 National Awareness Survey -a survey of the general adult population in England and 
Wales to deten-nine the awareness of the Agency's responsibility for flood warnings and of 
the existence of the flood warning service among the population at large. 
"At Risk" Survey -a nation-wide survey conducted amongst people who live in areas at 
risk of flooding to assess the awareness and understanding of the flood warning system 
operating in their area. 
Post-event Surveys - these surveys will be conducted on an ad hoc basis as and when a 
flood event occurs. The objective of these surveys is to provide an assessment of the 
efficiency of the flood warning service for people who are actually flooded. 
The first national awareness survey was completed in January 1997 (BN4RB, 1997). It 
showed that awareness of the Agency's responsibilities was low and only 8 per cent of 
respondents were aware that it is the lead organisation for issuing flood warnings. The more 
11common sense" methods of warning dissemination, such as television and radio, achieved 
the highest awareness, and awareness of such methods as AVM and FLOODCALL was low. 
The surveys were repeated in 1998 and 1999 (BN4RB, 1998,1999) and the number of 
interviewees that spontaneously named the Agency as being the lead organisation for issuing 
flood warnings has gradually increased (15% in 1998 and 24% in 1999). Awareness of the 
AVM and FLOODCALL systems has increased by 7% and 2% respectively over the 2-year 
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period. The Environment Agency therefore, still has a big task in raising public awareness not 
only of itself, but also the ways in which it disseminates flood warning information to the 
public. 
Feedback and confin-nation therefore, are important processes in an integrated system and the 
following points are of particular relevance: 
* The desire for feedback and confirmation can be identified at each stage of the 
flood warning process and in an integrated system this desire needs to be satisfied. 
This can only be done if flood warning systems are designed to facilitate a two- 
way flow of information and knowledge. 
e Forecasters, response agencies and warning recipients all seek confinnation and 
feedback especially when they are presented with information indicating an 
extreme condition or where information is uncertain or conflicting. If this is not 
forthcoming, the appropriate response to that condition may be significantly 
delayed, and delay can be a precursor to failure. 
e The need for confirmation and feedback is related to the level of the individual's 
knowledge and the number of channels via which information is received. It 
follows therefore, that an individual who is knowledgeable of a given situation 
and receives consistent information about that situation from a number of different 
channels, is less likely to seek out confirmation and require feedback, and is more 
likely to respond effectively and in a timely manner. 
Integrated flood warning systems should have in-built feedback loops to improve 
overall performance. This can be in the short-term, where information is used to 
improve the quality of forecasts or warning messages during an event, or in the 
longer tenn, which may result in changes to the way in which the warning system 
is designed or operates. 
* Special communication channels should be established at various stages in the 
warning process to facilitate feedback and confirmation during flood events. In the 
Thames Region for instance, a special telephone line has been installed in the 
Regional Flood Warning Centre for flood wardens to relay information on local 
flooding incidents, blocked rivers etc., directly to the flood forecasters. For the 
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longer tenn, post-event surveys are needed to review the operation of all parts of 
the process. This information should be fed back directly to the relevant managers 
for the necessary adjustments to be made to improve flood warning performance. 
7.3.8 Flood experience and public information programmes 
Most researchers recognise that the effectiveness of the entire warning system depends upon 
the awareness of the recipients of warning information of the flood risk, and their awareness 
of the appropriate actions to take when they receive that information. Knowledge and 
experience then are important elements of an integrated warning system, for in a flooding 
situation there is no substitute for knowledge, or as Williams (1964) puts it "experience is the 
great teacher". There are two main ways of gaining knowledge about flood risk and flood 
warning response; either through experiencing the effects of flooding directly, or through a 
public information programme. There is evidence in the literature that actual flood experience 
raises flood awareness and increases the tendency to respond effectively to flood warnings, 
but there is much less conclusive evidence that disseminating knowledge through a public 
infon-nation campaign performs the same task (Drabek, 1986; Penning-Rowsell et al 1982). 
There is the added complication that flood plain occupants may become "the prisoners of 
experience" (Kates, 1962), meaning that they can only perceive and interpret risk in terms of 
what they have experienced: this may extend to only low levels of flooding. 
In many instances, people lack knowledge of and underestimate the hazardous nature of the 
environment in which they live (Drabek, 1986). These under-estimates reflect busy people 
who are occupied with their own-life priorities and the day-to-day issues of living. Lay 
persons are typically over confident about their risk estimates and this over confidence leads 
people to believe that they are comparatively immune to common hazards. This may be due 
in part to a wider underlying issue of society (especially urban society) loosing touch with 
environmental reality, pointing to the need for more extensive environmental education 
programmes. The same perceptions are found amongst flood plain inhabitants who tend to 
underplay the extent of the damage that might result from a severe flood (Drabek, 1986). 
There is a need in an integrated system therefore, for targeted public education programmes 
that raise awareness of flood risk and address the tendency to underestimate that risk. Some of 
the techniques that can be adopted in this context are set out in Table 7.10 and the key factors 
that influence the successful implementation of such programmes are presented in Table 7.11. 
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The Environment Agency recognises the importance of raising and maintaining public 
awareness not only of the flood warning dissemination arrangements in England and Wales, 
but also of the public's responsibilities with regard to effective response. A number of 
strategies have been adopted since 1996, all of which have been co-ordinated on a national 
basis for reasons of consistency. In response to the recommendations of the Independent 
Review into the Easter 1998 Floods, the Agency has increased the priority given to public 
awareness and education campaigns and these were re-launched with greater vigour in 1999. 
The strategies adopted by the Agency since 1996 are set out in Table 7.12. 
Prior to this work, the use of public information to raise awareness was limited in England 
and Wales, and in some areas this approach was actively discouraged (Penning Rowsell, et al 
1982). An exception was in London between 1978 to 1981, prior to the building of the 
Thames Barrier, when campaigns were launched that included television adverts, posters in 
public places, newspaper articles and advisory leaflets. Although opinion surveys indicated 
that there was a high level of awareness of the tidal flood risk in London and that two thirds 
of those in risk areas retained this knowledge for at least three months after the period of 
major publicity, the detail of warning arrangements was not fully understood. 
The Agency has commissioned annual public opinion surveys since 1997 to gauge the 
effectiveness of its campaigns. These surveys indicate that they have only been pailially 
successful in meeting the Agency's principal objectives of raising public awareness of itself 
and its functions, of its flood warning methods, and of the actions that recipients should take 
before and during a flood event. Table 7.13 illustrates that public awareness of the Agency's 
role in flood warning is steadily increasing and it is now the most mentioned organisation. A 
third of respondents were unable to name any organisation responsible for flood warnings 
however, and 12% still mention the National Rivers Authority even though this organisation 
was disbanded in 1996. Awareness of the Agency's Floodcall infon-nation system is 
consistently very low (2-4%), it remains to be seen if the new Floodline service, that was 
given extensive publicity in the October 1999 campaign (post survey), has wider recognition. 
In stark contrast, almost four in five respondents (78%) said they were aware of special 
precautions that should be taken in the threat of a flood, but it should be noted that this 
percentage has not increased over the three-year period. However, the percentage of people 
who had made any specific preparations in case of a flood event remains consistently low at 
just 5%. 
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Table 7.10: Techniques for raising public awareness of flooding and flood warnings. 
Mode Technique 
Media Articles and advertisements in local newspapers, especially at the start of a flood based season where one exists or on the anniversary of significant flood events 
Radio and television broadcasts with "expert" personnel and/or local radio 
personalities, again at strategic times of the year 
Advertisements on local radio and in local newspapers to promote the understanding 
of flood risk, warning arrangements and appropriate response 
The provision of awareness "information packs" to the media 
Telephone Telephone answering service that is actively publicised and enables callers to obtain 
based relevant and updated advice for their local area 
Placing information and relevant telephone numbers in the Yellow Pages and local 
telephone directories. 
Visually Use of water and/or council tax bills to carry reminder messages about flooding and 
based flood warning. Targeting those leaflets that people tend to keep, such as those giving 
information on refase collection after public holidays. 
Encourage insurance companies to include flood risk and preparedness infon-nation 
with their annual reminders and infon-nation on premiums and insurance cover 
Provision of flood information brochures and leaflets to at-risk properties, libraries, 
Citizen's Advice Bureaux, schools, local authority offices, doctor's surgeries and other 
public places. 
Placing posters with maps and information on flooding on public buildings and other 
prominent p sitions such as bill boards 
Flood markers on telephone poles or buildings to indicate the levels reached by 
historical floods 
Provision of educational materials on local flooding to local schools, colleges and 
libraries. Use material on local rivers that fits in with the curriculum and cartoons to 
convey information to children on flood warnings and what to do in hazard situations 
Professionally produced videos preferably of local flooding and warnings to be used at 
public meetings, by community groups, local business organisations, and in libraries, 
colleges and schools. Enlisting a local TV or radio personality to narrate the video 
might add to its interest and credibility with the public 
Encourage people in risk areas to develop family disaster plans that focus on how the 
family or household would respond effectively to a flood 
Putting general and possibly localised flood warning information on the internet for 
public access 
Verbally Open days with demonstrations at flood warning centres for the public, community 
based______ organisations, media and schools 
Visits and talks by professional staff to schools, community and youth groups 
Flood warning exercises that have public involvement 
(After Tunstall and Parker, 1999: Emergency Management Australia, 1999: Haggettý 1997) 
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Table 7.11: Factors influencing public education programmes 
Key factors 
I- Public education programmes must be planned and conducted outside times of 
flooding an maintained for long periods, particularly if flooding is infrequent. 
2. Programmes need to draw on the "community memory" of flooding to help 
- 
communicate the effects of flooding to those at risk. 
I Those who operate warning systems should listen to those at risk as well as seeking to 
educate them. 
4. There is a need to consider the experiences of flood victims when re-appraising 
response procedures, 
5. Public education programmes should stress the need for self-reliance and for the 
individual to recognise and respond to threat cues, such as heavy rainfall or rising 
river levels. 
6. The differing needs of recipients groups should be considered and catered for. Groups 
- 
can be differentiated in tenns of experience, age, intelligence, health and ethnicity. 
7. The distribution of information should be accompanied by an ongoing assessment of 
its impact 
8. A mix of strategies should be employed (as defined in Table 7.10) and a focus for 
educational initiatives should be created when community receptiveness to flood- 
related information is likely to be high (e. g. beginning of a flood season or 
anniversary of a flood). 
9. Efforts should be made to involve as many appropriate agencies as possible in public 
education programmes, this will encourage the perception of an integrated 
organisational response 
10 The co-operation and support of the local or regional media to generate public interest 
is vital. Newspapers could carry photographs of previous floods with stories of how 
co le coped, whilst reminding those at risk that flooding is still possible. 
11 Periodic public surveys should be undertaken to discover whether information is 
being understood and will lead to the desired response 
(After: Foster, 1980: Keys, 1997, Bye and Homer, 1998; Drabek, 1986; Penning Rowsell et al 1982) 
A number of key issues can be drawn from this section that are particularly relevant to 
integration: 
* The effectiveness of the whole flood warning system depends on the ability of the public 
to respond effectively to flood warning information. To achieve this, the public must 
become knowledgeable about the flood risk and on how to respond effectively when they 
are warned. They can gain this knowledge either through direct experience of flooding or 
via public information and education programmes. There is some concern in the literature 
about the ability of public education programmes to raise and maintain awareness in the 
longer term and this concern is confirmed by the results of recent public opinion surveys 
presented here. 
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Table 7.12: Flood related public awareness and education campaigns launched and 
planned by the Environment Agency since 1996. 
Year Adopted/planned strategies 
1996 The issue of public information leaflets directly to properties considered to be at 
high risk of flooding from rivers and the sea and to public places such as libraries, 
local authority offices, police stations and Citizens Advice Bureaux. Two leaflets 
were produced: a national leaflet, which contained general information about where 
people can obtain warning information, and a local insert, which provided specific, 
jocal information for the area in question. 
A publicity campaign in local newspapers and on local radio at the time of the launch 
of the new arrangements on I September 1996, and reminder campaigns were planned 
at the beginning of flood seasons. 
Launch of the Agency's dial and listen flood information service, Floodcall. A single 
national number and a quick-dial code enables callers to receive recorded infonnation 
about flood warnings in force in their area. 
The production of flood warning merchandise, including key rings, reffigerator 
magnets, pencils, memo pads and plastic cards to publicise the Agency's Floodcall 
service. 
_Local 
poster campaigns targeted at public places in risk areas. 
Public opinion research was commissioned to determine the success or otherwise of 
the awareness campaign - repeated annually. 
1997 A national news release to publicise the 50'h anniversary of the 1947 floods that 
affected a large part of England and Wales and caused half a billion pounds worth of 
damage (at today's prices). 
1999 Re-launch of a 3- year programme to raise awareness of floods and flood warning in 
response to the Independent Review of the 1998 floods. 
The first national "Flood Awareness Week" was launched in October 1999, focusing 
on the level of flood risk, the need for self-help and for people to relate to flooding on 
a personal level, and the role of the Agency and other response organisations. 
Greater emphasis placed on encouraging active citizenship with a shift away from 
talking abo t the Agency as the "protector". 
Launch of the sub-brand "Floodline" which is designed to work as an icon, a marker 
and a telephone information line. The aim is to provide a stronger link between floods 
and the Environment Agency, 
Floodline telephone service incorporates Floodcall but enables callers to speak to an 
operator to et advice and/or transfer to an Agency area office for local enquiries 
Radio and poster advertising tailored to each Agency region. 
Direct mail to properties at highest risk including revised local leaflets, fact sheets 
giving prac ical advice, stickers, flood kit and key ring. 
2000 A pubic awareness launch in September 2000 that will centre on the introduction of 
new flood warning stages that will replace the existing colour coded warnings. 
2100 The campaign will focus on the need to raise the percentage of flood warning 
recipients that take effective iction to reduce flood losses. 
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Table 7.13: Spontaneous public awareness of the Environment Agency's principal 
education campaign objectives (after BMRB, 1999). 
1997 1998 1999 
a 
Spontaneous awareness of the Agency's flood warning role 8% 15% 24% 
Spontaneous awareness of the Agency's Floodcall service 2% 3% 4% 
Spontaneous awareness of precautions to be taken in the 
Event of flooding 83% 79% 78% 
Special preparations made in case of a flood event 7% 5% 5% 
0 In an integrated system a range of strategies and techniques should be used to raise 
and maintain public awareness, and the key ones are presented in this section. This 
should be a two-way process drawing on the "community memory" of flooding 
and relying to a certain extent on community self-help and active citizenship. 
Strategies should acknowledge that communities are made up of different groups, 
some of which have special needs. Where practicable, campaigns should be 
targeted at these different groups, as broad-based and non-focused strategies have 
been shown to be the least effective. 
e The effectiveness of awareness campaigns should be periodically reviewed 
through public surveys to discover whether information is understood and is being 
acted upon. The holding of exercises should be considered with public 
involvement. Organisations should be aware of how knowledgeable their target 
audience is regarding the hazard in question, 
e Public information programmes can be costly to sustain and pressures on budgets 
can result in their curtaihnent. Signs of this had already begun to appear within the 
Enviromnent Agency prior to the Easter 1998 Floods. There was a real danger that 
the extensive campaigns that were conducted in 1996/7 were about to be scaled 
down in subsequent years in some parts of England and Wales. The Easter 1998 
Floods gave added impetus to this work, but this could be a temporary reprise 
especially if a period of drought follows and priorities are re-assessed. In an 
integrated system it is important to maintain long term awareness through repeated 
Public information programmes. This is particularly relevant in urban areas such 
as London where population turnover is high. 
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9 There is evidence to indicate that low public knowledge of the flood hazard is part 
of a wider issue relating to the loss of environmental awareness in general terms 
and a lack of appreciation of the potential hazards that can impact on peoples' 
lives. There is a tendency for people to believe that they are immune to common 
hazards, especially in low risk areas. To counter this perception there is a need for 
organisations such as the Environment Agency to focus more on promoting 
environmental education campaigns and raising awareness of the hazardous nature 
of the environment in which people live. 
7.4 Summary and conclusions 
In this chapter the importance of information and knowledge to the process of integration in 
flood warning systems has been critically analysed. This has been approached by following 
the flow path through an idealised total warning system as described in the literature. Key 
stages in this process have been identified, often at points where information and knowledge 
flow from one system component to another, and it is suggested that the degree of integration 
can be influenced by optimising the actions taken at these stages. For each key stage 
therefore, a series of recommendations have been made which, if implemented, can directly 
impact on the level of integration that is attainable. By analysing the recommendations 
further, a number of cross-cutting themes emerge: these apply to a number of stages in the 
process and are therefore likely to be the most important issues with respect to integration in 
this context. These themes can be summarised as follows: 
1. Time. The speed of onset of a flood event significantly effects the type and amount of 
information required by all parties involved in the flood warning process. The detection, 
forecasting, dissemination and response elements need to receive infon-nation that is 
tailored to this variable for the overall system to operate in an integrated way. This will 
facilitate the issue of timely and accurate flood warnings and effective response. 
2. Uncertainty. When the quality of information is uncertain it can act as a blocking 
mechanism and has the effect of preventing actions and limiting response. In an integrated 
system it is important that mechanisms are introduced that will allow uncertain 
information to be communicated and understood by the recipients of that information. It is 
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important that the holders of uncertain information are given the confidence and the 
means to communicate it to others. 
3. The knowledge of the individual. The knowledge held by key individuals at various 
stages in the warning system is an important resource and should be nurtured and 
sustained in an integrated system. The assimilation, interpretation and decision-making 
processes that are undertaken by different individuals at different stages have an important 
influence on the cohesiveness of the total warning system. Experience and knowledge can 
also help overcome uncertainty. 
4. Conflrmation and feedback. The need for confirmation and feedback can be identified 
at each stage of the flood warning process especially when individuals are presented with 
information that is unusual and may indicate an extreme condition. It has been shown that 
this need is directly related to the knowledge of the individual and the number of sources 
from which information is received. It is important in an integrated system that the need 
for confirmation and feedback is recognised and planned for. This is closely linked to (1) 
above in that confirmation and feedback take operational time to achieve that may or may 
not be available. 
5. Adding va)ue to information. There are opportunities at various stages in the process for 
additional information to be added to the official information stream. This has the effect 
of adding value to and improving the quality of the original information. In an integrated 
system such infon-nation should be actively incorporated into official procedures and 
mechanisms should be put in place for this to be achieved. Such information may 
originate from staff within the forecasting agency or response agencies, from informal 
flood warning schemes, from key individuals such as flood wardens, or from members of 
the general public who live in risk areas. 
6. Understanding the information. If infort-nation is clearly understood then it is more 
likely that it will be responded to in an appropriate way. This holds true for flood 
forecasters and local authority/emergency service officials as well as for the at-risk public. 
Information that is inconsistent, vague and unclear, at any stage in the warning process, 
results in confusion and misunderstanding and may block action and response. In an 
integrated system, information should be presented in a consistent and specific way, and 
should be targeted to the needs of the end-user. It should be bome in mind that some 
people are better equipped to process and respond to information because of their 
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knowledge, education, status, the resources at their disposal and the lack of physiological 
constraints. People with special needs may need help in understanding and responding to 
warning information. 
7. Believing the information. Information should not only be understood by those who 
receive it, but it must also be believed. Again, this maxim applies throughout the warning 
process and recipients will not act or respond effectively if they consider the information 
that is presented to be false or not applicable to them. To ensure that information is 
believed in an integrated system, it should emanate from an authoritative and credible 
source, be delivered through more than one channel of communication, and be convincing 
and reasonable. As mentioned above, confirmation underlies the entire warning process 
and this also helps people believe the information they receive. Individuals, no matter 
what part they play in the warning system, are not easily convinced that the unthinkable (a 
flood) will happen. When they are presented with such information, they often will seek 
confirmation before they believe and act upon it, and this requirement needs to be 





This chapter presents the results of an in-depth case study undertaken in the Mimmshall 
Brook catchment in Hertfordshire to determine whether a policy of integration would be 
beneficial to flood warning procedures. Prior to this study only rudimentary official flood 
warning arrangements existed in this catchment and an assessment is made as to whether 
any of the integration factors identified in this study were present in these arrangements. 
An attempt is made to introduce improved and integrated procedures into the catchment 
using all relevant factors identified in this research and following the conceptual model 
described in Chapter 3. Special attention is given to the feasibility of integrating the 
improved official flood warning procedures with unofficial community-based 
arrangements that have been operating in the local community for sometime. 
8.2 Background 
The Mimmshall Brook is a gravel bedded stream located north of London in southern 
Hertfordshire (see Figure 1.2). The catchment is 53kM2 in area, of which about 17% is under 
urban land use. Geologically, the catchment lies on the boundary between the chalk of 
Hertfordshire and the London Clay and Reading Beds of the London Basin. As a result of the 
relatively impervious nature of the valley slopes the catchment has a relatively rapid runoff 
response. The main tributaries of the Mimmshall Brook are the Potterclls Stream, Potters Bar 
Brook, Catherine Bourne, Clare Hall Stream and Brookmans Park Stream. The most 
significant of these is the Potters Bar Brook that contributes approximately 35% of the flow. 
Urban development commenced in the early 1950's. Urbanisation, road construction, land 
drainage and agriculture have all altered water and sediment discharges within the catchment. 
Development has increased flood flows in the Mimmshall Brook and reduced the time taken 
for runoff to enter the watercourses. The M25 and Al(M) motorways cross the catchment and 
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although their combined area is only 1.4% of the total catchment area, it is estimated that they 
contribute 6% to flood flows (NRA, 1993a). The most significant increase in urban 
development has taken place in the Potters Bar Brook catchment. Catchment response, as 
measured at the river level station at Warrengate Road, can vary between 4 and 5 hours on 
average depending on the wetness of the catchment (see Table 8.1). 
The area at most risk of flooding is located in the lower reaches of the Mimmshall Brook, 
downstream of the Potters Bar Brook confluence, in the vicinity of Warrengate Road and 
Water End. The Thames Water Authority carried out a flood alleviation scheme in this area in 
the autumn of 1980, after the flooding of 1979. This involved channel regrading and 
resectioning, maintenance clearing and construction of a small flood embankment. Since 
these local improvement works, the NRA undertook frequent gravel and trash clearance work 
to help alleviate the flood risk. In the early 1990's the NRA attempted to introduce a flood 
storage scheme to offer protection to aI in 50 year standard in the lower reaches. The 
proposed works had an estimated cost of E2,266,000, but a benefit/cost ratio of only 0.37 has 
prevented the scheme from progressing despite persistent public and political pressure. 
Prior to this study, flood warning arrangements in the Mimmshall Brook were no more than 
rudimentary. The Environment Agency's predecessors would issue flood warnings for the 
Colne catclunent, which included the Mimmshall Brook, on the basis of general weather 
predictions, data from a sparse telemetry network and the experience of duty staff 
Table 8.1: Details of hydrological events in the Mimmshall Brook since gauge installation. 
Date Peak Level (m) at 
Warrengate Road 
Rainfall total (mm) Lag time (hrs) 
8 December 1994 1.369 24.6 4.00 
29 January 1995 1.238 12.0 4.25 
I.. February 1995 1.274 13.2 5.00 
7 March 1995 1.325 10.6 4.75 
1 November 1995 1.279 23.8 8.75 
2 November 1995 1.318 16.8 4.25 
9 January 1996 1.311 23.2 5.50 
9_April 1998 1.085 19.0 6.25 
15 April 1998 1.181 12.2 5.00 
31 October 1998 1.279 26.0 9.50 
2 November 1998 1.318 19.8 4.50 
12 January 1999 1.058 12.4 5.00 
24 December 1999 1.129 17.8 5.00 
15 April 2000 1.045 14.2 5.00 
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As these warnings were poorly targeted, the police had difficulty in identifying the properties 
at risk and where to direct resources for public warning purposes (when they had this 
responsibility prior to 1996). In short, the general flood warnings that were issued by the 
forecasting agency never got translated into specific public warnings in the Mimmshall Brook 
catchment. 
8.3 Flooding history 
The Mimmshall Brook has a recorded history of flooding extending back to 1928. Table 8.2 
gives details of the sixteen flood events that have affected the catchment from that time. 
It can be seen that the types of storm that give rise to flooding include both frontal and 
convective. The former causing overtopping in the winter months when the catchment is 
saturated, the latter predominantly between the months of May and October. The most severe 
flood on record occurred on 22-23 September 1992. The nearest recording raingauge at that 
time at Radlett, recorded 53.4mm of rainfall over a 19-hour period from 13.00 hrs; on 22 
September to 07.00 hrs on 23 September, 80.2mm was recorded at Harrow Weald 5krn to the 
south of the catchment during the same period. Analysis of this data (NRA, 1993b) suggests 
that the overall amount of rainfall has an estimated return period of approximately I in 20 
years. The daily raingauge at the Warrengate Road Pumping Station recorded 68mm and this 
has a storm return period of over I in 50 years for the 24 hour period. The peak flow in the 
Mimmshall Brook at Warrengate Road has been estimated to be 26 m3 /sec which has a flow 
return period of I in 25 years. Table 8.3 shows the number of properties at risk of flooding for 
flow return periods from I in 2 years to 1 in 100 years. It can be seen that the properties that 
flooded during this event (24 properties) would rise to 55 for aI 00-year event. 
A telemetered river level gauge was installed at Warrengate Road on 7 July 1994 and since 
this date fourteen high-flow events have been recorded (see Table 8.1). All fourteen events 
produced peak levels below the bankfull level of 1.410m at the gauge, however useful 
hydrological information was obtained concerning the response time of the catchment. 
The catchment is estimated to be 17% urbanised and there is every indication that this 
percentage will increase in the future as towns like Potters Bar expand. This will result in 
flows of a given magnitude occurring more frequently than previously. For example, Table 
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8.4 shows that the flow at which flooding to properties in Warrengate Road begins (17 
m 3/sec) decreases from aI in 30 year event with 0% urbanisation, to a less than I in 5 year 
event with 50% urbanisation. The effect of urbanisation on flows is likely to be greatest in the 
summer months when most of the runoff will then be generated from the paved areas. 
Table 8.2: Flooding history Mimmshall Brook at Warrengate Road (after NRA, 1993b) 
Date Storm Type Comments 
January 1928 Frontal Serious flooding - no details 
21 June 1936 Convective Serious flooding - thunderstorm centred on St Albans, 
extending to Barnet and Harpenden. 100mm recorded to 
the north of St. Albans. 
March 1947 Frontal 15 properties flooded. Widespread flooding in lbames 
catchment due to rapid snowmelt. 
July 1958 Convective Road flooding only 
1955 Road flooding only 
1960 Road flooding only 
December 1965 Frontal Road flooding only 
1975 Road flooding only 
February 1977 Frontal Road flooding only 
January 1978 Frontal Road flooding only 
December 1979 Frontal II properties flooded, depth of 450mm 
21 October 1987 Frontal/ 
Convective 
Flooding up to door of properties, road flooded 450mm 
29 January 1988 Frontal Road flooded to 450mm 
3 February 1990 Frontal Road flooded to 375mm 
23 September 1992 Frontal/ 
embedded 
convection 
21 residential properties and 3 cornmercial properties 





Road flooded to between 500 and 700mm. Garages and 
gardens flooded. 
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Table 8.3: Number of properties at risk of flooding against return period - Mimmshall 
Brook (after NRA, 1993b). 
Return Period 
(years) 
Flow (ml/sec) Residential Commercial Total 
2 10.8 0 0 0 
5 17.3 4 2 6 
10 21.1 13 3 16 
20 25.0 20 3 23 
25 26.0 21 3 24 
30 27.1 23 3 26 
50 30.6 33 6 39 
100 35.0 45 10 55 
Table 8.4: The effects of urbanisation: flows (in M3 /sec) for Mimmshall Brook at 
Warrengate Road (after NRA, 1993b). 
Return Period (years) 
5 10 20 25 30 50 100 
0% urbanisation 11.0 13.4 15.8 16.4 17.1 19.2 22.0 
10% urbanisation 13.0 15.9 18.7 19.5 20.3 22.8 26.1 
17% urbanisation 
(present day) 
14.4 17.8 20.9 21.8 22.7 25.5 29.2 
20% urbanisation 15.0 18.5 21.8 22.7 23.6 26.6 30.4 
30% urbanisation 15.8 18.7 22.6 23.8 24.8 27.7 32.9 
40% urbanisation 19.1 22.7 27.1 28.6 29.8 33.4 39.7 
50% urbamsation 21.7 25.9 30.8 32.4 33.8 37.9 45.0 
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8.4 Social characteristics 
An assessment has been undertaken to ascertain the social characteristics of residents at risk 
of flooding in the Mimmshall Brook catchment. As part of a feasibility study and benefit 
assessment undertaken by the NRA, the properties at risk of flooding in the I in 100 year 
flood risk area were identified along with the social characteristics of the householders (NRA, 
1993b). The details are presented in Table 8.5. 
The properties at risk from flooding are a mixture of 1920/30's detached and semi-detached 
bungalows and turn-of-the-century semi-detached and terraced houses. They are located 
mainly in the lower reaches of the Mimmshall Brook in the Warrengate Road and Water End 
areas of North Mimms. 
The community is relatively stable and is made up mainly of professional and skilled 
homeowners (see Table 8.5), many of who are elderly and retired. The frequency of flooding 
(13 events in the last 40 years) means that the residents are acutely aware of the flood risk and 
have been agitating for action to reduce the risk since 1955. Residents in Warrengate 
Road/Lane, who are the most susceptible to flooding, have formed themselves into a residents 
association that acts as an effective pressure group. The association's chairman is in regular 
correspondence with the Environment Agency, the district council, government departments 
and politicians concerning flood alleviation for the area. Regular newsletters are produced 
which keep the community up-to-date with matters concerning the river generally. 
The severe flooding in September 1992, when 24 properties were flooded to depths of over I 
metre, resulted in extensive damage to property. It also severely traurnatised those residents 
affected, some of whom were unable to return to their properties for several weeks after the 
event. Some of the residents have contracted longer-term stress-related illnesses and have a 
constant fear of a repetition of the incident. The fact that many of the properties at risk of 
flooding are bungalows means that residents are concerned about the possible loss of life in an 
extreme event due to the sudden onset of flooding and possible high flood depths. 
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Table 8.5: Social characteristics of residents in the lower Mimmshall Brook 
catchment. 
Property Details Social Band Property Details Social Band 
Rockwood, Swanland Road AB 24, Warrengate Road Cl 
The Haven, Swanland Road CI Abdale Cott., Warrengate 
Road 
AB 
1, Warrengate Road E 30, Warrengate Road AB 
5, Warrengate Road C2 Abdale House, Warrengate 
Road 
C1 
7, Warrengate Road C2 73, Warrengate Road C1 
9, Warrengate Road C1 7 1, Warrengate Road C1 
11, Warrengate Road E 60, Warrengate Road AB 
13, Warrengate Road C2 62, Warrengate Road AB 
15, Warrengate Road Cl 64, Warrengate Road AB 
17, Warrengate Road C2 66, Warrengate Road AB 
25, Warrengate Road C2 68, Warrengate Road AB 
27, Warrengate Road E 70, Warrengate Road AB 
29, Warrengate Road Ci 72, Warrengate Road AB 
3 1, Warrengate Road C2 74, Warrengate Road AB 
33, Warrengate Road E 76, Warrengate Road AB 
35, Warrengate Road CI 78, Warrengate Road AB 
37, Warrengate Road C2 80, Warrengate Road AB 
39, Warrengate Road E 82, Warrengate Road AB 
Colne Cott., Warrengate Road C1 84, Warrengate Road AB 
Maryland, Warrengate Road AB 4, Mimmshall Brook Cotts,, 
Warrengate Road 
Cl 
63, Warrengate Road C1 3, Mimmshall Brook Cotts. 
Warrengate Road 
C1 
65, Warrengate Road AB 2, Mimmshall Brook Cotts., 
Warrengate Road 
CI 
67, Warrengate Road AB 1, Mimmshall Brook Cotts. 
Warrengate Road 
Cl 
22, Warrengate Road AB Flint Cottage, Warrengate 
Road 
Cl 
Key: AB professional, CI skilled, C2 semi-skilled, E unskilled. 
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8.5 The impact of institutional and legal arrangements in the study catchment. 
A number of organisations influence the management of flood defence in the Mimmshall 
Brook catchment and the way in which these bodies interact can have an important influence 
on the level of service that the at-risk public receive. The roles of some of these organisations 
are briefly described below. 
Hertfordshire Police has issued flood warnings in the past, co-ordinate the evacuation of 
residents in extreme events and takes the lead role in emergency management. Hertfordshire 
County Council oversees emergency planning, including the development of emergency 
plans, and becomes involved in the rehabilitation process following flooding. Two district 
councils cover the catchment, Welwyn-Hatfield and Hertsmere, both of which have drainage 
responsibilities including sewerage and ordinary watercourses and a duty of care over local 
residents. The Environment Agency has overall responsibility for flood defence, including the 
issue of flood warnings for and maintenance of main river, and MAFF approve and grant-aid 
flood alleviation and flood warning schemes. The Met Office (London Weather Centre) issue 
local weather forecasts via the media, including the Agency's flood warning notices. The 
Highways Agency is responsible for drainage matters for major roads including the M25 and 
Al(M) in the Mimmshall Brook catchment. The difficulty for local residents, therefore, is to 
gain a clear appreciation of the roles and responsibilities of all these organisations and an 
understanding of how they relate to one another to meet their needs. Figure 8.1 attempts to 
illustrate the organisational arrangements in the Mimmshall Brook for flood warning 
dissemination and response. It is clear that the arrangements are both complex and, for the 
layman, potentially difficult to comprehend. 
Through the activities of the chairman of the Mimmshall Brook Residents Association, the 
residents have been pressing a number of organisations for action to lessen the flood risk in 
the catchment for many years and this intensified following the severe floods in September 
1992. The NRA carried out a detailed feasibility study following this event to lessen the 
risk of flooding and recommended a flood storage scheme that would offer protection to a 
I in 50-year standard in the lower reaches of the Mimmshall Brook. This scheme had the 
full support of the local community but despite persistent public pressure, the NRA and 
now the Environment Agency have been unable to proceed with its construction. This is 
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Figure 8.1: Organisational diagram for the Mimmshall Brook catchment 


























Public at risk 
due to the fact that it cannot be demonstrated that the economic benefits that the scheme 
will bring to the community will exceed the cost of construction. The Ministry of 
Agriculture, Fisheries and Food has refused to grant-aid this or any other scheme that are 
not, by their definition, cost effective. The local residents continue to apply pressure for the 
alleviation scheme to be implemented through regular correspondence with key players in 
various organisations, including the distribution of a monthly newsletter. These include the 
local MP, Secretary of State at MAFF, the Chief Secretary to the Treasury and their 
parliamentary private secretaries, the Chairman of the Environment Agency and other 
staff, the parish council and district councils. The desire for action has driven the local 
community to build up a very detailed knowledge of the workings of the appropriate 
government departments, agencies and local authorities and where to apply the most 
effective pressure. Nevertheless, the fragmented nature of organisational arrangements in 
terms of roles of responsibilities and geographical coverage places huge demands on a 
local community as it tries to secure the necessary improvements. These demands would 
be less and the public would be better served if a more integrated institutional system was 
in place. 
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The local community is not only pressing for the implementation of a flood alleviation 
scheme, it is also trying to ensure that the existing flooding problem is not exacerbated further 
by the actions of the above organisations. Pressure has been placed on the Highways Agency 
for instance, not to increase the runoff to the Mimmshall Brook through the widening of the 
motorways that cross the catchment. The point has also been made that through their very 
existence, the motorways have increased direct runoff in the catchment and consequently the 
responsible agency should make a financial contribution towards any alleviation scheme. The 
Highways Agency has responded by stating that any further runoff would be stored in 
balancing ponds with a controlled discharge into the river, and that existing runoff is 
calculated to be small (3.7%) thereby not warranting a financial contribution to any river 
improvement scheme. A similar position has arisen with one of the district councils in the 
catchment. Hertsmere District Council had drainage problems in Potters Bar due to 
inadequate surface water sewers. By simply enlarging the sewers the flooding problem would 
be passed downstream to the Potters Bar Brook and the Mimmshall Brook. The activities of 
the Council in tackling this problem have been monitored closely by the local community. 
But interestingly the action the Council took was greeted both with suspicion ("the NRA have 
been asked to watch very closely the activities of Hertsmere Council and monitor any outflow 
of water to the Mimmshall Brook") and admiration ("Hertsmere Council are to be 
congratulated on their caring for Potters Bar residents who suffer from flooding"). The 
Council has overcome the problem by constructing enlarged sewers and tanks to store 
floodwater, releasing it into the river when levels are low. The local community understands 
the importance of close inter-agency liaison in matters such as these to ensure that any works 
one authority carries out does not exacerbate the problems of another. A knowledgeable 
public can effectively influence organisations to modify their policies resulting in more 
locally sustainable solutions. Organisations should take note of this expertise and develop 
integrated partnerships with local community institutions. 
Organisational. liaison in providing a flood warning service is also worth examination. Prior to 
1994 the NRA only issued general and poorly targeted flood warning notices to the police for 
the River Colne and its tributaries, of which the Mimmshall Brook is one. The police had little 
information regarding properties at risk of flooding and for this reason was unable to notify 
residents in this area of any received warnings. Liaison between organisations on flood 
warning matters was generally poor, limited to an annual seminar covering the NRA's north- 
east operating area and ad hoc discussions at Hertfordshire emergency planning meetings. 
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The NRA had attempted to set out the respective roles and responsibilities of organisations in 
a written procedure, but this was not recognised as being a legitimate document by the local 
authorities and the police. Close working relationships between staff in relevant agencies had 
not been established and inter-agency exercises were not held. In summary, flood warning 
arrangements in the Minimshall Brook catchment were poorly integrated with few of the 
integrative factors identified in Chapter 2 being met. 
As part of this project, three important improvements were made in 1994. Details of property 
flooding in the catchment since 1965 were compiled and supplied to Hertfordshire Police and 
the local authorities. Flood detection gauges were installed and the local community was 
approached to discuss the setting up of a direct warning scheme. 
In February 1995 these new arrangements were activated for the first time when the NRA 
issued a flood warning for the catchment. The local community received notification 
however, from the police (acting on the detailed property information) and the NRA directly. 
This gave rise to confusion as the local residents were not expecting (and had no previous 
experience of) any police involvement. In hindsight, improved institutional liaison would 
have resulted in the delivery of a more co-ordinated public warning service. 
In 1996 when the Environment Agency took over primary responsibility for the dissemination 
of flood warnings, two main changes were introduced. In accordance with the Ministerial 
Direction a Local Flood Warning Plan was drafted for Hertfordshire that set out the 
arrangements for warning persons or bodies and the means by which this is to be achieved. In 
addition, a Flood Warning Planning Group was established for the County to facilitate 
improved consultation between the key organisations including the Agency, local authorities, 
the emergency services and utilities. Table 8.6 sets out the details of organisations in receipt 
of flood warning notices covering the Mimmshall Brook catchment as set out in the Local 
Flood Warning Plan (Environment Agency, 1996b). Even for a small river catchment such as 
this, a total of 18 different bodies have a role to play either in the dissemination of warnings 
or in the response to flooding. This makes the integration of organisational arrangements less 
easy to achieve. 
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Table 8.6: Organisations in receipt of flood warning notices covering the Mimmsball Brook catchment. 
Organisation Warned by 
Environment gency 
Warned by police 
Fax Phone Telex Fax phone Pager 
Hertfordshire Police X 
Hertfordshire County Council X X 
Hertsmere District X X 
Welwyn-Hatfield District X X 
Hertfordshire Fire and Rescue X 




Tbames Water Utilities X 
MAFF X 
British Telecom X 
British Gas X 
Eastern Electricity X 
Meteorological Office X 
BBC Tbree Counties Radio X 
Greater London Radio X 
97.3 FM Radio X 
AA Roadwatch X 
LTeletext X 
8.6 The application of technology to improve the flood warning service in the study 
catchment. 
Following discussions with the residents in the flood risk area at the start of this research 
project in 1994, it was apparent that the only flood warnings that have been received by the 
community were those generated from their own observations. For example, trigger levels 
had been established by local people at river crossing points such as road bridges and on a 
river level gauge board in Warrengate Road. These are monitored manually, a process that is 
straight forward during the day if people have the time to devote to the activity, but becomes 
more problematic at night. The severe flooding that occurred in September 1992 reached its 
peak in the early hours of the morning, no warnings were issued to the community, either 
from official or informal sources, and householders in 24 properties awoke to find up to a 
metre of flood water in their homes. There is a clear need to improve warning arrangements 
therefore, but to integrate any improvements with the best features of what is existing. 
The use of technology featured highly in the plans to improve the flood warning service in the 
catclu-nent. But rather than imposing solutions, the author attempted to ensure that any 
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enhancements were made in consultation with the community for which the service was 
aimed and in accordance with the integration factors developed in this study 
At meetings held with key individuals in the community, such as the chairman of the residents 
association, the options available to detect and forecast flooding and disseminate flood 
warnings were discussed in some detail. Residents could relate in particular to the importance 
of installing river gauges capable of issuing alert messages when pre-determined levels were 
reached i. e. automating their monitoring activities and trigger levels. The significance of 
rainfall measurement was also appreciated, especially the need to relate rainfall intensity and 
accumulation to river flow. Two types of storm were recognised by local people as causing 
flooding problems; short duration summer thunderstorms and more persistent winter rain 
falling over a longer period on a saturated catchment. One resident actually measured rainfall 
in a can in her garden and had established a relationship between the amount of rain collected 
and when flooding was likely. Automating this embryonic integrated process was seen as a 
logical progression. The forecasting of rainfall and river flow, although considered to be 
important, was not a subject that the residents felt qualified to influence and preferred to leave 
the issue in the hands of the "experts". Flood warning dissemination on the other hand was 
high on their agenda for improvement and a subject that they had strong views on. 
A number of possible technological options for disseminating flood warning messages was 
put before the local community and discussed at length. These included the use of a siren 
linked to river gauges, faxed or paged alerts, the use of automatic voice messages and vehicle 
mounted loudhailer. But by far and above the most popular warning method was a direct 
telephone call from the Environment Agency's Flood Warning Centre to nominated flood 
wardens who would cascade the warning to others by telephone or a personal visit, 
Following these discussions the following actions were taken with specific relation to the 
implementation of technology: 
a) a telemetered river level gauge was installed on the Mimmshall Brook at 
Warrengate, Road and linked by telephone line to the Environment Agency's 
CASCADE computer system (see Figure 1.2). The system has the ability of 
polling the outstation at frequent intervals (every minute if required) capturing and 
storing river level data at 15-minute intervals, archiving the information and 
239 
displaying it in hydrograph form (see Figure 8.2). The telemetered gauge was 
located in close proximity to the river gauge board that had been installed for 
many years and fon-ned a key element of the residents' informal detection 
arrangements. 
b) alarm trigger levels were established at the outstation to alert flood duty officers of 
rising river levels. Four alarm levels were set based on data from past events, 
flood modelling inforination and importantly, advice from residents. The first 
alarm (standby) for instance, was set at 75m AOD to correspond with the trigger 
level for monitoring that the residents established through their own observations 
(see Figure 8.2). 
C) two telemetered raingauges were installed in the catchment; one in the lower 
reaches at North Mimms, the second in the upper reaches at Boreharnwood (see 
Figure 1.2). Both sites were equipped with intelligent outstations and linked to the 
CASCADE system as described in (a) above (see Figure 1.2). 15-minute rainfall 
totals are captured, displayed, archived and made available to forecasting systems. 
The outstations generate alarms when one of two rainfall intensities is recorded: 
I Omm in I hour (for convective stonns) and 20mm in 8 hours (for frontal storms). 
d) a 2krn weather radar display was constructed for the Mimmshall Brook following 
the digitisation of the catchment boundary, rivers, roads etc. The display was 
incorporated into the CASCADE system and is used operationally to detect 
intense rainfall over the catchment. The raingauge adjustment procedure was 
amended to include the data from the two new raingauges, thereby increasing the 
accuracy of the radar data in this area (see Figure 8.3). These data are also made 
available to forecasting systems. 
e) the Nimrod and Hyrad rainfall forecasting procedures were modified to allow the 
selection and display of forecast data covering the Mimmshall Brook catchment 
(see Figure 8.4). These systerns give instantaneous forecast images and 15-minute 
forecast accumulations for 6 and 2-hours ahead respectively. Accumulation data 
are made available to flow forecasting models. 
the operational rainfall/runoff model running on CASCADE (the Isolated Event 
Model) was calibrated for the Mimmshall Brook at Warrengate Road using data 
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from a number of flow events of varying magnitude which were recorded in 1995. 
The model calibration was tested on other events and a rainfall/runoff relationship 
was established. The model was incorporated into operational procedures 
thereafter giving river flow forecasts up to 12 hours ahead (see Figures 8.5 and 
8.6). Rainfall data can be derived from radar, raingauges or the rainfall forecasting 
systems outlined in (e) above. 
g) a telephone warning system was instigated which included alerting 5 flood 
wardens or their deputies from either the Flood Warning Centre or duty officers' 
homes. A flood warden "help-line" was established giving a mechanism for 
feeding-back information directly to duty staff if the need arises. 
In 1996, in addition to these specific applications of technology, the Agency introduced the 
FLOODCALL (later renamed Floodline) dial-and-listen telephone service that included an 
infonnation box for rivers in Hertfordshire, and the Automated Voice Messaging (AVM) 
system that allows pre-recorded messages to be telephoned through to residents. These 
systems were discussed with the warning recipients and although a high percentage of people 
are able to access information using this technology (see Table 8.8), the systems were viewed 
as being too impersonal, providing information that is not specific enough for their purposes. 
The new warning system was activated on the 29 January 1995,1 February 1995 and 7 March 
1995 when heavy rainfall caused river levels to rise and exceed alarm levels. The systems 
worked well and enabled the duty officer to alert the flood wardens and the police of high 
river flows and possible flooding. For the March event for instance, the duty officer predicted 
that river levels would rise to just below bankfull and that no property was in danger of 
flooding. The flood wardens were notified of this prediction at 14.30hrs. The river peaked at 
around 17.00hrs, just 85mm below the bankfull level some 2.5 hours after a warning was 
issued. This precision could not be achieved without the introduction of the appropriate 
technology. 
On 31 October 1998 river levels rose to 0.292m below the bankfull trigger level. The 
wardens were contacted to reassure them that levels were unlikely to rise further and that 
flooding was not forecast. The wardens were able to advise the duty officer that the 
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Figure 8.2: Hyetograph-hydrograph for Nlimmshall Brook at Warrengate Road, 
January 1995. 
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Figure 8.5: Isolated event model output for the Nfimmshall Brook at Warrengate 
Road, 5-11 December 1994. 
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Figure 8.6 Isolated event model output for the Mimmshall Brook at Warrengate 
Road, 25-31 December 1994. 
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to investigate the matter further and for adjustments to be made to the trigger levels. This 
illustrates the importance of two-way communication and the value of feed-back from 
residents in the flood plain, a facility that would not be available if one-way AVM 
technology was relied upon. 
8.7 Human interaction, expertise and training. 
As has been discussed, people residing in the flood plain of the Nfimmshall Brook are very 
knowledgeable of the risk facing them. The area has been subjected to significant flooding 
on average once every 4 to 5 years in the last 70 years, and the last major flood that 
occurred in 1992 severely traumatised those affected. Prior to this study, the absence of a 
credible official warning service resulted in the community establishing informal 
arrangements and these have a number of positive integrative elements. 
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Table 8.7: Introduction of technology in the study catchment. 
Activity Prior to 1994 1994 to 1999 Future Plans 
Telemetered None 1 2 
rivergauges 
Telernetered None (gauge in 2 2 
raingauges adjacent catchment 
used) 
Weather radar displays General 5km and 2km 2km display developed Use of Met Office 
displays only for catchment - quality controlled 2km 
adjusted by local data 
raingauge information 
Rainfall forecasting General regional Nimrod and Hyrad GANDOLF 
forecasts forecast displays thunderston-n warning 
developed for system extended to the 
catchment catchment 
Flow forecasting Intuition only IEM calibrated for Catchment 




Warning Telex to police, then Telex to police, use of None planned at this 
dissemination to telephone messages to integrated fax/pager stage 
organisations other emergency system to local 
services, local authorities, telephone 
authorities and utilities to other emergency 
services, fax to 
utilities/media 
Warning Ad hoc arrangements Broadcast via media, Extend the number of 
dissemination to local only telephone to Wardens, radio stations 
community telephone/door broadcasting flood 
knocking to other warning information 
recipients. All 
recipients backed - up 
on AVM system. 
Table 8.8: Type of telephone in use by flood warning recipients in the study 
catchment 
Pulse % ofthose 
respondinp. 
Tone % of those 
responding 
No response 
13%(22%) 1 7 87%(78%) 5 
()- figures for Tbames Region 
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The informal detection and forecasting process is based around local observations of 
rainfall and river levels (see Table 8.9). As has been discussed in Section 8.6, there is a 
good understanding of the types of storm that can give rise to flooding and residents 
provided details without prompting by the author. It has been mentioned that the local 
community has established trigger levels in the Brook and these activate a process of 
routine monitoring during hours of daylight when the level at the gauge board in 
Warrengate Road reaches the "red 75 danger marker". This involves a volunteer visiting 
the gauge board at regular intervals and noting the rate of rise (this duty is "combined with 
walking the dog"). Residents also become concerned when the river reaches the soffit of 
the bridge and backing-up occurs. Forecasting is attempted by some through a combination 
of measurement and observation and drawing upon past experience. Based on the amount 
of rainfall recorded in one person's garden for example, she "knows when to expect 
problems". Discussions with residents also revealed a good perception of lead-time and 
catchment response, with a rule of thumb of 2 hours being quoted for the river to peak at 
Warrengate Road following heavy rainfall in the catchment. In September 1992 however 
the floods occurred at night and the informal warning system was not activated, the 
residents awoke to find floodwater in their properties and were totally unprepared for the 
scale of the inundation. 
Prior to this study the informal dissemination arrangements were organised on an ad hoc 
basis, with whoever had agreed to monitor the river levels undertaking to warn others 
either by personal visits or telephone calls (see Table 8.9). The local community has 
established an active residents association and it is this social network of friends and 
neighbours that is activated when the risk of flooding is thought likely. A regular warden 
scheme was not in place at this time and individuals did not have specific roles and 
responsibilities. The rather spontaneous procedures are prone to failure unless close liaison 
between local people is maintained. It was in this that area that the need for improvement 
was identified and where an official warning scheme could add value and enhance 
integration. 
The response to flooding is also well developed in the community and even though many 
of the properties in the risk area are bungalows, some elaborate coping strategies have been 
put in place, learning from past experiences (see Table 8.9). Some of the residents have 
fitted loft ladders for instance, as the more elderly members of the community are in fear 
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of their lives during flooding and find comfort in having an escape route. Other action that 
is taken includes moving cars (it can take 20 minutes to relocate a car out of the flood risk 
area), moving belongings above the anticipated flood level (especially clothes and 
valuables), using sandbags to block air bricks and door ways. One resident thought that the 
placing of sandbags could be a less efficient response than placing belongings above the 
flood water. It can take 20 to 30 minutes to put sandbags in place and this time can be 
better put to saving valuables. It is felt that sandbags can only slow the ingress of water 
into property and not prevent its entry. In bungalows there is a limit to what can be placed 
in the loft and stacking valuables on chairs and tables on the ground floor is often the most 
effective action. Some residents have developed a personal response plan to ensure that the 
most important matters are attended to first. There is concern about the well being of pets, 
with one family losing two dogs and goldfish from the garden pond. The dogs' health 
deteriorated markedly after they drank the floodwater and they died shortly afterwards - 
the family still misses the pets seven years after the event. 
Drabek (1986) states that people have a tendency to believe that history will repeat itself 
and it is often difficult to persuade them that a new disaster will be different from an earlier 
one. This phenomenon was encountered in the Mimmshall Brook catchment. One family 
for instance, was flooded in 1979 and floodwaters were about four inches deep within their 
property. When they were flooded in 1992 they assumed that the depth of flooding would 
be the same and they proceeded to raise their goods just above this level. They placed 
many valuables in the bath for instance, only to find flood depths reaching 20 inches 
causing the bath to be filled with water and their goods ruined. The magnitude of the 1992 
event was totally unexpected by the local community. 
Nevertheless, there are examples of where individuals have gone to some lengths to 
minimise the effects of flooding to themselves and their property. One resident for 
example, has rewired his house to ensure that all electrical sockets are at least 12 inches 
above floor level and that there is no under-floor cabling. Some sockets have been placed 
higher than this and a separate circuit supplies the loft space where the family can retreat to 
if flood levels are excessive. The central heating boiler has also been raised so that the 
family can keep warm. Another family has replaced all their divan beds with metal 
bedsteads to reduce flood damage. Yet another has installed suspended floors in all ground 
floor rooms allowing them to lift the floorboards and install industrial dryers to dry the 
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infrastructure quickly. They found that solid floors tended to absorb water and that it took 
some time to dry them out fully. 
In Chapter 6 there is discussion about the enthusiasm of individuals in taking a lead role in 
local communities and in organising flood warning arrangements. Such individuals can 
often provide an integrating link between official and unofficial systems and should be 
encouraged and supported. This has certainly been found to be the case in the Mimmshall 
Brook catchment with one individual in particular taking on this role. The individual in 
question is chairman of the local residents association and has been leading the fight for a 
flood alleviation scheme for the Brook for many years. He first became interested in 
attempts to improve the official flood warning scheme when he observed the installation of 
a river-level telemetry device in 1994. He contacted the NRA and asked why this was 
being installed and whether it could be used to improve warning arrangements - pre- 
empting the author's intended consultation with the community. The author held an initial 
meeting with him to discuss possible options and the decision to establish a warden scheme 
was his, which he subsequently volunteered to organise and maintain. Assistance was also 
given with the establishment of trigger levels at gauging stations and in the mode of 
operation of the system. He has continued to carry out this role during the period of this 
research project despite his age (he is in his 80's) and ill health. In discussions with other 
wardens the author expressed concern about his frailty and suggested whether this role 
should be taken over by someone younger, There was a general reluctance to consider this 
and a desire to support his wish to continue to co-ordinate matters. 
The new warning scheme was activated in January 1995 and a number of interesting 
perceptions by both "senders" and "receivers" have been recorded during the five years of 
operation. 
* The warning colour codes are thought to be confusing by recipients and to be too 
general. There is a preference for more personalised warnings with locally relevant 
information. One resident stated that if his property is considered to be one of the 
"isolated properties" in the AMBER definition his perception is that the warning 
indicates a less serious situation, but if his property flooded it is a RED situation for 
him. 
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Media warnings and FLOODCALL are also thought to be too general. One resident 
commented on flood warning information placed on Teletext - she found it to be of 
little use and it made her worry rather than reassuring her. Such outlets give too 
little information and this appears not to satisfy the requirements of local people. 
e There is a perception that a flood warning service is only an interim solution and 
that a flood alleviation scheme (if one is ever constructed) will provide the "final 
solution" at which point the warning scheme will be redundant. There appears to be 
less concern about extreme events that may exceed the design capacity of any 
structural scheme. 
On a number of occasions when warnings were issued the wardens indicated that 
they had made their own predictions but were glad of the infon-nation. This 
indicates that the informal warning system is still functioning along side the official 
scheme - an important development for integration. 
o Residents indicated that the knowledge that someone else (i. e. Environment 
Agency stafo is watching the river as well as them is comforting and reassuring. 
* On one occasion public warnings were issued via the wardens and via the police. 
The NRA also sent staff to reassure residents personally. This was considered to be 
a positive response by the senders of the warnings but was viewed as being 
confusing by the recipients. The residents felt "over warned". 
Although the new warning arrangements have been greeted favourably by most of the local 
community they did not adequately reassure one elderly couple who lived in Warrengate 
Road. In 1995 following the first heavy rain of the autumn that caused the levels in the 
Brook to rise, it is alleged that the strain of living with the flood hazard for another winter 
proved too much for this couple and they tragically committed suicide. They had 
experienced the effects of serious flooding on two separate occasions. The importance of 
the providers warning systems paying greater attention to the perceptions of people who 
live in risk areas is made even more poignant by this misfortune. 
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Table 8.9: Informal arrangements in operation in the study catchment 
Detection Forecasting Dissemination Response 
" gauge board 0 awareness of 0 alerting 0 flood proofing 
readings rainfall/runoff neighbours by measures 
" trigger levels at relationship telephone or door (sandbagging) 
bridge crossings 0 awareness of knocking 0 moving valuables 
" monitoring low catchment 0 activation of to higher levels 
points in river response time social networks 0 moving cars 
bank 0 using a 0 attending to 0 providing escape 
" awareness of combination of people with routes 
storm types measurement, special needs 0 rewiring house 
" measurement of observation and 0 raising boilers 
rainfall past experience 0 relaying flooring 
" monitoring 
weather forecasts 
8.8 The flow of information and knowledge in the study catchment 
As discussed, the initial environmental information that must be collected, collated and 
analysed prior to the issue of any flood warning was almost entirely lacking in the Mimmshall 
Brook catchment. This resulted in only a general official flood warning service being 
available for the wider River Colne catchment. The combination of poor infon-nation and a 
general lack of knowledge of the flood extents and properties at risk prevented the flood 
forecasters from issuing targeted warning messages and guiding the police in respect of where 
to go and who to warn. (In fact, detailed property information had been collated by new works 
engineers in the NRA as part of a feasibility study, but this had not been made available to 
flood warning staff - an example of poor internal integration). As reported in Section 8.6, the 
quality of environmental information accessible to the Environment Agency for this 
catchment has now been significantly improved. This, along with access to collated 
information on at-risk properties in the flood plain, has enabled a far more targeted and 
integrated flood warning service to be offered to the local community. 
Prior to 1995, it is not surprising that local people had developed infon-nal arrangements to 
detect and forecast flooding and alert each other when river levels became threatening. During 
discussions it became clear that key individuals in the community had developed a good 
knowledge base of the hydrological and meteorological conditions that give rise to flooding 
and the behaviour of the Brook in times of flood. One resident, for instance, recognised that 
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slow moving thunderston-ris posed the greatest threat; he had acquired the knowledge that 
storms depositing over 50mm of rain would give rise to floods, while accumulations below 
this figure were less likely to cause problems. Another resident pointed out that persistent 
winter rain falling on a saturated catchment could also give rise to flooding. Many residents 
had a good understanding of where the river was most likely to burst its banks and cause 
flooding. It is generally understood that the low point is upstream of the properties at most 
risk and that flood water is likely to flow down Swanland Road and enter the properties from 
the rear. Residents are also aware of the effects of additional runoff from motorways and new 
developments in the catchment. By introducing a flood warden scheme as part of the 
enhanced official flood warning service, the knowledge and information residing in the local 
community is not lost to the system and the total scheme becomes better integrated as a result. 
A conscious decision was taken to alert the wardens directly by telephone and not via the 
AVM system as is the normal practice in other regions of the Agency. This allows 
information to be exchanged between forecasters and wardens during flood events and for 
each to benefit from the others knowledge and expertise. 
One useful mechanism for disseminating information and knowledge around the local 
community is via a monthly newsletter. The chairman of the residents association produces 
such a publication entitled "Prevention of flooding from the Mimmshall Brook" and this is 
circulated to the residents of Warrengate Road and Lane. The newsletter is also used to feed 
back information and concerns to the relevant external organisations and individuals, such as 
the Environment Agency and local authorities, local MPs and counsellors, and even 
government ministers. This newsletter was the vehicle for seeking volunteers for the flood 
warden scheme, publicising their contact details when they were recruited and details of who 
they are responsible for alerting. The newsletter also gives infori-nation on the progress of the 
campaign for a flood alleviation scheme and any operational issues arising for the activation 
of the flood warning system. Other issues that are covered include those relating to insurance 
and health, for example: 
"one resident is suffering from heart palpitations, shingles, migraine and has 
frequently to go to the toilet when it rains. Another has eczema and stomach 
pains. According to doctors these complaints are stress related. " 
64 our insurance companies have heavily increased our insurance premiums or 
excess amounts and we are terrified that if we are flooded again we won't be able 
to get insurance for our homes and contents. " 
251 
Through first hand experience and the dissemination of flood hazard information and 
knowledge as detailed above, residents in the risk area have become well aware of the action 
that they should take to protect themselves and their families, and minimise losses to their 
property. In September 1996 when the Environment Agency embarked on its national publit 
awareness campaign, flood warning infon-nation leaflets were distributed to all properties 
located in high-risk areas including those in the Mimmshall Brook catchment. A consistent 
approach was followed by the Agency making no allowance for variations in the experience 
and knowledge of local communities across the country. The information supplied to 
residents in the Mimmshall Brook catchment was not well received and was considered to be 
66a very insensitive communication". Residents felt that the information and advice contained 
in the Agency's leaflets was too basic and rather patronising. One response to the Agency was 
"of course we know there is a risk of flooding. It happened to us in 1979 and 1992 and what 
have you done to prevent us being flooded again as promised? " By distributing general 
leaflets of this type, the Agency actually offended the local community and their awareness 
campaign was counter-productive. A more sensitive approach was followed in the 1998 
campaign. This illustrates the fact that different communities have different levels of 
awareness and knowledge, and as a consequence they have different needs. In an integrated 
system these differences need to be understood and built into any awareness campaign. 
8.9 Operational experiences 
One of the aims of this research project is to introduce an improved "official" warning service 
for the local community in the Mimmshall Brook catchment and to attempt to build on rather 
than replace or compete with the existing informal arrangements. Only through operational 
experience will it be determined whether both systems are functioning well together in an 
integrated way. Since 1994, the flood wardens have been contacted on a number of occasions, 
in some cases to issue formal flood warnings and in others to offer reassurance that flooding 
will not occur even though river levels were high. Some of the cases are documented in this 
section with an indication of how information disseminated by the Environment Agency was 
received and acted upon by the local community. 
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29 January 1995 
The system was first activated on Sunday 29 January 1995 at 23.30 hours when the Brook 
rose to a peak of 1.238m, some 0.172m below the bankfull level. The duty officer decided to 
advise the wardens that the river levels were high but were unlikely to rise any further and 
that flooding was not forecast to occur. Technically this was not a flood warning, rather an 
information passing exercise to allay fears. The duty officer spent about 15 minutes talking on 
the telephone to the first warden on the list and indicated that he would notify the other 4 
wardens in a similar way. By the time he was in a position to do this, the heavy rain had 
subsided and the level of the river had started to drop significantly. A decision was taken not 
to disturb the other wardens as the hour was late. The first warden however, took it upon 
himself to contact the others to make sure they had got the message, they hadn't so he relayed 
the information and in turn all wardens alerted their contacts. Most of the residents indicated 
that they stayed awake into the early hours of the next day and monitored the levels in the 
river "just in case". The original "official" forecast was in fact correct and the Brook remained 
within in its banks and no flooding took place. 
One resident who received a message from a warden complained the next day, stating that he 
believed the "warning" to be unnecessary and requested that the warden should be more 
precise about the probability of flooding in future. In general however, the feedback from the 
community was positive, people were glad of the information but many had predicted the 
outcome for themselves, but conceded that their predictions might have been wrong. One 
warden questioned the need for a warning if the duty officer was confident that the river was 
going to remain in banks. On balance, local residents indicated that they would rather receive 
information in such circumstances than not. 
The community newsletter reported the incident in the following way: 
"On Sunday 29"d Jan. we had our first official flood warning from the NRA, 
Flood Control Centre at Waltham Cross. It didn't quite work out as planned. The 
four other flood wardens had not been phoned by the NRA although my caller 
said he would. I phoned everyone and they alerted their contacts. Fortunately the 
Brook was contained but most of us stayed up until the early hours just in caseH 
One resident complained to me that it was an unnecessary warning and in future 
would I be more precise about the probability of floodingH I referred him to my 
note 7 in the December 1994 Newsletter (The NRA has pointed out that there 
may be an occasion when they get their forecast wrong. I think better than no 
warnings). " 
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1 February 1995 
On I February 1995 heavy rainfall and rising river levels prompted the issue of the first 
formal flood warning. At 09.45hrs an AMBER warning was issued to the Hertfordshire 
Police and this was the first time such a targeted warning had been issued to the police for the 
Mimmshall Brook. The police were initially confused by the warning message and sought 
confirmation from the Flood Warning Centre and requested ftirther infort-nation. The rainfall 
and river levels were monitored closely over the following few hours and as there was a 
degree of uncertainty in the forecasts the duty officer delayed contacting the flood wardens. 
This was heavily influenced by the feedback received following the previous event and the 
duty officer did not want to alert the wardens unnecessarily. At 12.18hrs the decision was 
taken to notify the wardens and 3 out of the 5 were contactable. The back-up arrangement was 
activated to ensure that all recipients received the message - this involved advising the 3 
wardens who were available to alert those residents who were normally contacted by the 
wardens who were not available. The river reached a peak level of 1.274m at 13.00hrs, some 
0.1 36m below the bankfull level, and no flooding occurred. 
On receipt of the AMBER flood warning the police toured the risk area and broadcast a 
warning message over their vehicle address system. This confused the local residents on two 
counts - (1) they were unclear as to why the NRA and the police were issuing separate flood 
warning messages and what the relationship was between the two systems, and (2) they did 
not understand what an AMBER flood warning meant. A letter was sent to the chairman of 
the residents association that addressed these issues and this was circulated to all residents 
with the monthly newsletter. The newsletter reported the incident in the following way: 
"On Wednesday, Is' Feb. the Brook was at its highest this year, fortunately during 
the daytime so we were at our best to cope with any flooding. We very much 
appreciated the visit to this area by the NRA executives to see for themselves the 
likelihood of flooding and to supervise the distribution of additional sandbags. 
Two constables also came during the morning as Hatfield Police had received a 
flood warning from the NRA. Fortunately about 1500 hours the rain abated and 
the water level in the Brook went down. We anxiously watched the TV weather 
reports that day and night and were horrified at what the people in the North of 
England, Holland and France were suffering. What has gone wrong with our 
global weather? Attached is an article from the Daily Mail which may provide an 
answer. " 
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"At 22.00 hours on 1" Feb. I had a telephone call from Hatfield Police - "we have 
had a fax to say there is flooding in Swanland Road, did you know? " No! So Jo 
and I get out the car and traverse to Swanland Road but are unable to find any 
sign of flooding. Came to the conclusion that the policeman who rang confused 
the morning fax as aI Oam fax and got the wires crossed. I've had a word with 
Waltham Cross Flood Control Centre and I attach a copy of an explanatory letter 
from them for information of residents. BUT, whatever warning we receive each 
resident must make their own mind as to action to be taken within their home. " 
7 March 1995 
Heavy rain accompanied by melting snow caused river levels to rise in the Mimmshall Brook 
during the period 4 March to 7 March 1995. The first (standby) alarm was exceeded at 
14.15hrs on 7 March and the duty officer predicted that levels would reach bankfull but were 
unlikely to exceed this level and no formal flood warnings were issued. All flood wardens 
were given this advice between 14.15 and 14.28hrs. The river peaked at 17.00hrs at a level of 
1.325m, just 85mm below bankfull and no flooding occurred. 
Feedback received after the event indicated that the residents were pleased to receive the 
information. One warden indicated that from his own observations and experience, the river 
would take a "couple of hours" to reach its maximum level from the time of receipt of the 
warning - the river did indeed peak some 2.5hrs after the notification was issued. Another 
warden passed information back to the Flood Warning Centre during the event indicating that 
there was a build up of silt in the river that needed to be cleared - this was relayed to 
operations staff. 
12 January 1999 
During the period between March 1995 and June 1999 no flood events were recorded and no 
flood warnings were necessary. On 12 January 1999 however, during a period of moderate 
rainfall the author contacted all 5 flood wardens to test the dissemination system. All wardens 
responded and were reassured to hear that the levels of the Brook were being monitored. The 
river level rose to just 1.058m and no further action was necessary. It is prudent to check 
dissemination arrangements periodically especially after a period of little flooding activity to 
ensure that those involved in the process have not become complacent. 
15 April 2000 
Persistent rainfall over the Mimmshall Brook catchment and rising river levels prompted a 
telephone call to all flood wardens on 15 April 2000 to notify them that the situation was 
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being monitored but that flooding was not anticipated. It was apparent that the informal 
warning system had been activated and two of the wardens were monitoring river levels at 
strategic locations. One warden confirmed that the gauge board at Warrengate Road 
Pumping Station has exceeded the 75m "danger level" and that they were keeping a close 
eye on the river. The wardens were in agreement with the "official" assessment of the 
hydrological situation - that flooding from the Brook was unlikely. 
8.10 Summary and conclusions. 
The Mimmshall Brook drains a small catchment area in Hertfordshire, responds rapidly to 
rainfall and floods on a frequent basis. The population at risk is made up of a high proportion 
of professional people (42% in the AB social band) many of whom are elderly living in single 
storey bungalows. The catchment is by no means typical of those in the Thames basin, 
nevertheless from the analysis presented above, a number of relevant issues emerge with 
respect to integration and the development of total warning systems. 
Critical assessment of institutional arrangements in the study catchment 
Prior to the start of this project the official flood warning service was failing to reach the local 
community in the Mimmshall Brook catchment. This was partly due to an inadequate flood 
detection and forecasting system and to a lack of detailed information of the areas and 
properties at risk of flooding. It was also due to poor institutional liaison arrangements 
between the large number of organisations covering the catchment (flood warnings are issued 
to 18 different organisations), resulting in a lack of clarity of respective roles and 
responsibilities. By itself, the number of organisations involved is detrimental to an integrated 
approach, but this coupled with insufficient liaison and planning only compounds the 
problem, ultimately leading to fragmentation and not integration. 
To influence the outcome of policy decisions in this function area the local community 
needs to establish a detailed knowledge of the roles and responsibilities of each of the 
organisations involved and ascertain which has the power to bring about change. This 
requires considerable determination and energy to master the intricacies of a complex 
organisational structure. The Mimmshall Brook flood alleviation scheme is a case in point. 
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It is interesting to note however, that in the case of the drainage issue in Potters Bar it was 
a local community institution (the Mimmshall Brook Residents Association) that policed 
the action of the official organisations to ensure that its best interests were being met. The 
OECD (1989) suggest that pressure from well infori-ned and knowledgeable interest groups 
can sometimes push agencies and government towards more sensitive policy co-ordination 
over a particular emerging problem. This has been illustrated in this case study and points 
to the need for organisations to work in partnership with local community groups to arrive 
at the most appropriate solutions for a local situation. 
The new procedures introduced in 1996 for flood warning dissemination have improved 
matters in relation to integration, but do they go far enough? The establishment of a Local 
Flood Warning Plan and Flood Warning Planning Group for Hertfordshire are steps in the 
right direction but they are not sufficiently focused at the local level to be of great benefit to 
the community in the Minimshall Brook. The Local Plan for instance, only has 7 lines of text 
that specifically refers to this catchment (Enviroment Agency, 1996b). As flood warning is 
essentially a local service there is a need to establish local plans and local liaison meetings 
involving key local players to bring fully integrated organisational arrangements to this area. 
Critical assessment of the use of technology in the study catchment 
Technology has played an important role in delivering an improved flood warning service to 
the community in the Mimmshall Brook catchment. Indeed, without the use of remote sensing 
equipment (gauge telemetry and weather radar), computer and communication systems, the 
provision of timely, accurate and reliable flood warnings would not be possible. But as this 
study has illustrated, it is the way in which technology is applied that most influences the 
success of integration and ultimately the effectiveness of the total warning system. To achieve 
this aim a number of important principles were followed: 
technological solutions were not imposed on the conununity and enhancements were 
made in consultation with them. Local people wanted to influence those aspects to which 
they could relate, such as gauge installation. They were less concerned with other 
elements that were considered to be beyond their level of expertise - such as rainfall and 
flow forecasting. They were happy to leave forecasting to the "experts". 
* technological solutions incorporated informal arrangements that were in existence and did 
257 
not attempt to replace them, e. g. use of trigger levels and local warning networks. 
40 the appropriate technology was introduced to suit the local circumstances and needs of the 
community rather than introducing the best systems available. The community requested 
a flood warden scheme with personal telephone communication with the Flood Warning 
Centre providing specific and locally relevant information. Some of the latest 
technological systems used for dissemination flood warning information, such as the 
AVM and FLOODCALL, were rejected as being too impersonal and providing 
information that was considered to be "too general". 
The impact of human interaction and expertise, information and knowledge 
The availability of quality environmental information has a crucial influence on the operation 
of the entire flood warning system. Poor initial information results in general, non-specific 
flood warning messages that frequently fail to reach their intended target. This was confinned 
in this case study, with the Environment Agency and its predecessors issuing general flood 
warning messages for the River Colne and its tributaries based on inadequate information for 
many years. These general warnings had never been translated into a public warning for the 
Mimmshall Brook catchment. 
This case study has shown that where the official warning mechanisms are failing and the 
frequency of flooding is relatively high, the local community seeks to "fill the gap" by 
developing their own informal detection, forecasting and warning arrangements. Key 
individuals develop a detailed knowledge of their river and how it responds to rainfall to 
cause flooding, and they are often the prime movers in organising the infort-nal systems and 
passing information to others. The systems that are introduced are invariably "low-tech" 
solutions and require a sizeable con-ununity resource to operate and unless they are well 
organised they, like any arrangement, are prone to failure. This was dramatically illustrated in 
September 1992 when both the official and informal flood warning arrangements failed to 
alert the local community. 
Even though informal arrangements may be in place, this does not diminish the desire for 
an official warning system. This was clearly demonstrated when the telemetry device was 
installed, local residents reacted almost immediately to try and secure the "maximum 
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benefit from the new system". The individuals mentioned above can often become an 
integrating link between official and unofficial systems and should be encouraged and 
supported. They often display a strong desire to help make the official system work by 
influencing the parts of the system to which they can relate. This includes setting up trigger 
levels, organising wardens and determining the fortnat of warning messages. In return they 
demand clear, consistent, locally relevant information and a recognition that they are 
knowledgeable about the flooding hazard in their locality and how to respond to it. There is 
not an expectation of perfection in relation to official system's ability to forecast flooding, 
nor a desire to stop being responsible for taking action themselves to prevent loss. 
A clear indication was given that the community intended to continue to operate the informal 
systems in parallel "just in case" - this may diminish if confidence builds in the official 
system, but evidence is presented that the informal system is still active 5 years after the 
official system was enhanced. There is also evidence that both systems are operating 
successfully in parallel, one supporting the other. 
Irrespective of the source, the public wants warning systems to be simple and straightforward. 
When warnings were issued for the Mimmshall Brook from two sources (NRA and police) 
for instance, local people found this to be both confusing and unnecessary. The advantages of 
redundancy in warning arrangements appear not to be fully appreciated by the community in 
their desire for simplicity. 
A number of people in the flood plain have developed good coping strategies in the event of 
flooding. There have been instances however, where these strategies have been based only on 
past experiences and larger floods have rendered their strategies ineffectual. This is where 
official sources can improve peoples' knowledge by offering education on the potential 
impact of extreme events. This needs to be managed carefully however, to avoid patronising 
the public as happened when the Environment Agency circulated flood warning information 
in 1996. 
The flow of information within the community is well developed and by means of a monthly 
newsletter focusing on flooding matters, local people are kept up-to-date with relevant issues. 
This is dependent however, on the drive of one elderly individual and it remains to be seen if 
his work would be continued by others if he ceased to be active. The Agency may wish to 
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consider backing-up and supporting such initiatives and use community newsletters to 
publicise flood awareness information. The other main mechanism for disseminating 
information both during flood events and other times is via social networks. Such a network 
was already well established, as part of the informal warning arrangement and the warden 
scheme was able to integrate directly with this process. Little attention has been given to the 
use and cultivation of social networks in the dissemination of flood warnings by the Agency. 
The feedback mechanisms built into the system as part of this project between the community 
and the Agency appear to work well and add value. The two-way flow of information during 
flood events is seen by both parties as being particularly valuable, this would not be 
achievable if one-way AVM technology was adopted as is the case in other Agency regions. 
There is an issue surrounding the communication of uncertain infon-nation however, and in 
such situations duty officers tend to delay action. The feedback from the community is that in 
general they would rather receive uncertain information than not. One individual did criticise 
one of the wardens when he relayed such information stating that he "should be more precise 
about the probability of flooding in future" but this was not a universal view. Another issue is 
the need for clarity in warning infon-nation. Officials should not assume that the public 
automatically understands the meaning of flood warning terms such as "AMBER warning". 
The clear message from this study is that local people want to receive warning information in 
plain English. 
Finally, there needs to be greater understanding by both parties of their respective perceptions 
of the flood hazard and their ability to respond to it. The community needs to be aware of the 
limitations of providing a flood forecasting and warning dissemination service, and the 
Agency needs to understand the impact floods have on the local population and their 
particular needs. The tragic suicide of an elderly couple in 1995 highlights the need for 
further work to appreciate the stresses of living with the flood risk. 
In conclusion, therefore, the main issues and arguments raised in each chapter of this thesis 
have been tested and strengthened by reference to the case study material from the 
Minimshall Brook. The author set about applying an integrated approach to flood warning 
arrangements in this catchment by satisfying as many of the integrative factors identified in 
this research as possible. This has been shown to be both feasible and practicable and hence 
has contributed in a substantive way to meeting the objectives of this project. In short, this 
case study has been a useful test of the theoretical propositions set out in this thesis and forms 
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Summary and Conclusions 
9.1 Introduction 
The main finding of this research project is that an integrated approach to flood warning can 
be highly beneficial in improving effectiveness. This chapter summarises this and other 
findings and examines to what extent the objectives of the research project have been 
achieved. The limitations of the work are discussed with an indication of what could have 
been attained with the benefit of more resources. The key findings of the research project are 
then presented under the substantive chapter headings, with an indication of lessons learnt and 
areas requiring further work. The implications of the research project are discussed in terms of 
policy and operational practice within the Environment Agency, and in the wider context of 
sustainable flood hazard management. 
9.2 The purpose of the work revisited 
The aims and objectives of this study as defined in Chapter I are re-visited in this section 
along with a brief assessment of the extent to which they have been addressed and achieved: 
To determine whether or not a policy of integration would be beneficial to flood 
warning programmes 
From the evidence presented in this thesis and elsewhere in the literature, it can be 
concluded that in general a policy of integration can be beneficial to flood warning 
systems. The consensus reached by many researchers (Mileti 1994, Leik et al 1981, Keys 
1997, Handmer 1997, Penning-Rowsell 1986) that the most effective structure for flood 
warning is that of an integrated system is bome out by this study. Such an approach has 
shown to result in enhanced interaction and co-ordination that in turn can lead to overall 
improved effectiveness, but this needs to take place simultaneously along several paths for 
the strategy to be successful. There are instances however, when integration can lead to 
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inefficiencies but this can often be traced to poor, often singular and narrow, 
implementation caused by a lack of attention to the criteria needed to facilitate this process. 
To identify relevant integration factors that may be of significance and to present 
these in a conceptual model 
The implementation of an integration policy has been recorded in a number of fields with 
varying degrees of success. Following a detailed review of the literature and the analysis 
presented here, it has been possible to identify a series of factors that are considered to be 
of universal relevance to the successful implementation of a policy of integration. As can 
be seen from Table 9.1, these have been compiled under four main headings that have in 
turn been used to structure the substantive chapters of this thesis. 
" Institutional and legal arrangements 
" Technology 
" Human resources, expertise and training 
" Infon-nation and knowledge 
The limited number of models that attempt to conceptualise flood warning systems in an 
integrated way have been summarised and critically examined. Although these models 
offer a useful framework in which to contemplate such systems, a number of fundamental 
flaws in their approach have been identified. These include a tendency to oversimplify 
what is a complex process and an inclination to focus too narrowly on a limited (but 
nevertheless important) number of integrative factors. It is concluded that there is a need 
for a wider and multi-dimensional perspective. 
This research project has attempted to rectify this perceived deficiency by presenting a 
conceptual model that is derived from a more comprehensive assessment of "integrative 
devices" that are considered to be most relevant in the flood warning context. The 
approach adopted a two-staged process with an initial identification of a wide range of 
issues and variables, leading to a more focused set of factors presented under the four 
headings listed above. These integrative factors have been conceptualised as crosscutting 
263 
strands running through the main components of a flood warning system: detection, 
forecasting, dissemination and response. The model is presented in Chapter 3 of this thesis 
and its main elements are detailed in Chapters 4 to 7. 
Table 9.1 Integrative factors 
Institutional I Secure political commitment, establish clear objectives, and define roles 
Arrangements and responsibilities, preferably in a written plan. Agree rules for conflict 
resolution. 
1 Establish functions and structures to foster integration, consider the 
designation of a lead agency. 
3. Establish a forum for negotiating between all relevant organisations. 
4. Instil a positive organisational climate and culture for a policy of 
integration. 
5. Inter-agency exercises should be held at regular intervals followed by 
comprehensive debriefing sessions. 
6. Close working relationships should be cultivated between staff in relevant 
agencies at a local level. 
Legal 7. Revisit and update legislation with a view to making laws compatible and 
Arrangements not contradictory. 
8. Legislation should clearly define roles and responsibilities of all relevant 
authorities and the mechanisms for resolving conflict. 
9. Periodically review legislation and seek continued political support to 
underpin the principles of integration. 
10. Reliance on non-statutory, co-operative agreements between organisations 
is not conducive to integration in the long term. 
Technology 11. Technological integration can lead to organisational change and structures 
should be flexible enough to cope with this. 
12. Technological advances should be applied to all functions rather than 
focusing on one function in isolation. 
13. The application of technology should not be an end in itself. Low- 
technology solutions may be more effective with respect to integration. 
Applications should be need driven. 
14. The social access to technology can be variable and certain social groups 
can become excluded from the benefits it brings, causing fragmentation. 
Steps should be taken to cater for these groups when designing 
communication strategies. 
Human resources, 15. Formal human resource management strategies should be adopted, such as 
xpertise & Training multi-disciplinary team working practices. 
16. The use and cultivation of informal contacts and personal networks should 
be encouraged both in organisations and communities. 
17. Staff development programmes and recruitment of staff from a wide base 
of expertise will ensure an organisation has the necessary skills. 
Information and 18. There should be free flow of, and ready access to information within and 
KnowledRe between organisations and communities. 
19. The use of expert and decision support systems should be explored to 
merge machine and human knowledge. 
20. Steps should be taken to ensure that the recipients of information 
understand and believe it, and are able to confirm its accuracy. 
21. The incorporation of information and knowledge from unofficial sources 
should be encouraged. 
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To assess whether these factors are present in existing operational flood warning 
arrangements in England and Wales 
As a general statement it would be true to say that prior to 1996 few of the integrative 
factors reproduced in Table 9.1 could be identified in operational practices in England and 
Wales. Following the establishment of the Environment Agency as the lead authority in 
both flood forecasting and flood warning dissemination, a number of improvements were 
made in the following areas: 
Greater political commitment and legitimisation was secured for flood warning, 
it is now the Government's top priority for flood defence. 
Attempts have been made to clarify the roles and responsibilities of relevant 
institutions through the development of local flood warning plans. 
e Inter-organisational forums have been established for discussing flood warning 
matters on a county/metropolitan area basis. 
A Ministerial Direction was given to the NRA/Environment Agency in relation 
to its flood warning duties that went part way to clarify roles and 
responsibilities. 
9 Technology has been applied more evenly to all elements of the warning 
process, including flood warning dissemination. 
9 Multi-disciplinary team working has begun to feature more in the 
implementation of the new flood warning dissemination arrangements. 
More emphasis has been placed on the need for good-quality, locally specific 
information both during flood events and at other times, and on the necessity 
for public education and awareness programmes to improve response. 
Despite these improvements, a number of weaknesses have been identified in the post- 
1996 arrangements that impede the establishment of fully integrated flood warning 
procedures in England and Wales. These can be summarised as follows: 
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*A failure to secure legislative change to clearly define roles and responsibilities 
of relevant authorities and the mechanisms for resolving conflict. 
*A failure to achieve universal commitment and a positive climate in all relevant 
organisations involved in flood response. 
* The frequent lack of close working relationships between staff in partner 
organisations at a local level. 
The tendency to apply technological solutions without fully considering the 
needs and abilities of the customer. 
*A need to widen further the expertise base in organisations and to fully 
implement multi-disciplinary team working practices. 
*A failure to understand the value of infon-nal contacts and personal networks 
both in organisations and communities. 
* The lack of appreciation of the value of a free flow of infonnation and feedback 
between organisations and communities. 
* The need to give greater attention to the human and social aspects of warning 
message construction and dissemination to encourage effective responses. 
The need to ensure that information is understood and believed and that 
recipients are able to confirm its accuracy. 
A failure to make provision for information and knowledge from unofficial 
sources in official warning systems and a tendency to ignore and deride this 
resource. 
This research demonstrates therefore, that while a number of positive improvements have 
been made to integrate flood warning systems, the systems in England and Wales still 
suffer from a variety of highly significant integration problems that threaten to undermine 
the effectiveness of the entire system. Solving these problems is critically important if the 
at-risk public is to have confidence in their flood defence agency's ability to provide the 
levels of safety and security demanded by them. These problems have been diagnosed for 
several years and many stem from the difficulty that technical and engineering 
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organisations such as the Environment Agency have in recognising and addressing the 
social and behavioural aspects of risk communication and warning recipient response. 
Through the use of case studies, determine the plausibility of introducing a fully 
integrated approach to future programmes 
Throughout this research project the main issues and arguments raised in each chapter have 
been tested and strengthened by reference to case study material taken from the Thames 
catchment. The Mimmshall Brook in Hertfordshire was chosen as the principal case study 
area where, prior to this research, only rudimentary official flood warning arrangements 
were in place. The author set about introducing more comprehensive warning procedures 
using a more integrated approach by satisfying as many of the integrative factors identified 
in Table 9.1 as possible. The feasibility and practicability of following such an approach 
was recorded and analysed, and used to determine the feasibility of introducing such 
techniques on a more universal basis. 
9.3 Limitations Of this study 
As discussed in Chapter 3, the methods adopted in this study, the status of the researcher, 
and the sources and extent of information and data used, all impose limitations to the study 
and this needs to be recognised. 
Due to resource constraints, the research focused around a limited number of case study 
areas in the Thames basin, the principal one being the Mimmshall Brook in Hertfordshire. 
With additional time it would have been desirable to extend the number of in-depth case 
studies to allow an analysis of communities with differing social attributes, differing levels 
of experience of flooding and flood warning systems, and river catchments with differing 
hydrological responses and land-use. 
Conducting a research study as an "insider" offers a number of distinct advantages over a 
conventional research student. These include unlimited access to data and infon-nation, 
professional staff and recipients of flood warning information, to name but a few. Such a 
position does bring with it however, a number of disadvantages and limitations. The 
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insider may be too close to the subject area and could be less objective than an outsider, 
and the ability to be constructively critical may be impaired. In addition, the researcher 
may have become conditioned into a certain way of thinking and may have biased or 
prejudiced views, influenced by the very organisation he or she is attempting to study. A 
number of strategies have been adopted by the author to counter these disadvantages 
including the development of a critical approach to his work and that of his employer, the 
Environment Agency. These are fully set out in Chapter 3 of this thesis. 
The third area of limitation was the information and data on which the study is based. 
Although it is comprehensive and extensive in many areas, it can be restricted in others. 
Much of the information held by the Environment Agency for example, has been collected 
by engineers and hydrologists and tends to be selective and biased towards the flood 
detection and forecasting elements of flood warning systems. There are large gaps in the 
data relating to the dissemination and response elements and details covering behavioural 
aspects are sparse prior to 1990. Post 1990, the main source of this kind of information in 
the Thames Region is from commissioned research by the Environment Agency and its 
predecessors. 
Despite these limitations, the author believes that the results of this research project are 
both sound and credible and significantly improve the understanding and knowledge of 
integrated flood warning systems. 
9.4 Key findings 
9.4.1 Institutional and legal arrangements 
It can be concluded that the legislative and organisational framework covering flood warning 
and response in England and Wales presents a number of severe problems in relation to 
integration. Typically, precise roles and responsibilities of the key institutions have not been 
adequately defined, inter-organisational co-ordination and liaison have often been poor, and 
the fostering of close working relationships has been largely ad-hoc'. This has been 
compounded by non-coincident organisational boundaries and poor translation of national 
I See Integration Factors 1,3,5 and 6 in Figure 9.1. r 
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strategic priorities into positive action on the ground. 
No organisation has an unambiguous statutory duty to prepare for, issue warnings for and 
respond to peacetime emergencies such as floods. The Environment Agency has pennissive 
powers to establish and operate flood warriing systems, but the legislation focuses on the 
provision of equipment and the Agency's general supervisory role over matters relating to 
flood defence. There is no reference to the social and behavioural aspects of risk 
communication, the need for effective warning recipient response and the raising of public 
awareness. This is reflected in the Government's procedure for grant-aiding new capital 
equipment that fails to integrate the technical with the social and behavioural aspects of flood 
warning 2. 
Evidence is presented of the gradual breakdown of the voluntary agreements between 
organisations that underpin flood warning arrangements, precipitated by tightening resource 
constraints, the fear of legal liability and low political commitment. It is concluded that 
reliance on non-statutory, co-operative agreements between organisations is not conducive to 
integration in the long term 3. This is compounded by the distinction in the legislation between 
"main" and "ordinary" watercourses and the resultant fragmentation of flood defence 
responsibilities. 
The Ministerial Direction issued to the Environment Agency in 1996 established the Agency 
as lead authority for flood warning and was designed to clarify matters. Indeed, many of the 
changes introduced by the Agency since this time have had a positive impact on integration. 
The production of Local Flood Warning Plans and the establishment of Flood Warning 
Planning Groups are obvious examples. However, as confirmed by the Independent Review 
of the Easter 1998 Floods, a number of serious shortcomings are still prevalent. For example, 
the Direction fails to address the specific question of roles and responsibilities and this is left 
for the Agency to tackle through discussion with other organisations but without the power of 
direction. There is a failure to include other relevant organisations that have important roles in 
flood warning and management, such as the Met Office, the media, utility companies and 
research bodies. The media for example are not obliged to broadcast warning notices and the 
2 See Integration Factors 7,8 and 9 in Figure 9.1. 
See Integration Factor 10 in Figure 9.1. 
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procedure is dependent on voluntary agreements with individual radio and television stations. 
The need for rules for conflict resolution between organisations is not addressed, nor is the 
need for inter-agency exercises, both of which are important criteria for integration. In short, 
although the Direction may have had a positive influence on integration, it has been issued 
within the context of a set of institutional arrangements that have led to fragmented 
responsibilities. It could be argued therefore, that any positive influence that any Ministerial 
Direction might have had on integration is likely to have been badly degraded by these 
contextual problems4. 
The present Government has indicated its desire for "an integrated and seamless service for 
flood forecasting, warning and response" but to achieve this many more of the integration 
factors set out in Table 9.1 need to be addressed. For instance, this concept has yet to be 
reflected in the legislation, the relevant sections of which were originally drafted in the 1970's 
when legislators had little notion of the "total warning system". Another example is the need 
for a positive organisational climate and culture for a policy of integrated flood warning to be 
instilled in all relevant agencies5. Even though much has been achieved in the Environment 
Agency in this regard, this is not matched in other organisations where fluvial flooding in 
particular is often not seen as a particular priority. 
9.4.2 Technology 
Technology has had a major impact on flood warning systems over the last thirty years. The 
influence of technology on integration has been variable however, at times positive, at others 
more negative. 
Since the 1970s, technology has been progressively applied to integrate the technical aspects 
of detection and forecasting systems, in particular in the collection, processing and 
presentation of environmental data from various sources to enable the monitoring of current 
and prediction of future conditions. Technology has not been applied uniformly however, and 
as demonstrated in the Easter 1998 Floods, there has been a tendency to focus investment in 
areas at high risk of flooding at the expense of lower-risk or defended areas. This fragmented 
4 See Integration Factors 1,2,3 and 5 in Figure 9.1. 
5 See Integration Factor 4 in Figure 9.1. 
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policy can have devastating consequences during extreme events when flood defences may be 
6 overtopped without adequate warning, as in Northampton in 1998 
Ever since technology was first adopted in flood warning systems there has been concern 
about its reliability and fallibility especially in times of emergency. Due to shrinking staff 
resources however, it has been increasingly necessary to place greater reliance on 
technological methods. Nevertheless, there is still a perceived need to provide visual 
confirmation, especially in extreme conditions, when measurements and forecasts tend to be 
trusted less, no matter how sophisticated the technology. A lack of confidence can act as a 
blocking mechanism for action resulting in delayed response. It is an important integration 
point therefore, to build into any operational detection and forecasting system the means to 
obtain confin-nation from alternative sources to minimise periods of uncertainty. 
The use of technology in the dissemination and response phases has been far more limited and 
a number of reasons can be given for this situation: 
The tendency for legislation and govenunent support to focus on technical 
solutions in the detection and forecasting areas. 
* The differing perceptions of organisations involved in flood warning 
dissemination and response leading to variations in investment policy. 
9 The lack of a co-ordinating organisation to oversee the total warning process prior 
to 1996. 
The tendency of some professionals to develop the science of flood forecasting in 
its own right using the best available technology7. 
Since 1996, technology has been embraced far more readily to disseminated flood warning 
information but it can be argued that this has resulted in a more impersonal public service 
giving rise io integration problems at the customer interface. There is evidence to indicate that 
the public still prefer a personal approach, with certain social groups being unfamiliar with 
See Integration Factor 12 in Figure 9.1. 
See Integration Factors 11 and 13 in Figure 9.1. 
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and confused by modem telephone-based information systems (Bye and Homer, 1998). 
Public access to and understanding of technology is not universal resulting in a sizeable 
section of society becoming excluded from technology-based systems. As pressure increases 
on organisations such as the Environment Agency to deliver infon-nation to an increasing 
number of people, the temptation to use impersonal technological solutions is likely to 
increase. This could well lead to a fragmented flood warning service with the prospect of 
societal inequalities widening further as the pace of technological change accelerates. To 
counter this, it is important that the technological methods that are adopted are appropriate for 
the local circumstances and satisfy the needs of the warning recipient8. 
9.4.3 Human interaction, expertise and training 
Flood warning is essentially a social process involving a wide range of players with varying 
levels of knowledge and expertise, all with different perceptions and modes of interaction. For 
an integrated system to evolve the key players need to communicate effectively, to minimise 
their differences in beliefs, attitudes and language, and be open to the acquisition of new 
skills. A number of key issues have been identified in this study that can facilitate the 
development of an integrated approach in the area of human interaction, expertise and 
training. 
For many years flood warning has been dominated by a small number of professions and it 
can be argued that as a result there has been a preoccupation with a narrow range of issues 
principally within flood detection and forecasting. The social and behavioural science of 
risk communication and warning recipient response, for instance, has received 
comparatively little attention historically. Within organisations, the establishment of 
multidisciplinary teams is an essential development if the necessary range of professionals 
are to work together to deliver an effective and integrated service'. 
Variation in risk perception exists amongst all players involved in flood warning and flood 
response. This can not only exist between the experts and the public, but also within these 
8 See Integration Factor 14 in Figure 9.1. 
See Integration Factor 15 in Figure 9.1. 
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groups as well. In an integrated system a greater account should be taken of the variation in 
public response caused by differing background experiences and situations. Perceptional 
variations amongst the experts also need to be addressed to avoid possible inconsistencies 
in service levels that could ultimately have a detrimental impact on system integration. The 
effects of this can be minimised through better training including the holding of regular 
multi-agency exercises involving the public. 
Personal networks have been shown to be central to the functioning of warning systems, 
facilitating effective response. When people become separated from their networks, 
whether in communities or organisations, delay and inaction can result. As demonstrated in 
the Mimmshall Brook catchment, personal networks are an important community 
mechanism for disseminating unofficial flood warnings and for an integrated system to 
flourish it is important that official and unofficial schemes coexist and reinforce each other. 
This can be achieved through the use of flood wardens and where the flood warning 
agency and a local community have entered into such a partnership, local flood warning 
arrangements are demonstrably more robust and effectivelO. 
Individuals can play important integrative roles at all stages in the flood warning process. 
For instance, the enthusiasm of key staff members can deten-nine how effectively an 
organisation responds in an emergency and it is important that they are empowered to 
actively support a strategy of integration. There are individuals within communities who 
are more capable of detecting and interpreting signs of danger and are often prepared to 
play a leading role in disseminating information to their neighbours and friends. In an 
integrated system these "local experts" would be brought into the warning process (say as 
flood wardens) and supported to ensure their long-term involvementlo. 
Learning and training strategies for individuals in both organisations and communities and 
for organisations themselves have an important role in an integrated system. Within 
organisations, individuals should receive regular training in all elements of the flood 
warning service including the social and behavioural aspects of risk communication. In 
communities, well-targeted and focused education campaigns offer a mechanism for 
10 See Integration Factor 16 in Figure 9.1. 
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raising awareness of flooding and effective response. Like individuals, organisations also 
need to learn from experience and have the flexibility to modify their structures and 
decision-making procedures if appropriate. The commissioning and response to the 
Independent Review of the Easter 1998 Floods by the Environment Agency is a good 
II example of an organisation initiating and implementing a learning strategy 
9.4.4 Information and knowledge 
Flood warning is all about obtaining information about a flood hazard and communicating 
that information to those who need it in sufficient time for them to take mitigating action. 
In many operational flood warning systems information and knowledge flow mainly in one 
direction from the warner to the warned in a linear communication chain. This study has 
shown that for an integrated system to function effectively, it is important to establish a 
circular communication process around which information and knowledge flow and to 
allow feedback from responses at various stages. There should be free flow of, and ready 
access to, infon-nation within and between organisations and communities for instance 12 . 
The time of onset of a flood event will govern the type and amount of information that is 
available, can be assimilated and acted upon, and the total flood warning system needs to 
be integrated around this variable. There is no point in developing a sophisticated flood 
forecasting system that can deliver very detailed information for instance ' if a river 
catchment responds faster than the information is made available to the decision-maker, be 
it the forecaster or the individual about to be flooded. In rapidly responding catchments 
there is likely to be greater uncertainty over the quality of the information available and 
this can act as a blocking mechanism preventing action. It is important therefore, that the 
holders of uncertain infori-nation are given the confidence and the means to communicate it 
to others, and that the recipients of that information understand the context in which it is 
issued and know how to respond appropriately. 
Another important integration point, which can be identified at each stage of the flood 
warning process, is the need for confirmation and feedback. Individuals, whether they be 
II See Integration Factor 17 in Figure 9.1. 
12 See Integration Factors 18 and 19 in Figure 9.1. 
274 
flood forecasters or flood plain dwellers, will seek confirmation before acting especially 
when the information they are presented with is unusual and may indicate an extreme 
condition. The level of confirmation needed is directly related to the knowledge and 
experience of the individual concerned and the number of sources from which information 
is received. In an integrated system the need for confirmation and feedback needs to be 
recognised and planned for' 3. 
There are opportunities at various stages for additional infon-nation to be added to the official 
infort-nation stream, thereby adding value and quality to the original data. It is vital to have the 
ability to integrate such information into official procedures as this can significantly improve 
the cohesiveness of the total warning system and can help overcome uncertainty. As has been 
shown in the Mimmshall Brook case study, the information and knowledge residing in the 
local community is an important resource and should be nurtured and sustained. Within 
organisations however, there is a danger that information and knowledge can be lost, 
especially during times of re-organisation and structural change. There is a need to limit the 
impact of such losses through the careful documentation of flood information and the 
14 development of expert and decision support systems 
This and other research has shown that information is more likely to be responded to in an 
appropriate way if it is clearly understood and believed by those who receive it. This holds 
true for flood forecasters, local authority/emergency services personnel as well as the at- 
risk public. Information that is inconsistent, unclear or thought not to be applicable will 
result in confusion and misunderstanding and may block action and response. In 
developing an integrated system the following factors need to be addressed: 
9 infori-nation should be presented in a consistent and specific way, it should be 
convincing and reasonable, and emanate from an authoritative and credible 
source 
* information should be targeted to the needs of the end-user, people with special 
needs, for example, may need help in understanding warning information 
13 See Integration Factor 20 in Figure 9.1. 
14 See Integration Factor 21 in Figure 9.1. 
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9 information should be delivered via more than one channel of communication, 
thereby allowing confirmation from an alternative source 
9 it should be recognised that the response to information will be made in 
different ways depending on the knowledge, education, status, gender, ethnic 
origin, etc. of the receivers of that infonnation. 
In conclusion, a range of factors has been identified in this section that attempt to 
distinguish an integrated system from a more fragmented approach that is more often than 
not the norm. These factors can be usefully summarised as a series of key words and 
phrases such as those presented in Table 9.2 below. 
9.5 Implications of the study 
The implications of this study can be summarised under two broad headings: those of 
direct relevance to flood warning agencies such as the Environment Agency in England 
and Wales, and those with wider relevance to flood hazard management in general. 
9.5.1 Implications for the Environment Agency and other flood warning agencies 
It is important for the success of an integrated flood warning system that sound 
relationships are developed and maintained between its constituent parts. This applies not 
only to the main elements of detection, forecasting, dissemination and response, but also to 
a range of other constituents such as organisations, human interaction and the application 
of technology. It is at the interfaces of these constituent parts where the greatest 
weaknesses lie and hence the greatest potential for failure. Perhaps the most significant 
interface that requires attention is between the experts and the public or the Environment 
Agency and its customers. It is suggested that matters will not improve in this crucial area 
unless there is a fundamental shift in organisational culture and perception within the 
Environment Agency. Some of the specific issues that need to be addressed are outlined in 
this section, 
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Social and technical Techno-fix 
Inclusive Exclusive 
Political legitimisation Ambiguous legitimisation 
Free flow of information Restricted access to information 
Enshrined by statute Voluntary agreements 
Compatible laws Contradictory laws 
Confirmation Uncertainty 
Feedback Uni-flow 
Environmental awareness Own-life priorities 
Formal and informal Formal only 
Customer orientated Systems orientated 
Locally specific Nationally consistent 
Targeted approach Blanketed approach 
Varying messages Standard messages 
Flexible Rigid 
Multi-agency Single agency 




Public involvement Public exclusion 
Personalised. Impersonal 
Simple complex 
Learning and training Custom and practice 
As discussed by Bye and Homer (1998) the public often does not understand the 
organisational arrangements that cover flood warning and response in England and Wales. 
This is not surprising as the number of organisations is large (eighteen relevant authorities 
were identified in the Mimmshall Brook catchment alone), reorganisation is frequent (in 
London the flood warning agency has changed four times in the last fifteen years), and 
their respective roles and responsibilities are unclear and are not fully defined in the 
statute. The Environment Agency has been directed by government to clarify the situation 
by means of Local Flood Waming Plans, but although these are now in place they are not 
widely distributed and are not easily accessible by the public. In addition, flood warning 
arrangements are rarely exercised and when there are, public involvement is minimal. As 
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lead organisation, the Agency needs to consider giving greater public access to its plans 
and procedures (say on the internet and in public libraries) and to holding regular exercises 
involving the at-risk public. 
The Agency has moved towards introducing technological solutions more evenly across 
the flood warning process, focusing recently on using technological means to disseminate 
flood warning messages and information. Although this is a positive development for 
integration in one sense, it can have more negative implications in that a far more 
impersonal service could ensue in contrast to that previously provided by the police. As 
illustrated in the Mimmshall Brook catchment, the public prefers a personalised service 
and is often confused and unfamiliar with modem telephone-based information systems. It 
is often overlooked that technology is not universally accessible and that sections of 
society may be excluded from its use. Nevertheless, there are some within the Agency that 
see the use of technology as the great panacea as it gives direct control and is relatively 
easy to operate. The alternative community-based arrangements are generally considered 
to be prone to failure, difficult to control and time consuming to maintain. It is clear that 
technology has its place in public warning procedures but the Agency must put greater 
effort into developing more user-friendly techniques after assessing the specific needs of 
the target audience. 
Flood warning is a social process but is sometimes viewed only in technical terms. For 
historical reasons the Agency and its predecessors have focused on the detection and 
forecasting elements and disseminating warnings to other organisations. As a consequence 
a few professional disciplines have become dominant within the Agency, namely science 
and engineering. The skills needed for dealing with social and behavioural issues are 
severely lacking and this requires staff development and training to rectify. It follows 
therefore, that there is limited appreciation within the Agency of the social processes that 
operate within at-risk communities and as a result problems arise at the public interface. 
An assumption is often made for example, that the community is a single mass of people 
that will react in a uniform way to standard warning messages. The Agency fails to fully 
recognise that communities are stratified in terms of degree and type of risk, past 
experience, language, gender, ethnic background and other differentiating characteristics. 
Community processes such as personal networks, local experts and informal warning 
mechanisms, that can be central to the successful functioning of flood warning systems, are 
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often not perceived as being relevant and are generally not trusted. The role and value of 
public awareness programmes however, is gaining acceptance in the Agency and this is 
resulting in greater interaction with the public, which can only be beneficial if maintained 
in the long tenn. 
The flow of information between the Agency and those at risk of flooding both during 
flood events and at other times needs closer examination. There is an increasing tendency 
to rely upon a small number of dissemination techniques over which the Agency has direct 
control and to make little or no provision for feedback and confirmation. This strategy is 
unlikely to meet public expectations and there is a need to incorporate a wider range of 
disseminating techniques. Greater engagement of the broadcast media could help satisfy 
the public need for confirmation, clarification and repetition of warning information. The 
Agency is actively taking steps to review and replace its colour-coded warning messages 
that are misunderstood by most people, but it needs to do more to open up communication 
channels with the heterogeneous at-risk communities. There should be greater realisation 
that the Agency is not the sole receptacle of knowledge and with it a greater readiness to 
trust and involve local people who are willing to participate in flood mitigation activities 
but over whom the Agency does not have direct control. Working in closer partnership 
with local communities will necessitate a major shift in culture within the organisation, but 
without this it is difficult to know how sustainable arrangements will evolve. The 
importance of sustainability in warning and hazard management will be explored more 
fully in next section. 
9.5.2 Implications for flood hazard management 
The Environment Agency's principal aim is to protect and enhance the environment in 
such a way as to contribute to sustainable development. In recent years this sustainability 
paradigm has been increasingly adopted by researchers and practitioners in environmental 
science to frame their work. More recently still, there has been a fundamental reassessment 
in the United States of how natural hazards should be managed and a desire to embrace the 
principles of sustainability within the context of hazard mitigation (Mileti, 1999). This 
section will briefly explore the key issues emerging from the reappraisal of natural hazard 
management and examine the synergies between these developments and the work 
presented in this thesis. 
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The current thinking surrounding natural hazard management involves the moving away 
from policies that focus on controlling floods to one of living more in harmony with them. 
This includes a shift from central government dominance to local level involvement, and 
the development of local commitment to flood management and renewed emphasis on self 
help (see Parker, 2000). The goal is to develop sustainable and resilient communities that 
are able to withstand natural hazard stresses and live in harmony with nature's varying 
cycles and processes. Sustainability in this context means that a community can tolerate 
and overcome damage, diminished productivity, and reduced quality of life from an 
extreme event without significant outside assistance (Mileti, 1999; Godschalk et al, 1999). 
To achieve this position, communities must become pro-active rather reactive, take 
responsibility for choosing where and how settlements are located and built through a 
planned process, and evaluate its environmental resources and hazards with the aim of 
reducing their vulnerability. A number of factors have been identified in the literature that 
will help achieve greater sustainability in the context of hazard mitigation, many of these 
have strong parallels with the conclusions reached in this study (see Table 9.3). 
Effective warning systems are an important element of a sustainable hazard mitigation 
strategy. It is recognised that there is a need to make local waming systems more uniform, 
and to provide the at-risk public with better information and technical assistance. Technology 
is seen as an important tool that can support sustainable hazard mitigation and enhanced 
waming arrangements. GIS, remote sensing, decision support systems, risk analysis 
techniques and computer-based communication systems are some of the technologies that are 
considered to have great potential in this regard (see Mileti, 1999). All these findings echo the 
conclusions reached in this study. 
In many respects the main findings of this study can be viewed as confirming several of the 
guiding principles of sustainable hazard mitigation. Both approaches require relevant 
organisations to work in a networked way, working as one to tackle common problems 
with the benefit of comprehensive planning and improved legislation. Communities are 
required to share responsibility for natural hazards and acquire a greater awareness of the 
risks they face. There is a need for better collation of risk information and knowledge and 
for this to be shared amongst all parties, and for new technology to be used in an 
appropriate and supportive way. Greater emphasis is placed on education and training that 
focuses on real-world problems. By providing an integrated and hence more effective flood 
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warning service, people in risk areas will be supported in the management of their 
vulnerability to flooding resulting in the building of more resilient and safer communities. 
Conversely, a sustainable approach to flood mitigation can be viewed as an integrative 
process: the integration of flood management with environmental management and 
sustainable development, and the integration of local stakeholders into flood hazard 
management decision-making processes. 
Table 9.3: Factors for a sustainable approach to hazard mitigation (after Mileti, 1999) 
Key objectives Details 
Establish sustainable hazard The need to build local networks involving all 
mitigation networks relevant stakeholders. To produce comprehensive 
Develop integrated local plans plans that identify hazards, potential losses and 
Identify and assess social capital the locality's ability to recover from a hazard. 
Secure stakeholder responsibility Focus 
local stakeholders on taking responsibility 
for natural hazards. 
2 0 Establish holistic government All policies related to hazards and sustainability 
framework should be integrated and consistent. Re- 
* Develop integrated policies and assessment of legislation to reflect principles of 
programmes sustainable mitigation. Apply across all levels of 
0 Secure local and national government. 
government commitment 
3 0 Undertake nation-wide hazard and Obtain better information and knowledge on risk, 
risk assessment losses, and the social impact of hazards. Collate 
0 Construct national databases this information nation-wide but at the 
0 Improve community-scale hazard community-scale. Focus on interactions among 
information the physical, social and constructed environments 
0 Share information - locally and on 
how they are reshaping the impact of 
nationally and internationally natural hazards. 
4 0 Provide comprehensive education Focus better training and education on managers 
and training who have to tackle and understand the complex 
0 Secure interdisciplinary education in physical and social processes that are generated 
hazard mitigation by hazards. Greater emphasis needs to be placed 
0 Aim for holistic training that focuses on interdisciplinary education and training 
on real-world problems programmes. 
9.6 The problem of complacency 
The successful operation of a flood warning system (and for that matter a policy of 
sustainable hazard mitigation) is heavily dependent upon the enthusiasm of the people that 
are involved in the process, be it influential individuals in organisations or the general 
public. Much that is written on flood warning systems in the literature assumes that those 
involved will react and respond in an optimal way if they are provided with the appropriate 
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information and are made aware of the risk that faces them. Practical experience suggests 
however, that there are many instances when people will not respond effectively, 
irrespective of the amount of information and education provided to them. This can occur 
in organisations as well as in at-risk communities and is often associated with a lack of 
direct experience of the flood hazard. This is most acute in the large areas of the flood 
plain where flood risk is low and in areas that are "protected" by flood defences. In these 
localities flooding is infrequent and as Keys (1997) puts it "the community mind is not 
tuned" to receiving information about flood warnings. This is also true of organisations 
such as local authorities and the emergency services that operate in such areas. They may 
not have experienced flooding for many years and as a consequence may focus their 
resources on planning their response to other hazards that occur more frequently. If 
communities and organisations are not receptive to attempts to make them aware of the 
flood risk, then the Environment Agency will struggle to make flood warning systems 
operate effectively. It is perhaps only after a flood when those living and operating in low 
risk areas become receptive to attempts at education but such moments will only be few 
and brief. The scale of this problem can be illustrated in the Thames basin in that only 
around 15,000 properties can be classified as being at high risk of flooding from rivers, 
whereas over 400,000 are estimated to be at low risk, 250,000 of these are located behind 
the 1 in 1,000 year Thames tidal def6nces. It follows therefore, that the vast majority of 
people in the flood plain in the Thames Region are likely to be indifferent to the risk of 
flooding. 
It can be argued that the failings of the flood warning systems during the Easter Floods of 
1998 were partly due to complacency. Many of the 5,000 or so properties that were 
affected were in areas of low flood risk, such as Northampton and Kidlington, and many 
people thought that the flood would not affect them. Some of those who heard the flood 
warnings on local radio did not think they applied to them and took no action, they were 
surprised by and unprepared for the subsequent flooding. The same unpreparedness was 
evident in some of the local authorities and emergency services. In Northampton for 
instance, procedures had not been updated for many years and warnings were not passed to 
the correct authorities and important flood response actions were not carried out. Bye and 
Horner (1998) conclude that "effective interfacing between the Agency, the borough 
council and the emergency organisations was not achieved because all concerned were 
unprepared for an extreme event". The Environment Agency too was caught unawares by 
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the severity of the event at both a local and a national level. Many of the Agency's senior 
managers were new to the organisation and had not experienced a flood of this magnitude. 
As a consequence, they did not fully appreciate the risks involved and the implications for 
the organisation especially in the context of its new responsibilities for flood warning 
dissemination. At the time, flood warning and flood defence were not high on the 
Agency's list of priorities with greater emphasis being placed on its other functions. This 
has changed since the flood but the Agency should ensure that a "boom-or-bust" approach 
to flood hazard mitigation is not perpetuated. This is usefully summarised by Godschalk et 
al (1999): 
"Past mitigation planning operated in a boom-or-bust setting. After a declared 
disaster, the boom is on. Money pours in, staff levels are built up, elected 
officials are very concerned, and a variety of agencies and organisations are 
eager to co-operate. However, not only do the compressed time-scales make it 
difficult to carry out effective mitigation, but once recovery is compete, the 
climate returns to bust. Budgets are cut, staff levels are reduced, decision- 
makers lose interest and other organisations return to normal business. This 
kind of crisis management is prone to mistakes and inefficiency. " 
A more sustainable approach would be to view hazard mitigation, including flood warning, 
as a valued and on-going activity. This requires stable budgets and dedicated staff 
complements and for all relevant organisations to maintain close working relationships in 
the long term, with the involvement of people in at-risk areas, to overcome complacency 
and develop sustainable and resilient communities. 
9.7 Future research directions 
It is doubtful whether any warning system justifying the title "total flood warning system" 
yet exists. This research project has attempted to address this issue by identifying what is 
needed to develop the constituent parts of the total system and integrate them into an 
effective whole. The conceptual model based on a set of integrative factors that is 
presented here focuses on experiences in the Thames Region using case study material 
from areas that are of high risk of flooding. Further research is required to ascertain the 
applicability of this approach to other regions in England and Wales and perhaps to areas 
of low flood risk where the introduction of an integrated approach to flood warning may be 
more difficult to achieve, Attempts have been made to implement such an approach in 
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other developed countries (Emergency Management Australia, 1999) and in developing 
countries (Walsh, et al, 1997). It would be of both academic and applied interest therefore, 
to determine how the techniques presented here and developed there could be combined, 
adapted and applied on a more universal basis. 
It is at the interfaces of the constituent parts of a flood warning system where the main 
weaknesses lie and where failure is most prone. This study has shown that the interfaces 
are large in number and extend beyond those traditionally thought to be most relevant. 
They can include the interfaces between organisations, between organisations and 
communities, between researchers and practitioners, between professional disciplines, 
between technology and the recipients of information, between those at high risk and those 
at low risk of flooding, and so on. Further research is needed therefore, to understand these 
interfaces more fully and to determine ways of optimising interactions where they occur. 
This thesis focuses on the notion of integration and how this can be best applied to flood 
warning systems to improve performance. It has been demonstrated that the idea of 
integration and total flood warning system design is analogous in many ways to the concepts 
of total quality management and sustainable hazard mitigation. All three paradigms advocate 
a holistic approach to management, emphasising the need for continuous improvement 
through comprehensive planning and liaison, group problem solving and people involvement, 
good customer relations, better information, knowledge, education and training, 
interdisciplinary communication and the building of high-trust relationships. Research is 
needed to analyse these synergies in greater depth and to determine whether flood warning 
systems can benefit further from ideas and concepts developed in other fields of study. 
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Appendix 2: Conceptual models of the warning process 
Williams' Conceptual MOdel. 
Williams (1964), studying warnings relating to natural disasters in the United States in tile 
1960's, attempted to conceptualise a warning as a system involving the origin, coding, and 
transmission of information about the existence of possible danger, together with responses to, 
and feedback from responses to this information. He contrasts this with looking at a warning as if 
it were only the issuance of a warning message, or the transmission of such a message, or the 
behaviour of the sender or receiver of such a message. He considers, therefore, a warning to be a 
process and not a discrete message or act. 
As illustrated in Figure A2.1, Williams states that the warning process comprises of the following 
steps: 
detection and measurement or estimation of changes in the environment that could result in a 
danger of one sort or another. 
collation and evaluation of the incoming infon-nation about environmental changes. 
decisions on whom should be warned, about what danger, and in what way. 
transmission of a warning message, or messages, to those whom it has been decided to wam. 
interpretation of the warning message by the recipients and action by the recipients. 
" feedback of information about the interpretation and actions of recipients to the issuers of 
warning messages. 
" new warnings, if possible and desirable, corrected in terms of responses to the first wanling 
messages. 
In the first stage of the model Williams recognises that both official and unofficial sources may 
originate and transmit warning messages to the public. The unofficial sources may be individuals 
who have specialist knowledge and experience or are particularly sensitive to environmental 
changes. It is important to recognise that more than one source may be collecting and reporting 
warning data that can have its advantages but can also create opportunities for distortion, 
attenuation, contradiction and redundancy. 
When information is received from whatever the source, these data have to be collated and 
evaluated. Evaluation involves such questions as: 
is the information reliable? 
if some or all of it is from unofficial sources, are these sources reliable? 
what do the data imply in terms of specific dangers to specific places at specific times? 
The next step is the decision to warn and this involves such questions as: 
is the danger really going to materialise to a certain degree at a certain place? 
when will it strike and how much warning do people need to take protective action? 
what will be the consequences if an extreme event strikes and there is no warning? 
will it do any good to give a warning? 
is there time to take protective action? 
how will people behave if they are not warned? 
2: 2 
Williams stresses that the decision to warn may also be influenced by anticipation of the 
behavioural consequences that may result from an incorrect warning. The decision-maker may be 
pressurised by the anticipation of blame if either a warning is issued and the danger does not 
materialise or if no warning is issued and the danger does materialise. 
Once a decision has been made to issue a warning, it may be transmitted by a variety of means: 
television or radio, sirens or other signals, or police or other officials going from door to door or 
using loudspeakers. Williams considers that different channels of con-inlunication may have 
different degrees of credibility for the recipients. These differences may vary in relation to the 
culture and social structure of the population, so the use of multiple channels for transmitting 
warnings may increase the chances of reaching all the intended recipients. Williams goes on to 
discuss, however, the existence of sub-points through which warnings often pass. These sub- 
points can delay, distort, attenuate, contradict and even block a warning message. He stresses tile 
importance of psychological variables involving human operators that exist at each sub-point. 
They often have difficulty operating automatically in a warning situation and may delay a 
warning message seeking confirmation or even block it all together by not believing its content. 
Interpretation of the warning message is another important area. Williams points to the fact that 
different persons may react differently to the same warning message and that some of tile 
reactions appear illogical. He goes on to suggest that this is a function of how the individual 
defines the danger situation. This definition includes the following factors: 
" the strength of the threat (how likely is the danger to materialise, and how serious will the loss 
be if it does? ) 
" the time element (how long will it be before one has to decide, and how long will it require to 
take protective action? 
the cost of taking protective actions (economic, psychological, social) 
the presumed effectiveness of available countermeasures (will they do any good against the 
threat? ) 
All these factors are interrelated. Thus the greater the strength of the threat the less weight is 
given by the warning recipient to the cost of taking protective actions. 
Williams does not imply that response to warnings is a conscious, coldly calculating process. 
Unconscious and irrational factors, such as repressive denial and even perceptual distortion of 
incoming inforination, may occur. Informal social communication and personal observation are 
other important factors in the warning response process. People often try to confirm the hazard 
situation through discussions with others and are influenced by the actions of others. They also 
try to seek proof of the situation with their own eyes by looking at a river for example. In short, 
interpretation of and reaction to a warning is not a simple or automatic process, it is a complex 
and often highly social process. 
Finally, Williams emphasises; the need for feedback from the warned to the wamer and concludes 
that it is valid and useful to regard warning as a circular communication process, rather than 
simply a linear process. This would involve fast feedback during the event itself that allows new 
information to be issued accordingly, and slow feedback that continues to occur after the incident 
is over which may give rise to system improvements over a period of time. 
2: 3 
Figure A2.1: Model of warning-and-response system (after Williams, 1964) 
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Foster's C neeDtual Model 
Foster's model (1980) of integrated flood warning design usefully reveals the complexity of the 
process. It involves the interaction of physical, technological, and social systems, the operation of 
which must be carefully co-ordinated if the desired result, the avoidance of disaster or reduction 
of the scale of devastation, is to be achieved. He illustrates the complexity of total warning 
systems by suggesting that the successful design and operation of such systems involves sixteen 
basic steps (Figure A2.2) that he goes on to describe in detail. 
1. The first stage of the model is the recognition by decision-makers that there is the possibility 
of danger from a particular source. 
2. Danger recognition precedes the design of the warning system that involves evaluating the 
"disaster agent" and its characteristics that have implications for the warning process. Factors 
that must be considered when designing a system include: frequency, physical consequences, 
speed of onset, length of possible forewarning, duration, scope of impact, destructive 
potential, gross predictability and gross controllability. 
3. The installation and operation of the system involves defining the type and distribution of 
sensors used to collect data. There is oRen a minimum number below which he system is 
incapable of fulfilling its obligations. 
4. So that the warning recipients are familiar with the warning system and its meaning, 
education of the user groups is important. It is important to present the warning message at a 
level that can be readily understood by those members of the public at which it is aimed. This 
will facilitate effective response to a warning. 
5. Testing the system to ensure that it is technically sound and that those involved in issuing and 
receiving its warnings act as required, is essential to provide scope for improving accuracy 
and effective dissemination. 
6. Modifying the system if test results indicate that changes are necessary. 
7. Detecting and measuring changes in the hazard that could result in increases in death, injury 
and/or property damage. 
8. Collating and evaluating incoming information. This requires value judgements based oil 
experience. 
9. Deciding to warn. This carries with it a great deal of responsibility and represents a major 
threshold in the warning process. 
10. Warning messages must be designed and transmitted with great care. Messages must include 
details of the time of impact, the specific area threatened and the likely consequences. A wide 
variety of channels and media should be used to distribute warning messages. Individuals are 
more likely to respond if they receive information from several sources. 
H. Interpretation of warning messages and actions by recipients have a great influence on tile 
effectiveness of warning systems. This element, however, is the most difficult to predict 
because it is conditioned by the beliefs, experiences, prejudices, education and perceptions of 
those at risk. Foster believes that response can be improved through education. 
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12. Information in a warning system should flow both ways, passing both to and from those 
threatened. Such feedback permits operators of the warning network to assess the impact of 
their messages and transmit modified messages designed to achieve their desired impact. 
13. Warning messages should be repeated frequently and modified to relay changes in the nature 
of the threat. 
14. Transmitting all-clear messages when danger has passed is important. 
15. Foster believes that it is essential to record in detail the operation of the warning system. Such 
a hindsight review allows malfunctions to be identified, future operations to be improved and 
aids the training of new personnel. 
16. Once a system has been enhanced through hindsight review it should be tested once more. 
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Miled's ConceDtual Model 
Mileti (1994) states that the most effective structure of a warning system is that of an integrated 
system. Such a system has two qualities that make it unique: 
1. To ensure preparedness, the warning system is composed of three relatively separate 
subsystems, the detection, management and response subsystems. 
2. Integration requires that sound relationships among these subsystems be developed and 
maintained. 
The Detection Subsystem 
This focuses on the monitoring of the natural environment that could induce a flood emergency. 
It collects, collates, assesses and analyses information and when warranted, makes a prediction 
about the potential occurrence of a flood. The prediction is then communicated fi-om the detection 
subsystem to the management subsystem. 
The basic functions of the detection subsystem are to detect the presence of a potential 
emergency and then inform those who must manage the event. In an integrated waming system 
the detection subsystem has specific structural characteristics. 
1. The enviroru-nental-detection linkage is clear and routine 
2. The link between detection and the management subsystem is clear and familiar. 
The Management Subsystem 
This system focuses on integrating the risk information received from the detection system and 
warning the public when warranted. This subsystem is composed largely of local emergency 
management officials. After receiving information from the detection system, these managers 
must interpret that information in terms of potential losses and then decide if the risk warrants a 
public warning. in making such decisions manager's use specified or ad hoc criteria. Official 
public warnings are made following a positive decision, One part of this subsystem often 
overlooked is the monitoring of public response once warnings are issued so that subsequent 
warnings can be refined or changed if people are not responding in a way that would minimise 
their exposure to risk. This subsystem is typically the domain of local government. 
The management subsystem has particular structural characteristics in an integrated systeni. 
I- Linkage between detection and management systems is clear and familiar. 
2. There is communication between personnel in each system to help with interpretation. 
3. Links with the public through actual warnings and monitoring of response is coniprchcnsive 
and informed, not ad hoc. 
4. The ability of the environment to bypass the detection system and directly influence 
managers is recognised and incorporated into plans. 
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Response Subsystem 
People respond to warnings received from the management subsystem on the basis of their own 
interpretations of those warnings, this can differ from the interpretation of detectors and 
managers. Moreover, the response system contains an additional warning element, in that people 
generate unofficial warnings for others. Unofficial warnings can come from a variety of sources 
and people can issue unofficial warnings according to their own perception of events and their 
own social realities. 
The ideal response system has particular structural characteristics in an integrated warning 
system: 
I. Comprehensive and multiple channels of communication to the public have been prepared 
2. Warning messages are comprehensive and provide the public with all that it needs to know 
I Public response is monitored as it occurs and fed back into the management system so that 
adjustments in warnings can be made as needed 
4. The ability of the environrnent to bypass the detection and management subsystems and 
directly influence public response is planned for 
5. The possibility that detection-system personnel may informally give the public direct 
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Appendix 3: Institutional and legal background 
The legal framework covering flood warning 
The Environment Act 1995 (S. 6 (4)) gives the Environment Agency a general supervisory 
duty relating to all flood defence related matters in England and Wales and this can be 
interpreted to include flood warning. The Water Resources Act 1991 (S. 106) stipulates that 
most of the Agency's functions in relation to flood defence must be carried out through 
Regional Flood Defence Committees (RFDCs). The extent of the Agency's operational role 
however, greatly depends upon the designation of a watercourse with responsibility for Main 
River, sea and tidal defences resting primarily with the Agency via RFDCs and for other 
watercourses (defined as Ordinary Watercourses) with the appropriate local authority or 
internal drainage board. The Land Drainage Act 1991 gives local authorities and internal 
drainage boards the power to carry out works on ordinary watercourses (Ss. II& 14). 
The Agency is empowered to provide and operate flood warning systems and to provide, 
install and maintain apparatus required for the purpose of such systems (Water Resources 
Act, 1991 S. 166). A Flood Warning System is defined to mean: 
"any system whereby, for the purpose of providing warning of any danger of 
flooding, information with respect to: 
a) rainfall, as measured at a particular place within a particular period; or 
b) the level or flow of any inland water, or pail of an inland water, at a particular 
time; or 
c) other matter appearing to be relevant for that purpose, 
is obtained and transmitted, whether automatically or otherwise, with or without 
provision for carrying out the calculations based on such information and for 
transmitting the results of such calculations" (S. 148). 
The legislation therefore, focuses very firmly on giving powers to install equipment to detect 
storms and floods. Critically for the development of an integrated approach, the issue of flood 
warning dissemination was not addressed at the time and prior to 1996 reliance was placed on 
voluntary agreements between the Environment Agency (and its predecessors), police and 
local authorities. A number of reasons can be put forward to explain why the legislators chose 
not to address the issue of warning dissemination: 
" the tendency to concentrate on technical issues only; 
"a narrow understanding of the total flood warning process or, 
" the issue was just side-stepped 
The establishment of these voluntary arrangements for the dissemination of flood warnings 
can be traced to procedures that were drawn up in the 1960s between the then River Boards, 
local authorities and the police. In 1968 the Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food, 
which supervises flood defence, held a conference on flood warnings in order to clarify 
administrative roles and liaison procedures and to set down guidelines in this respect 
following severe floods during that year (Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food, 1968). 
At the 1968 conference it was generally accepted that the technical capability for flood 
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detection and forecasting lay with the River Authorities - the successors to the River Boards 
and the predecessors of the Water Authorities, the National Rivers Authority and the 
Environment Agency - through liaison with the Meteorological Office. It was also agreed that 
the River Authorities would warn the police who had the responsibility to warn the public. 
Local authorities would receive warnings either from the River Authorities or the police and 
might also warn the public. This liaison arrangement remained virtually unchanged until 
1996, though precise arrangements varied locally. As Haggett (1997) notes however, at that 
time no one agency was given a lead role to co-ordinate activities across the function, the 
effect of which was to focus individual agency's activities on their area of interest and not on 
the performance of the system as a whole. This has inevitably resulted in inefficiencies 
developing across the interfaces of detection, forecasting and dissemination and response and 
this has had a negative impact on the integration of these elements. 
Parker (1992) suggests that these informal co-operative agreements have worked well on 
some occasions in the past. It is evident however, that they began breaking down because of 
tightening resource constraints and growing concerns over legal liability. Attempts to tighten 
up and formalise the arrangements between organisations have been viewed very cautiously 
by some because of the resource and legal implications of entering into formal agreements. 
In 1996, following a period of discussion with the key players, the Government decided to 
change arrangements by means of a Ministerial Direction under Section 5 of the Water 
Resources Act 1991. This requires the NRA and now the Agency to take the lead role in 
flood warning dissemination from the I September 1996 and to "take steps as appear to it to 
be reasonable and practicable to provide warning of any danger of flooding". Although the 
Ministerial Direction attempts to clarify the position with respect to flood warning 
dissemination, it is drafted in imprecise terms and gives the Agency a wide margin of 
discretion. This has implications for the introduction of integrated and consistent 
arrangements across the country. Nevertheless, it could be argued that the Agency would not 
be acting "reasonably" if it failed to introduce consistent flood warning arrangements across 
England and Wales. 
The full text of the Ministerial Direction is reproduced below: 
"The Authority shall ensure that, with effect from V September 1996, there is 
maintained at each of its area offices, or at an alternative office designated by 
the Authority, a record in writing of the arrangements for the time being in 
effect concerning the circumstances in which the usual means by which and 
the persons or bodies to whom information will be transmitted (whether by 
the Authority or any other person or body) for the purpose of providing 
warning of any danger of flooding in the area for which that office has 
responsibility for flood defence matters. 
The Authority shall ensure that, before the arrangements referred to in 
paragraph I (including any significant variation in those arrangements) take 
effect, there is consultation with the bodies providing relevant emergency 
services in, and the local authorities for, the area concerned. 
The Authority shall take such steps as appear to it to be reasonable and 
practicable to provide warning of any danger of flooding in accordance with 
the arrangements referred to in paragraph I above". 
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Legal Liability 
In recent years, and following flood warning failures, questions have been raised about the 
liability of authorities that are engaged in the flood forecasting and warning process. As 
Parker (1989) reports, there have been a number of cases brought to the civil courts that have 
attempted to find the agencies legally liable for inaccurate warnings or for not providing 
warnings at all. The specific tort law to which the agencies are most vulnerable are 
negligence and, to a lesser extent, liability for breach of statutory duty (Middlesex University, 
1992). For example, in 1987 under the Robinson & Ors v. Cardiff City Council, Welsh Water 
Authority and South Glamorgan County Council case, residents claimed against the local 
authorities and the water authority in respect of property damage caused by a failure of the 
flood warning system for the River Taff in Cardiff in December, 1979. The warning system 
failed because of an absence of clear responsibility for disseminating warnings to the public. 
The Court found that both of the local authorities involved were liable for failure to warn the 
public. Two types of duty were specified: 
prior duty, that relates to the provision of reasonable steps to ensure 
concluded, effective and continuing flood warning provisions vis-i-vis flood 
endangered areas, 
duty on the day, that relates to the taking of reasonable steps to ensure 
communication of warnings to persons in flood endangered areas. 
The Court considered that the local authorities failed to carry out both of these duties 
effectively and that the plaintiffs suffered damage due to the failure to issue warnings 
(Davies, 1987). 
In 1992 Middlesex University examined in detail the legal framework governing flood 
warning in England and Wales and addressed the question of liability with particular 
reference to the then National Rivers Authority (though equally applicable to the 
Environment Agency). They consider that as the legislation granted only a power to the NRA 
to set up and operate flood warning systems, it is arguable that the NRA might not incur 
liability if it failed to provide any flood warning system at all. Problems might arise however, 
if the NRA sought to discontinue established flood warning systems without public notice. If 
the Authority chose to allow systems to wither away so that they became ineffective when 
needed they might well be deemed negligent. It might be argued that if the NRA exercised its 
powers and set up flood warning systems it then assumed a duty to operate and maintain 
such systems with care. The functions and responsibilities placed on the NRA by the Water 
Act 1989, and subsequently the Water Resources Act 1991, underline the fact that the 
Authority has a general duty to establish and maintain safe systems. The NRA had no 
coercive authority however, to require outside agencies, such as the local authorities and the 
police, to operate to any system it may wish to set up for flood warning purposes. Indeed, 
local authorities and the police have obligations to prioritise the use of their resources, 
obligations which they might consider override any commitment to the NRA. Nevertheless, 
Middlesex University suggested that the NRA would be unwise not to seek to maintain and, 
if necessary, improve its flood warning systems and that local authorities must be asked to 
continue to make an important contribution to these systems. Legal opinion also made 
reference to the general flood defence supervisory duty placed on the NRA. It was considered 
possible that this duty might place legal obligations on the NRA to provide flood warning 
systems. This opinion has yet to be tested in the courts. 
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It has already been mentioned that local authorities have sufficient power under the Local 
Government Act 1989 to incur expense in taking action to avert, alleviate and eradicate the 
danger in emerging or actual disaster situations. As Middlesex University (1992) report, they 
also have power given in the Civil Protection in Peacetime Act 1986 to use their civil defence 
resources in emergency situations. These provisions seem to be wide enough to enable local 
authorities both to take part in actual emergencies and in planning for them. They are only 
powers however, and local authorities may not be inclined to prioritise the use of these 
powers in relation to taking part in setting up and maintaining flood warning systems. On the 
other hand, the fact that they have other roles in flood defence, that might result in them 
incurring liability for allowing the emergency to arise in the first place (or permitting it to 
continue for longer than necessary), may be a considerable incentive for them to take part in 
the flood warning process. In practice, many local authorities produce detailed emergency 
plans that contain sections covering response to flooding and flood warning. 
The situation of the police is more complex. As Middlesex University (1992) mention, their 
primary common law function is keeping the peace, however, a custom has grown up for the 
police to take overall command in emergencies. There has been litigation concerning the duty 
of the police to citizens in the performance of their duties. All cases have failed to establish 
that the police have any general duty to protect individual members of the public. Thus it 
seems unlikely that members of the public could attach liability to the police for negligent 
failure to act in respect of either flood warning or other emergency procedures related to 
flooding. It also seems improbable that the Environment Agency could get anything in the 
nature of an enforceable contractual commitment from the police to partake in emergency 
procedures. 
The situation in the United States may point the way to future public attitudes in this country. 
As Drabek (1986) notes, there is a growing propensity to seek compensation through 
litigation in the United States if another party can be held responsible. There are signs that 
issues of liability pertaining to warning issuance or actions taken during an emergency will be 
introduced with increasing frequency in the American court system. Peoples' perceptions of 
natural hazards are changing and there is a tendency not to see them solely as acts of God. It 
is likely that such views will become more prevalent in England and Wales in years to come. 
The institutional framework in England and Wales prior to September 1996 
In England and Wales the principal national government department responsible for 
overseeing and supervising flood defence matters and determining flood defence policy is the 
Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food (MAFF). MAFF actively encourages the 
adoption of flood forecasting and warning schemes by allocating grants for the installation of 
flood monitoring equipment. The Department of the Environment, Transport and the Regions 
(DETR) also has a role through its supervision of the planning process and in Wales the 
National Assembly of Wales takes many of the executive decisions in relation to flood 
defence. At the regional level, flood defence on "main rivers" (the principal arterial rivers and 
their major tributaries) is the responsibility of the Environment Agency, The Agency is a 
non-departmental public body that has eight regional units that in tum are subdivided into 
twenty-six operational areas, all of which are based upon river catchment boundaries, The 
Agency is responsible for flood defence planning, implementation and monitoring and has a 
remit for both fluvial and sea flood defence. At the local level, local authorities (district and 
borough councils) have certain responsibilities for flood defence on some of the smaller non- 
main tributaries or "ordinary watercourses". In some rural areas farmers' co-operativcs, 
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known as Internal Drainage Boards, have powers to exercise general supervision over all 
matters relating to land drainage within defined internal drainage districts. 
In the flood forecasting and warning chain of agencies, the Meteorological Office is often the 
first to be involved, providing a forecast of conditions that might lead to flooding. The Met. 
Office has agreements to provide the Environment Agency and other customers with 
warnings of heavy rainfall or sea conditions that may lead to flooding. It operates and 
maintains the Storrn Tide Forecasting Service and the UY, Weather Radar Network Oointly 
owned by the Met. Office and the Environment Agency) and provides tidal alerts, radar and 
satellite data to the Agency's Flood Warning Centres, Increasingly, the Environment Agency 
has demanded more quantitative precipitation forecasts, especially in urban areas, in addition 
to the more routine synoptic forecasts (e. g. Nimrod and the GANDOLF thunderstorm 
warning system). The Environment Agency has a key role in the flood forecasting and 
warning process and prior to 1996 this covered the following activities: 
" the operation and maintenance of rainfall and river flow measurement networks 
" rainfall and flow forecasting using models of varying complexity 
" issuing flood warnings to the police for onward transmission to the general public, 
other emergency services, local authorities, utility companies, etc. 
" recording the extent and impact of flooding 
" operation of river control structures and securing flood defences 
" ensuring watercourses are free of obstruction 
" providing assistance to other agencies 
" holding post-event evaluations 
These roles were mainly restricted to main rivers, although the Agency has permissive 
powers to operate flood warning systems on any river. 
In England and Wales the police have historically been an important agency within the flood 
warning dissemination chain. Although they do pot have a statutory responsibility to Pass on 
flood warnings received from the Environment Agency to the public or any other body, in 
practice they respond to emergency situations such as flooding, Prior to September 1996 their 
role was not only in emergency response and traffic management but also in warning 
dissemination and public notification. Because of the general lack of statutory duties on any 
authority to provide flood warnings, however, the police focused increasingly upon their legal 
position if warning arrangements failed for any reason. The police resisted attempts by the 
Environment Agency to establish more formal agreements to disseminate flood warnings and 
in general, the informal arrangements that had been in place since the 1960's were steadily 
breaking down. An example of this is in London where in recent years the Environment 
Agency has improved the identification of properties at risk and hence the ability to offer 
more targeted public warnings. The police were concerned that once information of this type 
was formally accepted they would be obliged to warn the identified properties whenever a 
flood warning was issued for the area concerned. The police were not willing to offer such a 
commitment in case they became legally liable if warning arTangements failed due to other 
operational pressures and accordingly refused to incorporate the property infori-nation into 
their operational procedures. 
Because local authorities have powers to undertake flood mitigation works on ordinary 
watercourses, district and borough councils have permissive powers that extend to flood 
warning for such rivers. In practice, local authorities rarely operate flood warning systems. 
Apart from passing on flood warnings to the public in some cases, the role of the local 
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authorities is mainly in the areas of public awareness, public defence, social services and post 
event clear-up operations. Although local authorities have powers to incur expenditure to 
avert, alleviate or eradicate the danger emerging from a flood, they have not been given an 
unambiguous statutory duty to prepare for and respond to peacetime emergencies such as 
floods. They find it increasingly difficult to find resources to prepare for flooding once funds 
have been allocated to their statutory duties in other areas. Just prior to September 1996, the 
Environment Agency had asked local authorities to confinn their role in flood warning 
response, but had experienced difficulty in gaining agreements because of the ambiguous 
legal position, and because local authorities feared legal liability being placed upon them. 
There was no general agreement about how the mass media fitted into the emergency 
management communication process by carrying news and information about hazards such 
as flooding. The strengths of the media, namely their independence from government or other 
agencies and their ability to attract large audiences which regard them as reasonably credible 
information sources (Burkhart, 1991), were not fully appreciated, As a consequence, prior to 
1996 the media's role in disseminating flood warning messages to the public was minimal, 
with at most some local ad-hoc arrangements in place. For significant flood events most of 
the agencies involved would issue press statements to the media, but mostly after flooding 
had occurred and without co-ordination. There was no concerted effort to involve the media 
and to win their confidence and at times this invariably resulted "in the needless arousal of 
the media's watchdog role of looking into possible wrongdoing and waste" (Burkhart, 1991). 
Arrangements in the Thames Region prior to September 1996 
In the Thames Region the importance of flood warning was given particular impetus as a 
consequence of the serious floods that occurred in 1968 when there was considerable damage 
to property in the Mole and Wey catchments, in the lower reaches of the Thames and in south 
London. As elsewhere in England and Wales, the institutional arrangements that have been in 
operation in the region were established in December of that year at the special MAFF 
conference convened in response to those floods. Essentially the detection and forecasting of 
floods has been carried out by the Environment Agency and its predecessors at varying levels 
of sophistication since 1968. Until 1974 this was undertaken in the Thames catchment by 
three different authorities, namely Thames Conservancy, Lee Conservancy and the Greater 
London Council (GLC). It was not until 1986 that this fragmented arrangement was 
addressed and the flood forecasting function for the entire Thames basin was integrated under 
one organisation, the Thames Water Authority. Since this time flood detection and 
forecasting has been operated for the catchment by the Thames Water Authority (until 1989), 
the National Rivers Authority (1989 to 1996) and now the Environment Agency. 
In general terms, flood warning notices were issued by the flood forecasting agency (in its 
various guises) to the police. Typically, the warning message provided details of the river 
catchment likely to be affected, the warning severity, the local authority area in which 
flooding may occur and the places in those areas that are particularly at risk. On receipt of a 
warning it had been custom and practice for the police to disseminate notices to their own 
staff, the relevant local authorities and other emergency services, and ultimately the general 
public at risk of flooding. In some areas however, the local authority carried out the role of 
public warning through the operation of flood warden schemes. Indeed, in the London 
catchments formerly administered by the GLC, the arrangements for warning dissemination 
were changed following flooding in 1977, with the riparian London Borough Councils taking 
on the police's role of public warning (Haggett, 198 1) (see Figure A3.1). The Thames Water 
Authority reversed this policy in 1986 however, following discussions with the Metropolitan 
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Police and the London Boroughs). From 1986 the Thames Water Authority issued direct 
warnings to just the 12 police forces in its area and relied totally on the police to onwardly 
transmit these messages to all other relevant organisations (see Figure 4.. 2, Chapter 4). 
Thames Water kept no record of the organisations that ultimately received its warnings from 
the police and considered that once the police had been notified its job was done. 
One of the inherent difficulties with these arrangements was that there was a communication 
chain over which no one authority had control or a responsibility to ensure operational 
effectiveness, and this inevitably provided opportunities for misinterpretation and delay. The 
unclear statutory position and confusion over roles and responsibilities added to the air of 
uncertainty. In an attempt to minimise the effects of these and other difficulties, the 
Environment Agency and its predecessors attempted to improve inter-agency liaison in the 
Thames Region over a number of years. This was tackled in two main ways: 
1. by holding annual seminars for police and local authorities to remind them of the 
flood warning arrangements in their local area 
2. by producing detailed flood warning procedures which set out why and how 
warnings are issued to organisations and the public. 
Although in general these initiatives assisted in the inter-agency liaison process, confusion 
still existed regarding public warning arrangements and concern over legal liability had 
become an increasingly important issue. In 1990 the National Rivers Authority attempted to 
clarify the roles and responsibilities of the key players in the Thames Region so as to allay 
confusion. The NRA's flood warning procedures were reformatted (NRA, 1990) to better 
present the arrangements and roles of all parties based on the understanding of the Authority. 
The NRA insisted that it was not attempting to impose duties on either the police or local 
authorities it was merely trying to better summarise arrangements based on existing practice. 
The NRA argued that as these arrangements had not been challenged in the past, it was 
reasonable for it to assume that they had the agreement of all concerned. The NRA circulated 
the revised procedures and gave notice that they would be discussed at their annual flood 
warning seminars during that year. 
A number of local authorities, at county and district level, and police forces reacted strongly 
to the NRA's initiative, especially in Hertfordshire and Berkshire. There were two main 
concerns articulated by Hertfordshire County Council in 1991; 
a) "that the document produced by the NRA lays down and implies duties and 
responsibilities upon the police and local authorities which have no statutory basis, 
and although they may previously have been assumed, their continued viability 
was open to question. " 
b) "that such a document with the profound legal, financial and resource implications 
implied to the parties mentioned within, should have been produced without the 
prior consent of the aforementioned parties. " The annually held flood warning 
seminars were considered to be an inappropriate forum for consulting on a 
document such as flood warning procedures. 
Several district councils wrote to the NRA in 1990/91 and challenged the right of the 
Authority to set out the roles and responsibilities of other agencies in their procedure 
document and questioned the legal basis on which this was undertaken. The NRA's assertion 
that it was articulating current practice was not excepted. It was felt that the arrangements 
agreed in 1968 were no longer valid and did not take into account the severe financial and 
resource restrictions now placed on local authorities and the increasing risk of litigation 
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following the "Cardiff Judgement". 
At this time there was an attempt at a national level to clarify the respective roles of the NRA 
and police. The Director of Operations of the NRA wrote to all chief constables in August 
1991 and stated that the role of the NRA was "to make forecasts, to advise, to monitor and to 
implement flood defence operational activities on the ground". The role of the police was "to 
disseminate warnings to the public on receipt of such advice from the NRA". Guidance was 
taken from the "Government Response to the Third Report of the Welsh Affairs Committee, 
Session 1989/90: The Breach of the Sea Defences of 26/27 February along the North Wales 
coast". The chief constables were given the opportunity to give their response to these 
definitions. 
Following a period of protracted discussion between a number of police forces, local 
authorities and the NRA at a regional and national level, several authorities gave notice that 
they would be raising the issue with the relevant govemment departments. They generally 
felt that they were unable to resolve the matter with the NRA to their satisfaction. The NRA 
maintained that it had a responsibility to help clarify arrangements and ensure that the whole 
flood waming dissemination process worked properly. If, however, local authorities wished 
to challenge current practices due to resource constraints, then the NRA made it clear that it 
would encourage govemment intervention to resolve the issue. A number of authorities, 
notably Hertfordshire County Council, subsequently pressed the Govemment for a resolution 
of this matter which in tum gave weight to the establishment of the MAFF working group to 
re-examine the whole question of flood waming dissemination in England and Wales. 
The institutional arrangements post September 1996 
In 1993, the Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food (MAFF) identified a number of 
difficulties with the existing arrangements for disseminating flood wamings. The four main 
areas of concern were; 
1. resourcing difficulties for the police and some local authorities lead in some cases to a 
desire to reduce involvement in the transmission of flood warnings 
2. a realisation that the general public was confused about the roles and responsibilities 
of the various bodies involved and that they generally had a low level of awareness of 
flood risks 
some evidence that development in flood plains is exacerbating storm water run-off 
thus increasing the need for accurate and timely river flood warnings 
4. evidence that in a significant number of cases flood warnings can fail to reach those 
for whom they are intended, suggesting that new technologies and new methods of 
dissemination need to be explored. 
In an attempt to address these issues and review the operation of the present arrangements, 
MAFF convened a national working group, known as the Flood Warning Procedures Group 
(FWPG)- A number of organisations were represented including, the Welsh Office, the Home 
Office, the NRA, the police and each of the local authority's national associations. The 
FWPG was tasked primarily with considering ways in which the dissemination of warnings 
could be improved. It was judged that this could be achieved by; clarifying roles and 
responsibilities, simplifying the chain of communication, and through the use of technology. 
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The key recommendations of this Group affecting institutional and legal arrangements are set 
out below, along with an assessment of their likely impact on future integration of flood 
warning systems, and where further work is needed. 
Designation of a lead agency 
One of the first conclusions made by the FWPG was that one agency should take the lead role 
in relation to flood warning arrangements. This recommendation is likely to have a positive 
effect on integration in that one agency will be able to co-ordinate planning and management 
activities across the function and with all involved parties. However, the Group experienced 
some difficulty in agreeing which agency should take on this role. The unclear statutory 
framework, the vulnerability to litigation and the economic cost all mitigated against an early 
decision on this matter. Nevertheless, a revised national system was proposed and the newly 
formed Environment Agency was given the lead role (see Figure 4.3, Chapter 4). This was 
felt to be a sensible arrangement as the Agency already had a general supervisory duty for all 
matters relating to flood defence in England and Wales. Its powers were considered to be 
flexible under present legislation and could be used in ways that would suit local 
circumstances and had the potential to fit in with contingency plans worked out with local 
authorities, the police and others. It should be noted however, that the Agency was not 
provided with additional financial resources to carry out this role and had to re-prioritise its 
existing flood defence programme to enable these arrangements to be implemented. It could 
be argued that the Agency's senior management was not fully briefed as to the potential risks 
of taking on such a role without adequate resources. These risks were fully exposed during 
the Easter 1998 floods. 
Changes to legal arrangements 
It was judged by MAFF that the proposed arrangements would not require a change to 
primary legislation and that this could be formalised by means of a direction from Ministers. 
Accordingly, in 1996 the NRA was issued with a Ministerial Direction by MAFF and the 
Welsh Office under Section 5 of the Water Resources Act 1991. The Direction instructs the 
NRA and now the Environment Agency to exercise its permissive powers in relation to flood 
warning provision without placing a specific duty on the Agency. Specifically, the Direction 
requires the Agency to maintain records in writing of the arrangements by which flood 
warriings are disseminated and for these records to be drafted in consultation with local 
authorities and the emergency services. It also requires the Agency to take steps as appear 
"reasonable and practicable" to provide flood warnings in accordance with the written plans. 
The Direction has been given however, within the context of the existing institutional 
arrangements and, as has been discussed in Chapter 4, these are seriously fragmented in a 
number of areas. There has been no attempt to fundamentally change these arrangements to 
minimise fragmentation and facilitate integration. 
Nevertheless, the Ministerial Direction is likely to have a positive influence on integration but 
this must be tempered by the contextual situation in which it has been issued. Although 
statutory duties are not conferred on any Organisation however, the Direction does attempt to 
clarify the role and responsibilities of the lead agency and by doing so gives that agency a 
greater degree of legitimisation with the other authorities involved in the process. An 
obligation is also placed on the Environment Agency to clarify the roles and responsibilities 
Of other organisations in a written plan, which in practice may be difficult to achieve. The 
Agency can only accomplish this through negotiation, a process its predecessor authorities 
have attempted in the past with mixed success. Although the Agency will have the final say 
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in relation to the content of the plan, it will not have the light to impose any duties on other 
organisations who will be working to their own operational agendas. To help facilitate inter- 
agency liaison the FWPG drafted "Circulars of Understanding" that have been forwarded to 
each local authority and police force in England and Wales. The Circulars attempt to clarify 
the principles of the new working arrangements as agreed and recommended by the FW`PG 
and set out the roles and responsibilities of the key players. It remains to be seen, therefore, 
how individual organisations; will react to these arrangements and whether they will have the 
anticipated positive influence on integration. 
Institutional liaison 
As was mentioned in Chapter two, to encourage the likelihood of integration and co- 
operation between organisations, it is important to have in place processes and mechanisms 
to facilitate bargaining, negotiating and mediating. Inter-organisational liaison groups have 
often been lacking in the flood warning field with the result that organisations have not been 
fully aware of the actions of others which can lead to misunderstanding and suspicion. With 
this in mind, the FWPG reached agreement on the respective roles of the Agency, police and 
local authorities and circulars were issued by the Association of Chief Police Officers and by 
the Local Government Association in 1996 containing the following working arrangements: 
1. The Agency will in partnership with the police and local authorities ensure plans 
are in place to disseminate flood warning messages to the public, businesses and 
other statutory bodies and will take the lead role in arranging for the 
dissemination to take place. 
2. The police and local authorities will, in consultation with the Agency at local 
level, ensure plans are in place to respond when flooding occurs in known flood 
risk locations. 
3. Proposals will not affect the arrangements that currently exist for taking action 
when flooding occurs. The police and local authorities will continue to exercise 
their existing role as explained in the Home Office publication "Dealing with 
Disaster". 
4. Adopt the agreed framework that reiterates the need for police and local authority 
involvement in flood warning dissemination where there is a pressing locally 
agreed need to do so. 
The Home Office publication, Dealing with Disaster (Home Office, 1997), embodies the 
current government guidance on disaster response. It advocates an integrated approach to 
planning and management of major incidents in which, without rigid prescription of specific 
roles, the relevant institutions can plan and act together. A flexible use of all available 
resources is encouraged with effective pre-planning and clear command and control 
throughout a major incident. In outline every organisation, including the utilities, British 
Waterways, and the media, is responsible for preparing effective plans for responding to 
disasters within the limits of its own responsibilities and resources. The arrangements 
described in this document and the agreements referred to above, comprise the framework in 
which organisations are supposed to operate during floods. 
The success of any nationally agreed procedure lies in its perception and implementation at 
the local level. The requirement to have written flood warning plans in place will encourage 
organisations, to consult and liaise in a more formal manner and this will be bolstered by the 
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establishment of consultative fora for each county and metropolitan area in England and 
Wales for this purpose. The Environment Agency has actively set out how it expects to 
approach this issue through the establishment of Flood Warning Planning Groups. It has 
issued instructions to each of its regions to ensure that all local authorities and emergency 
services are invited to attend these groups and are actively encouraged to attend. A 
standardised list of other operational organisations has been drawn-up and it is a requirement 
that these authorities are also invited to the planning groups. Because the number of 
organisations that have a role to play in flood warning activities is so large and arrangements 
are so fragmented, it places a significant demand on those within the Agency tasked to 
undertake liaison work. A more integrated institutional system would place fewer demands 
on the lead agency and would be significantly easier to administer. 
Nevertheless, these new liaison arrangements are likely to be beneficial to integration. 
Success is dependent however, on the co-operation of the agencies involved and recognition 
and acceptance of the Environment Agency's lead role, particularly at the local level. 
Difficulties may arise when the Agency attempts to clarify the roles and responsibilities of 
the individual organisations involved in flood warning dissemination. Different authorities 
will almost inevitably have objectives which conflict with those of the Agency and it is 
important that a balance is struck between obtaining clarity of objectives and building in 
flexibility. Some organisations, for instance, may not place particular priority on fluvial 
flooding alongside other potential emergencies. It is not desirable to unreasonably constrain 
organisations and some carefal generalisation in objectives may be needed to resolve this 
issue. The danger here is that if flexibility and generalisation are taken too far then plans 
become ineffective and confusion and misunderstanding will remain. 
Political commitment and organisational climate 
For an integrated approach to succeed there needs to be a strong political commitment to the 
policy, backed-up by the instillation of a positive climate and culture within the organisations 
directly involved in its implementation. It is true to say that previous attempts to introduce a 
More integrated approach to flood warning, instigated by the National Rivers Authority, have 
suffered from a lack of such commitment and a rather parochial attitude by other 
organisations. 
The difference with the new arrangements is that on this occasion the pressure for change has 
come from a government department. Indeed, MAFF have elevated the provision of 
"adequate and cost-effective flood warning systems" to the highest priority (MAFF, 1993). It 
has indicated that this project should be funded before other flood defence work and has 
agreed to grant-aid a significant amount of the expenditure at a special rate of 50% for a 
limited period. The test will be whether this degree of commitment will continue in the 
longer term, The relationship and degree of influence that MAFF has with other organisations 
involved in the response to flooding however, is particularly diffuse. The commitment of 
other key government departments to a policy of integration in flood response is not so 
resolute and this will influence the reaction of organisations such as the police and local 
authorities to such a policy, 
With regard to organisational climate and culture, the degree of dedication shows signs of 
variation. Both MAFF and senior management in the Environment Agency have given firm 
backing to the introduction of an integrated flood warning system in England and Wales and 
have sent positive signals to those within the organisation responsible for its implementation. 
A national project group has been instigated and a national project manager appointed to 
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oversee implementation and ensure consistency between the eight regions. This is to be 
further supported by the establishment of a National Flood Warning Centre by the Agency in 
2000. 
In other organisations a rather less positive climate is common. This situation is not helped 
by the fact that MAFF, despite its many pronouncements for the need for integration, has 
very little influence with these organisations to deliver such a policy. This is illustrated by the 
fact that the police are actively trying to disengage themselves from the responsibilities of 
flood warning dissemination and are looking to off-load as many activities as possible to the 
Environment Agency. Surrey police for instance, gave notice that they wished to withdraw 
from all flood warning dissemination activities, including warning their own police stations! 
They reconsidered this position after discussions with the Environment Agency and 
subsequently fell in line with national agreements. In general, the local authorities have a 
more positive approach to the new arrangements. Concern over legal liability, which is still 
upper-most in the minds of the police, has lessened in the local authorities. There is almost a 
sense of relief that the Environment Agency is taking the lead role and by implication putting 
itself in the front line with regard to legal liability. The local authorities seem to be more 
comfortable in a supporting role and are generally approaching this position in a positive 
way. Many county councils for instance are co-ordinating liaison with the district councils 
and actively helping the Agency in the drawing up of flood warning plans. 
Implications for legal liability 
As discussed above and in Chapter 4, concern over the question of organisational liability has 
hindered inter-agency co-operation in recent years and ultimately the furtherance of 
integration. To minimise the effects of perceived liability on integration it is important that 
the organisations involved clarify their position and tailor their policies accordingly. 
Following the issuance of the Ministerial Direction, the Environment Agency has sought 
legal opinion on the question of liability, the main conclusions of which are likely to be 
relevant to other organisations involved in the process (Environment Agency, 1996c); 
1. there is a judicial reluctance to impose a common law duty of care on an authority 
exercising a statutory discretion. 
2. the Agency has the power to provide and operate flood warning systems and general 
powers to do anything that in its opinion may facilitate carrying out its flood defence 
functions. Because of the general nature of these powers it is hard to envisage 
circumstances in which a successful challenge would be made if the Agency failed to 
forecast or disseminate flood warnings, unless it could be proved that it had acted in a 
negligent manner. 
only in exceptional circumstances where particular arrangements have been 
established and a particular relationship exists between the Agency and a member of 
the public in relation to flood warnings, may a duty of care be found to exist. It is 
unlikely that giving broadcast warnings or warnings over a loud hailer or public 
address system or siren warnings would be enough to establish such a relationship. 
However, direct dial telephoning and any direct contact (such as knocking on peoples 
doors) may be enough to establish a duty of care, particularly in areas of repeated 
flooding where a pattern of such direct contact has been established 
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4. the Ministerial Direction does not give rise to a cause of action where one would not 
otherwise have existed. The most that it could do would be to colour the approach 
that a court might take on whether a common law duty of care existed and whether 
there had been negligence. However the requirement to provide warning of the danger 
of flooding is in such general terms that in practice it is difficult to see how it could 
have this effect. 
the Direction covers three matters - the maintenance of records of the arrangements 
for flood warnings, consultation on proposed arrangements with emergency services 
and local authorities, and the Agency's duty to take steps to provide warnings in 
accordance with these arrangements. No requirement is imposed as to what the 
arrangements should include, and there is no requirement to make arrangements 
which are not reasonable and practicable and resource limitations would be material 
in this respect. The form and content of the records is a matter for the Agency and 
there is no requirement that the arrangements should be consistent across the country 
nor that there should be a warning prediction capability of uniform standard in all 
areas. In all these respects the Agency has a discretion. 
The Enviromnent Agency has acknowledged the risks identified above and has decided to 
pursue its current policy of providing an enhanced flood warning service from September 
1996. Other authorities have also sought legal opinion on this issue and their response is 
varied. There is still a general nervousness with respect to legal liability and this is motivating 
the police in particular to distance themselves from public warning arrangements. However, 
many police forces and local authorities believe they have a moral duty to assist the public in 
times of flood and judge that in-action in such circumstances could be as, or even more 
litigious than action that is ruled to have failed in some way. Norfolk Police for instance have 
decided to continue to offer a public warning service on receipt of RED flood wamings from 
the Agency, and will disseminate warnings to local authorities and utilities as before. It is 
also clear that the Environment Agency's new role will go someway to reduce their fears of 
legal liability and thereby ease the process of integration. 
Implementation of the new arrangements in the Thames Region 
The implementation of the new arrangements began in October 1995 with initial discussions 
with the police and local authorities (see Figure A3.2). Some difficulty was experienced in 
getting the police to formulate a clear policy with respect to flood warning. It was clear that 
this issue was not a high priority especially with their senior management and with a number 
of forces it took several attempts before a policy statement could be obtained. It also proved 
difficult to acquire specific written details of the current warning arrangements from each of 
the 13 forces in the Thames catchment. Some forces stated that they did not issue public 
warnings even though police involvement in previous flood events was well documented, 
Others indicated that ad-hoc warning arrangements were in existence but they were unable to 
Supply specific details of properties warned. When particulars were forthcoming and 
subsequently checked many of the contact details were out-of-date and a number of recipients 
indicated that they rarely received warnings if at all. In general therefore, the police seemed 
keen to pass warning responsibilities to the Environment Agency but were unable or 
unwilling to supply sufficient information to make this transfer easy. This underlined the 
poor state of public warning arrangements in the Thames Region. 
The local authorities on the other hand are more positive and willing to work in close liaison 
with the Agency to make the new arrangements work effectively. The county councils, 
Possibly keen to establish a role in the process, have helped co-ordinate liaison with the 
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district and borough councils. This generally worked well but with two notable exceptions. In 
Berkshire, the move towards unitary status for the districts meant that the county council had 
lost its authority and the previously close relationship had become strained. With the 
abolition of Berkshire County Council, liaison activities across the County are now co- 
ordinated by a lead district council. In London, the already unitary London Boroughs value 
their independence and resent any interference with their affairs. So when the London Fire 
and Civil Defence Authority (LFCDA), again seeking a role, volunteered to assist the 
Environment Agency with liaison it was met with some hostility from the boroughs and was 
not pursued and a possible process for organisational integration was lost. The London 
Boroughs have arranged themselves into 5 emergency planning groups that now form the 
basis for liaison on flood waming matters with the Agency. This is in contrast to other 
counties where a single flood waming planning group has been established. 
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Figure AM: Non-tidal flood warning arrangements for the London Excluded Area 
(after Haggett, 1981). 
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Appendix 4: Flood duty officer questionnaire 
Name: ................................................................................................... 
Age: 20-25....., 25-30....., 30-35....., 3540....., 40-45....., 45-50....., 50+..... 
What is the best method for minimising possible inconsistencies between the service 
offered by individual flood duty staff? Please rank these options. 
1. Regular informal meetings to discuss issues 
2. Formal training sessions 
3. Multi-agency exercises 
4. Use of expert systems 
5. Better understanding of the needs of warning recipients 
6. Standardised actions formally written down 
7. Consistent instruction 
8. Work shadowing with other duty officers to understand how they act in given 
situations 
9. Other - please specify ................................................................... 
Rank: 
As a duty officer you may be presented with information in which you may have low 
confidence (e. g. an extreme rainfall measurement/forecast or rapidly rising river level at 
just one station). In this situation do you: 
1. Dismiss the information as being wrong or incorrect and take no further action. 
2. Act immediately on the information presented, despite its uncertainty, to ensure the 
issue of a timely warning 
3. Delay action until the situation becomes clearer 
4. Proactively seek confirmation from another source and only act when you are 
certain 





Your intuition as a duty officer may be at odds with the environmental Information that 
is being presented to you via the detection system. It might not "feel right". In these 
circumstances do you: 
I. Dismiss your feelings and only act on the factual information presented to you 
2. Go with your intuition and reject the information presented to you and take no 
further action 
3. Delay action until the situation becomes clearer and you are more certain (wait 
until you see "the whites of its eyes"! ) 
4. Proactively seek confirmation from another source and only act when you get 
confin-nation 
5. Other - please specify ................................................................... 
Answer: 
................................................... 
You are in a situation where a colleague considers that your interpretation of events Is 
incorrect and suggests a different course of action than you were going to take. Do you: 
I. Ignore what you colleague says and stick to what you think is the right course of 
action. 
2. Bow to your colleagues better judgement and follow his/her advice 
3. Seek the advice of a third party 
4. Other - please specify ................................................................... 




When you are considering issuing a flood warning what is uppermost in your mind: 
I. Getting the warning out in time 
2. Getting the location (reach) of the warning correct 
3. Concern about issuing a false warning/ your future credibility 
4. Ensuring that the warning gets to the public at risk 
5. Ensuring that the warning recipients understand the message and act appropriately 
6. Other - please specify ................................................................... 
.......... I ................................................. .... I ........ I .................. 
................................ I ...................................................... 
Answer: 
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Do you think the format of flood warning messages sent to the public and response 
agencies should be: 
1. Standardised. for all recipients to ensure consistency and ease of delivery 
2. Variable and tailored to reflect the range of different audiences and community 
groups 
3. Other - please specify ................................................................... 
Answer: ................................................... 
What information do you think the public most wants in a flood warning message? 
I. Time of the onset of flooding 
2. How long will the flooding last 
3. Information on what to do 
4. How severe will the flooding be 
5. The depth of flooding 
6. Where can they get sandbags 
7. How long will flooding last 
8. Is this warning real 
9. Is evacuation necessary 
10. Where to go for help 
Please rank the options: 
Rank: 
Which approach to public warning are you most comfortable with? 
A technology-based warning dissemination system capable of relaying consistent, 
pre-recorded and standardised messages, with a monitoring system capable of 
recording when messages where issued, to whom and whether they were received 
or not. 
2. A community-based warning dissemination system that is reliant on local pcople 
passing on verbal warnings to their neighbours and friends, with a monitoring 
system dependent on feedback from the community. 
Answer 
............................................................ 
Thank you for you co-opcration. 
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